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WAR AND THE CITY:

THE EFFECTS OF ARMED CONFLICTS ON URBAN SPACE AND POPULATION

48TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MILITARY HISTORY
3-8 SEPTEMBER 2023 / İSTANBUL, TÜRKİYE

Volume I

“WAR AND THE CITY”

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TURKISH NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
FATİH INSTITUTE OF MILITARY HISTORY STUDIES

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Editors

**Bünyamin KOCAOĞLU
Gültekin YILDIZ
Ahmet TAŞDEMİR**

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PREFACE

As the Turkish Commission of Military History and the Turkish National Defense University, we were honored to host the 48th International Congress of the International Commission of Military History in İstanbul between 3-8 September 2023. This congress had historical importance for us as it coincided with the centenary of the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye. With 140 participants from 29 countries, the congress featured an extensive academic program organized into 14 parallel sessions over four days. 53 scholars presented their research, contributing to a vibrant exchange of ideas. Beyond the academic sessions, a rich cultural program provided participants with the opportunity to experience İstanbul's unique historical and cultural heritage, a city that has long been a crossroads of civilizations and the capital of empires.

The congress's theme, "War and the City: The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Urban Space and Population" addressed the evolving relationship between warfare and urban environments. Historically, this relationship was characterized by gradual change, but the 19th century witnessed a marked acceleration in transformation due to the increasing complexity of warfare. Technological advancements played a pivotal role in this evolution. Lind's four-generation framework for understanding warfare is instrumental in contextualizing and analyzing these changes. The first generation, characterized by ancient battles with basic military equipment and tactics, had limited impact on civilians and cities. The second generation, with innovations such as new weapons and compulsory military service, saw increased effects on urban spaces and populations, lasting until WWII. The third and fourth generations, representing modern warfare, emerged during WWII. The advent of air power extended the battlefield beyond traditional front lines, significantly increasing the impact on civilians and urban areas. Cities and their inhabitants became direct military targets to undermine enemy morale and disrupt tactics. Unconventional tactics, including terrorism and proxy wars, further blurred lines between civilians and combatants, highlighting the profound and lasting effects of armed conflicts on urban areas. These developments underscore the profound and lasting effects of armed conflicts on urban spaces and populations.

With the papers presented at the congress, we had the opportunity to explore various issues and periods of warfare outlined above. The current book contains the final versions of the 46 submitted articles, encompassing various periods and geographies. Different viewpoints and interpretations on the effects of wars on urban space are presented in two volumes. The articles, organized thematically and chronologically, offer a comprehensive

examination of the interaction between military history and society. The first volume addresses this interaction until World War II, while the second volume details the effects of various conflicts from the Cold War to contemporary times. In order to save space, the bibliographies at the end of the articles have been removed during the editorial process if the articles contain footnotes. Only articles without footnotes have retained their bibliographies. We hope these volumes serve as a valuable resource that reflects the impact of wars on urban spaces and contributes meaningfully to the field of military history studies.

We would like to express our sincere thanks to Prof. Dr. Erhan Afyoncu, Rector of the Turkish National Defense University, for his support and patronage. We also wish to express our deepest thanks to the dedicated personnel of the Fatih Institute of Military History Studies for their significant contributions throughout the entire process. We are grateful to the esteemed participants from around the world. Their valuable insights and contributions not only enriched the congress but also played a crucial role in the successful compilation and publication of this volume.

Our official response regarding the participation of the Greek Cypriot Commission:

We faced with an unfortunate situation during the congress on participation of the Greek Cypriot Commission. We have noted the concerns raised and would like to address these points with the utmost respect for the principles that guide our organization. As you are aware, the situation involving the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus has long been a sensitive issue for Türkiye. Since the acceptance of Southern part of Cyprus into the ICMH in 2005, we have expressed our notes about its representation of the entire island. Our concerns were based on the potential complications that might arise in future events, particularly when Türkiye is the host nation. However, this decision was made despite our objections. Unfortunately, our predictions have come to fruition.

During the organization of this congress, the Turkish Commission of Military History made significant efforts to find a solution that would allow for the participation of the Greek Cypriot delegation. We proposed to the ICMH board that accommodation and academic sessions be arranged in a private hotel, enabling participation on an individual basis. This proposal was made in good faith, with the intent of ensuring inclusivity while respecting our national regulations. We planned the entire process based on this and conducted our discussions and presentations within this framework. However, due to financial concerns regarding the costs of private hotel accommodations, which were raised by the board, it was decided to held the congress at the

official campus of Turkish National Defence University, a venue under the jurisdiction of Turkish Ministry of National Defence. As Türkiye does not officially recognize the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus, our Ministry's regulations prevent representatives of this administration from participating in events held at official state facilities. This decision is not a reflection of any personal or academic stance but rather a necessary compliance with our national laws and policies.

We fully understand and appreciate the importance of maintaining the apolitical and non-governmental nature of the ICMH, as outlined in the statutes. However, it is important to note that national commissions, including our own, are directly affiliated with their respective defense ministries or general staffs. This connection means that certain constraints are unavoidable when organizing such events. This reflects the Turkish perspective on the matter. This is fundamentally a matter between states. As we are organizing this event with the support of our government, we are obliged to adhere to our national regulations.

ADDRESS OF THE RECTOR OF TURKISH NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

Prof. Dr. Erhan AFYONCU

Distinguished Participants,

Welcome to the 48th Congress of the International Commission of Military History. In this Congress, 51 speakers from 24 national commissions will make presentations under the main theme of “War and the City: The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Urban Space and Population”. 140 esteemed guests from 30 different countries will attend the Congress. As the Turkish National Defence University, we are pleased to host this distinguished group in our country and in our university. I would also like to add that, as a historian and an academic, it is a great pleasure for me to address my civilian and military colleagues like you.

As you probably know, we are commemorating the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye. In the aftermath of the First World War, which was the first global conflict affecting the whole world, especially Europe and Asia, the lands of the Ottoman Empire were occupied by the imperialist states. İstanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire and a certain part of Anatolia were under the enemy occupation starting from 1919. During this time, our nation was subjected to great suffering and great cruelty. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the Turkish Independence Movement and the founder of the Republic of Türkiye, the War of Independence started and it liberated Anatolia and İstanbul from the enemy occupation within three years. Immediately afterwards, the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye was announced to the world on 29 October 1923. We are very happy to host you and this significant event in our country on the centennial of the Republic of Türkiye, which is the last link of the 1000 years of Turkish domination in Anatolia. During this important one-week-long scientific event, you will listen to many presentations on the relationship between the war and the city, while you will also witness the natural and historical heritage of İstanbul, one of the most beautiful cities in the world, as well as the traditional Turkish hospitality. I greet you with respect and friendship, and as the Rector of the Turkish National Defence University, I would like to welcome you all once again.

INAUGURAL SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF MILITARY HISTORY

Prof. Dr. Massimo DE LEONARDIS

Ladies and Gentlemen, Mesdames et Messieurs, Bayanlar ve Baylar, My speech is divided in two parts. Unfortunately, the first one recalls an unhappy situation. In this respect, I have to read the statement approved by the Full Board of ICMH last 17th of August.

«This Congress in Istanbul meets under negative and unprecedented circumstances. One National Commission in good standing is not allowed to participate. This violates Article 8. *Rights and duties* of ICMH Statutes, which states:

« a. National Commissions of the ICMH are entitled to:

-Take part in the ICMH International Congresses as well as in the work of the Specialised Committees; [...]

b. National Commissions of the ICMH are required to:

-Comply with the Statutes of the ICMH; [...] ».

This very unfortunate situation is the result of opposed and subsequent positions taken by the Turkish hosting Commission. Last year in Wrocław, answering a specific question during the meeting of the ExBoard, the leaders of the Turkish Commission of Military History assured that the participation of the Cypriot Commission would create no problem. Only at the end of May this year, during the meeting of the ExBoard in Istanbul, the leaders of the Turkish Commission informed us that, according to their State's regulations, no person holding a Cypriot passport is allowed to cross the Turkish border, since the Republic of Türkiye does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, and that moreover there are no possibilities of the Cypriots being able to participate in the congress since its venue is a military installation. Any effort on our part to find a mutually acceptable solution was rejected.

ICMH does not express any opinion on the political issue of Cyprus; we are prevented from doing so by Article 1 of our Statutes which defines the non-governmental and not political character of our organization. However, we certainly regret that political considerations are prevailing over academic ones, configuring another violation of our Statutes.

Given the very late communication by the hosting Commission it was hardly feasible to cancel the Congress, adding further damage particularly to

those who had already registered. However, several National Commissions have decided to not participate or to downgrade the level of their participation. We express our strong solidarity to the Commission of Military History of the Republic of Cyprus.

A Congress goes through three phases: preparation, unfolding, accomplishments after the Congress, as the publication of the Acta. We are committed to collaborate to a profitable execution of the academic programme. The Full Board continues to keep under consideration the general situation, ready to take, if necessary, further decisions ».

As also decided by the Full Board I have to read a Statement by the President of the Cypriot Commission:

« It is with disappointment that we are not able to participate at the XLVIII Congress taking place in Istanbul. I refer of course to the decision of the Turkish Commission of Military History not to accept the Republic of Cyprus Delegation to the works of the International Commission of Military History. I am afraid such a refusal to accept a member state to the works of an international event of the ICMH constitutes “*a serious violation of [the ICMH’s] Statutes*”. From the beginning of the Turkish objections, at the end of May this year, despite their previous assurances that our participation would create no problem, and until the beginning of August, when a final decision not to allow our participation, the Cyprus Commission expressed every willingness to find a mutually acceptable solution; we also made ourselves available to the President of the ICMH, who carried trilateral consultations with Turkey in good faith, seeking a resolution in an amicable manner; most regrettably, his good offices mission and all his efforts were also rejected.

Let me confirm again, here, that if we did actually participate at our Congress here in Istanbul, this would not be the first time any holder of a Republic of Cyprus-European passport visited Turkey; as a matter of fact, Cypriots have always been able to join conferences or other international events hosted by Turkey.

Furthermore, please let me express my deepest regrets for the different pretexts the leaders of the Turkish Commission used against a member of the ICMH in good standing.

Most unfortunately, it seems that political considerations prevailed over academic ones and this should have never been the case.

Finally, at the same time, I should like to express my gratitude to you all, the Full Board, and to all the Presidents and the Members of the National Commissions, who expressed their objections to such pretexts, and for the principled stance taken, and for their strong solidarity, supporting a member of the ICMH. Thank you all, again! »

I now move to a more traditional part of my speech. For the International Commission of Military History, the Congress is the culminating event, which since 1973 is organized every year, featuring six days full of activities: scientific sessions, PhD candidates' panel, cultural visits, social events, in general a forum for worldwide exchanges of ideas. It is a unique and remarkable opportunity offered to the community of military historians. Just to strengthen our sense of community, two years ago we introduced a nice ICMH pin in silver, produced in Cyprus, since Col. Fournaris proposed the idea. Only delegates who have not yet received it previously are invited to collect one pin at the Secretariat desk.

This year we are in Istanbul, the most famous metropolis, albeit not the capital, of the Republic of Türkiye, which just this year celebrates the centennial of its foundation. Actually, while geographically it spans over two continents, the history of Istanbul stretches over more than two millennia and half. Born as Byzántion, from the fourth century before Christ it was known as Constantinople and in 1930 received the official name of Istanbul. It is one of the towns in the world which can be described as an "Imperial city" and was a crossroad of cultures. Coming or returning here (for me it is the fifth time) is in itself a fascinating experience.

Our Congress takes place in an environment which perfectly reflects the identity of the International Commission of Military History, combining culture with military ethos. We are hosted in the impressive campus of the Milli Savunma Üniversitesi, the National Defence University of Türkiye, founded in July 2016. Among its colleges there is the Fatih Institute of Military History Studies.

Thirty years ago, ICMH already held in Türkiye its nineteenth Congress from 17th to 24th August 1993; some people who are here today were already there. The topic at that time was *The Study of the Period between the First and Second World War 1918-1939 from a Viewpoint of Military History*.

In agreement with the ICMH's governing bodies, the Turkish Commission of Military History selected an original and intriguing General Theme: *War and the City: The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Urban Space and Population*. Well thought sub-topics include the following:

- War and the City in the Ancient Ages
- Technologies and Tactics in Siege Battles During the Middle Ages and Early Modern Period
- Battles in the Residential Areas and Their Effects on the City During Modern Industrial War Period
- The Impact of Air Bombardments Over the Cities

-Civil Wars, Revolutions and Urban Warfare

55 scholars, including PhD candidates, from 24 countries will present papers.

I said that the General Theme is original; however, in recent years it drew increasing attention. The publisher Brill, which has an institutional link with the International Commission of Military History through the *International Journal of Military History and Historiography*, in 2020 published a collection of essays titled *War and the City. The Urban Context of Conflict and Mass Destruction*. In the same year, Mary Kaldor and Saskia Sassen published *Cities at War: Global Insecurity and Urban Resistance*, with the Columbia University Press. Previously, in 1991 Gregory J. Asworth published a book just titled *War and City*.

In Military History we can find two conflicts named “War of the Cities”. The first began as a war between the Swabian League of Cities and the Bavarian dukes in 1387–1389. It evolved into a war of influence between the nobility and free cities.

During the Iran–Iraq War an operation from 1984 to 1988 included five series of air raids, missile attacks and artillery shellings on major cities and urban areas initiated by Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Air Force, with the aim of disrupting the morale of Iran. The first phase of air strikes was followed by retaliation by the Iranian Armed Forces. Iraq attacked major cities in the western half of Iran, including Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan and Shiraz, in addition to attacks to Iranian towns and cities close to the front. Iran’s retaliations targeted mostly Baghdad, Kirkuk and Basra.

To Frederick II King of Prussia is attributed this sentence: «The subjects must not notice when the Sovereign wages war». It was the epoch of professional armies and limited wars; the enemy had to be brought to surrender without totally crushing him, since today’s adversary might be tomorrow’s ally. Unfortunately, since the XX century civilian populations suffer every kind of damages. Aerial bombardments of cities were a major feature of the Second World War. Today, combats often take place inside the cities. Stephen Graham in his article *War and the city* just writes: «Western military strategy was long premised on the avoidance of urban combat, with air strikes the preferred method of subduing large conurbations. Cities were seen as targets, not battlefields. But today, the cityscapes of the global South have emerged as paradigmatic conflict zones».

Already during the Second World War, streets of exact-replica Berlin tenements were created at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, designed by the exiled German architect Eric Mendelsohn. Today this kind of training ground is used by the American and Israeli armies.

I conclude with a quote from the page “War in Cities” of the International Committee of the Red Cross: «It’s heartbreaking to watch a city you love die. Yet that is exactly what happens when armed conflicts are fought in the middle of cities, endangering the lives of civilians and the infrastructure they depend on. The humanitarian consequences of urban warfare persist years, and even decades, after the fighting ends».

Ladies and Gentlemen, Mesdames et Messieurs, Bayanlar ve Baylar, many thanks for your attention, merci pour votre attention, ilginiz için teşekkürler.

KEYNOTE SPEECH: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN URBAN WARFARE

Prof. Dr. Gültekin YILDIZ (Türkiye)

As the Turkish National Commission, we offered the International Commission this theme of “War and the City: The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Urban Space and Population”. Why? Because many of us are historians, civil or military, we all know that historians and people remember something in a state of danger or emergency. Now, our cities and our urban spaces all around the world are at risk of war. We live in Türkiye, and, in our country’s north, we now have a war. We have been witnessing the Russian occupation of Ukraine for the last year. In the south, there are civil wars in Syria and Iraq. Like World War I and II, we have witnessed the destruction of cities and towns and the transfer of wars and armed conflict into urban areas, unfortunately. So therefore, in this congress, we have preferred to discuss with you the effects of the war and armed conflict in previous wars and recently on the urban areas, what lessons we can take from history regarding this issue, and what our future will look like if these armed conflicts will continue and threaten the cities and towns all around the world. Now, we have two types of threats to the cities. The first one is terrorist attacks, and this has been especially visible since the 2001 New York terrorist attacks. But now, in many metropolises of the world, we see terrorist attacks happening twice or sometimes more a year, as we also witnessed some in Istanbul in Türkiye. Also, in Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia, terrorist attacks and terrorist groups continue to threaten urban areas and urban populations. On the other hand, since the Siege of Sarajevo in the early 1990s, we have entered another phase of urban warfare in world military history. And now, in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and many other countries, we are actually witnessing the return of urban guerilla or so-called urban guerilla and urban warfare.

Now, these issues are discussed and evaluated in the military literature, especially in the army military doctrine literature. What are the continuities and changes in this perspective? As the professor said in his speech, cities and towns have always been targets for hostile groups. In ancient times, in the mediaeval age and early modern age, we have always seen cities and towns threatened by another rival political group or state, as happened in Istanbul. As you know, in Byzantine times, Istanbul (Constantinople) was also sieged many times before the Ottoman conquest. In addition, in feudal principalities and mediaeval political structures in Europe, many political contests threatened the cities. The term “burg” is used as the names of cities

in European languages. The word “burg” originates, as you know, from the Arabic word “burç,” so the cities and towns also synchronically mean fortification.

“War and the City” actually means “War and the Peace” because cities, towns, and urban areas ideally represent public salute, prosperity, and peace. However, cities and towns are also targets of armed conflicts because they are the centers of political power and wealth. However, till the use of high-tech artillery in the early modern period, towns and cities succeeded in defending themselves, so the battles and wars remained more in the rural areas. During the 19th century and with the technological developments in long-range artillery, not with missiles but with the first army and naval long-range artillery, cities and towns felt themselves no more secure. As military historians, we observe the destruction of many cities and towns at the beginning of the 19th century. However, most examples come from the beginning of the 20th century. Although the First Great War was the milestone for this kind of artillery war, the Second Great War, in fact, was the turning point in urban warfare. Now, what we witness in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and especially in the Ukrainian combat environment is, in a way, the return of urban warfare from the Second Great War. However, the situation has changed a little bit. Technology, especially air warfare technology, has drastically changed. In addition, we also witness the return of the strategic bombardment, a doctrine from the First Great War but used much more in the Second Great War. Many papers we will listen to in this congress belong to this period, that is, the destruction of European cities with air bombardments.

Now, in Mosul, Idlib, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, we witness the destruction of the cities and urban areas in the same manner with a strategic objective of destroying the will of the resistance of the hostile nation or country. So, suppose military technology continues to develop in the same fast manner as it is now. In that case, we can say that, unfortunately, we will continue to witness the destruction of urban areas in the near future.

However, I should also emphasize the question of why the armed conflict has been transferred from rural areas to urban areas again. The answer to this question is also linked to the increasing military technology by the regular armies. If you use drones and unpiloted (unmanned) aerial vehicles over the urban areas of Afghanistan, the Middle East, or Africa, then the irregular forces, militias, terrorist groups, or, in short, all the non-state armed groups then transfer the armed conflict into urban areas. Because the urban areas, with their dense populations and buildings, are also a shelter for terrorist groups or threats. So, you cannot solve the problems with increasing or developing technology in military affairs. We know that very well from military history. I think, this week, we will also listen to papers which will present lessons from military history, from ancient ages to modern times,

regarding the fact that political problems cannot be solved by armed conflicts or by high-tech military technology and that these will only give ends and results of human destruction, the destruction of urban spaces, the destruction of the urban population.

Nevertheless, military history, on the other hand, has a new perspective for the last 20 or 30 years. When we talk about war and the cities, we also talk about women, children, older men, older women, in short, the civilians. The words “civitas” in Latin, “polis” in Greek, and “medina” in Arabic always point out the opposite of war, of barbarians or of armed groups. So, peace and prosperity, as I said before, are represented in the cities. Thus, when we talk about the effects of war on the cities, we should and will also discuss gender issues, the impact of the armed conflicts on women, children, and disadvantaged groups, the emancipation of these groups, and the participation of women in the political arena in Europe and also in Türkiye after their participation in the armed conflicts. Thus, I believe this congress theme also allows us to handle social and economic issues as well as the operational history.

As a military historian, I hope this congress will offer exciting ideas and further research topics to all military historians. However, as we all historians very well know, the lessons learned from past armed conflicts or wars do not help in winning the next battle, as the military thinker and the master of the military historian Clausewitz puts it. We study military history not to win new wars or new armed conflicts but, in fact, to prevent them. So, if we talk much more about the destruction in Leipzig or Dresden, I believe we can help, maybe not to end but to shed light on the destruction in Kyiv or other Ukrainian towns or in the cities of Syria and Iraq.

Last but not least, we should emphasize that the towns of Ukraine are equal to those of Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. We lost countless souls in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen, but the lives lost in these countries did not catch as much attention in Western public opinion as the lives lost in Ukraine. Türkiye tries to prevent these conflicts but also provides help in these regions in different ways, either through a military peacekeeping operation or by facilitating peace negotiations.

As neighbors of all conflict regions these days, we hope that this congress and relevant military history studies and research will contribute to the maintenance and continuation of peace and prosperity worldwide.

**CITIES SHAPED BY WAR:
EVOLVING STRATEGIES AND CHANGING PARAMETERS**

BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: REIMAGINING EUROPEAN MILITARY HISTORY

Prof. Dr. Jörg ECHTERNKAMP (Germany)

Russia's raid on Ukraine has pulled NATO members closer than ever before. We witness larger multinational exercises, more transnational readiness, and international reinforcement strategies. European identity is currently receiving a strong boost. These recent developments have not only raised fundamental questions for policy makers regarding security and defense policy. They also have to be understood as a challenge for historians. This is my point of departure. How can we as military historians respond to the challenge of the current European and Western security crisis that intensified common defense efforts that have been on the agenda long before the war of aggression? Multinationalism has been a key term of military affairs for quite some time.

This is why the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr (ZMSBw, Potsdam) had launched the project of a European military history book aimed at the 'Europeanization' of historical education. The book treads new ground methodologically as well as didactically. It draws on modern approaches to military history within the academy, focused on transnational events, processes, and interrelationships. This research has been "repackaged" to make it accessible for a new target audience. For the first time, this consideration of selected European events and developments from the end of the Napoleonic Wars aims not only to convey historical knowledge for the purpose of orientation but also to engender the ability to see events from the past through someone else's eyes (multiperspectivity), so as to be able to interact with them (narrative competence).

The International Commission of Military History (ICMH) has been predestined to make an innovative contribution to this crucial academic project. Its current president Massimo de Leonardis as well as leading representatives of several national committees – from Germany to the Netherlands to Roumania – have joined other internationally renowned scholars from e.g. Austria, France, Italy, Poland, the UK, as well as the United States in an effort to write military history "beyond national borders". While a revised and enhanced German edition is in print an English version is due to

appear early next year as part of the De Gruyter Series of Military History.¹ A Czech version came out some time ago.² This paper will present the interdisciplinary concept and discuss its focus on transnational relations, international alliances, and national images.

Conceptual Considerations

Soldiers are caught in a tension between old and new roles, between national interest and humanitarian goals, which are (or are supposed to be) valid worldwide. Additionally, their ability to understand the self-image and military culture of others has long been an essential part of their professionalism. In my eyes, knowledge of a shared, if not common, past is vital here. The establishment of a European security system consequently requires a fundamental reconsideration of historical education as well as of the politics of military history, both of which continue to be shaped largely by national histories underlining national identities.

We do not want to simply replace the national narrative by a European narrative. The idea is not to instruct the reader on European military history (as if such a thing existed) as in a textbook. Instead, the intention is to offer the reader systematically selected instructive examples of a non-national-historical military history within a European framework in order to open up a new perspective on our past. In order to do so we have to look at current tendencies in academic historical writing which is, of course, the basis of historical education. In recent years, historians have discussed the temporal limits of historical areas of investigation. For instance, they speak of a “long” 20th century, stretching back from the present day far into the 19th century. But it is in particular its spatial dimensions that the discipline of history has indeed has defined anew since the 1990s.

On the one hand, a new “global history”, in response to globalization, is devoting itself to worldwide developments. Europe was in many ways made from without as nations such as the US encountered and used European ideas and forms under the global condition of travelling and academic exchange. In this book, the impact of German military education on the American military academies is a case in point.

¹ Jörg Echternkamp/Hans-Hubertus-Mack, *Militärgeschichte europäisch Internationale Beziehungen und transnationale Verflechtungen vom 19. Jahrhundert bis heute*. 2nd revised and enhanced ed., Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2024; *Beyond National Borders: Reimagining European Military History*, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, forthcoming 2024 (= De Gruyter Series of Military History, vol. 12). For further literature, please refer to this edition.

² Jörg Echternkamp/Hans-Hubertus-Mack, *Dějiny bez hranic? Evropské dimenze vojenských dějin od 19. století po dnešek*, Prag: Academia, 2019

And just as exciting is an approach that is being termed “transnational history”. Both surmount old borders, consider relationships and interconnections, and are interested in inter- and supranational organizations of states and non-governmental organizations. In doing so, they extend the focus, which has been limited for too long to one’s (own) national history. One “version” of this transnational history aims at the “Europeanization” of historiography, by pointing out its European dimensions. European dimensions of history cannot mean a history of Europe, since Europe does not exist as a historical entity. Quite apart from the fact that there is never one history. And to write the history of Europe as a history of European Union would be to reduce it to the process of integration that has occurred since 1945. But multiple histories of all of the individual European states is not what is meant here either. For that would amount to nothing more than a disconnected juxtaposition of national histories. Between these two extremes – just one history and many histories – historians have developed an approach to writing European history to which the articles in this volume are more or less explicitly indebted. It involves recognizing and tracing connections that extend beyond national borders. This process may take concrete form, as when underpinned by organizations or rituals, for example. But it may also be less tangible if, for instance, it involves imitating developments deemed to be exemplary. “Entangled history” is the technical term for this kind of historical consideration of relations, exchanges, and transfer.

Historical events, developments, and institutions are the focus of such studies, not, in the first instance, because they have great significance for the military history of a particular country, or even constitute its history. Their significance, rather, lies in the fact that they point to this other, supranational dimension. What is more, it is frequently not the historical events themselves but the manifold memories of them that are of interest, since these have had historical impact and, in this respect, are just as “real” as the events themselves. A European military history therefore sets out to examine the military web of impact and connections within Europe over extended periods of time. And its point of departure is the assumption that historians can only do justice to the actions and experiences of contemporaries in this way.

On the other hand, there is no way to avoid an apparently contradictory insight: the rise of nationalism and nation building in the 19th century led to the nation state asserting itself with maximum force in the 21th century at the latest. This had a marked effect on the political order, both externally and internally: in the name of national interests, alliances were forged and wars conducted, and people were either accepted as part of a “people’s community” or excluded from it. The unabated significance of the nation state must consequently also be accommodated in a European military history. The nation states offered, and continue to offer, their citizens military

protection. Soldiers are recruited for national armies from national societies, often through universal conscription. Up to the present day, one's own army has remained the actual bearer of state sovereignty. The military cultivation of tradition draws upon national history (or what one considers this to be). Also, it is, above all, one's own military that is at the heart of any consensus regarding civil-military relations within society (conscription, for instance) and when scandals are discussed (regarding armament, for example); This enduring national orientation does not run contrary to the fact that various armies are connected through international military alliances or are even interwoven with one another at divisional level.

A book that aims to give insights into dimensions of European military history must therefore take two things into account: on the one hand, the diverse international relations, transnational interrelations, and pan-European developments; and, on the other, national peculiarities. Rather than trying to tell the European military history the project focusses on topics that illustrate interdependence, interaction, and mutual perceptions.

Structure and Topics

Against the backdrop of these conceptual remarks, let us to turn to selected chapters of the book and highlight examples of various forms and contents of entanglement. First of all, the project itself is a good example of European cooperation. The international team of authors comprises established experts from a dozen Eastern and Western European states – including, alongside Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Spain, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, Austria, Romania, and Switzerland. They are joined in this endeavor by colleagues from the US and Russia, a reminder of the fact that Europe was and remains integrated in larger historical contexts. In many of the contributions, the authors are not concerned with their “own” national history. Instead, they look beyond their national borders through comparison, a European historical approach, or consideration of another country.

The authors covers wide range of topics that reflect the conceptual approach – from the Napoleonic Wars to the Russian and the Spanish civil wars to current military conflicts and unconventional warfare. They take a closer look at the logic of the Cold War, the role of International Law, European peace movements, the French Foreign Legion, war veterans, and military-political alliances. They also explore the effects of armed conflicts on civilians and urban landscapes, the experience of violence, the shadows of memories, as well as the role of propaganda. Last but not least, they reflect on the current collapse of the security order as we knew it.

Since this is not a handbook-like chronological overview, the structure of the volume and the selection of themes is consequently, first and foremost, only secondarily chronological. The book consists of seven parts: As sort of an overview, Part I deals intensively with military historical development up to the end of the Cold War. The rise of nationalism, the industrial revolution, and globalization enabled the radicalization of warfare, while the European tradition of strategic thinking with its guiding principles of movement and annihilation through scientification experienced its heyday. At the same time, the image of war also changed: as a military instrument of politics, it hardly came into question on account of the nuclear arms buildup in Europe during the Cold War.

This is followed by five thematic parts, which present various approaches to the subject: wars and peace efforts (Part II) is concerned with the very object of military history, which is based from the outset on a kind of (often negative) connection: the war and the pre- and post-war eras. Jan Hoffenaar (Dutch Institute for Military History) illustrates how, after 1945, the “Iron Curtain” divided Europe into two separate areas, which differed on account of their incompatible political and social orders and belonged to two opposing military alliances. It was a systems conflict between two mutually exclusive, missionary alternatives for a new world order, which sought to fill the power vacuum that appeared after Germany and Japan were defeated. Hoffenaar reminds us that the Cold War was conducted on all levels: ideologically, politically, economically, culturally, and militarily – through conventional and nuclear arms buildup as well as the willingness and capability to mobilize large armies in the event of war. And the conflict was almost total because the weapon of last resort – the atomic bomb – constantly hung over Europe and the world like a sword of Damocles. This particular situation lent the Cold War a “logic” all of its own, as Hoffenaar points out.

A series of conferences of European states across the two blocs occasioned concrete contact. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, from 1995 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE) was based on a declaration of intent: The Helsinki Accords. As Carmen Rijnoveanu (Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Bucharest) explains, this process of communication was not only significant for the relationship between the individual European states. How such international events impacted on national political and social order becomes apparent, for example, if we turn our attention away from the large powers and the center and direct it toward the southern-European periphery. If one looks for change in a smaller signatory state such as communist Romania, it is clear how its dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu used the foreign policy forum of the CSCE for a domestic policy agenda: to secure his own power and his relative autonomy from the Soviet Union.

Part III addresses the interrelations between the Military and Civil Society, mostly in time of civil wars. Even though they are rooted in domestic social conflicts, they have a knock-on effect for politics and the military in other countries and also affect other states. The Russian Civil War is a case in point, and so is the Spanish Civil War. Part IV underlines the military significance of national images of self and the other. What images did the soldiers harbor of themselves and their enemies? What role did various media play in the communication of such images? And how is our perception of the past connected to previous experiences of violence? Those are questions raised at this point with reference to WW I and II. A common enemy image was central to military alliances.

Part V deals with these military-historical interconnections at the level of foreign and security policy. Alliances of European states shaped events of war until 1945. Such alliances were possible because military structures in the European states were relatively similar. Coalitions developed into particularly effective instruments of warfare, provided cultural differences did not hinder communication of the military elites too much. Integration as a path to security gradually became a leitmotif of foreign and security policy in the second half of the 20th century. This is argument that Massimo de Leonardis (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan) makes. The harmony that the Concert of Europe of the Great Powers sought between 1815 and 1914 was accompanied by early visions of a “United States of Europe”. The National Socialist utopia of an “Aryan”-dominated Europe and the distorted depiction of the Waffen-SS as an international brigade should also be thought of in this way. After 1945, it was clear: a European coalition, but this time on a parliamentary democratic basis, was a prerequisite for Europe playing a role on the international stage alongside the superpowers, the US and the USSR. An additional factor was the skepticism of those who viewed old-style national states as a possible source of new conflicts and consequently backed a European federation.

With the intensification of the East-West conflict, NATO and the Warsaw Pact reflected the conflict of systems at a military level, as Winfried Heinemann (formerly ZMSBw) points out in the book. And there were not only tensions between the alliances. Systematic comparison reveals that the allied states did not make life easy for one another either. So, alongside a military function, the Western alliance was also tasked with strengthening the cohesion of member states. The question of the influence of the respective superpower, the US or USSR, hung over everything. Two things must consequently be noted with regard to a European military history. For one thing, the military alliances after 1945 have influenced relations among the European states – within each camp as well as across blocs; for another, the North Atlantic Alliance, in particular – since it also had the task of driving

forward the political integration of its member states – highlights Europe’s embeddedness in military history beyond Europe.

Part VI thus seeks to counteract a risk that arises from a European-centered view of history. Critics speak of a “Eurocentric” point of view, which suggests that one can regard European history as a separate area of the past because it has remained independent of other influences. The chapters in this part, however, foreground the cross- and interconnections that have made Europe the originator or goal of ties with the superpowers or smaller states on other continents. I have already mentioned the chapter on the US: Leading American military theoreticians reached back to the ideas that their French, then Prussian and British counterparts had developed for command and organizational structures. and the non-European contexts in which European military history takes place. Finally, in part VII, like a bracket around the systematic Parts II to VI, the contribution on the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and, most recently, the war against Ukraine extend the chronological development of Part I beyond the end of World War II to the present crisis.

Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, please let me end with a concluding remark. Military multinationalism has been on the agenda of security politics for a long time. It has become even more important these days. If policy in general needs historical reassurance, security policy is incomplete without a knowledge of military history, since wars and their consequences occupy a special place in the “cultures of memory” of all European states. If we take the current events as a challenge for historical education – and I think we should, as I said in the beginning – we should supplement the more traditional, national narratives and reimagining military history in a different way – “Beyond National Borders”.

We should pick up innovative methods from historical science that go beyond the territorial principle. Our volume represents a first attempt to integrate comparative, transfer, and transnational approaches into military history on a European level. Due to its presentation – its comprehensible style, astute caricatures, clearly arranged maps – it also takes into account its broader target audience, not the least the soldiers. A new form of historical thinking, with an emphasis on multiperspectivity, strengthens the military’s European competence. We hope that further translations will make the results more accessible to historians and soldiers alike in our various countries. If we continue our cooperation within the framework of ICMH, for instance by further translations, this international project could serve as a new keystone of education in European military history.

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THE IMPACT OF URBAN MILITARY OPERATIONS ON WESTERN SOCIETIES

PhD Cand. Jonas NEUGEBAUER (Germany)

Introduction

When artillery shells and air-dropped munitions hit the ground, and soldiers start to roam the streets alongside tanks and armoured vehicles, a city's residents usually are the first victims of an armed conflict that is waged in an urban environment. As several examples in history show, wars and conflicts regularly take high tolls on cities, with large portions of urban areas being damaged or destroyed, the civilian population threatened to be killed or injured, and vital infrastructure being impaired or rendered dysfunctional. The battle of Hue, during the Vietnam War's Tet-Offensive in early 1968, destroyed almost 80 percent of the city's structures and severely damaged its water, sanitation and power systems, making it impossible for many of those residents who had fled Hue or had survived the 30-day battle to continue living in their former hometown. In addition, some 4.000 civilians had lost their lives in the course of the battle, with just as much being injured as a result of the fight.¹ Similarly, the second battle for Fallujah in November 2004 produced large destruction and damage to the Iraqi city's structures, with more than 60 percent of its buildings left damaged, and 20 percent destroyed.² Some parts of Fallujah even were flooded by the nearby Euphrates River, as several of the pumps that had been installed to avoid such incidents were rendered inoperable by the fighting, as were large parts of the power and fresh water supply.³ The second American attempt to secure the city of Fallujah supposedly produced only minimal civilian casualties as a result of the fact that the city's residents mostly had fled the area before the US troops started

¹ National Archive College Park; No. 6A General Offensive and General Uprising (DIA Paper); 1968-1969; p. 56./ National Archive College Park; Hue, One Year After Tet; 8 February 1969; p. 1./ Peter Braestrup; Big Story; How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Novato, Presidio, 1994), p. 203.

² Kendall Gott; Eyewitness to War. The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History, Vol. I (Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006); p. 14.

³ William Knarr, et al; The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr; in Al Sahawa - The Awakening, Vol I: Al Anbar Province Final Report; Institute for Defense Analysis Joint Advanced Warfighting Project (2009); p. 70f.

their attack.⁴ The first battle of Fallujah, which had taken place earlier in 2004, however, had generated some 200 to 600 killed civilians within just a few days⁵ - enough to trigger vocal criticism from within parts of the Iraqi population and from the Iraqi transitional governing body, the Iraqi Governing Council, which ultimately created sufficient diplomatic pressure to force the United States to abort its assault on the city.⁶

While the residents of a city can be seen as the first victims of an armed conflict that is waged in an urban area, the urban environment also usually takes its toll on the troops and soldiers who are forced to operate in the city's dense and challenging terrain. Comprising countless natural and man-made structures, chaotic alleys and streets, culturally and religiously significant buildings and an omnipresent population of civilians, the urban battlespace oftentimes is considered to be the "worst", most challenging and most demanding environment in which military operations can be conducted.⁷ The difficulties this environment entails by impeding armed forces' situational awareness, disrupting their communications and command and control efforts, and hindering them in bringing to bear the full toolbox of weaponry and technological gadgets they usually can rely on, in the past regularly have presented armies in urban combat situations with considerable challenges, forcing them to quickly adapt or face serious consequences.⁸ In addition to that, the urban environment oftentimes in the past has provided countless advantages to those, who tried to defend a city against an attacking army, by offering ready-made cover, innumerable opportunities to ambush and isolate the enemy's forces and by providing ample ways to counter an opponent's numerical and technological superiority. In the end, this repeatedly created situations in which seemingly superior armies were forced to sustain significant casualties and overcome severe strains when faced with a skilled and determined enemy utilizing the features of the urban environment. The battle of Grozny in 1994-95, during which Chechen fighters were able to

⁴ Spencer, J.; Case Study #7. Fallujah II.; URL: <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-7-second-battle-of-fallujah/>.

⁵ Spencer, J.; Case Study #6. Fallujah I; URL: <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-6-first-battle-of-fallujah/> Alice Hills; Fear and Loathing in Falluja; *Armed Forces & Society*, 32:4 (July 2006); p. 623.

⁶ Spencer, J.; Case Study #6. Fallujah I/ Alissa J. Rubin and Doyle McManus; Why America Waged a Losing Battle on Fallouja; *LA Times* (24 October 2004); URL: <https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-fallouja24oct24-story.html>.

⁷ Ministry of Defence; Future Operating Environment 2035. Strategic Trends Programme (2015); p. 25./ US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Publication 3-06. Joint Urban Operations (20 November 2013); p. I-2./ Michael Evans; Lethal Genes. The Urban Military Imperative and Western Strategy in the Early Twenty-First Century; *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 32:4 (August 2004); DOI: 10.1080/01402390902986949.; p. 518.

⁸ US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Publication 3-06; p. I-1ff.

inflict heavy damage on the Russian forces attacking the city by exploiting the benefits provided to them by the urban battlespace and by quickly adapting to the modus operandi of their enemies, is one such example.⁹ Similarly, and at almost the same time, urban guerrilla fighters in Mogadishu, Somalia were able to badger and harass both the assembled international armed forces of the United Nation's mission in the country and the conventional and special operations forces of the United States that had been deployed to Somalia. By not only turning to account the special features of the urban terrain, but also employing tactics that implicated significant portions of the city's civilian population directly in the armed confrontations, the fighters of Somali warlord Mohammad Farah Aidid were able to hamper with their opponents ability to apply force, to offset their enemy's military and technological advantages and ultimately to create a deadly environment in which the international contingents suffered significant casualties. The helicopters the Somalis were able to shoot down and the more than twenty US, Malaysian and Moroccan soldiers they were able to kill during the notorious battle of Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 illustrate the effects the urban battlespace can have in certain situations on the one hand and underline the Somali fighters' skills and ingenuity in utilizing these effects on the other.¹⁰

The people who live in an embattled city and the soldiers who partake in urban military operations experience the devastating effects and high risks of urban armed conflict more immediately and in greater detail than any other groups involved in or observing such events. It therefore is of little surprise that these two are the groups most frequently examined and analysed by scholars and researchers trying to explore and explain the various aspects of armed conflicts in urban environments. However, looking at groups that seemingly are less directly and immediately affected by the occurrences and effects of the confrontation itself, by the fighting and the dying on the streets and in the buildings, too can provide interesting insights into the wide-ranging complex of urban conflict, especially as such groups notwithstanding their actual distance can have considerable influence on the course of events on the battlefield. The societies behind those armed forces who wage war in a city, for example, can be seen as such a group that technically is not directly affected by urban conflicts that are waged in a foreign country, a foreign city, but which nevertheless is able to influence the way in which their own armed

⁹ Timothy L. Thomas; *The Battle of Grozny. Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat*; *Parameters* 29:2 (Summer 1999); pp. 87-102.

¹⁰ US Army; *United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994* (Washington D.C; Center of Military History; 2003); p. 139./ Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel (UN S/1994/653) (1 June 1994); in *United Nations; United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996* (New York; 1996); p. 410.

forces conduct their operations, thus potentially altering the course of the conflict. This in the past repeatedly has been the case especially in Western societies, as these societies in the last few decades increasingly developed rather specific expectations on how war has to be waged and especially on what human costs armed conflicts should or should not involve.¹¹ This furthermore has been of particular significance in Western democratic societies, as these not only exhibit the aforementioned expectations, but also through form of government have the unique ability to exert pressure and thus influence on their political decision-makers, based on public sentiments and expectancies.

The aim of this paper is to take a closer look at the expectations and perception of Western democratic societies in the context of urban military operations, examining the origins of their apparent aversion to the bloody realities of war in general, illustrating how this aversion in the past repeatedly played a role especially in the context of urban military operations conducted by Western armed forces, and pointing out how public expectations and sensibilities in multiple cases impacted political decisions with regard to such operations, in some instances permanently altering the course and outcome of events.

Western Aversion to the Costs of War

As many scholars have pointed out, the Vietnam War marked the starting point of an emerging trend of casualty sensitivity and casualty aversion among the American public.¹² Following the costly Tet-Offensive of 1968, decision-makers in Washington had come to realize that public support in the United States for the war in Vietnam was significantly dropping due to the countless casualties the American troops had suffered during the North Vietnamese attacks on southern cities. Especially the 30-day battle for the old imperial city of Hue, with its more than 200 US soldiers and Marines killed and over 1.500 wounded had made a lasting impression on the American public, who had closely watched the fight for the city on their television screens back home.¹³ In the end, the actually successfully repulsed Tet-Offensive, via devastating media representation and poor political guidance would be turned into a strategic defeat for the United States and its South

¹¹ Robert Mandel; *Security, Strategy, and the Quest for Bloodless War* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2004)./ Christopher Coker; *Waging War Without Warriors?. The Changing Culture of Military Conflict* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2002).

¹² Sebastian Kaempf; *Saving Soldiers or Civilians?. Casualty-Aversion versus Civilian Protection in Asymmetric Conflicts* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018); p. 62ff./ Christopher Coker; *Humane Warfare* (London, Routledge, 2001); p. 36.

¹³ Jack Shulimson et al; *U.S. Marines in Vietnam. The Defining Year 1968.* (Washington D.C., 1997); p. 210./ Peter Braestrup; *Big Story.*

Vietnamese allies, not only changing the course of the war for the worse for the US, but permanently affecting the American public's relations with and perception of American military endeavours in foreign countries and the human costs resulting from such undertakings. "The ideational purpose which had not only mobilized the American nation in the past, but had also legitimized its costs in lives and material, began losing its appeal"¹⁴, and thus the deaths of American soldiers in faraway countries were increasingly deemed needless and undesirable. As became apparent later on, the Vietnam War had marked the "first conflict in which the American people were unwilling to subject their own soldiers to the cruelty of war".¹⁵

Even though virtually none of the other Western democratic nations shared the experiences the United States had made in Vietnam, societies in other countries like Great Britain too started to develop an increased sensitivity towards losing soldiers' lives in military operations, especially if these operations were perceived to be pointless or if the public accredited them with little or no prospect of success.¹⁶ Thus, merely a few years after the United States had made its experiences with impactful casualty-related public discontent in the context of the Vietnam War, Great Britain similarly faced challenging societal dynamics with regard to its military involvement in Northern Ireland. Even though the British Army's operation in "the Province"¹⁷ started off in 1969 as a peacekeeping and policing effort in support of the local representative government and security forces, by early 1971 it had turned into a fully fledged urban counter-guerrilla operation in which British Army casualties soon started to mount. Little by little, the rising numbers of killed and wounded soldiers in Northern Ireland created a strained atmosphere among parts of the general public in homeland Britain, as many not only felt discomfort over the fact that the men were dying in the streets of Northern Ireland, but sensed that they died in vain as little to no progress was being made in calming the overall security situation in the Province. Specifically, "the mounting deaths of soldiers in the streets of Belfast and Londonderry constituted a significant surge in the overall costs of the engagement, and thus had a permanent and negative effect on the people's

¹⁴ Sebastian Kaempff; *Saving Soldiers or Civilians?*; p. 63.

¹⁵ Christopher Coker; *Humane Warfare*; p. 36.

¹⁶ Jason Reifler et al; *Success Matters. Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq*; Political Science Faculty Publications, 10 (2006); URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub/10/ Andrew H. Sidman and Helmut Norpoth; *Fighting to Win. Wartime morale in the American public*; *Electoral Studies*, 31:2 (2012); pp. 330-341.

¹⁷ *The term Province refers to the fact that the six counties of Northern Ireland once were part of the historical Irish province of Ulster*; Britannica; Northern Ireland/ Ulster; URL: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Northern-Ireland>.

willingness to ignore the evident lack in successes the government had produced”¹⁸ so far over the course of the entire operation. Calls to end the British engagement in Northern Ireland and to “Bring Back the Boys from Ulster” soon started to be voiced.¹⁹ Particularly vocal in their criticism of the British Government and in their calls for a withdrawal of the British Army from the Province naturally were the relatives of British soldiers, who feared to lose their kin to an IRA bomb or bullet. Their public protests and demands quickly incited growing sympathy and support and even caused the British Army’s recruitment numbers to drop temporarily.²⁰

In the end, the public pressure brought to bear on the British Government as a result of military casualties being suffered in Northern Ireland never reached the same levels as it had within the United States with regard to the Vietnam War. This not least was the case as the decision-makers in London were able to reassure a portion of their critics by increasing the intensity and extent of the army’s activities in Northern Ireland, thus giving the impression that progress was being made in the fight against the Irish Republican Army.²¹ As however can be observed in hindsight, the rising number of killed and injured soldiers in the Northern Ireland campaign in 1971 nevertheless produced sufficient incentive to force the British Government to alter its policy in the Province, which in turn suggests that the element of public casualty aversion in the past played a role in the context of Western military operations, not only in the United States, but in other countries like Great Britain as well.

With time, Western societies’ growing concerns for those killed and injured in armed conflicts further consolidated and even expanded beyond their own soldiers to include the civilians who regularly and involuntarily got caught in the middle of violent confrontations. In that respect, scholars have identified another element of influence in shaping and defining Western societies’ expectations on the manner in which wars are to be waged, namely the rise of so-called “technological determinism”²². This concept illustrates

¹⁸ Jonas Neugebauer; *The Dilemma of Humanized Urban Warfare* (Dissertation forthcoming); p. 127.

¹⁹ Paul Dixon; *Britain’s „Vietnam Syndrome“? Public Opinion in British Military Intervention from Palestine to Yugoslavia*; *Review of International Studies*, 26:1 (January 2000; URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097658>); p. 112.

²⁰ Paul Dixon; *Britain’s „Vietnam Syndrome“?;* p. 111f./ *National Archives London; Programme Analysis and Review Defence Manpower Summary No 6. Manpower for the Armed Forces; 1971; p. A-5f.*

²¹ Jonas Neugebauer; *The Dilemma of Humanized Urban Warfare* (Dissertation forthcoming); p. 126ff.

²² Ned Dobos; *Insurrection and Intervention. The Two Faces of Sovereignty* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); p. 54./ Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi; *Choosing*

how societies have expanded and strengthened their expectancy that wars are to be fought with minimal effects on human lives, based on the simple perception that modern technological developments plainly enable armed forces to do so. In other words, from the public's perspective, new technological advancements, like precision-guided munitions or sophisticated reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting methods have allowed for modern armed forces to conduct operations drawing upon a complete understanding and awareness of the areas of operation and to carry out attacks with extreme precision and thus with virtually no risks of harming or damaging anything or anyone but the intended targets. This then oftentimes led to the conclusion that it has to be possible and thus can be expected of armed forces to employ these technological assets to the effect that military operations are conducted and wars are waged with minimal casualties suffered and collateral harm caused.²³ As in the former case, the "technological determinism" too first and foremost came into effect within Western societies, and especially within the American public, as the people in this part of the world perceived their armed forces to be equipped with the most advanced technological gadgets and thus capable of dominating any opponent on the battlefield simply by drawing on their technological superiority.²⁴ The fact that even with the most advanced equipment and technological gadgets, armed conflicts usually are too complex and too unpredictable to reliably enable any actor to partake in a violent confrontation without taking at least some risk of suffering casualties and causing harm and damage, especially in certain environments and conditions, however, usually got overlooked.

The Realities of Urban Conflict

These expectations of Western societies that wars were to be waged with a minimum risk for soldiers and civilians, on multiple occasions in the past have collided with the inherent realities of armed conflicts, and thus repeatedly have presented Western armed forces with the challenge to comply with their societies' expectations while nonetheless attempting to fulfil their military mission. This especially was the case in the context of operations that were conducted in an urban environment, since military engagements in this

Your Battles. American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004); p. 153ff.

²³ Marshall J. Beier; Discriminating Tastes: "Smart" Bombs, Non-Combatants, and Notions of Legitimacy in Warfare; Security Dialogue, 34:4 (2003); pp. 411-425.; URL: <https://journals-1sagepub-1com-100899a2v023b.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010603344003>; p. 413ff./ James Igoe Walsh; Precision Weapons, Civilian Casualties, and Support for the Use of Force; Political Psychology, 36:5 (2015); DOI: 10.1111/pops.12175; p. 507ff.

²⁴ Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi; Choosing Your Battles; p. 153.

particular area of operations by nature run the risk of producing high numbers of military and civilian casualties.

This feature can be mainly attributed to two distinct aspects. First, the urban environment tends to interfere with and disrupt armed forces' ability to effectively conduct their operations, among other things by hampering their communications and thus command and control efforts, by fragmenting large troop contingents into small, often separated groups and units, by canalizing troop movements, especially for large, heavily armoured vehicles that are confined to those streets and roads of a city which they can navigate, and by limiting their ability to effectively bring to bear all the assets of warfare at their disposal.²⁵ The latter feature can be seen both as consequence of the other aspects, as for example an attacking force has little chance to apply direct fire from a tank or armoured vehicle if these assets are unable to reach the necessary firing positions due to natural and man-made obstacles impeding their movement, and as a result of the armed forces' efforts to avoid causing unnecessary harm and destruction in the course of their operations. During the battle for Hue, for example, the attacking US Marine forces were instructed to avoid unduly damaging the city and were ordered to especially look out for the multiple culturally and historically significant buildings that were located in the ancient part of the city. This, for a significant part of the battle precluded the use of indirect fires from artillery batteries and nearby navy ships and subsequently left the attacking US and South Vietnamese forces more or less without any supportive fires, as, due to North Vietnamese air defences and bad weather conditions, close air support too was rendered unemployable.²⁶ In the end, the considerably high casualty figures among the attacking forces in Hue, among other things can be directly attributed to the fact that the assault was predominantly carried out by infantry units, clearing the city street-by-street and house-by-house with little direct and even less indirect fire support.²⁷

Similarly, British troops in Northern Ireland, for a considerable amount of time were strictly limited in their ability to use force in order to avoid producing unintentional and excessive harm among the omnipresent civilian population.²⁸ As a result, the troops operating in the Province,

²⁵ US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Publication 3-06.; p. I-1ff.

²⁶ Luke Falkenburg; Charlie Company's Battle for Hue. An examination of an after-action report on urban combat; Marine Corps Gazette, 97:8 (August 2013); p. 48./ Richard D. Camp Jr.; Death in the Imperial City. U.S. Marines in the Battle for Hue 31 January to 2 March 1968 (2018); p. 45.

²⁷ James H. Wilbanks; The Battle for Hue, 1968; in Block by Block. The Challenges of Urban Operations; ed. William G. Roberston and Lawrence A. Yates (Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003); p. 152f.

²⁸ Desmond Hamill; Pig in the Middle. The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1985 (London; Methuen; 1985); p. 49ff./ Ministry of Defence; Operation Banner; p. 4-10.

patrolling the streets of Londonderry and Belfast, were permitted to open fire only in very narrowly defined circumstances and in most cases only following several warnings. They, furthermore, especially in the initial phase of the operation, were only allowed to fire single shots instead of full-automatic firebursts and were prohibited to apply fires from heavy weaponry. This in turn limited the soldiers' abilities to effectively prevent and counter attacks and thus made them more vulnerable to the increasing assaults by IRA gunmen and bombers. Over the course of the British involvement in Northern Ireland, the restrictive guidelines were revised and adjusted several times, the basic challenge of weighing the minimization of unintentional harm and the safety and efficiency of British troops, however, remained for most of the conflict.²⁹ Both the example of Hue and the case of the British engagement in Northern Ireland furthermore highlight how military actors operating in an urban environment in the past repeatedly have been forced to balance the safety and well-being of their own soldiers against the integrity of the city and the safety and well-being of the non-combatants in the area of operations.

The Second aspect contributing to the fact that armed conflicts in urban areas usually produce high numbers of especially military casualties, is that this particular environment not only obstructs their abilities and capabilities, it additionally also offers those opponents who are capable and willing to turn to account the special characteristics of the urban environment countless opportunities to present the attackers with serious tactical and operational challenges. In the past, this particularly often was the case in operations in which a conventional army was forced to attack an urban area that was defended by a determined and skilled unconventional opponent with better knowledge of the local terrain and its innate particularities. During the British involvement in Northern Ireland, for example, the Irish Republican Army used the narrow streets and densely packed houses in Londonderry and Belfast in a relatively mobile fashion, ambushing British Army patrols or taking aimed sniper shots at British soldiers and then making a quick and unhindered escape before the troops could adequately react. In doing so they profited from their better knowledge of the terrain as they carefully selected firing positions and ambush sites, and exploited the multiple escape routes made available to them by the numerous narrow alleys and tight streets of the densely built environment.³⁰

During the two battles of Fallujah in 2004, the insurgent fighters defending the city similarly took advantage of its tactical benefits, by using

²⁹ Jonas Neugebauer; *The Dilemma of Humanized Urban Warfare* (Dissertation forthcoming); p. 128ff.

³⁰ Ministry of Defence; *Operation Banner. An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland* (2006); p. 5-3.

the network of paths and roads to evade and circle around the advancing attackers, and by preparing countless ambushes inside the city's residential buildings, with small groups of fighters just waiting hidden inside the houses for US soldiers to step into the rooms and be welcomed by a barrage of small-arms fire and grenades.³¹ Aware of the fact that the attacking American troops would be reluctant to simply tear down all the buildings in the city, this tactic offered the possibility to fairly easily exact heavy casualties on the supposedly superior enemy. This technique furthermore proved to be especially successful when insurgents took cover and started attacks from within mosques and other religious buildings, as the particular significance of such structures even further inhibited the US troops in their use of force.³² As a result, US Army and Marine Corps forces in their second attack on Fallujah ultimately were forced to escalate their use of force and in fact flatten several of the city's houses in an effort to minimize the deaths and injuries the units suffered when securing buildings room-by-room.³³ This in turn, however, produced vocal international criticism, even from some of the United State's closest allies, and in the end contributed significantly to the vast damage and destruction the battles of Fallujah caused in the city.

Society's Expectations and the Realities of Urban Conflicts

As several historical examples demonstrate, armed forces operating in an urban area in the past regularly suffered significant casualties that directly can be traced to the conditions and features innate to this particular environment. In combination with Western societies' expectations that military operations should be conducted and wars should be waged with a minimum risk of producing casualties among the respective country's armed forces, this particular characteristic repeatedly has turned urban military operations not only into tactically, but also into socially and politically challenging undertakings. In more than one case, this even created a situation in which Western states and their governments found themselves confronted with such heavy public pressure that they were forced to fundamentally alter their policies or even abort the respective military operation entirely.

Especially the United States in the past decades have been prone to this particular dynamic, not least because of the country's experiences during the Vietnam War and the mostly urban Tet-Offensive. This offensive, and in particular the battle of Hue can be seen as one of the first examples of how a

³¹ Kenneth W. Estes; Operation Vigilant Resolve. The First Battle of Al Fallujah; *Leatherneck* 102:4 (April 2019); p. 29.

³² Alfred B. Connable; The Massacre That Wasn't. Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare; in U.S. Marines in Iraq. 2004-2008. Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington D.C.; History Division US Marine Corps; 2010); p 75.

³³ Cpt. Natalie Friel; in Kendall Gott; *Eyewitness to War*; p. 67ff.

military operation in an urban environment took effect far beyond its actual military significance. The casualties suffered in Hue and the reports that were conveyed to the US addressing the fight and its implications, contributed significantly to a rise in American casualty aversion and thus anti-war sentiments, and ultimately created a public atmosphere in which the United States were forced to change and finally end their engagement in South-East Asia.³⁴

Some twenty years later, in a different conflict in a different part of the world, the United States once again were forced to face the unpleasant realities of urban conflict. In Mogadishu, the warlord Mohammad Farah Aidid and his militia fighters proved to be rather skilled in utilizing the city's special features to exact a considerable toll from international and US forces in the city. In the end, they were able to create a situation in which the American forces suffered 18 killed within just a few hours during a single operation on 3 October 1993, which in turn caused public pressure in the US to rise.³⁵ Just as had been the case following the Tet-Offensive and the battle for Hue, this pressure once again forced the US government to fundamentally alter its policy, ultimately causing President Clinton to reassess the entire American involvement in Somalia and to subsequently withdraw all American forces from the region.³⁶

Others besides the USA too have experienced which challenges can arise from a combination of military with societal and political factors in the context of urban military operations, as the involvement of the British Army in Northern Ireland clearly illustrates. In the early years of its engagement in Belfast and Londonderry, the British government too faced an increase in casualty-related public discontent, as the British society grew dissatisfied with the fact that several of its soldiers lost their lives in an operation which yielded no visible progress or success. Even though this dynamic did not create the same political repercussions as it had in similar situations in the United States, the public criticism and occasional calls for an end of the British Army's deployment to Northern Ireland nevertheless caused the government at Westminster to adapt its strategy and boost the army's actions against the IRA, thus demonstrating that the dilemma of conducting a low-casualty operation in an environment known for producing considerably high casualty figures has

³⁴ Andrew F. Krepinevich; *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press; 1986); p. 251./ Erik B. Villard; *Staying the Course. Combat Operations October 1967 to September 1968* (Washington D.C.; Center of Military History US Army; 2017); p. 445f.

³⁵ US Army; *United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report*; p. 139./ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry (UN S/1994/653)*; p. 410.

³⁶ Douglas Delaney; *Cutting, Running, or Otherwise? The US Decision to Withdraw from Somalia; Small Wars & Insurgency*, 15:3 (2004); pp. 28-46; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0959231042000275551>; p. 37.

never been an exclusively American phenomenon, but rather can be detected among other Western nations as well.

When wars and armed conflicts are waged in an urban environment, the people living in the embattled cities and the soldiers and fighters participating in the hostilities are usually the ones most directly affected by the consequences. However, as this paper has shown, the implications of such events in the past have repeatedly exceeded these direct and obvious impacts, in particular in cases in which armed forces of Western, democratic states like the United States and Great Britain have participated in urban confrontations. In these instances, the urban environment not only influenced the course of events in the conflict zone, but also took effect among the societies behind the participating Western armies. As has been elaborated furthermore, this first and foremost can be attributed to the fact that armed forces operating in the urban battlespace, with its unique set of characteristics and challenges, are prone to suffer considerably high numbers of casualties, which in turn Western societies since the late 1960's have increasingly been unwilling and unable to condone. As a result, Western governments in the past have repeatedly been forced to fundamentally alter their strategies towards military involvements with a strong urban component due to public pressures and discontent, in more than one case even leading to a premature abortion of the military operation. Historical examples like the battle of Hue in 1968, the early years of the British involvement in Northern Ireland, or the United State's engagement in Somalia in 1993 underline these findings. Furthermore, more recent examples of Western urban military operations, like the two battles of Fallujah indicate that this by no means merely represents a phenomenon of the distant past, subsequently raising the question whether the "West", and Western societies in particular, are prepared and will be able to operate militarily in a modern world that is increasingly defined by global urbanization and the emergence of vast urban metropolises.³⁷

³⁷ David Kilcullen; *Out of the Mountains. The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford; Oxford University Press; 2013); p. 28ff.

URBAN WARFARE AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, THE CHANGE OF PARAMETERS

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Introduction

Urban operations entered the *modus operandi* and *pensandi* of UN stabilization missions and ‘coalitions of the willing’ as the most visible sign of the decomposition of consolidated patterns due to the Cold War and the emergence of intra-state conflicts (or civil wars) to the detriment of conflicts interstate, or conventional warfare. Before going into detail, it is useful to make some clarifications, some of which are apparently detached from history, military history and more related to the demographic and social evolution of the world. Urbanization is a major economic and social phenomenon which take a global dimension, giving that since 2008, the majority of world population lives in cities and urbanized areas. Other than an economic and social challenge, the presence of large urban areas also represents a major problem for military planners, which are obliged to focus organization, training and equipment to operate in this environment. This problem is present as well for the military operations addressed not to eliminate opposing forces but to the stability. And it is useful resume shortly the evolution of the capabilities of the UN in managing military operations, which was limited since the earliest activities, in the late ‘40s, with the staff as almost entirely civilian and lacked the capacity to handle military issues. With the end of the Cold War and the increased use of force in peace operations, the Secretariat established in March 1992, the DPKO, and since the release of the ‘Brahimi Report’ there has been a significant increase in military personnel in the department. The growth of civil wars has had, among others, the consequence of involving urban areas in conflict-related instability and has led to the need to stabilize them. Complicating factors in urban warfare for stability operations is the presence of civilians and the complexity of the terrain, and in some cases, the necessary restraint of the use of force. In general terms, the operations in urban areas by UN and/or multinational forces are the more similar to the ordinary military operation giving that operate within the framework of the ‘peace enforcement’ or Chapter VII of the Charter. In a peacekeeping operation, more or less, common is the will of the parties to respect the ceasefire/truce, but in the cases mentioned in this paper, Haiti and Somalia the UN and/or international forces operated against more or less organized armed formations that contrasted, for various reasons (purely criminal and/or for the acquisition of power), the presence of these forces.

Somalia

In 1992 the UN dispatched a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, not in response to a peace agreement but to assist the safe distribution of international aid against a famine, induced by drought and prolonged by civil war between local factions following the collapse of almost thirty years dictatorship of Siad Barre (October 1969- January 1991), that portended a major humanitarian catastrophe. It was initially a small mission, named UNOSOM (later known as UNOSOM I), but ineffective and its enlargement did not bring any substantial change on the situation.

Phase I - UNITAF

UNOSOM I was replaced by UNITAF, a multinational 'coalition of the willing' led by the USA and mandated by the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing the use of the force in pursuing the spirit and the letter of the mandate of the UNSC. This, repeating the operational and legal formula of the UN Command in Korea: a largely USA-led and formed operation with 23 other nations contributions, including several elite units from France, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Spain, Sweden, Germany, and Canada. The force, well organized and disciplined, operated between from 5 December 1992 until 4 May 1993 in central-South Somalia. It should be noted that the force included specific assets, which resulted critical in urban operations, like PSYOPS, CIMIC/CA and liaison. While judged positively the resuming of the humanitarian assistance work, UNITAF did not addressed other critical tasks, like the disarmament of the local militias, the establishment of judiciary, police and correctional systems and other nation building missions, as requested by the UN. The withdrawal of local gangs limited the clashes with multinational forces to few and minor cases, due the deterrence of UNITAF, that had a strength of 37.000 troops. Unlike typical UN ROE, UNITAF authorized to use not just 'force' but 'deadly force'. It was authorized the use of deadly force not only when troops were fired on or threatened but also when there was 'a clear demonstration of hostile intent'. An entire section of the ROE was devoted to contrast 'crewserved weapons' or 'technical' (pick-up 4x4), largely used by local armed groups.

Phase II – UNOSOM

While UNITAF was regarded as a successful mission which skilfully employed the threat and use of force to bring back the normality, UNOSOM II, the follow-up body, fully UN flagged mission, succumbed to 'mission creep', with serious operational, managerial and command mistakes, lost its legitimacy, and withdrew ignominiously. UNOSOM II was forced to deal with the issues not previously tackled, in particular disarmament, deployment

throughout Somalia and the wider nation-building agenda, failing in all and each. On 26 March 1993 UNSC unanimously adopted the Resolution 814, authorizing the UNOSOM II to succeed UNITAF. It was the first mission directly organized and commanded by the UN to be explicitly mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the first since the Congo to be specifically mandated to use force beyond self-defence. Like UNOSOM I and UNITAF, it was to be deployed without the consent of a host government, since Somalia did not have one. UNOSOM II's CONOP was 'military concept of operations' and a 'cease-fire and disarmament concept'. But the original sin was the divergent views between the UN and the US. New York look for a nation-building process, necessarily slow giving the condition of Somalia, without any governmental structure, other than the warlords militias. Washington was reluctant to be involved in long term commitment without having the full control of it. This divide was a red line which crossed the mission, operated in the Centre-South Somalia, excluding Somaliland and Puntland, between March 1993 and March 1995, was constantly understrength, affected by lack of a proper command and coordination system between national contingents. Especially this affected seriously the conduct of operations in taking control of key areas or storming critical targets, opening the door to the use of unnecessary force. The then UNSG, Boutros-Ghali, looked for an expansive view of the use of force, which impacted negatively on the weak structure of the force, poorly coordinated and understrength.

Despite its more ambitious mandate, UNOSOM II had a smaller, less capable and less coherent military structure than UNITAF. Its authorized strength was 20.000 troops and 8.000 civilian and logistics personnel; the USA provided 4.000 troops, the bulk of UNOSOM's logistical wing, which were simply transferred from UNITAF, ensuring at least some continuity. This was the first time the USA had directly contributed troops to UN operation, but keeping its contribution as small as possible in order not allowing the operation to fail, deploying a JTF off the Somali coast, and on land, a QRF in support of UN troops in emergencies. These forces remained fully under exclusive US command and control and furtherly increased. Unfortunately, the critical PYSOP, CIMIC/CA and liaison assets of UNITAF where not continued in UNOSOM II, paving the way for the disaster. Together with the intra-UN communication problems, as all levels, at Mogadishu, between Mogadishu and New York, between UNSG, UNSC, SRSG, FC, TCCs and other Member States, there was created an inextricable loop. With UNOSOM II's arrival, militias began to infiltrate heavy weapons back into Mogadishu and the tensions escalates since May with uncoordinated and badly planned inspections in the arsenals of a local warlords. In June there was the first serious clash when 24 'blue helmets' with KIA and 60 WIA by militiamen using the crowds as cover, ambushed and attacked the unprepared and too late

responsive peacekeepers. Based on UNSC decisions and the position of UNSG Boutros-Ghali, strongly in favour of iron fist, the UNOSOM entered in open confrontation with the local militias engaging intense urban combat operations in Mogadishu, with a 'systematic' drive to restore law and order by destroying or confiscating illegal weapon stocks and neutralizing its broadcasting stations. The offensive, despite aerial bombardments (the first such UN action since the former Belgian Congo in the '60s) and frontal assaults by UNOSOM and QRF troops, was repelled by the favoured tactic of the militiamen using civilians as human shields. The summer 1993 with the escalation of urban combats, recorded an increased number of KIAs among the international troops, without keeping the control of Mogadishu. This situation originated growing concerns and doubts among TCCs due the increased number of fatalities among their own troops, deployed for an in-theory peace-oriented operation, adding fractures to an already fragile political consensus. As well, the persistent lack of coordination between US-led forces and UN-led national contingents (and among those), added additional divides. The disarmament of the warlord's militias, in particular the one of Aideed, neglected humanitarian and nation-building efforts.

In October, another raid, uncoordinated, badly planned and worst carried out, ends up with 19 KIA, 90 WIA among the international forces and up to 1.000 Somali killed, originating a major turning point in the approach and evaluation of the entire mission. In December the US decided to withdraw, already preceded by Belgium, France and Sweden, and followed by Italy, Germany, and Spain for the spring 1994. Although still under Chapter VII, the operation abandoned coercive means. On 4 February 1994 UNSC decided to withdraw UNOSOM II by March 1995 and initiated the scaled-down of the force. The UN asked military assistance in ensuring the safe removal of UNOSOM II. Another 'coalition of willing' with forces from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, USA, the UK, protected the withdrawal of the last 2.500 Bangladeshi and Pakistani 'blue helmets' from Mogadishu. Although there were 27 incidents involving weapon fire, from snipers to RPGs fired by militias, the entire force was withdrawn well ahead of schedule, in 73 hours instead of the planned 7–10 days. No lives were lost. UNOSOM II was gone by 3 March 1995. The entire deployment of UN and multinational forces had 217 fatalities and caused an unspecified number of Somali fatalities, militiamen and civilians.

Haiti

Haiti has been plagued with instability for much of its existence, despite being the second country in the Western Hemisphere, after USA, to declare independence on 1st January 1804. UN, OAS, US and ‘coalitions of willing’ have been involved in Haiti constantly since 1993. However, the creation of a long-lasting secure government has eluded Haiti, and today we are at the eve of another deployment of another UN mission there, giving that the current presence, BINUH, appear totally incapable to assist the local authorities, improve the governance and facing the endless wave of criminal violences. The island life was marked by violence and crime and the degradation of the economic and social situation in an already poor territory worsened the situation, which received a serious blow with the earthquake of 2010. This one fully opened the door to ties between local gangs and criminal organisations from Mexico, US, Brazil and Colombia. Since the first deployment, all the missions, regardless their institutional framework, failed in the final achievement, the establishment of a solid, democratic, inclusive governance; where able only to alleviate the desperate economic and social condition of the civil population, and losing 200 elements (military, police and civilian staff). Despite efforts, one of the main tasks of the international efforts for the island, the establishment of a professional police force, with a planned strength of 25.000, capable to re-install the monopoly of the use of the force, was not achieved.

Even though mostly composed by military forces—the presence of the requested strength of police officers has proven difficult due to the resistance of many countries to the precious staff and dispatching armed forces ones into a foreign mission — the UN faced uncontained violence stemming from political unrest and from common criminals. As result of it, the thousands of military and police personnel deployed in the island across the years, instead to be only the trainers and be the back-up of the ongoing formed police forces, become the main keepers of the law and order of Haiti, something for what those where not fully prepared. There are several reasons of it, like the lack of minimal local conditions for the setting up of national building programme, then a growing criminal environment and other external factors, like the extended misconduct cases of UN personnel, the cholera epidemic, which destroyed any trust with the local population and the earthquake of 2010. In the first period of the MINUSTAH mandate, the mission was rocky but headed in the right direction, however the degradation of the security and economic and social situation imposed progressively a mandate creep to the UN forces. Like in Somalia, there was a critical fact; the deadly incursion at Cité du Soleil, in Port-au-Prince, when 1.500 ‘blue helmets’ in 2005 stormed the area, attacking the criminal gangs operating

there shooting 22,000 bullets with estimated 80 civilians killed. But like in Somalia that was a peak of the iceberg, hiding the progressive degradation of the law and order and since then the ‘blue helmets’ were involved in a myriad of skirmishes with armed groups, sometime heavily equipped, and to face it often was requested the support of helicopters. In 13 years of presence in the island, MINUSTAH (and precedent missions) lost 60 personnel, in vast majority military and police, involved in street fighting (there were more than 100 fatalities due to the earthquake). In April 2017, UNSC decided in resolution 2350 (2017) that MINUSTAH, dispatched since 2004, would close on 15 October 2017, transitioning to a smaller follow-up peacekeeping mission which would support Government efforts to strengthen rule-of-law institutions, further develop the HNP and engage in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis, the MINUJUSTH, then replaced as of 2019, by BINUH, currently there.

Analysing the mandate of MINUSTAH, the most controversial presence of the international organization, it is possible to identify that the mission suffered of the same problems of UNOSOM II, with a prevalence of the use of force and not enough attention to the governance and development dimensions. And, as above mentioned the limited number of police personnel did not allow to train, mentor and monitoring the establishment of a proper security service, together with the missed task for a judiciary and correctional architectures. The institution building mission in Haiti faced the inability of Haitian political actors to accommodate and compromise. However, the failure of the Un and international missions in Haiti to establish a lasting government or police force embodies larger failures by the UN and its stakeholders to understand how missions should approach institution building. The peacekeeping missions in Haiti show once again that security-only interventions in failing regimes do little to address why the insecurity exists in the first place. Instead, the UN must learn that mandates to establish security must be accompanied by an effort to establish a government capable of providing basic education and health to its citizens.

Conclusion

Urban warfare is one of the most difficult forms of warfare. There are disproportionate levels of political, tactical, and accidental risks in attempting to take the control of an urban area. This is even more difficult for forces mandated to stabilize an area and not, as first task, to degrade the capabilities of an opposing force. Separating hostile forces from among millions of people while maintaining a military/institutional legitimacy could be considered more difficult—it is one of the riskiest missions for an organization, or group of nations in case of a coalition, can attempt.

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Glossary

BINUH - Bureau intégré des Nations unies en Haïti (UN Integrated Office in Haiti)

CA – Civil Affairs

CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation

CONOP - Concept of Operation

DPKO – Department of Peace Keeping Operations

HIPPO – High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (N.B. quoted as source in bibliography, UN body)

HNP - Haitian National Police

JTF - Joint Task Force

FC – Force Commander

KIA – Killed in Action

MINUJUSTH - Mission des Nations unies pour l'appui à la Justice en Haïti (UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti)

MINUSTAH – Mission Intégrée des Nations unies pour la Transitions en Haiti (UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti)

OAS – Organization of American States

PYSOP – Psychological Operations

ROE - Rules of Engagement

RPG – Rocket Propeller Gun

TCC(s) – Troop(s) Contributing Country(ies)

UN – United Nations

UNITAF – Unified Task Force

UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UNOSOM I/II – UN Operation in Somalia I/II

USA – United States of America

UNSG – UN Secretary-General

WIA – Wounded in Action

QRF - Quick Reaction Force

SRSR – Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary-General

SIEGE AND CHANGE: BELGRADE – A CITY BETWEEN ORIENT AND OCCIDENT

Dr. Claudia REICHL-HAM (Austria)

Introduction

Walking through downtown Belgrade with an open eye today, you quickly realize that the city's eventful history also manifests itself in the cityscape. The frequently changing ownership and the many wars accompanied by destruction have left unmistakable traces. As a result, hardly any buildings in the old town are more than 100 years old. However, not only the wars, but also the lack of financial resources, construction speculation, corruption and indifference to the historical heritage are among the reasons for the crumbling facades.

Today, Belgrade (in early modern times also called Griechisch Weissenburg) is the capital of the Republic of Serbia. It is located at the confluence of the Danube and Sava Rivers.¹ The city was built on the borderline between the southern end of the Pannonian Plain and the northern foothills of the mountainous Balkan Peninsula at the intersection of two important transportation routes in southeastern Europe (the Danube and the connection via Niš and Skopje through the Vardar and Morava Valleys to Thessaloniki). Over time, this very favourable geographical location attracted a wide variety of peoples, making Belgrade a place of encounter, but also an important theatre of war due to its military-strategic importance, and thus vulnerable to siege, conquest and destruction.² According to Katja Bintinger, the city was destroyed and then rebuilt more than 40 times.³

As a fortified hilltop settlement called Singidunum, the permanent settlement of the area began under the Celtic Scordiscans, who were expelled by the Romans in the 1st century BC. The Romans built a castrum, a military camp, for the Legio IV Flavia Felix on the site of today's Belgrade Fortress and subsequently granted Singidunum the status of a municipium, and in the

¹ Katja Bintinger, "Belgrad als Metropole Südosteuropas. Faktoren einer zentralen Rolle der Stadt für eine europäische Großregion in historischer und zukunftsorientierter Perspektive" (diploma paper, Vienna University, 2017), 30.

² Bintinger, "Belgrad," 31; Anne Cornelia Kenneweg, "Studien zur Stadt in der Literatur. Belgrad in ausgewählten Werken des 20. Jahrhunderts" (diploma paper, Leipzig University, 2002), 13.

³ Bintinger, "Belgrad," 31.

3rd century AD the status of a *colonia*.⁴ The period of the migration of the peoples was an important turning point in the development of the city, because it led to the decline of the ancient urban culture and is the reason why hardly anything worth mentioning of the ancient heritage has been preserved. In the course of the following centuries, the city continued to be exposed to invasions and destructions from outside and was situated on the edge of Byzantine, Frankish, Bulgarian and Hungarian territories of interest.⁵ In the 9th century, the city was first mentioned under its Slavic name, Beograd, which means White City.

In the Byzantine period, Belgrade was little more than a fortress and had only two functions: first, as a stopover for pilgrims coming from the west on their way to Jerusalem via Constantinople, and second, as an important border post.⁶ During the reign of Prince Stefan Lazarević at the beginning of the 15th century, it became a residential town for the first time and experienced a period of prosperity, which, however, lasted only a few years (1403-1427). Lazarević also had churches, a hospital, a library and other facilities of an urban settlement built and the upper town fortified with ramparts, towers, ditches and drawbridges. A small harbour was built in the lower town. Lazarević pursued a wise settlement policy, attracting rich settlers to the city and granting various privileges to merchants. Within a very short time Belgrade was very densely populated and had between 40,000 and 50,000 inhabitants.⁷ Lazarević's successor, his nephew Đurađ Branković, however, was forced to hand over the city and the fortress to the Hungarians.

⁴ Bintinger, "Belgrad," 31, 36f.; Miroslava Mirković, *Moesia Superior. Eine Provinz an der mittleren Donau*, (Mainz: von Zabern, 2007), passim; Ljubica Gajević, "New Belgrade urban fortunes: Ideology and practice under the patron-age of state and market" (Master Thesis, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, 2011), 6f., [accessed 15 July 2023], http://upcommons.upc.edu/pfc/bitstream/2099.1/13025/1/GAJEVIC_TESIS.pdf.

⁵ Bintinger, "Belgrad," 14; Jovanka Kalić, "A millennium of Belgrade (Sixth-Sixteenth centuries). A Short Overview," *Balkanica* 45 (2014), 71-96, here 71f., [accessed 15 July 2023], http://www.balkanica.rs/balkanica/uploaded/balkanica/balkanica_45/06%20J%20Kalic.pdf; Gajević, "New Belgrade urban fortunes," 7f.; Nicole Münnich, *Belgrad zwischen sozialistischem Herrschaftsanspruch und gesellschaftlichem Eigensinn. Die jugoslawische Hauptstadt als Entwurf und urbane Erfahrung*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2013), 56.

⁶ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 57.

⁷ On a detailed description of the appearance of the town during the time of Lazarević see Kalić, "A millennium of Belgrade," 79-86. Vgl. Gajević, "New Belgrade urban fortunes," 8; "Medieval Serbian Belgrade," [accessed 15 July 2023], <https://www.beograd.rs/en/discover-belgrade/201247-medieval-serbian-belgrade/>; Dejan Medaković, "Der Aufstieg Belgrads zur Residenz- und Hauptstadt," in: *Hauptstädte in Südosteuropa: Geschichte, Funktion, nationale Symbolkraft*, ed. Harald Heppner, (Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1994), 185-194, here 185.



Fig. 1: The fortress of Belgrade in the 15th century (Source: Wikipedia)

In the 15th century, Belgrade became part of the Kingdom of Hungary and played a central role in the defensive fortress belt against the Ottoman Empire. Especially after the final conquest of Serbia by the Ottomans, the strategic importance of the city grew enormously. In the early modern period, the fortified city of Belgrade was considered a “bulwark” of Christianity and a key fortress at the mouth of the Danube and Sava Rivers for the defence of Hungary. The battle for Belgrade between the Hungarians and the Ottomans was now in full swing. As early as 1440, Sultan Murad II failed for the first time to capture the fortress of Belgrade. In 1456, another attack took place. This attempt was thwarted with maximum effort and the city remained under Hungarian rule, but the losses were enormous – Belgrade had badly suffered from the fighting; the cannon fire had caused great damage.⁸

⁸ Kalić, “A millennium of Belgrade,” 87-91; Birgitta Gabriela Hannover Moser, *Belgrad und Novi Sad. Sehenswürdigkeiten, Kultur, Szene, Umland, Reiseinfos*, (Berlin: Trescher, 2013), 22. For a detailed account of the siege see Robert Nisbet Bain, “The Siege of Belgrade by

The Conquest of Belgrade in 1521 and the Transformation of the City

The Ottoman expansionist efforts under Sultan Suleiman I in the 1520s were directed toward the northwest of the empire against the Kingdom of Hungary and later against the Habsburg Empire. The first advance in 1521 was concentrated on the city as well as the fortress of Belgrade, which the Ottomans considered the “key to Hungary”⁹ and was supposed to open the way to Vienna. In contrast to the 15th century, the circumstances had now changed: The Ottoman Empire was on its way to establishing itself as a great power, while Hungary was gradually losing its medieval great power status. The strong central power in the country had given way to a feudal anarchy of the Hungarian elites (magnates). The Hungarian king had failed to raise a powerful army due to a lack of financial resources and military support from the magnates.¹⁰ The conquest of Belgrade in 1521 resulted in the destruction and pillaging of the city as well as the fortress by the Ottomans and paved the way for them to Central and Western Europe.



Fig. 2: Historical woodcut of the siege of Belgrade by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, 1521, (Source: Austrian National Library, Vienna)

Muhammad II, July 1-23, 1456,” *English Historical Review* 7 (1892), 235-252; Pál Fodor, “The Ottoman empire, Byzantium and Western Christianity: the implications of the siege of Belgrade, 1456,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 61 (2008), 43-51; Vilmos von Zsolnay, *Vereinigungsversuche Südosteuropas im XV. Jahrhundert. Johann von Hunyadi*, (Frankfurt am Main et al.: Selke-Verlag, 1967).

⁹ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 58. In several travel reports of the 16th century the term “key (fortress)” is found. Thus Hans Dernschwam wrote in 1555: “Vnd weil Weissenburg an einem solchen orth an der Saw vnd Thuna gelegen, ein schlussel vng[arischen] landtz gewest, ist es gar schlecht bevestiget worden vnd ein spot anzusehen, dan mans von allen ortten beschissen vnd in grund zerprechen mag [...]” *Hans Dernschwam’s Tagebuch einer Reise nach Konstantinopel und Kleinasien (1553/55)*, ed. Franz Babinger, (Studien zur Fuggergeschichte 7, Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1923), 264. Reinhold Lubenau wrote in 1587: “[...] weil sie ein Schlüssel zu dem Ungerlande gewesen, und da auch diese Stadt und Festung der Turck einbekomen, ist Ungern in solchen erbarmlichen Zustandt gerathen.” *Beschreibung der Reisen des Reinhold Lubenau*, Vol. I, ed. Wilhelm Sahn, (Mitteilungen aus der Stadtbibliothek zu Königsberg i. Pr., Vol. 4, Königsberg, 1912-1914), 92f.

¹⁰ Josef Matuz, *Das Osmanische Reich. Grundlinien seiner Geschichte*, (Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges., 1994), 117f.

Belgrade was incorporated into the Sandžak Smederevo¹¹. The establishment of separate administrative and legal structures, incorporating older local administrations, was a common procedure in the Ottoman Empire and was also applied here.¹² The transfer of the pasha's seat from Smederevo to Belgrade changed the role of the city. Although the pasha had the city developed into a Janissary garrison, which meant that it retained its military importance - hence the epithet "dar-al ğihad", "House of Holy War"¹³ -, the administrative function dominated over the strategic importance of the fortress, which was now called Kalemegdan.¹⁴



Figs. 3 and 4: "Graffiti" left by Ottoman soldiers at the entrance area to the fortress: keçe (Janissary cap) and scimitar (single-edged sword with a convex curved blade), (Photo: Author)



After the Battle of Mohács in 1526, which ended with a heavy defeat of the Hungarians, large parts of Hungary were integrated into the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Belgrade lost its status as a border fortress, but this led to an upswing in the city. It developed into one of the most important trade hubs on the Balkan Peninsula. Soon it was the second largest Ottoman city on European soil, only Constantinople was bigger.¹⁵

¹¹ In the Ottoman Empire, a sandshak was a military and administrative district below the level of the eyâlet, i.e. a subdivision in the provincial administration.

¹² Tobias Strahl, *Kultur, Erbe, Konflikt. Kulturgutzerstörung in Kroatien, Bosnien-Herzegovina und Kosovo 1991-2004*, (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2018), 43.

¹³ The common term is "dār al-harb", "House of War". This meant all areas in which the Islamic order still had to be established. This was primarily done through "jihad", the holy war. Bertrand M. Buchmann and Claudia Reichl-Ham, *Habsburger und Osmanen. Eine bilaterale Geschichte*, (Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums, Vol. 29, Vienna 2021), 15, note 4.

¹⁴ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 59; Binting, "Belgrad," 52; Marko Popović, "Siege of Belgrade in 1521 and Restoration of Fortifications after Conquest," in *Belgrade 1521-1867*, ed. Srđan Rudić, Selim Aslantaş and Dragana Amedoski, (Belgrade: The Institute of History Belgrade: Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, Turkish Cultural Centre, 2018), 5-25, here 9f. Therefore, there was no reason to modernize or expand the fortifications.

¹⁵ Gajević, "New Belgrade urban fortunes," 9; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 59.

The Ottoman takeover of Belgrade caused an extensive ethnic shift within the city's population through migration. Sultan Suleiman applied the policy of state-controlled forced migration or population transfer (*sürgün*). This was a common means used by the Ottomans to secure their rule over newly conquered territories and to neutralize the original inhabitants, especially the elites of a country, by isolating them far from their homeland.¹⁶ High-ranking noble Serbian families “disappeared” into the vastness of Anatolia and made way for a new “elite”, mostly of non-noble origin, who received land or properties from the sultan as a fief.¹⁷

Large parts of Belgrade's Serbian population were relocated to Anatolia in the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople. The name Belgrade Forest for a recreation area in the north of Istanbul is still a reminder of this today. In return, numerous Muslims from Anatolia were settled in and around Belgrade: In addition to nomadic Turkic tribes, who were thus forced to settle in the Balkans, these were mainly trained artisans, administrators, functionaries, dignitaries, clergy and soldiers.¹⁸

Since the Ottoman settlement policy was characterized by a certain degree of tolerance, Armenians/Aromans, Greeks and Roma also settled in the city as merchants, traders and residents, as well as Jews,¹⁹ who were well-liked in the Ottoman Empire because of their trade contacts. The population grew rapidly, and trade and commerce flourished. From the 1530s onwards, Belgrade experienced an economic boom that soon turned the city into one of the most important trading centres of the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁶ Claudia Reichl-Ham, “(Zwangs-)Migration am Balkan und im Osmanischen Reich im 19./20. Jahrhundert,” in *Zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Festschrift für Erwin A. Schmidl zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Alma Hannig and Claudia Reichl-Ham, (Vienna: Militaria Verlag, 2022), 32-56, here 33-36. See also Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “Migrationen von Bevölkerungsgruppen in Südosteuropa vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts,” *Südost-Forschungen* 59-60 (2000), 125-148; Andreas Helmedach, “Bevölkerungspolitik im Zeichen der Aufklärung. Zwangsumsiedlung und Zwangsassimilation im Habsburgerreich des 18. Jahrhunderts – eine noch ungelöste Forschungsaufgabe,” in *Zwangsmigrationen in Mittel- und Südosteuropa*, ed. Wolfgang Höpken, (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitäts-Verlag, 1996), 41-62; Klaus-Peter Matschke, “Zwangsmigrationen in der älteren Geschichte Südosteuropas,” *Comparativ* 1 (1996), 63-70.

¹⁷ Buchmann and Reichl-Ham, *Habsburger und Osmanen*, 90f.; Reichl-Ham, “(Zwangs-)Migration am Balkan,” 34; Hans Georg Majer, “Südosteuropa im Osmanischen Reich. Einige Grundgegebenheiten,” in *Osmanen und Islam in Südosteuropa*, ed. Reinhard Lauer and Hans Georg Majer, (Berlin et al.: De Gruyter, 2014), 9-36, here 23.

¹⁸ Ema Miljković, “Ottoman Heritage in the Balkans: The Ottoman Empire in Serbia, Serbia in the Ottoman Empire,” *SDU. Journal of Social Sciences* 27 (2012), 129-137, here 135; Kenneweg, “Studien,” 15; Buchmann and Reichl-Ham, *Habsburger und Osmanen*, 90f.

¹⁹ The Sephardim made up 80 per cent of Belgrade's Jews since the end of the 15th century (Hannover Moser, *Belgrad und Novi Sad*, 100).

Travellers such as Jakob Betzek,²⁰ who visited Belgrade in 1564, and Reinhold Lubenau were fascinated by the lively trade in the city and mentioned in particular the merchants from Ragusa in this context.²¹ These had received extensive privileges from the Ottomans for trading with the Ottoman Empire.²² The Ottoman traveller Evlija Çelebi reported rapturously that in this city even the poorest would become rich.²³



Fig. 5: Mehmed Paša Sokolović's Fountain, 2nd half of the 16th century, on the Kalemegdan, one of the few relics from the Ottoman period, (Photo: Author)

Already shortly after the conquest, the reconstruction of the fortress and fortifications, as well as the city, began. In the following decades, Belgrade underwent a fundamental expansion and transformation into an oriental Ottoman city, as some kind of “over-forming” or “re-shaping”²⁴ of the medieval urban structures based on the model of Islamic cities took place. The city was divided into quarters for the individual ethnic groups, and buildings typical of Ottoman culture shaped the cityscape – mosques, schools, caravanserais, etc. – as was the case with other conquered cities such as Skopje or Niš. The Balkan cities, including Belgrade, were dominated by their own characteristic Ottoman architectural style, which had a lasting impact on the cityscape of each individual city. Their appearance changed from European cities to Ottoman-influenced ones.²⁵ The cultural “overforming” or “transformation” also affected everyday areas such as language, food, music and artisan tradition.

²⁰ Jakob Betzek, *Gesandtschaftsreise nach Ungarn und in die Türkei im Jahre 1564/65*, ed. Karl Nehring, (Veröffentlichungen des Finnisch-Ugrischen Seminars an der Universität München, Ser. C, Vol. 10, Munich, 1979).

²¹ Betzek, *Gesandtschaftsreise*, 14; *Beschreibung der Reisen des Reinhold Lubenau I.*, 93.

²² Suraiya Faroqhi, “Die osmanische Handelspolitik des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts zwischen Dubrovnik und Venedig,” in *Das Osmanische Reich und Europa 1683 bis 1789. Konflikt, Entspannung und Austausch*, ed. Gernot Heiss and Grete Klingenstein, (Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, Vol. 10, Munich: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1983), 207-222.

²³ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 64.

²⁴ This term can be found in Strahl, *Kultur, Erbe, Konflikt*, 42, and Münnich, *Belgrad*, 73.

²⁵ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 59; Bintinger, “Belgrad,” 52f.; Gajevic, “New Belgrade urban fortunes,” 9.



Fig. 6: The Ottoman quarter Dorćol during the rule of the Ottomans,
(Source: <http://beogradskonasledje.rs>)

The urban space of a city was the same throughout the Ottoman Empire; it was divided into two large areas: a “public” centre and a “private” residential area with its associated gardens and fields, both usually protected by a wall.²⁶ The institutions that significantly shaped urban life were not supported by the city or the state, but by wealthy donors within the framework of so-called pious or family foundations (*vakıfs*), with the charitable and sacred institutions and buildings they financed. The proceeds from trade served as maintenance for mosques, schools, hospitals, baths, bazaars, bridges or as retirement income for the donor family.²⁷

²⁶ In the case of Belgrade these walls are clearly visible on a map of after 1693. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Kartensammlung, Sign. AB 424 (4), Gabriel Bodenehr, *Neuester Plan Der Stadt und Vestung Belgrad*, [after 1693].

²⁷ Markus Koller, “Die osmanische Geschichte Südosteuropas,” *Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO)* 43, [accessed 15 July 2023], <http://ieg-ego.eu/de/threads/modelle-und-stereotypen/tuerkengefahr-exotismus-orientalismus/markus-koller-die-osmanische-geschichte-suedosteuropas>; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 60; Hans Joachim Kissling, “Die türkische Stadt auf dem Balkan,” in *Die Stadt in Südosteuropa. Struktur und Geschichte*, ed. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, (Munich: Trofenik Verlag, 1968), 72-83, here 74-80; Uwe Becker, “Der osmanische Basar I.,” *Osmanisches Reich*, s. p., [accessed 15 July 2023], <https://www.osmanischesreich.de/kunst-kultur-1/städte-märkte/basar-i/>.

There were four groups of endowments: 1) the public bath (hamam) and other sanitary facilities, 2) the mosque with its social facilities,²⁸ 3) the dervish monastery (tekije) with its soup kitchens and caravanserais,²⁹ 4) the bazaar,³⁰ also called bedestan in large cities³¹, or the čaršija, central point and economic center and thus the public space of an Ottoman city.

The bazaar did not only fulfil an economic but also a social function, as it was the meeting place of the city's inhabitants, who otherwise segregated themselves in their districts, and acted as a kind of "information exchange" between the districts. Large squares, which dominated public life in European cities, did not exist in Ottoman cities. In an Ottoman city like Belgrade political institutions and functions that were already typical of a European city at that time, such as a city hall and a mayor, did not exist either. This shows the main difference in the political organization. The Ottoman city did not have self-administration, separate jurisdiction, civil rights privileges or the ability to grant market rights. Government was represented solely by emissaries of the sultan or/and by local rulers.³² Thus, during Ottoman rule, neither a nobility nor a bourgeois class or autochthonous economic elites, as in most Western European states, could develop, because the Ottomans strove to level or homogenize social differences within the Slavic part of the population.³³

The system, which relied increasingly on private initiatives to shape public space, was also beneficial for the development of Belgrade. Private merchants who had settled there now invested in the city's development, as they could make a profit from the newly created infrastructure. This was also a reason why Belgrade developed into a flourishing Ottoman city.

²⁸ The first mosque in Belgrade was the Great Mosque of Sultan Suleiman in the Lower Town at the foot of the fortress, the rededicated former Church of the Assumption, seat of the Serbian Metropolitan. It was destroyed in 1688 during the Habsburg attack on Belgrade (Strahl, *Kultur, Erbe, Konflikt*, 78).

²⁹ Fatma Acun, "A Portrait of the Ottoman Cities," *The Muslim World* 92 (Fall 2000), 255-281, here 263.

³⁰ The word bazaar has its origin in Persian and means four-sided square. See Becker, "Der osmanische Basar I.," s. p.; Uwe Becker, "Der osmanische Basar II.," *Osmanisches Reich*, s. p., [accessed 15 July 2023], <https://www.osmanischesreich.de/kunst-kultur-1/staedte-maerkte/basar-ii/>; Mohamed Scharabi, *Der Basar. Das traditionelle Stadtzentrum im Nahen Osten und seine Handelseinrichtungen*, (Tübingen: Wasmuth Verlag, 1985).

³¹ The bedestan was a typical Ottoman building, roofed and secured with locks, in which goods and personal possessions were stored and traded separately from the rest of the bazaar. It was usually made of stone and thus offered a high degree of security, especially against fire. Koller, "Die osmanische Geschichte Südosteuropas," 42; Becker, "Der osmanische Basar II.," s. p.; Acun, "A Portrait of the Ottoman Cities," 267.

³² Münnich, *Belgrad*, 60f.

³³ Kenneweg, "Studien," 20.

From the administrative point of view, Belgrade was initially divided into two so-called “varoši”³⁴ – the Muslim and the Christian-Serbian ones – a division that lasted until the 19th century. While the čaršija represented the city’s public space, the residential area was divided into independent districts or quarters, the mahalas. These quarters represented the basic administrative level and were the basis for the collection of taxes. An average district contained between 25 and 50 houses, often separated by walls.³⁵ The Muslim ones were subordinate to a local imam. Therefore, the houses were usually grouped around a mosque.³⁶ The streets were narrow, and cart traffic was almost impossible due to the mostly non-existent thoroughfares.³⁷ People with the same religious affiliation, ethnic group, descent or profession lived in these mahalas and were subject to a strict social neighbourhood order: Everyday life in the quarters was organized according to the rules and traditions cultivated by the residents, which led to the development of individual identities. This environment offered the inhabitants protection and care, but on the other hand, it also created an atmosphere of strong social control.³⁸

The poorer inhabitants lived in the outlying districts, which were recognizably different from the neighbourhoods near the city centre, where the wealthy upper class (the ruling elite, the notables such as the wealthier merchants, the spiritual leaders and the higher representatives of the artisans) had their homes.³⁹ The defence of each mahala lay in the hands of the city commander and his troops.⁴⁰

Apart from the construction of the numerous residential houses – in 1632 there are said to have been 8,000 already –, public building activity in Belgrade also increased enormously, from Islamic religious buildings such as mosques⁴¹ or dervish monasteries to secular buildings financed by wealthy donors, such as baths, marketplaces, fountains and caravanserais.⁴² The art historian Divna Đurić-Zamolo succeeded in proving the existence of no less than 275 (public) oriental buildings, including 55 mosques, from the period of

³⁴ The term “varoš” is derived from Hungarian and means castle or town.

³⁵ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 59.

³⁶ Gajević, “New Belgrade urban fortunes,” 10.

³⁷ Bintinger, “Belgrad,” 53; Acun, “A Portrait of the Ottoman Cities,” 267; Majer, “Südosteuropa,” 26; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 59.

³⁸ Koller, “Die osmanische Geschichte Südosteuropas,” 44.

³⁹ Koller, “Die osmanische Geschichte Südosteuropas,” 44; Acun, “A Portrait of the Ottoman Cities,” 267, 270f.

⁴⁰ Uwe Becker, “Die osmanische Stadt,” *Osmanisches Reich*, s. p., [accessed 15 July 2023], <https://www.osmanischesreich.de/kunst-kultur-1/st%C3%A4dte-m%C3%A4rkte/>.

⁴¹ Vgl. Strahl, *Kultur, Erbe, Konflikt*, 78f.

⁴² Münnich, *Belgrad*, 62.

Ottoman rule.⁴³ The city centre of Ottoman Belgrade was in the Dorćol district, where the economic centre with its artisans and merchants developed around the marketplace. The most important *čaršija* of the city was also located here, as well many of the pious foundations such as the hospital, a fountain, a medrese and several mosques.⁴⁴ The urban planning concept of the Ottomans envisaged the dominance of green colours, individual houses and beautiful gardens. The numerous travellers who stopped in the city on their way to the Orient described it in their reports as a rising and colourful city.⁴⁵

The period up to the 1680s was characterized by quiet development and a not insignificant degree of economic prosperity – by that time the city had already outgrown its original boundaries and was spreading more and more along the well-known trade routes.⁴⁶

Belgrade under Habsburg Rule 1717-1739



Fig. 7: Belgrade around 1717, (Source: Museum of Military History, Vienna)

In 1688, 1717 and 1789 the Habsburg troops succeeded in conquering Belgrade three times, but failed to hold it permanently. The conquest and destruction of the city in 1717 by Prince Eugene and the peace treaty of

⁴³ Divna Đurić-Zamolo, *Beograd kao orijentalna varoš pod Turcima* [Belgrade as an Oriental City under the Turks], (Beograd: Muzej grada, 1977). She found out these numbers on the basis of historical city maps, travel descriptions and administrative documents of the Ottoman governors as well as the later Serbian government. Some authors even write of 80 mosques! See e.g. Machiel Kiel, “Osmanische Baudenkmäler in Südosteuropa. Typologie und Verhältnis zur lokalen Kunst – Probleme der Erhaltung in den heutigen Nationalstaaten,” in *Die Staaten Südosteuropas und die Osmanen*, ed. Hans Georg Majer, (Südosteuropa-Jahrbuch, Vol. 19, Munich: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1989), 23-76, here 29f.

⁴⁴ Nothing is known about the fate of these buildings, with the exception of a mosque called “Imaret džamija”. The mosque was used as a uniform magazine during Habsburg rule, then again as a mosque before it was demolished in the years after the final withdrawal of the Ottomans in 1867 (Đurić-Zamolo, *Beograd*, 63).

⁴⁵ Đurić-Zamolo, *Beograd*, 64; Bintinger, “Belgrad,” 56; Gajević, “New Belgrade urban fortunes,” 10.

⁴⁶ Bintinger, “Belgrad,” 53; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 65.

Passarowitz (Požarevac) in 1718 were especially significant for its further fate. Until the Ottoman reconquest in 1739, northern Serbia, which included the entire Pashlik of Belgrade, was under Habsburg rule.



Fig. 8: Belgrade at the time of the siege by the Habsburgs under Prince Eugene of Savoy, (Source: Museum of Military History, Vienna)

The so-called “Kingdom of Serbia” was directly incorporated into the monarchy as a *dominium regium* within the framework of the *Neoacquisita* (newly acquired domains) and adopted the Habsburg administrative structures as well as the instructions and regulations drawn up for the *Neoacquisita*. For the city of Belgrade, this was another important turning point.⁴⁷ The focus shifted once again in favour of the fortress function, for Belgrade once more found itself in a border position between two great empires. The city acted as a centre of operations for the entire Balkan region and the fortress was again considered a bulwark in the fight against the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁸



Fig. 9: Transformation of Belgrade Fortress during Habsburg rule [partial demolition after 1739], exhibition model in Nebojša Tower, (Photo: Author)

⁴⁷ Theodor von Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad unter der Regierung Kaiser Karls VI. (1717-1739): mit Benützung archivalischer und anderer Quellen*, (Vienna: Holzhausen Verlag, 1908), 29, 72 note 27.

⁴⁸ Bintinger, “Belgrad,” 59; Gajevic, “New Belgrade urban fortunes,” 12; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 66-69.



Fig. 10: Charles VI Gate in the former Lower Town, (Photo: Author)

During this period, the appearance of the city and fortress of Belgrade also changed, “subsidized” by Pope Benedict XIII in the form of a “Turkish tax”. In addition to the transformation of the fortress into a modern fortress with bastions based on Vauban’s model, the plans of the Habsburgs also envisaged a comprehensive redesign of the city, which was based on the European model, with straight streets, large squares and monumental buildings for the administration and the army built around them, as well as churches, monasteries, hospitals, etc.⁴⁹ The primary goal was to erase the Ottoman heritage. Thus, the largest mosque was converted into a cathedral and most of the 55 mosques into homes, monasteries, places of worship and hospitals; only about 14 mosques continued to exist. Belgrade thus lost most of its oriental appearance, acquiring baroque contours and the look of a European city instead.

According to Theodor von Stefanović-Vilovsky,

“the former Ottoman city, in which the small Ottoman houses were arranged in irregular groups, like swallows’ nests, and the narrow and excrement-covered streets made passage impossible, while in the busiest places mosque followed mosque and minaret followed minaret, [...] became a strongly fortified city, crisscrossed by regular and beautiful streets, the picturesque location of which [...], [the] public buildings, churches and monasteries remind[ed] so vividly of Vienna [...].”⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 23f.; Gajević, “New Belgrade urban fortunes,” 12.

⁵⁰ Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 28.

The Habsburgs promoted the emigration of Muslims, who fled to Niš or Vidin, and the immigration of as many Christians as possible – especially Catholics. The colonists from the Habsburg and the Holy Roman Empires (including more than 300 artisans, interpreters and officers from the Palatinate) as well as from other European countries were settled in the so-called “German Town”, within the fortress walls from the Stambul Gate to the Danube.⁵¹ An important principle was that “the population of the capital must be German by nationality, Catholic by religion” and that “the native population, in this case the Raiscian or Serbian, should be relegated to the city’s territory outside the fortifications⁵²”.⁵³ However, this strict division could not be carried out consistently, because the wealthier Greeks, Armenians and Serbs, in whose hands the wholesale trade mostly lay, also had their houses in the city. Stefanović-Vilovsky noted with regard to the new arrivals that “among them there were only a few wealthy people, on the other hand, a great deal of riffraff, who by easy acquisition harmed the striving and honest artisan”.⁵⁴ However, the new settlers were urgently needed, because according to a Habsburg census only about 1,000 families lived in the city in 1717.⁵⁵



Fig. 11: Belgrade around 1720. The change in the cityscape is already clearly visible! [baroque elements, squares, streets], Austrian National Library, Vienna, (Photo: Author)

⁵¹ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 67.

⁵² I.e. the “Serbian or Raiscian Town” at the Sava River.

⁵³ Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 29.

⁵⁴ Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 31.

⁵⁵ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 67.

The division into varoši, which had their own administrations, remained. The “German Town” received a kind of limited municipal autonomy by imperial decree of 18 February 1724 and had the right to elect a municipal judge. It had a magistrate, who had to be confirmed by the government in Vienna and was entrusted with the management of municipal affairs. In addition, the municipality was granted the right to collect certain fees, to determine the number of inns and taverns, to issue pharmacist licenses and to supervise church and school affairs as far as they concerned Catholic affairs in Belgrade.⁵⁶ The “Serbian Town” of Belgrade, which was located outside the fortifications, also enjoyed a certain degree of self-government. In accordance with tradition, the Serbs had the right to elect a knez, i.e. a municipal judge, and four jurors who were entrusted with the management of municipal agendas.⁵⁷ Apart from the Greeks and Armenians, there continued to be a Jewish community in Belgrade during Habsburg rule. However, they experienced a (spatial) segregation: they were assigned their own Jewish court and had to pay a so-called tolerance fee.⁵⁸

The Reconquest of Belgrade by the Ottomans and a Renewed Change

In the years 1737 to 1739 there was another war between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, which culminated in the renewed conquest of Belgrade by the Ottomans. The city that the Ottomans again took possession of now had little in common with the one they had to leave 20 years earlier. The fortress had been rebuilt, the streets straightened, many houses demolished. In addition, the siege of the city and fortress had once again led to great destruction and a massive loss of population. Many inhabitants had fled the city. The former inhabitants of Belgrade settled in Semlin (Zemun), Essegg (Osijek), Szegedin (Szeged) and Temeşvár (Timișoara), as well as in the so-called Bridgehead of Petrovaradin (Neusatz, Novi Sad).⁵⁹ In accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Belgrade of 18 September 1739, “Belgrade [...] was to be left to the Turks with the enceinte⁶⁰ as it had existed in 1717, together with all new buildings and additions made since that time [...], together with all public and private buildings”.⁶¹ For this reason, before returning the city to the Ottomans, the Habsburgs had blown up all the

⁵⁶ Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 30.

⁵⁷ Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 32.

⁵⁸ According to Hannover Moser, *Belgrade und Novi Sad*, 100, there had already been reprisals against Jews and forced resettlements to Bohemia and Moravia during the conquest of Belgrade in 1688. See also Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 33.

⁵⁹ Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 60.

⁶⁰ I.e. fortification line.

⁶¹ Moritz von Angeli, “Der Krieg mit der Pforte 1736-39,” *Mitteilungen des k. k. Kriegsarchivs* 5 (1881), 409-479, here 474.

fortifications they had built after 1717 (both of the city and the citadel, up to and including the covered road), and the detached works beyond the Danube and Sava Rivers. Thus, the fortress lost a great deal of its defensive power. For the demolition work, which ended in June 1740, Feldzeugmeister Count Samuel Schmettau had requested 4,000 workers, who were recruited in Lower and Upper Austria and even in Bohemia.⁶² After the conclusion of the Peace of Belgrade, the Ottomans returned to Belgrade, and “as soon as they entered the city, they showed their anger both towards the Serbs and the Serbian sanctuaries”. The magnificent residence of the Serbian metropolitan was destroyed, and the church “they plundered and tore down the vault”.⁶³ Belgrade now underwent another transformation and once again became a “city with oriental characteristics in a border location”. It was now divided into a western Christian-Serbian and eastern Muslim-Jewish part. However, there were no longer such profound changes as had been the case some 200 centuries earlier. The Ottomans attempted to rebuild the old main *čaršija*, but the Habsburgs had erected residential buildings on the site where the stores used to be. Therefore, many smaller *čaršijas* were built instead.

There are two reasons why this new change of rule did not bring about a comprehensive transformation in the city: on the one hand, Belgrade remained a contested border city and the situation thus remained unsettled. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was weakened due to internal crises – a weakening of central power that was felt especially in the periphery of the empire and thus also in Belgrade. The disintegration of state power went hand in hand with political terror exercised primarily by local Ottoman elites; in Belgrade, these were the Janissaries. It was a time of looting, violence and chaos, which eventually led to uprisings of the Serbian population in 1804 and 1813.⁶⁴ Economically, it was also no longer possible to revive the heydays of earlier years, since trade links with the Ottoman Empire were mostly cut after the Habsburgs had conquered Belgrade. The former long-distance trade was replaced by agriculture and livestock exports to the Habsburg Monarchy. However, even if the former wealth did not return to Belgrade, the city regained modest prosperity in the course of the 19th century.⁶⁵

⁶² Stefanović-Vilovsky, *Belgrad*, 63f.

⁶³ Joakim Vujić, *Putošestvije po Srbiji, I knjiga 1828. Godina* [Travelling in Serbia, Ist Book 1828], (Belgrade, 1901), 23; *Kathedrale Hl. Michael (Belgrad)*, s. p., [accessed 15 July 2023], [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kathedrale_Hl._Michael_\(Belgrad\)#cite_note-1](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kathedrale_Hl._Michael_(Belgrad)#cite_note-1).

⁶⁴ Bintinger, “Belgrad,” 60; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 69f.; Matuz, *Das Osmanische Reich*, 213; Claudia Reichl-Ham, “The Serb Uprising from 1804 to 1813 and the Austrian and Russian Reactions,” in *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present. Acta of the 36th International Congress of Military History*, ed. Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, Jan Hofenaar and Alan Lemmers, (Amsterdam, 2011), 663-673.

⁶⁵ Münnich, *Belgrad*, 69.

In the Search of a Serbian Identity

Until 1830, Ottoman rule was predominant in Belgrade. Many Serbs had fled to the Habsburg Empire during the 1804 and 1813 uprisings, and despite concentrated resettlements by Prince Miloš, the population increased only slowly. In 1830, Serbia was recognized by the Ottomans as an autonomous but tributary principality. Belgrade became the centre of the new Serbian state, but it was not until 1841 that it became its capital.⁶⁶ After having been granted the status of autonomy, the new Serbian ruling class, who wanted to demonstrate that it now had access to previously barred privileges, initially retained the Ottoman Oriental-influenced lifestyle and even took it as a model.⁶⁷ The residence of Princess Ljubica is one of the best-preserved examples of the civic architecture of that period; the spatial concept was still based on the oriental tradition. From the middle of the 19th century, however, the principality of Serbia broke with the Ottoman past, which also manifested itself in urban planning. There was a general trend towards a so-called “de-Ottomanization” or “de-Orientalization”.⁶⁸ The transformation of the city with a multitude of urban planning innovations and the establishment of the corresponding administrative functions were accompanied by the import of cultural models from the West. As in many other successor states to the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, almost everything reminding of the Ottoman past was displaced and largely destroyed.



Fig. 12: Turbe of Damad Ali Pasha on the Kalemegdan. Damad Ali Pasha died in the battle of Petrovaradin against the imperial forces under Prince Eugene of Savoy in 1716. His body was brought to Belgrade. (Photo: Author)

⁶⁶ Binting, “Belgrad,” 68f.; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 71.

⁶⁷ Mirjana Prošić-Dvornić, “The Reurbanization of Belgrade after the Second World War,” in *Die Volkskultur Südosteuropas in der Moderne*, ed. Klaus Roth, (Munich, 1992), 75-102, here 83.

⁶⁸ Klaus Roth, “Osmanische Spuren in der Alltagskultur Südosteuropas,” in *Die Staaten Südosteuropas*, ed. Majer, 319-332, here 324f.

With the elimination of the oriental urban structures and the destruction of the architectural heritage of the Ottoman Empire, often stylized as a “fight against the minarets of the numerous mosques”, Belgrade again experienced a politically and symbolically motivated “over-forming” or “reshaping”, this time against the background of the formation of the Serbian nation-state.⁶⁹ This “Serbianisation” was based on the emigration of the Muslims and the withdrawal of Ottoman garrisons on the one hand, and on the influx of Serbs from the villages and from the Habsburg monarchy on the other.⁷⁰ The takeover of the city by the Serbs and their efforts to strengthen and affirm Serbian identity were reflected in the cityscape after 1840. According to the ethnologist Klaus Roth, what was at stake here, as in other Balkan cities, was nothing less than a

“very emotionally charged elimination of all visible traces of the Ottoman past: the demolition of countless mosques and public buildings, total urban renewal with the erasure of entire Ottoman residential quarters [...] were not only physical acts, but to a large extent also symbolic ones.”⁷¹

As during Habsburg rule, the transformation of Belgrade led to the replacement of Ottoman public and religious buildings with new architectural forms and types of construction. This mainly affected the numerous mosques, which were replaced by Orthodox church buildings. Travellers of the time were fascinated by Belgrade’s European flair, but the break with the oriental, Ottoman past seemed radical to many.⁷² Felix Kanitz reported around 1868 that the Ottoman-inhabited district of Dorćol and the streets adjacent to Kalemegdan “made a sad, highly disconcerting impression due to their desolation and devastation in some places.”⁷³ Most of the mosques were already in ruins, only a few had been left in the city, such as the Bajrakli Mosque or the Batal Džamija. The latter was to be transformed into a Serbian

⁶⁹ Bintinger, “Belgrad,” 69. According to Kiel, “Osmanische Baudenkmäler,” 25, up to 98 per cent of the Ottoman building stock was lost in some areas during these destructive actions, including Belgrade.

⁷⁰ Strahl, *Kultur, Erbe, Konflikt*, 81; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 73; Holm Sundhausen, “Gesellschaftsgeschichte Serbiens 1804-1914,” in *Serbien und Montenegro*, ed. Walter Lukan, Ljubinka Trgovčević and Dragan Vukčević, (Österreichische Osthefte, Vol. 18, Vienna and Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2005), 193-214, here 194f.

⁷¹ Roth, “Osmanische Spuren,” 325.

⁷² Bintinger, “Belgrad,” 75; Daniel Göler and Holger Lehmeier, “Belgrad – Periphere Metropole im Europäischen Städtesystem?,” in *Europa: Metropolen im Wandel*, ed. Walter Matzner and Robert Musil, (Vienna: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2011), 341-359, here 343; Hannover Moser, *Belgrad und Novi Sad*, 31f.; Münnich, *Belgrad*, 73; Nataša Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards. Belgrad im 19. Jahrhundert*, (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), 17.

⁷³ Felix Philipp Kanitz, *Serbien. Historisch-ethnographische Reisestudien aus den Jahren 1859-1868*, (Leipzig: Verlagsbuchhandlung von Hermann Fries, 1868), 434.

national museum, but this idea was ultimately not realized and the džamija was finally demolished in 1873. Incidentally, the Parliament building was later erected on this site.⁷⁴



Figs. 13, 14: Bajrakli Mosque, (Wikipedia/Photo: Author)

The only remaining secular Ottoman building is that of the former Belgrade High School, founded in 1808 by Dositej Obradović, the first higher education institution in Serbia. This building was probably built as a residence for the Belgrade “defterdar” (head of the Ottoman provincial treasury).⁷⁵

Despite all efforts to give Belgrade a European flair, many a traveller, such as Charles-Édouard Jeanneret-Gris, better known as Le Corbusier, still saw the city at the beginning of the 20th century as a small, more oriental than European-looking market town with little representative architecture and an inharmoniously structured cityscape: “Capitale dérisoire; pire: ville malhonnête, sale, désorganisée” [Miserable capital; worse: dishonest, dirty, disorganized city].⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Kanitz, *Serbien*, 435, 440.

⁷⁵ Today the museum dedicated to Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and Dimitrije „Dositej” Obradović is located there (Strahl, *Kultur, Erbe, Konflikt*, 79).

⁷⁶ Le Corbusier, *Le Voyage d’Orient 1910-1912*, ed. Charles Edouard Jeanneret, (Paris: Les Editions Forces vives, 1966), 39.



Fig. 15: View of the Lower Town today with hamam, remains of the fortress/town wall with Charles VI Gate and military kitchen and in the background the Nebojša Tower, (Photo: Author)

The city owes its current appearance mainly to the urban-planning expansions after the First and especially after the Second World War, which were based on previous heavy destruction. To this day, however, Belgrade's cityscape is shaped by its contested past.



Fig. 16: Former Serbian Ministry of Defence building destroyed by NATO attacks in 1999, (Source: Wikipedia)

Most recently, in 1999, the NATO air raids set the city back in its development. Even today, ruins bear witness to the attacks, numerous construction projects remained unfinished after the war, and other buildings are empty or no longer in use after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

HAVANA: A SEA PORT CITY AFFECTED BY WAR

Cpt. Jose R. VALLESPÍN (Spain)

Introduction

Wars are complex events that have effects of many different classes, and those effects are produced at very different levels. Throughout human history, cities have frequently been targets of military operations of many kinds, and their consequences have produced all types of effects on them. Many cities have been damaged or completely destroyed, or even erased from the face of the Earth, but those are examples of effects of war on a short to medium terms. Other cities have been affected by wars on a more strategical scale, and not only in the form of damages and destruction, but on the contrary, in the way they were being constructed and the form they developed physically. Sometimes cities have developed mainly because the reality of war. Moreover, wars have significantly impacted their population through various factors such as economic, governmental, racial, and others, profoundly influencing their fundamental structures and frameworks, commonly referred to as their charters.

There are cities of many types. One particular case, very common anyway, is that of port cities, urban bodies that lay on the coast and are used to harbor vessels that sail the seas. These tend to be the most prosperous of all cities, as the sea, regardless the perception on the inland man, has always been more a pathway than a frontier. Therefore, many port cities have played a prominent role in war. But the sea, compared to the land, is a hidden world, and the effects of war on port cities have correspondingly been less visible than in land locked ones.

Havana, the capital of Cuba, is a good example of a city affected by war mainly for its maritime dimension. As we shall see, the development of both the physical and the human halves of Havana have been profoundly influenced by the different conflicts in which it was involved. And Havana is not just a port city, but it is the heart of a rich hinterland and it is not only the capital of the island in which it lays, but was the most valuable city of a vast part of a worldly structure, Spain and its dominions, an empire based on the control of the maritime realm. Different geostrategic factors made Havana the hub of the maritime lines that connected Spain with its overseas provinces.

Havana was founded almost right at the start of the Spanish establishment in America, and as other main capitals of the Spanish America like Mexico or Lima, was raised from scratch. This reflected the fact that the Caribbean was an area where human civilization have developed only moderately and the Spaniards found there no urban concentrations of significance. For the same reason, and for the obvious fact that they came from the sea, Havana was erected on the coast. Therefore, from its very beginning, Havana has been exposed to the enemies, and has suffered the effects of conflicts and war throughout its history. It has been under threat from the sea from the beginning, starting with pirates, corsairs and then proceeding to full-fledged wars.

The Beginnings

San Cristobal de la Habana, as it is her full name, was initially established in 1514 by Pánfilo de Narváez on the southern coast of Cuba, but very soon this location showed to be deficient and the city was moved to its current situation in 1519, and gradually but constantly, grew up to become the jewel of the Spanish monarchy overseas. It acquired the rank of city in 1592 and in 1607 was recognized as capital of the island.

In the beginning, Havana faced a very little threat. It was just a small village protected by a medieval palisade and it had no formal military establishment. There is no record of significant opposition from the indigenous taino and guanahatabey populations. After a first attack by French privateers in 1538, the first fortification, the Old Fort (*Fuerza Vieja*), was erected in 1539, still as a medieval style construction. It was built by the channel that connects the bay with the open sea, indicating that the threat they expected was from the sea itself. Not by chance, it was close to where the first small shipyards were established. The construction of this first fort didn't prevent the 1555 sacking of the city by French corsair Jaques de Sores

During the initial phase of Spanish colonization in the New World, there was a demand for goods to support the growing European population, rather than relying solely on imports from the newly discovered lands. To regulate this trade, the Spanish crown established a monopoly controlled by the *Casa de la Contratación* in Seville. This monopoly was necessary to prevent non-Spanish merchants from selling their own goods and to consolidate power under the crown. However, the regulated trade conducted by the *Casa de la Contratación* was insufficient to meet the settlers' needs, leading to widespread smuggling. Despite the crown's efforts to suppress this illegal activity, it persisted and even involved local authorities in some cases. As we will see, smuggling only increased over time.

For France, England and other European kingdoms, there was no reason to accept the Spanish domination of the New World, especially when the Reform made void the rules of the Catholic Church in their realms. Throughout the XVI century this feeling increased their desire to contest that domination. First France and England, and then the United Provinces, developed a desire to steal Spanish goods, trade circuits and finally territories in America. Among those goods, silver from the mines soon discovered and exploited in Mexico (Zacatecas) and Peru (Potosí, nowadays Bolivia) was the most attractive for them.

From smuggling sprung overt piracy and, when wars broke out in Europe, initially mainly France against the Hapsburg Empire, piracy became the basis of privateering. This became the first important threat to Havana. Well known is the sacking of the city by Jaques de Sores in 1555 taking advantage of the little defense of the village at the time. Other ports in the area have been attacked before but Havana have been speared so far. This attack made the authorities to start the serious fortification of it. A new and stronger fort was erected in 1558 near the place of the old fort, destroyed by de Sores. It was named *Real Fuerza* (Royal Fort), a renaissance style castle in which Stereotomy was first used. The engineer who started the work of raising it was probably Bartolomé Sánchez, and it was certainly continued under the direction of Francisco de Calona from 1561. Under its protection, the first *atarazana* (shipyard for galleys) grew in size and production. Initially small ships for the local needs were constructed there, and later on galleons for the protection of the *Carrera de Indias*, mainly for the *Armada de Barlovento* (Windward Squadron) and some other minor warships for the local patrol duties were built during the early XVII century. It was the dawn of a golden era of naval construction in Havana that will be explained later on. Soon it was obvious that they were stronger and lasted longer than the ships built in Spain thanks mainly to the superior quality of the local wood. These qualities were specially sought for warships. Therefore, the more pirates and privateers threatened maritime traffic and coastal cities and the more wars were waged, the more interest had the locals in developing the shipyards and the associated industries. Master shipbuilders were brought from Seville to Havana for the purpose. All that increased the importance and the prosperity of Havana.

The center of the maritime trade

As anticipated, and having been established in a very big and very well protected harbor, and due to its strategic situation in front of Bahamas Channel, the way back to Europe for the sailing ships of the time, Havana was selected in 1561, when the *Carrera de Indias* was organized in detail, as the port of assembly for the fleets that were due to return to Spain with goods from the New World, included gold and silver. From then on, the ships from

Cartagena de Indias, Portobello and Veracruz came to Havana were they formed the escorted convoys that sailed to the East. Of all the many goods that were transported on those ships since then, Protestants, both individuals and states, started to see Spanish silver as a commodity to acquire by any mean, including war, and therefore the conquest of the city became an objective in their plans to contest the Spanish Empire.

Throughout the second half of the XVI century, mainly due to the conflicts between Spain and England that ended with the Anglo-Spanish war (1584-1604), and at the turn of the century with the globalization of the Eighty Years War, the threat of pirate or corsair attacks grew steadily and, after repeated requests by the officers of the *Casa de la Contratación* to improve the fortifications to protect the different harbors in the Caribbean, and prompted by the sacking of Cartagena de Indias by Drake in 1586, Phillip II finally decided that it was time to answer positively and ordered his engineer Bautista Antonelli¹ to move to the Indies, study the situation, and present a fortification plan. In 1588 the authorities of San Juan sent to the king their remarks to such plan, referring them to the proposed fortifications of Santa Marta, Cartagena, Nombre de Dios, Portobelo, Chagres, Havana and Santo Domingo². It was actually a grand plan of defense of the whole Caribbean. This plan was carried out, but not entirely completed until the XVIII century. For Havana this meant that from 1589 to 1594 Antonelli designed and directed the construction of the fort of *Los Tres Reyes de el Morro*, on the northern side of the mouth of the channel of the bay, and immediately after, from 1589 until 1609 the fort of San Salvador de la Punta, on the southern side followed suit under the direction of his uncle Cristobal de Roda. Both fortifications were designed to prevent enemy fleets entering the bay to raid the ships at anchor or to land directly on the city. Based on the development of the artillery at this times, the forts were supposed to stand the attacks from the ships. At that time the threat of an invading army landing in a point in the coast was not considered, among other things because the coast was rugged enough to considerer this operation too difficult. In the end, since Jacques de Sores sacking, Havana was spared of any further attacks during the XVI century. Drake sailed in front of Havana but didn't dare to attack it. Obviously, the measures taken to improve its defenses were instrumental for this effect.

¹ Adelaida Sourdis, Real Academia de la Historia, Diccionario Biográfico Electrónico (DBe), [accessed 19 August 2023], <https://dbe.rah.es/biografias/36468/battista-antonelli>

² Navy Historic Archive, (AHA), 0027 Ms.0036/037. Similar petitions were presented as per AHA 0023 Ms.0031/006, and AHA 0026 Ms.0034/003

Slavery

At the heart of the economic development of the Spanish America and its relationship with other colonies in the area, slavery played a very important role, especially when England rose to international power status as the head of the British Empire, which, eventually, became the main contender to the Spanish Empire in the XVIII century. Slavery was as important as the economies of the New World needed workers that neither the aboriginal nor the European populations could provide. As the Indians were not specially capable to work as the new rules demanded and, more importantly, because there was a substantial reduction in their numbers due mainly to their lack of immunization against the illness brought by their new rulers from the Old World, the Spaniards started the importation of small numbers of black slaves from Africa from the very beginning of their establishment in the New World. Also, it played an important role the fact that the crown had given them the status of subjects of the state at a par with the Spaniards themselves, and moreover, had the obligation to Christianize them. In principle this should have not been a problem and in the long run it was one of the reasons for the wealth that Spanish America enjoyed when the internal defenses of the natives eventually allowed them to stand to the new bacteria and viruses and they both adapted to the new work ethic and learned their benefits for themselves, but with the introduction of new industrial processes that demanded great numbers of workers, the slave trade became a substantial element in the economies of the Spanish overseas provinces and the colonies of other European countries.

Mention must be done of the comparatively different nature of slavery in the Catholic and Protestant world spheres. In the first one, very especially in Spain, slavery was less severe as, even when Queen Isabel the Catholic banning of slavery in America was not extended to Africans, in the end Catholicism imposes a general obligation of equalitarian treatment of the entire population. In fact, for the Spaniards slavery in America, based in the importation of blacks from Africa, was a civilizing endeavor as, in the end, the masters had the obligation to Christianized their slaves. This can be better understood by the institution of *coartación*, by which the slaves themselves could buy their freedom, which allowed for the creation of a component of the population intermediary between the slaves and the creole, that of the free blacks, of enormous importance for what this works deals with. *Coartación* was non-existing in the colonies of Protestant countries. More generally, right when the Spanish rule ended, an African leader said that the blacks in the country that was being born under the protectorate of the United States

“received more rights during slavery, as subjects of the Spanish crown, than they were likely to receive in an independent Cuba”³.

Consolidation

During the first half of the seventeenth century the threat to the Spanish trade and possessions in the New World was mainly represented by the rebellious United Provinces which, as already mentioned, extended their attacks to Spain, then including Portugal with its Atlantic and Indian empire. The main objective in this war was, precisely the Portuguese possessions of the Catholic Monarchy both in Brasil and the Far East, but they still roamed the Caribbean in search of prey. There was a significant war action very close to Havana when a squadron under command of Piet Pieterzon Hein seized the only entire Treasury Fleet ever taken by any Spanish enemy. The main part of the actions happened in Matanzas Bay, only 100 km east of Havana. The success of the endeavor was possible thanks, among other things to intelligence provided by Jewish pirate Moses Cohen Henriquez, very well informed thanks to the Sephardic merchants established mainly in the Portuguese colonies, well connected with *conversos* that remained in Castile after the expulsion of the Jews in 1492. Before the successful action by Hein there was an attempt to conquer San Juan de Puerto Rico by Dutch privateer Heindrick that was rejected, even when there were no Spanish warships in the harbor. It was thanks to the strength of the fortifications and the action of the militias who won the battle. After the defeat, he cruised in front of Havana considering conquering it, but gave up the intent after having suffered the damage that the artillery from El Morro inflicted on their ships every time they entered their range. Most probably he thought that, given the similarity of both cities, the defense would have been equal to that of Puerto Rico.

After having seized several West Indian islands in 1625 and 1632 (St. Kitts, Barbados, Nevis, Montserrat and Antigua) then came the next phase of the encroachment of Great Britain in the Spanish American territories. In protestant countries the Black Legend was already in full bloom with all its unjustified defamation of Spain’s behavior in the New World. This was seen as a moral justification to steal Spain of its territories in America. It was accompanied by a sense that this would be easy as the aboriginals would be happy to help in expelling the Spaniards from their lands. With these sentiments supporting the plan, by 1655 Cromwel’s Western Design, having failed in taking Santo Domingo, ended in the occupation of poorly defended Jamaica. Havana was considered as a target but, whether influenced by Heindrick’s failure at San Juan or not, it was discarded. Spain planned the

³ David Sartorius, *Ever faithful. Race, Loyalty and the Ends of Empire in Spanish Cuba*, (Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2013), 217.

reconquer of Jamaica in a couple of occasions, but it never ended in success. The British engaged in enlarging the sugar production of the island for which they had to import increasing numbers of black slaves, a business in which they were already world masters. Port Royal, became the hub of the slave trade in the Caribbean. It not only satisfied the needs of Jamaica, but also of other British possessions. But also, they were eager to take advantage of the opportunities for privateering and smuggling that the situation of the island, not only near the routes of the Spanish galleons, but in the center of the Spanish Main and very close to Cuba, offered to them. Then a bond between both islands started to develop. Under the obvious antagonism of Spain and Great Britain, the particulars from Jamaica and Cuba built commercial relationships. With the relatively easy occupation of Jamaica, the appeal for a conquest of Cuba grew among British interests, not only as a way to steal Spain of its dominions of the New World but as tactic to prevent Spain of retaking the already lost possessions. In the English edition of Arnoldus Montanus' *The New and Unknown World: or Description of America and the Southland* of 1671 a letter from a Captain Smith proposing the conquest of Havana is included. This captain was captured by the Spanish in Providence Island (*Santa Catalina* for the Spaniards) in 1565 and spent some time in Havana as a prisoner. He took good care to learn about the military defenses of the city while he was arrested there, and his estimate was that could be conquered with just two regiments from Jamaica. He stresses the abundance of silver in the West Indies⁴. This letter is just an example of the growing eagerness of the English people for the conquest of Havana, and through it, the entire Spanish New World.

So far, in term of land military forces, there was not a regular army deployed to the Spanish possessions in the New World, leaving the defense of the territory in the hands of the local militias. In their ranks were included not only the peninsular and creole Spanish inhabitants, but also mulattos, and blacks, both free men and slaves. In particular, the increasing population of free blacks was very eager to join this militias and participate in their actions in defense of the crown as they saw it as a protector against the Protestant conquerors, much less lenient in their treatment of people of African descent. The slaves were similarly eager to do the same as they were very often promised to be freed when they do so. In fact, this measure was adopted by all European nations in the area but for the Spaniards this was more easily done. A good example is the escape to Florida of slaves from the Southern colonies of Great Britain in North America in late seventeen century and onwards, to

⁴ Elena A Schnaeider, *The occupation of Havana: War, trade, and slavery in the Atlantic World*, (Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, and University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 28.

whom Spain would grant citizenship status if they convert to Catholicism and serve in the military. These black soldiers were put in charge of Fort Mose under the command of one of them, Francisco Menéndez.

Shipbuilding

With the arrival of the Bourbon dynasty to Spain in the early 18th century, one of the significant changes was the reorganization of the Spanish navy. Previously, it consisted of separate armadas and squadrons with little cohesion between them. However, it was now transformed into a unified navy known as the Real Armada, with a shared officer corps called the *Cuerpo General* and a comprehensive logistical system. This reorganization also impacted shipbuilding. Instead of relying on private shipyards under contract, the navy began constructing galleons in royal shipyards known as *arsenales*. In 1713, a royal shipyard was established in Havana, improving upon the earlier private shipyards of the port. This new shipyard focused on building ships of the line designed by Antonio de Gaztañeta e Iturrizalza. In 1723, José Patiño y Rosales elevated it to the status of a Real Arsenal and relocated it to an inner location. This move aimed to free up shipping in the channel and expand the facility. The shipyard was strategically positioned just outside the city wall. Thanks to these improvements, the availability of high-quality local woods, the abundance of skilled workers, the competence of the officers, and the support from the crown, the Havana shipyard became the most important Spanish royal shipyard in America. It took on the workload previously handled by Cartagena and Veracruz, reaching the same level as the shipyards on the mainland. In 1748 the base of the *Armada de Barlovento* was moved from Veracruz to Havana, confirming the superior importance of Havana as the main Spanish military harbor in the West Indies. In fact, more ships were built there during the 18th century than in any other location⁵. The relocation and management of the Havana shipyard from 1744 onwards were overseen by Lorenzo Montalvo Ruiz de Alarcón, an officer of the Real Armada. His leadership further contributed to the success and significance of the shipyard.

XVIII Century, First half. Wars with Britain

In 1702 an imposing British fleet of 21 men-of-war showed up in front of Havana requesting the acceptance of the Archduke as the king of Spain. The guns spoke from El Morro and the fleet simply left. This was another example of the influence of war, in this case previous ones that provoked the fortification of the city, in the development of Havana. This time the fortifications saved the city of being attacked. And it was more the rule than

⁵ Jose Manuel Serrano, *El Astillero de La Habana en el siglo XVIII: Historia y construcción naval (1700-1805)*, (Ministerio de Defensa, Madrid, 2019), 527.

the exception for the rest of the century, which saw repeated armed conflicts between Great Britain and Spain (with the grand exception that will be dealt with below). After the small incident of the War of Spanish Succession related just above, the only one affecting Havana during this conflict, Great Britain reacted against Phillip V seizure of Corsica and Sardinia (and eventually Naples) in 1717/1718 but this war was very contained and it barely had any effect in Spanish America. Nevertheless, in 1719 Havana saw the establishment of its first unit of a regular army, the *Batallón Fijo de la Habana*, composed of seven infantry companies plus companies of artillery and cavalry, some 8000 men in total. This force increased regularly in the decades ahead. Also, in 1726 the defense of the mouth of the bay was improved with the construction of the Divina Pastora battery, in front of the old city across the channel. This battery was improved in later years under the captaincy of Governor Cagigal.

Except for a small action by one captain Brown with six ships of the line in which fired his guns against the tower of Cojimar, to the West of El Morro⁶, and a failed intent of Admiral Knowles to seize the treasure fleet under the command of general Reggio in front of the harbor, the Jenkin's Ear War (1739-1748) spared Havana of attacks. Obviously, Vernon's tremendous failure to take Cartagena de Indias and, later on, Santiago de Cuba, help in dissuading to mount an attack on Havana. Actually, instead of inflicting damage to Havana, the war was an opportunity for prosperity for the city as the Spanish crown had to invest in its military defense with increasing number of troops to deter the British of their natural impulse to take the city and a reinforcement of the construction of military ships to help in the defense of the whole Caribbean Sea, including its merchant traffic. The need to feed the additional soldiers and workers strengthened the local commerce, most of the time with foreign colonies, including enemy ones, especially Jamaica. All this meant that the merchants of the city improved their gains. In fact, this was the fact rather than the rule since the installation of the foreign colonies in the Caribbean. For the government, this war instilled the sense that Havana, with its fortifications, military units and naval arsenal, was impregnable. The sense was so dominant that in 1756, Governor Juan Manuel de Cagigal de la Vega y Montserrat invited admiral Knowles to visit the city on his way back to England, at the end of his term as governor of Jamaica. The British naval officer took the opportunity to complete with his own observations and upon his arrival to England he presented a plan for the seizure of Havana.

⁶ Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Armada Española (desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y Aragón)*, (Museo Naval, Madrid, 1972), 244.

The *Asiento de Negros*

Although Spaniards themselves, as they saw it as unworthy, didn't participate in the directly in the slave trade until much later, slaves arrived in the Spanish New World initially brought by Portuguese, Dutch and French traders. This trade was conducted under license by the crown (*asiento*) as a monopoly and out of the rules of the *Casa de la Contratación*, which was much resented and opposed by it. With the outcome of the War of Spanish Succession the British took over the *asiento* from a French company. The corresponding license was granted in 1713 (just after the Treaty of Utrecht) by agreement between the Catholic King Phillip V and Anne Queen of Great Britain, who in turn granted the license to the South Sea Company. Under this contract the company was allowed to send ships to Spanish ports in America to deliver a mandatory amount of 4800 pieces of blacks annually for 30 years. This *asiento* had a dramatic importance in the economic development of both empires. It served for Great Britain as a legal exception to the Spanish monopoly of trade with Spanish America, as a tool to exercise smuggling to a high scale and, as it included the permission to establish factories in different Spanish American ports, as a source of intelligence on the military forces, warships and fortifications of the Spanish Empire. For some, it was equivalent to Spain maintaining an empire for the British to commerce with it⁷. Beyond this economic and military importance lie the most important consequence of this *asiento*: the contractual conflicts that it originally between the Spanish crown and the company were the main sources of wars in the first half of the XVIII century to the point that the War of Jenkin's Ear is called in Spain the War of the *Asiento*. Later, in the second half of the same century, when the contract had been terminated, the infiltration that it had allowed to Great Britain in Spanish America in general and in Havana in particular had a direct influence in the relationship between the two countries. In general, it increased the desire of Great Britain to attack and, if possible, to take the city.

The combination of slave trade, smuggling and espionage that the *asiento* meant for Great Britain, fixed Havana as its main target: slave trade for the higher demand of workers that the industrial potential of Cuba and the higher probability of being paid in silver; smuggling for the higher purchasing power and demand of products that the increasingly affluent elites in the city; and espionage for the capital importance of it for the entire Spanish Empire. In fact, and thanks for a liberal policy by the local authorities involved and the permission for the company's factory to have installations and agriculture to sustain the slaves between their arrival to the island until its selling, the factors of the company in Havana became important landowners.

⁷ Fernández Durán, Reyes, *Gerónimo de Uztáriz (1670-1732): Una Política Económica para Felipe V*, (Minerva Ediciones, Madrid, 1999), 40.

The first factor of the company in Havana was Richard (Ricardo) O’Farril, an Irish Catholic born in the island of Monserrat that soon became very well integrated into Havana’s social fabric to the point that he married a local distinguish lady (the daughter of and became a Spanish citizen in 1722). During his tenure he became also the owner of two sugar factories, and through it he helped the local elite to get introduced in the sugar plantation business. His descendants became important civil and military officers in Havana. His successors, Wargeant Nicholson and Hubber Fassel, stayed on the island only during his respective tenure, forced to abandon it when wars between Spain and Great Britain broke out, but they still played a significant role in the commerce and industry of the island, and Nicholson in particular was active in providing intelligence for the British invasion plans that will be referred to in due time, but he did not do it just for his nation, but purely to recover his investments in Cuba.

The Seven Years War

The Seven Years War was a very complex conflict and there is no need to go in deep on the causes of the it here, as it followed well known lines, common to all others at that time an in that area. For what we are concerned here, contrary to what happened before, the conflict affected profoundly Havana and its development. To begin with, the previous interwar period saw an increase in the desire of Great Britain to conquer the city, and even before Spain entered the war allied with France in 1762, the decision in London was to try it with overwhelming force, and the result was a success. In favor of this success played the information obtained by Great Britain regarding the defenses of the city, thanks to the increasing commercial interaction based both on the legal activities conducted under the coverage of the *asiento de negros* and the always increasing illegal trading both in Cuba by British subjects mainly from Jamaica and in the British colonies by Spanish subjects. This trading was fueled by the prosperity of Jamaica thanks to the sugar industry (the same applied to Haiti, on the French side).

Regarding strategy and tactics, the invasion of Havana can be briefly expressed by saying that the allies (Spain and France) were unable to conduct a coordinated campaign; Spain, fairly confident on the defenses of Havana, didn’t expect an attack to the city; and Great Britain was skillful enough to conceal the objective of the operation that was openly being prepared in the South coast of England, and daring and lucky to conduct the approach on a route, the Old Bahama Channel, that the Spanish thought it was too difficult to execute successfully, and therefore were not expecting. In the tactical side, the British forces made a good plan for landing in two different lot actions, but were too focused on storming El Morro following the recommendations of Commodore Knowles, when a frontal attack against the relatively weak

city's Western wall could have been enough to take it by assault. On the Spanish side, there was not enough preparation against the attack, but on the contrary, their forces, especially the companies of free and slave blacks, fought so fiercely that the siege was so protected that the British were close to be defeated by the difficult sanitary conditions it imposed on them. As it is well known, Havana surrendered to the British forces who immediately took possession of the city, but nearly one year later the city was returned to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. During the occupation the British governor Lord Albermale, who has commanded the invasion, tried to exercise power in a soft manner but his practices were fairly corrupt and, anyway was not able to gain the favor of the general population. The elites of Havana on the other hand, took advantage of the freedom to trade goods with the British merchants and strengthen their connection with the British colonies. The consequences of the British occupation were numerous and some of them very significant, especially in the human side of the equation. The local army unit was strengthened in such a way that the battalion of infantry became a full regiment and the militias (of whites, mulattos and blacks in separate companies) were now a force that reached 4500 volunteers. In the fortification side, three more main fortifications were raised to remedy the deficiencies that the invasion had demonstrated. The massive *Fuerte de la Cabaña* projected but not executed before 1762, was completed in 1778. Additionally, a two completely new forts were raised on the Western and South outskirts of the city (Princes and Atares Castles, completed respectively in 1780 and 1767). All this big effort was completed with minor additions to the defensive system. The Royal Arsenal was restored to efficiency very soon and the next year was again starting to build ships for the Spanish navy, the most famous of them being the *Santísima Trinidad*, 140 gun four decker that was the biggest ship having sailed the seas in those, and all, times. On the commercial side, the British merchants who had established themselves in Havana were allowed to stay during some time. This permitted the continuation of the commercial links between Cuba, directed from Havana, and the British colonies. In the industrial side, competition for the world sugar market became the goal of many plantation owners and therefore the need for slave labor increased dramatically. Terminated the contract with the South Sea Company in 1750, the slave trade passed to Spanish hands. But the most important change in the development of Havana was the fact that the black population gradually lost some of the privileges had been granted for their participation in the defense of the city. Finally, the maintenance of the loyalty of Havana's population to Spain was manifested through its behavior during the occupation⁸, although differences between creole and peninsular Spaniards had been stressed in the

⁸ Guillermo Calleja and Hugo O'Donnell, 1762: *La toma de la Habana por los ingleses*, (Cultura Hispánica, Madrid 1999), 191-196.

process. The next war in the series of Anglo-Spanish confrontations was the War of Independence of the United States, in which Spain, again allied with France, helped the American rebels in their fight against Great Britain as a way to weaken its capability of defense against the actions of the allies. Havana played a key role as a rearguard base for the Spanish military operations in the Southern colonies. A good example of it is the conquests in Florida by Bernardo de Gálvez supported by squadrons like the one of José Solano y Bote, sent to support the battle for Pensacola. This naval squadron and the army and marine units that it transported for the occasion was assembled and readied in Havana. The city played this role throughout the whole war for many other naval and land operations with efficiency based on the fact that it had previously become the center of military Spanish operations in the West Indies, but also in the enthusiasm and energy of the Havanan elites and population. This was not only consistent with the secular position of defending Catholic Spain against Protestant Great Britain, but now also with helping their Northern neighbors in their fight for independence, a process in which they expected to gain as they were exchanging extensive trade (especially Cuban tobacco and rum for North American wheat)⁹.

Sugar Boom

A particular conflict that had a very significant impact in the development of Havana was the Haitian slave revolt that started in 1791 and ended in the establishment of the first independent republic governed by blacks. In the first place, it instilled in Havana elites the fear that something similar could happen in Cuba, although in reality, the treatment of the slaves in the Spanish island was not the same than what was applied in Haiti. In any case, this affected the way slavery was practiced in Cuba. But the main effect was on its economy as the production of sugar in Haiti declined substantially as a consequence of the expulsion of the French and its place in the market was duly occupied by Cuba, whose economic policy had been increasingly oriented to it after during the second half of the century. This produced wealth for Cuba in general and for Havana in particular in such a way that, thanks to the increased revenues obtained through taxation of the sugar production, the crown could reduce significantly the remissions from Mexico to support the army and the navy on the island.

⁹ Allan J. Kuete and, José Manuel Serrano, *La pérdida de la fidelidad cubana: una perspectiva del siglo XVIII* in Ibero-Americana Pragensia. Supplementum 15/2005, *Nación y Cultura Nacional en el Caribe Hispano*, ed. Josef Opatrný, (Universidad Carolina de Praga, Editorial Karolinum, 2006), 206.

The Cuban Loyalty

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars era provoked an earthquake in the reality of Spain. Not only they spurred the emancipation of the overseas provinces, but it divided the country in two opposing sides. From 1812 to 1820 almost all of them became independent republics. In this process, Cuba, headed by its capital Havana, remained loyal and the small attempts to break away from the nation was aborted or died away. After these until almost the end of the century, Havana lived a period of diminished importance compared to what had been before. To begin with, its shipyard have ceased building warships since the end of the eighteenth century, when the king's government sought to increase revenues by reducing national expending, and afterwards only recovered a small fraction of its production. Nevertheless, Spain was eager to keep Cuba under its wing against the several emancipations attempts that started to take shape soon, and the self-declared will of the United States to acquire the island, whether peacefully or by force. Therefore, the Spanish government had to maintain a good level of investment in the defense of the capital. This together with the sugar production boom and the benefits of other important exports, allowed Havana to maintain its affluent situation, but the fact is that Cuba has left to be truly a province of Spain and it was now more a colony with much to say about its future. The government of the island became more militarized and the rights of the population didn't follow those of the people in Spain proper. This process increases the natural will to gain independence, or in some cases a desire to swift dependency, become part of the United States.

The End of the Presence of Spain in America

In 1886 the pro-independence political faction in Cuba, which have been growing steadily thanks, among other things, by the support of north-American interest, best represented by the famous statement by president John Quincy Adams early in the century that the Island would eventually fall under the influence of the North American Union, started an armed rebellion against Spain. Adams's statement was just a particular case of the more general. This was the initiation of the final phase of the emancipation which, after three separate conflicts (Ten Years War 1868-78, Little War 1879-80, and War of Independence 1895-1898) conducted to the establishment of the Republic of Cuba. All this was almost inevitable due to the increasing influence that the United States have been placing on the economy of Cuba, but it is paradoxical that a country that, although having banned slavery maintained a fierce segregation policy intervened in favor of a people whose half was precisely black. As in the case of the Union in the Secession War in the United States, those who led the rebellion against Spain in Cuba tended to grant freedom to

the slaves only as a mean to recruit men for the armed forces. In spite of this, and as what have happened in the emancipation of the Hispanic American republics of the start of the century, if the lower/indigenous class leaned on one of the sides of the conflict, it was towards the Spanish crown, not the liberators. Most of the leaders of the independence movements were mainly white and relatively affluent creoles. In any case, Havana was again spared of the direct impact of the war. When war between Spain and the United States finally broke out in April 1898, the logical object of the invasion army of the last one that was amassed in Tampa should have been Havana, as it was the head of the government. It was only because the Spanish naval squadron that was sent by Madrid under the command or rear admiral Cervera, avoiding the encounter with the squadron of admiral Simpson, entered the bay of Santiago, that the landing was conducted in Daiquiri and Siboney with the goal of taking first Santiago. Still, after the eventual capture of Santiago, the war could have progressed towards the capital in a military campaign that for most military analysts would have been a very long and bloody one; as the American army was no match for the Spanish one, but the defeat of Cervera's squadron in front of Santiago, which happened just after rear admiral Montojo's one was similarly defeated in Cavite, in the bay of Manila, led to a surprisingly hastened surrender by Spain. If this was the consequence of a secret agreement between the American and the Spanish governments as some want nowadays is an interesting topic, but goes beyond the scope of this study.

Independent Cuba

In principle, the independence of Cuba from Spain made Havana the capital of a sovereign country. In reality, initially it became simply a protectorate of the United States. This was demonstrated by many well-known facts, especially by the introduction In the Cuban Constitution OF 1901 of the Platt Amendment and the armed intervention of the United States in 1906. Nevertheless, for about six decades under Cuban governments under American protection, Havana thrived and prospered producing tobacco and sugar. But the failure of the regime to provide equality and eliminate corruption in an era in which the capitalist United States was facing communist Soviet Union, provoked Castro's Revolution. The American reaction, the support of opponents to Castro in their actions against the new regime, was ultimately against Havana as the seat of the Cuban government, but once more the city was spared of direct attack. The invasion attempt at *Bahía de los Cochinos* was a small-scale model, twentieth century-wise, of the attack of 1762, a landing at a distance and then a march against the city, but it failed. Since then, under the blockade,

Havana has suffered the consequences of the lack of resources for its maintenance, and shows a very obvious decay, but their inhabitants seem to keep a good part of the old strength when faced by a foreign invader.

Conclusion

Havana has experienced the impact of war since its inception, with the city's strategic importance being a key factor. Over four centuries, it was under the control of the Spanish Empire, later becoming a protectorate of the United States, and in the past seven decades, it has been in opposition to the US. As part of the Spanish Empire, Havana was considered a valuable asset and faced attacks from pirates, corsairs, and armies attempting to seize its riches. The city's fortifications, naval shipyard, and military units made it well-defended, allowing it to prosper and serve as a base for military operations in the region. Interestingly, many people of African descent, originally brought to Havana as slaves, played a significant role in its defense and military operations, showcasing the relatively open society that allowed for their integration. Havana experienced a brief occupation by Great Britain in the 18th century, which led to some economic changes, particularly in relation to the slave trade and sugar cultivation. However, the occupation also prompted the Spanish crown to strengthen the city's fortifications, deterring further attacks. Eventually, Cuba gained independence from Spain in a war that narrowly spared Havana. However, an incident involving the blowing up of an American warship, dispatched to Havana to protect their interests, led to the intervention of the United States. This move, though difficult to comprehend based on the official explanation, further influenced the city's development. Under the protectorate of the United States, Havana continued to thrive as the capital of a wealthy country. However, since changing sides on the global stage, the city has faced increasing isolation, leading to its current state of decline.

LISBON – THE CITY, THE WORLD AND THE DEFENCE

Prof. Dr. António TELO (Portugal)

The Tagus estuary is the best natural harbour on the Peninsula, capable of sheltering the largest fleets, protecting them from winds and storms, without even requiring significant work to enable such protection. In addition, its position is particularly favourable during the sailing era. Lisbon is located in the middle of the western coast of the Peninsula, which makes this city an ideal support harbour for navigation along the coast. In the 16th century, when the great Atlantic routes opened, Lisbon was the ideal port in Europe, as the winds and currents facilitated the journey of ships coming from the Azores, the point where the routes from Brazil, the Gulf of Guinea, of the Indian and the Pacific came together. The capital of the kingdom received the wealth of three continents. Ships from Northern Europe and the Italian republics made their distribution across the huge European market, that was growing quickly in 1300-1600. Added to this, Lisbon was also in an ideal position for Portugal's internal trade routes, whether those following the Tagus or overland. This points to the first and foremost factor that shapes Lisbon: trade, both by land, inland waterway or sea. The sea trade with an overwhelming weight. From early, the powers linked to maritime trade realized the importance of Lisbon. For this reason, we find traces of the occupation of Lisbon since the Neolithic and, from 1200 BC, we can speak of a Celtic city (Olisipo). The Phoenicians settled in Olisipo, with traces of trade from 1100 BC onwards. At that time, the Tagus invaded the entire lower area of current Lisbon, and so the port naturally occupied the base of Colina do Castelo (Castle Hill), a high area, ideal for defence, where fortifications were built early on. The entire Lisbon downtown of today (Baixa de Lisboa) was then under water. This means that, since its origins, more than three thousand years ago, the city of Lisbon has been shaped by two interconnected concerns: maritime trade and defence. For almost two thousand years, defence was fundamentally centred on the Castle Hill, a high spot that was ideal for protecting the port. Phoenicians and Greeks settled therein for commercial purposes, mixing with the local Celtic population, in what would be the first of many miscegenations that gave rise to the Portuguese people.

Rome conquers Olisipo in 139 BC. The first concern of the Roman Empire was to strengthen the walls of the Castle Hill, to defend against hostile

tribes that for a long time resisted the Roman occupation. Olisipo was integrated into the Roman province of Lusitania, which had its capital in Emerita Augusta (present-day Mérida). Olisipo was its main seaport, even if sea trade was minimal at the time.

The fall of the Roman Empire, accompanied by the fall of maritime trade, implied a decline in the Visigothic Ulishbuna (the roman Olisipo). In the 7th century, the city was falling apart and smaller than in Roman times. In 714, Lisbon is occupied by the Moors that come from North Africa, who promoted the development of the city for the cabotage trade. The Moorish Hedge or *Cerca Velha* is then built, which defends the entire urban boundary of the city. On Castle Hill, in the uptown area, the old fortified bastion is transformed into a castle. *Cerca Velha* will be for many centuries the limit of the city with its twelve gates, which extend from the castle area to the edge of the Tagus in the current Campo das Cebolas / Alfama. It represents an important expansion of the urban area, enhancing the size and importance of Lisbon. The defensive wall now comes down to the riverside area. From the 8th century on, the main concern for the defence of Arab Lisbon was the Viking incursions, which justifies the reinforcement of the city's defences against threats coming from the sea. Over time, suburbs grow both west and east of the walls, with houses that no longer fit in the Moorish Wall and take advantage of the retreat of the river. The first construction axis in Lisbon heads North to South, extending from Castle Hill to the Tagus.

The Arab Defences and the Christian Conquest


Portugal was born in the context of the reconquest of the Peninsula by the Christian powers, that developed since the 8th century. When Portugal became independent (a process that took place between 1128 and 1143), its territory was limited by the Minho River Valley (to the north) and the Mondego Valley (to the south). Afonso Henriques, the first king, had the strategic objective of extending the territory to the Tagus Valley, which implied the conquest of the fortified complex of Lisbon.

Moorish Lisbon was the centre of a system of fortifications. Around Moorish Lisbon one could find some of the best castles of the Peninsula, with Sintra, Mafra, Arruda and Vila Franca de Xira to the north; to the south, Lisbon was supported by the castles of Almada, Palmela and Alcácer do Sal, which extended the fortified area to the Sado River. What was at stake were the navigable estuaries of the Tagus and Sado rivers, in which Lisbon was the central and most important point, surrounded by a set of important castles. Afonso Henriques knew that this area had to be the core of his kingdom to come, and so his future would be decided by the ability to conquer the Lisbon defensive network.

The major problem was that the young kingdom of Portugal did not have the means to reconquer the vast fortified region, either in terms of land or sea forces. The first attack on Lisbon is launched in 1142, with a Portuguese force supported by 80 ships, one of the largest fleets ever set up by Portugal at the time. The siege fails, proving the effectiveness of Al-Ushbuna's (Arab Lisbon) defences. The international context favours the Portuguese plan. In 1147 Pope Eugene III called for the Second Crusade authorizing the Crusade to help King Alfonso VII of León and Castile to regain the Peninsula. The main force of the Crusade departs from Devon (in England), made up of English, Scots, Flemings, Germans, Bretons and Normans, all aboard 164 ships. The fleet skirted the Peninsula on its way to the Mediterranean, halting in the city of Porto, in June 1147. The Bishop of Porto followed up on previous contacts established by Afonso Henriques and tried to convince the Crusaders to help in the conquest of Lisbon, claiming that the city was rich and the time was right. In fact, Santarém had been taken by the Portuguese on the 15th of March of that year, with the Moors still recovering from the loss of that fortress, which was important for the defence of the upper Tagus. At the time, Lisbon had more than 150 thousand inhabitants, which made it one of the most important cities of the Peninsula and its main port. The agreement, which ended up convincing the Crusaders, was that they could keep all the loot, as well as the ransoms obtained.

The Christian force would have approximately 14,000 men, of which about 10,000 were Crusaders (4,500 Anglo-Normans), heading to Lisbon by sea. Afonso Henriques commands a Portuguese force of around 4,000 men, which moves by land from Santarém. The Portuguese halted in the north of the city, on Monte de Santa Ana (near present-day Martin Moniz); the larger force of Crusaders (Anglo-Normans) halted to the west, on Monte Frágoso (today Carmo Hill); the siege was completed in the east by the Flemings and Germans, who occupied Monte de S. Vicente (in the current district of the same name); the Crusader Squadron dominates the Tagus, from where the Moorish ships had previously withdrawn to avoid destruction. At the beginning of July, the first battles take place. The siege lasted for four months, until October 25th, much longer than the Crusaders expected, which shows the effectiveness of the city's fortifications. The Taifa fleet of Badajoz, to which Lisbon was connected, withdrew before the arrival of the superior Christian force, leaving the city without defence on the side of the Tagus and the sea. Its garrison (at least 15,000 men-at-arms) resists firmly, supported by a strong militia, finding protection on the high walls, where ballistae, inspired by Roman technology, and trebuchets were installed. The besiegers also had numerous trebuchets, which fustigated the area of the wall gates, mainly on the eastern side (it was said that they managed to launch 5 thousand balls in 10 hours, a number that João Gouveia Monteiro considers an overstatement).

The besieged threw incendiary material using their trebuchets, with which they managed to destroy some of the siege equipment, mainly a 20 m high assault tower, which tried to approach the city from the western side, along the riverside area.



Lisbon in 1147, a city contained by the Arab Wall (on the left, in yellow), with suburbs outside the walls. The whole of current *Baixa* was occupied by the Tagus River. The three Christian siege camps were set on the main hills around the city, with the Tagus dominated by the Navy. Author's assembly of an aerial photograph of Lisbon in 1917, published by *Ilustração Portuguesa*.

Christian attacks followed one another from July to September, while supplies and water ran out in a completely encircled city. The garrison repels all the attacks, yet with major casualties. The final attack was launched on the 19th of October, supported by a second siege tower (25 m high), which moved from the Tagus, where it is nowadays the eastern part of Terreiro do Paço. At the same time, the Germans and Flemings launched a strong offensive in the eastern part, directed against *Porta do Sol*, in the current *Alfama* area. The final attack lasts for five days. Christians are able to penetrate the defences at the two points mentioned. On the 24th of October, the city surrendered, an agreement having been concluded that allowed controlled looting and the withdrawal of the large Muslim population. The agreement would end up not being respected by the plunder-hungry Crusaders, despite the efforts of king Afonso Henriques and the Portuguese bishops to contain them. The fall of Lisbon drags with it the fall of the Tagus line, in an offensive that lasted for several weeks. The Crusaders occupy the Castle of Almada, landing in September, and giving Portugal essential control of the south bank of the

Tagus. Palmela, the main castle to the south, falls in October, while Sintra, the strongest Moorish castle on the north bank remains unconquered, but eventually surrenders after the fall of Lisbon. Afonso Henriques still tries to continue the offensive after the departure of the Crusaders, but the attempt to conquer the important castle of Alcácer do Sal fails, which would also have given the Portuguese the Sado line (it would only be conquered 11 years later, in 1158). In just five months, the Portuguese advanced from Santarém to the Sado line and obtained the central area of the Atlantic coast of the Peninsula, which holds the best natural harbour. This would become the centre of Portugal, a notable advantage for the sea trade, the base of wealth of the State.

The conquest of Lisbon was what today we would call a joint and combined operation, carried out by a multinational force both from land and sea, innovative in terms of amphibious operations, with multiple landings, in Lisbon, Almada and Vila Franca, which allows to bypass the strong defences of Sintra, with its magnificent castle. It was a dangerous operation, only possible because the Crusader fleet achieved total control of the sea and the river. The major difficulty was the coordination of the operations, without a clear command on the side of the Crusaders, with numerous nationalities involved. King Afonso I tried to maintain control of the operations, but the Crusaders (especially the Germans and Flemings) were suspicious of his intentions and launched several uncoordinated operations, particularly when sacking. The fall of Lisbon brings with it the collapse of the entire defensive system that it coordinated, particularly the castles of Sintra and Palmela, the best fortifications at the time, which surrendered. The defences of Lisbon, with its highly located *Cerca Velha* encircling the city, proved to be effective and difficult to take by storm, forcing the Crusaders to use the most advanced siege technology back then, mainly with the construction of the two huge assault towers engaged on the western side, as well as catapults and trebuchets. The castle of S. Jorge, which occupied the highest point of the defensive perimeter, was practically impregnable, but, as the great garrison committed to the defence of *Cerca Velha* over many weeks, by the time of the final assault, it was smaller and worn out. The besieged thought that the continuation of the fight would only serve to sacrifice the numerous population that was outside the castle, so they surrendered, upon promises of acceptance of withdrawal. This was a lesson that the Portuguese confirmed over the centuries: no matter how effective the defences were for assaults and sieges launched from land, only control of the Tagus River and the sea could allow Lisbon to resist effectively. The siege of Lisbon could only be successfully carried out by those who dominated land and sea (river). Whoever did not have a superior naval force was doomed to encircle by land a city that could be supplied by sea, as it happened in several failed sieges.

Fernandine Walls – 1373

The Strategic Change of the Portuguese Role


After the 13th century, Europe experienced a process of growth in trade, which multiplied several times, causing the birth of many cities and the development of others. The surge is based on both local trade and intercontinental connections. From Africa come the products of the camel caravans from the Sahara, which cross the desert to the ports of North Africa. From there they are channelled through the Arab trade and Italian republics networks to southern Europe, both by land and by sea, using Lisbon as a connection between south and north networks. The Italian republics will also seek the products of the silk route from the Middle East and the Black Sea, promoting their introduction into the European trade networks. Through the rivers of Ukraine and Russia, Asian products reach the Baltic, where they feed the trades of the Hanseatic League and the North Sea.

Lisbon increases in importance and grows with this commercial boom, becoming a significant link between the south and the north of Europe. The city became a trading post, due to its importance in cabotage navigation (along the coast) that allowed the exchange between products from the Mediterranean and those from northern Europe. Ships from the Arab commercial networks in North Africa, those from the Italian republics and those from the northern commercial networks (Gascony/Aragon, France, the North Sea and the Hanseatic League) came to Lisbon. These products are normally unloaded in Lisbon, where they are exchanged, and then sent to their final destinations. One of the reasons for this practice is that ships adapted for sailing in the Mediterranean were not suitable for sailing in Gascony and the North Sea and vice versa. The best procedure was to unload the products in Lisbon, where commercial warehouses were maintained (entrepotos), which allowed them to be sold; then the journey continued in adapted ships, allowing the Mediterranean galleys to return, loaded with northern products, while the carracks and barges continued to the North Sea, with southern products. Through this procedure, the new Portugal consolidates relations with three entities that would be essential for its future: the Kingdom of Aragon, the second largest Christian kingdom on the Peninsula, after neighbouring Castile; the Italian republic of Genoa, with which the kings of Portugal would sign multiple agreements for the development of its navy, namely by D. Dinis; the kingdom of England, which becomes Portugal's main link with the commercial networks of the North Sea and the Baltic.

Lisbon then expanded westwards, taking advantage of the retreat of the waters and the conquest of a large piece of land where the old branch of the river was located in the area that is today the city downtown (*Baixa*). This was the place where the great commercial houses and, from the 14th century

onwards, also the financial houses of Europe were installed, creating large warehouses in the riverside area, recently conquered from the river. The new Lisbon far exceeds *Cerca Velha* and for many years it did not have particular defence concerns, due to the absence of a concrete threat. It will be king Fernando, the last king of the 1st dynasty, to revive concerns about the defence of Lisbon, from the moment he decides to get involved in the Castilian Succession wars, the main Christian power of the Peninsula, the only one on the borderland of Portugal. King Fernando takes two important strategic decisions for the future of Portugal, which are closely linked and only make sense when analysed together, although they are normally considered independently.

The first one was to sign a treaty of alliance with King Edward III of England in 1373, which provided for “a perpetual friendship”, in which the two kingdoms would be “friends of their friends and enemies of their enemies”, maintaining the freedom to decide on the form of support on a case-by-case basis. It would become the oldest alliance in the world, which still officially stands, renewed and reaffirmed countless times over the centuries. The second decision is taken at the same time (1373) and is the logical conclusion of the first: king Fernando decides to surround the new Lisbon with a wide set of walls, which would be known as Fernandine Walls. Its layout takes advantage of *Cerca Velha*, yet wider, with 5.35 km in length, 77 towers and 38 gates. The defended area of Lisbon increased to 103.6 km², which corresponds to almost 7 times the 15.68 km² defended by *Cerca Velha* – in two centuries Lisbon increased to seven times more. Altogether, it was Portugal’s greatest defence project since its founding and took several years to complete.



Base photograph: one of the first aerial photographs of Lisbon, published in 1917 by *Ilustração Portuguesa*. Therein, the author demarcated, in general lines, the *Cerca Velha* or *Cerca Moura* (Moorish Hedge, in red) and its wide extension in the Fernandine Walls or Old City Walls (in blue and yellow). The Fernandine Walls extend the area of Lisbon by 6.6 times, in land conquered from the river. The link between these two strategic decisions is clear. The new wall protected the trade centre of Lisbon along the river, where the moorings and warehouses of the multiple commercial networks that used Portugal, namely the English ones, were located.

The Treaty of 1373 created what would come to be known as the “secular alliance”, giving Portugal the strength to resist pressure from Castile on the land border by its sea alliance. The link between the two was Lisbon, much larger than the one existing in 1147, which became the guarantee of Portugal’s future connection to the sea and trade, consolidated by the long-term understanding with England (Atlantic trade), as well as with Aragon and Genoa (Mediterranean trade). Lisbon was the centre of all strategic decisions and took a new role: it had been the essential link in the reconquest of Portugal, achieved due to an understanding with the Crusaders of northern Europe for its conquest; it became the essential link in Portugal’s maritime future, its main connection to the European commercial networks, now defended on the landward side by *Cerca Fernandina*. In the coming decades, Fernandine Walls would be put to the test, allowing to defend the capital against several sieges carried out by Castile. The most important siege was that of 1384, which lasted almost four months. The Castilians only withdrawing after their camp was devastated by the plague. Lisbon, which was the centre from which the new dynasty of Portugal emerged (the 2nd dynasty or Joanine, with the acclamation of the Master of Avis as king of Portugal by the population of Lisbon), would also be the strategic focus of Portugal’s new role in the creation of what would be the 1st world system (15th-16th centuries).

The 19th Century – The Role of Lisbon in the French Invasions

Early in the 19th century, between 1807 and 1814, Portugal experienced a new strong change in its global strategic role. Portugal had lost its global role with the fall of the 1st world system (after 1580), when control of the main ocean routes was transferred from Portugal/Spain to the Netherlands/England, i.e. from southern Europe to northern Europe. This represented a substantial decline in the role of Lisbon, which had been, together with Seville, the main port of the 1st world system, an essential link between Europe’s trade networks and products from other continents. After 1588, this role was assumed by the ports of the Netherlands and England,

which developed the main world navies. Lisbon becomes a secondary port in the new European commercial network, largely due to the disastrous link between its strategic destination and that of Spain, unavoidable since 1580, when Filipe II of Spain also becomes Filipe I of Portugal, a dual monarchy that intended to be the new heart of the world system, but that failed completely.

From 1640 onwards, with the separation between the monarchies of Portugal and Spain, Lisbon reinvented its role, which continued to be linked to the Atlantic trade. The capital becomes the connection between products from Brazil and Europe. The new Portuguese dynasty regains control of Brazil, expelling the Dutch and the French. The Empire of Brazil is the Portuguese version of the new empires of the Atlantic, which are based on plantations and slave labour, while the empires of the 1st world system were almost exclusively commercial, without the European powers getting involved in production. Portugal continues to have a State of India, but the trade is very reduced, representing less than 5% of the trade with Brazil. This grew over time and, in the 18th century, it was between 6% and 9% of total Atlantic trade. The new Portuguese dynasty (the Braganças) decreed that the commercial link between Portugal and Brazil was a monopoly of the crown, handed over to Portuguese ships, as the basis for the rebirth of the navy. Lisbon became the heart of this trade, which was a great source of income for the Old Regime. Between 6% and 9% of Atlantic trade gets through the city, with Brazil's products being re-exported to Europe from there, in a global agreement guaranteed by the alliance with England.

In 1807, this agreement changes on one single day, with the withdrawal of the royal family to Brazil, while all of mainland Portugal is occupied by the armies of France and Spain. The withdrawal to Brazil was decided jointly with England, in the secret convention of October 22, 1807, with the withdrawal taking place on November 29 of that year, Lisbon being occupied by the French a few hours later. The royal family was followed by 15,000 Portuguese people, who were the social elite at the time, which included almost all of the navy and nobility; they carried with them approximately a third of the national wealth, mainly in the form of tons of gold, silver and jewels. On one single day, Lisbon loses its important role in the Atlantic trade, as England demands payment for its support of Portugal during the French invasions. The main price is the end of the crown's trade monopoly. Products from Brazil are now sent to London and not to Lisbon, something that will never change (even after the end of the Napoleonic wars) and which is the basis of Brazil's declaration of independence in 1822. Lisbon is no longer the centre of a substantial part of the Atlantic trade, a role it never recovered. However, Lisbon will be the core of the fight against the French


invasions, carried out jointly with England, in a strategy coordinated by General Wellington, who commanded the joint Anglo-Portuguese army and presided over the Council of Regency, the true government of Portugal in these years, while the Court remains in Brazil. I remind you that the round trip between Portugal and Brazil lasted about 5 to 6 months, so it was impossible to govern Portugal from Brazil.

From the English strategic view, it was clear that the key to Portugal was Lisbon, its best natural harbour and the centre of the trade networks, the heart of political and military power. It was, moreover, the guarantee of a connection to England. As long as Lisbon was in Anglo-Portuguese hands, the French invader would not dominate Portugal and the army could always be resupplied and/or withdrawn from the sea. In these years (1808/12), the English army in Portugal did not exceed 40,000 men, while France had more than 200,000 men in Spain.

The most important French invasion was the 3rd, when Massena entered from the North at the head of 60,000 men, with orders to quickly occupy Lisbon. For France, the 200,000 men on the Peninsula were only 1/5 of an army of more than 1 million individuals in 1810. As for England, the 40,000 men in Portugal were very relevant, an important part of the British small Army, very well trained and equipped, but tiny. France, in short, could afford to take heavy casualties, but England could not. France's strategy in Portugal was to occupy Lisbon in order to sever connections with England, as well as to surround and destroy its army in the Peninsula, so they were looking for the "decisive battle". England did the opposite: avoided the battle in the open field and only fought in very strong defensive positions, where it was certain to suffer few casualties. Wellington applies this reasoning with great mastery in the so-called "Lines of Torres", about 40 km long, built approximately 30 km north of the capital. They were the greatest works of military engineering in Portugal, with more than 60 bastions and fortified positions, manned by more than 600 guns. Wellington withdrew with his precious army behind the Lines of Torres, which were essentially manned by Portuguese militias and soldiers, inviting the French to attack. If they did and managed to break the first defensive line (there were two), they would still have to face the Anglo-Portuguese army, concentrated behind the lines, and Wellington could choose between fighting or withdrawing to the ships that would take him to England. To this end, the third defensive line was organized around the São Julião da Barra Fort, an ideal position to allow the troops to embark. Finally, a fourth defensive line, rarely mentioned, was placed in Almada, on the south bank of the Tagus. Its mission was to cross fire with those of the north bank, preventing the use of the port of Lisbon by the French, even if they conquered the capital. Finally, the anglo-portuguese created the

“Tagus Navy” operated on the river, with large dozens of armed and reinforced barges, that could go up to Santarém and harass the French; on the west side, there was the Royal Navy, in the Atlantic, with total control of this ocean, where French ships did not sail. Lisbon was a kind of island, surrounded by water on three sides and defended on the other by double lines wisely built by military engineering.

It was this articulated force that made Lines of Torres impregnable. Massena did not even attempt a forceful assault, predicting crushing defeat if he did so. Deciding to withdraw to Santarém, where he installed the winter headquarters. In that terrible winter, marked by the action of Portuguese guerrillas, cold, hunger and disease, the French lost about half of their army, and so they withdrew hastily as soon as spring arrived. The Anglo-Portuguese army, sheltered behind the Lines of Torres and supplied from Lisbon by sea, suffers minimal losses and is strong and ready for combat (now in numerical superiority) as soon as spring arrives. It was one of the most crushing defeats of the French in the Peninsula.




Lines of Torres on a map of the time. The two main lines ran from the Tagus to the Atlantic; the third defended São Julião da Barra, essential to guarantee the withdrawal by sea, if necessary; the fourth, which does not appear on this map, placed numerous Artillery pieces in Almada, on the south bank of the Tagus, in order to prevent the use of the port of Lisbon by the French, even if they would occupy the city.

Lisbon's Entrenched Field– 19th and 20th Centuries


The huge success of Lines of Torres influenced the Portuguese military view until 1945. Portugal's military defence against a larger force that invaded from the land border became focused on the defence of the capital, protected by fortified works. The possibility of an invasion from the sea did not even arise, because the alliance with England would always be enough to prevent it, at a time when the Royal Navy alone corresponded to the combined naval power of the rest of the world. The problem was that the defence of Lines of Torres, with its 40 km of extension and dozens of bastions and forts, required at least 40 thousand men, which was more than the entire Portuguese army in peacetime. Therefore, it was not possible to consider the defence of Lisbon as a modern version of Lines of Torres far north of the capital. Another concept was needed.

The answer would come during the long civil war between liberals and absolutists, which began in 1823 and lasted for a long period of internecine wars until 1850. In these wars, liberals are expelled from the continent, but with the support of England and France, manage to keep the Azores in their possession. From there, they create an expeditionary force, which ends up landing on the mainland (in Porto). In 1835, the liberals ended up conquering Lisbon, in a movement by sea, where they were also surrounded by absolutist forces in superior numbers. In a short time, the liberals improvised Lisbon's defence lines, which completely surrounded the urban perimeter of the city, but were much smaller in length than the Lines of Torres.

On these improvised lines, a smaller liberal force succeeded to defend the capital against the absolutist assault. It was an immense success of liberal military engineering, a weapon where the liberals had a clear technical superiority over the absolutists – in simple terms, the liberals proved to have a technical advantage in engineering and artillery, where academic training was more important, while the absolutists had better cavalry.



Lisbon's liberal lines of defence in 1835, on a map of the time. These lines covered an urban area that was four times the size of Fernandine Walls and would form the basis of the Entrenched Field.



Lisbon's liberal defence layout in 1835. Improvised map based on the previously reproduced map. With the end of the liberal wars, Lisbon's defence lines would be the basis of the Lisbon Entrenched Field concept, approved from 1850 onwards. This would be the main defensive work of the kingdom, with an extension of about 18 km, much less than the 40 km of Lines of Torres. According to the approved concept, Lisbon's Entrenched Field was not a continuous line, with permanent trenches, but rather a set of fortresses, which surrounded Lisbon to defend it on the land side and extended along the north and south banks of the Tagus, in order to defend the access to the Tagus bar. The basic idea was that, in the event of an attack by a superior enemy, the Portuguese Army would quickly withdraw almost entirely to the Lisbon Entrenched Field, where they would set up a strong defence with a force of 30 to 40 thousand men, after a first and quick enrolment. Lisbon was expected to withstand a siege by a superior force for at least 3 to 6 months. This would be enough time for the ally (England) to send an expeditionary force by sea. When this arrived, it would be possible to move on to the counterattack and regain the ceded territory.

It was the strategic manoeuvre of Lines of Torres, however in a version in which the defence of Lisbon would have to be guaranteed only by Portuguese forces in the early months. Therefore, the size of the perimeter was much smaller. This concept is facilitated by the evolution of artillery in the second half of the 19th century. Then, steel artillery became popular, with explosive howitzers and ranges that quickly went from just over 1.5 km in 1835, to 6 to 10 km, or more in 1860. This allows the main forts to be more widely spaced, maintaining the possibility of cross fire. As the forts become better defended, strongly underground built and more expensive, with few large calibre pieces (like the 220 mm from Krupp) and greater ranges, a half dozen forts, with some auxiliary bastions, are enough to defend the entire Lisbon's Entrenched Field. The layout of the Field, as well as the layout of the forts, underwent a very rapid evolution between 1850 and 1914, which we will not go into further.¹ The concept of an Entrenched Field in Lisbon constrains the evolution of the capital for almost a hundred years (between 1850 and 1949). The field includes many kilometres of military roads and even railway

¹ As a whole, the defences of the northern accesses follow a line from Sacavém to Caxias, marked by four large forts (Monte Cintra, in Sacavém; D. Carlos, in Ameixoeira; Sá da Bandeira, in Monsanto; D. Luís I, in Caxias). The defence of the north bank of the Tagus was centred on two forts with heavy Krupp artillery: Bom Sucesso and Alto do Duque. This set was completed by São Julião da Barra fort, which defended the mouth of the Tagus River, crossing fires with the Fort of Almada (south bank). From the end of the 19th century, the Navy concluded the defences of the Tagus setting up submerged torpedoes in the riverbed or on the river banks, supported by 4 small torpedo boats and by a single battleship for coastal defence (the Vasco da Gama, with the same artillery pieces of the forts).

lines, which are the only ones that follow an east-west route, while the others radiate from the centre of Lisbon, like the spokes of a circle. The growth of the urban area of Lisbon is limited by the planning of the Entrenched Field. Constructions that jeopardize the firing ranges, or that are too exposed to enemy artillery, are not allowed. This was one of the reasons why, for example, the modest industrial development of Lisbon was concentrated along the Tagus outside the Entrenched Field, or transferred to the south bank, in places that were born out of nowhere, such as Barreiro. The cities in the vicinity of Lisbon (like Amadora) only developed in the 20th century, as the concept of defence of the capital did not allow them to grow earlier. The industrialization of the south bank of the Tagus, important on a national scale, is a direct consequence of the Entrenched Field. In summary, as it happened with the Moorish Hedge, the urban development of Lisbon depended on the general strategic environment (now affected by the alliance with England) and on the military strategy. The urban perimeter was larger and the constraints were different, but the reasoning continued to be the same as in the days of Afonso Henriques. Lisbon had lost much of the commercial importance of previous centuries, but continued to be at the centre of national defence doctrine, which, in turn, strongly conditioned the development of the urban perimeter. The main concept was that in order to defend Portugal you need to defend Lisbon, and wait for the help that would come from the sea.


Lisbon in the New 20th-Century – Defende and Politics

For reasons not to be covered in this presentation, the monarchy entered a crisis in 1891 and was overthrown in the so-called republican revolution of October 5, 1910. It was the beginning of a period of great instability, with the frequent use of armed force, both by regular units, as well as military security forces and, above all, armed civilians. Armed civilians are private armies with a semi-legal existence, initially linked to radical republican governments, later also associated with other political groups, from trade unions, monarchists or moderate republicans. Almost all of the many revolutions and coups, with violent street fighting, took place in Lisbon. It was the application of a principle proclaimed in 1910: power is conquered in the capital and the rest of the country adheres by telegram. This means that, between 1910 and 1926, power depends on the fights in the streets of Lisbon. The first problem that this raises is the fact that the numerous heavy artillery surrounding the capital cannot interfere with these battles. One of the specifications for the construction of the forts of the Entrenched Field was that their pieces could not rotate in order to hit targets in the urban area, so that an enemy coming from abroad, who would conquer a fort, could not use their artillery against Lisbon. The fight in Lisbon therefore depended on infantry

units, machine gun battalions, lighter field artillery (up to 75 mm) and, above all, on groups of armed civilians, who were acquainted with the back alleys and made use of the roofs with great efficiency, launching improvised grenades into the street from high spots. The cavalry units (almost all monarchists or conservative republicans) were of poor employment in these fights, as the explosion of a grenade thrown from the roof into the middle of a cavalry force was enough to disperse it, turning it an easy target for the snipers placed on high spots. On the 5th of October, for example, the cavalry of Belém, considered the monarchical elite, was defeated by about 50 armed civilians set on roofs in the narrow streets of Alcântara and had to withdraw in a disorderly manner. In the streets of Lisbon, cavalry could not attack improvised barricades, and was merely employed as couriers or in small reconnaissance units. The new reality of urban development in Lisbon facilitates this fight. In the 19th century, the main axis of expansion of the city started from the old *Baixa*, going beyond the already demolished Fernandine Walls to the North, through a wide avenue inspired by Paris “boulevards”, named Avenida da Liberdade. This ended in a high area, from which you could see the Tagus and dominate the whole city, called *Rotunda* (later, Marques de Pombal Square and Eduardo VII Park). Whoever controlled the *Rotunda* had the city at their feet. It was enough to place a few quick-fire pieces therein to dominate any spot in the city, while the accesses were controlled by machine guns, set in improvised barricades. Any attack on this position would have to come from wide, straight avenues, with unobstructed fields of fire, where machine guns and rapid-fire guns would wipe out the attacking force before contact. The only possible alternative would be for the attacking forces to be able to count on strong artillery, with whose support they could overcome the high position of the *Rotunda*. This, however, could not be assigned to the artillery of the Entrenched Field. In addition, the ships in the Tagus River had a very difficult fire range, while, on the other hand, they were easy targets for the artillery placed in the high ground of the *Rotunda*. It turns out that, by pure chance, the two ideal weapons to take advantage of Lisbon’s new military potential had arrived in Portugal shortly before the republican revolution. One was the Vickers-Maxim machine guns, delivered to independent machine gun battalions. The other was the revolutionary piece Schneider TR 75, a secret French weapon, which arrived in Portugal in 1908, by commitment and direct request of King Carlos. It was the first gun in which the recoil was completely absorbed by a hydro-pneumatic system, which meant that it could aim once and fire 12 shots per minute (the breech was closed by an interrupted screw system, simply activating a lever to open), using a complete grenade with many variants (explosive, light, shrapnel, etc.). A military force installed in the *Rotunda*, equipped with machine guns and TR 75 guns, was very difficult to dislodge.




The Schneider TR75 set in the *Rotunda* in the October Revolution of 1910. The artillerymen are from the Artillery 1 barracks, the only artillery unit in Lisbon and one of the only two units in the Army that supports the republicans. They are surrounded by armed civilians from the Carbonária, the private army of the republicans. Photograph of *Ilustração Portuguesa*, October 1910.



Vickers-Maxim was the other weapon that allowed the republicans to gain power. This had been placed in the *Rotunda* in order to cover the accesses by Av. da Liberdade, the largest avenue in Lisbon in 1910. Photograph of *Ilustração Portuguesa*, October 1910. The republican military art, improvised by Machado Santos on the 5th of October, was to take a very small force of regular soldiers (about 200) positioned at the *Rotunda*. In addition, near the *Rotunda* was the Artillery 1 barracks, the only artillery unit in the capital, so the approximately 6 Republican TR 75 guns mounted in the upper zone had

ample ammunition. The manoeuvre was completed by armed civilians from *Carbonária*, linked to the Republican Party, who dominated the streets of the city, preventing the displacement of monarchical forces through the narrow and tortuous streets of old Lisbon. The numerous military forces that supported the monarchy (about 6,000 men at the beginning of the revolution) were forced to move in large numbers across the widest and straightest streets, avoiding confrontations with armed civilians, who acted in very small groups (5 to 20 men) and were perfectly acquainted with the alleys, byways and accesses to the roofs.

As a result of this manoeuvre, the small force concentrated at the *Rotunda* served as a fatal attraction for the enemy, in a larger number, but unable to launch an assault on the high and well-defended spot. Meanwhile, the streets were given over to armed civilians, who carried out discouraging actions upon the opposing forces, while unarmed civilians were trying to mix with the military personnel, persuading them to change camp and causing the disruption of enemy units. This was so heartily felt, that the monarchical command gave orders to concentrate all forces in Rossio square, closing all access streets, so that unarmed civilians could not get in contact with the faithful units. The Republicans were able to win precisely when a monarchical garrison that guarded one of the access streets to Rossio was distracted, letting in a crowd of unarmed civilians who mixed up with the units in the square, breaking discipline and causing many to change sides. It was the end of the large monarchical military force.




Aerial photograph of Lisbon in 1917 (*Ilustração Portuguesa*), which permits to understand the republican military manoeuvre in the revolution. The approximately 200 regular Army soldiers who support the Republic (without a single Army officer) are concentrated at the *Rotunda* (in red, to the

north), where they set 6 Schneider TR 75 pieces in a high spot. Rossio is in blue. In the riverside, the Arsenal da Marinha was a republican strongpoint, also in red. In the riverside area, the Republicans dominate two units of the Navy: the sailors' barracks and the Navy Arsenal (represented in red, next to Praça do Comércio). The numerous forces of the monarchy are concentrated in Rossio (in blue, in the middle). All attacks launched against the *Rotunda* have to follow wide avenues and fail due to the action of artillery and the fire of the Republican barricades. The small streets of Lisbon are dominated by civilians, some of them armed, others unarmed, who oppose the monarchical forces. After 24 hours of such procedure, the Republicans won.

The same manoeuvre was adopted again in several later revolutions. The military centre of Lisbon had moved to the *Rotunda* area and to the new avenues (Liberdade and Fontes Pereira de Melo), which was possible due to the new urban layout and the new weapons. Added to this is the fact that the Republicans, who only had the support of a very small part of the Army officers (less than 3%), had greater influence in the Navy, as a result of which the Navy Arsenal and the Sailors' Barracks, both located in the riverside area of the city, join the movement, as well as two small Navy cruisers. From that moment on, the Republicans dominated the river line, preventing the movement of monarchical units in the wider streets of the riverside area. The concentration of monarchical forces in Rossio is between two fires (the pieces at the *Rotunda* and the ships in the Tagus), while the artillery of the ships defends the sailors' facilities on the banks of the Tagus. One day of fighting in Lisbon under these conditions was enough for the 400 Republican soldiers (supported by about 2 to 3 thousand armed civilians) to achieve the surrender of the approximately 6000 soldiers loyal to the Monarchy, which seemed impossible for a "normal" operation.

Lisbon takes a new military role after 1910: the role of a centre of military power, backed by armed civilians, without which political power could not stand. The Republic was a fragile regime, dominated by the Republicans' most radical party, whose support centre was located in the capital, far from the majority of the rural population of Portugal. The main concern was to keep power, which was intended to be carried out from Lisbon, with a new military system that included private armies of armed civilians, in addition to the new military security force created in 1911 (the GNR – Guarda Nacional Republicana). All major revolutions and coups of the next 16 years (1910-1926) repeat the 1910 model, with some variants. Most of these movements are victorious (as in 1915, 1917 and 1921), led by various political forces, some radical and others moderate, all of them using military violence to seize power.

The new military manoeuvre, which allowed a small urban force to take power, was only possible due to the urban development of Lisbon from 1850 onwards, with the opening of Avenida da Liberdade and Avenidas Novas. It is curious to note that the Lisbon area where all this is happening surpasses the Fernandine Walls, yet remains within the defence lines of Lisbon's Entrenched Field. The capital is at the centre of political and social life in Portugal, however linked to strong internal instability and an original military manoeuvre, which conjugates the traditional with the new and that is only possible in a modernized Lisbon after the Regeneration (1851).²



Aerial photograph of Avenidas Novas in 1917 (*Ilustração Portuguesa*). On the left, we find the *Rotunda*, a high area, without trees and with wide accesses. On the right, the two main new avenues: Fontes Pereira de Melo, which ends in Saldanha, and Av. da República, which ends in Campo Grande, then a suburb of Lisbon. The capital of 1910 was contained within

² The democratic revolution of April 25, 1974, also started in Lisbon, with a similar manoeuvre. As Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho (the author of the plan for the revolution) told the author of these lines, he intended to concentrate the main rebel military unit (the armoured force of Santarém) in Terreiro de Paço, to serve as a fatal attraction to the forces that supported the dictatorship, while the main targets (television, radio, airports, arsenals, communications) were occupied by small detachments, which did not encounter resistance. It was the same idea as the *Rotunda*'s fatal attraction in 1910, applied to new circumstances. I might add that, as early as 1910, one of the Republicans' first concerns was to occupy the submarine cable centre in Carcavelos and the telegraph stations, which meant that internal and international communications were in their hands.

the liberal lines of defence of Lisbon in 1835, which served as the base for the Entrenched Field. All revolutions and coups took place in this small area, where the three main avenues and the Rotunda conditioned military manoeuvres and the strong artillery of the Entrenched Field could not be used.

World War II and the Changes of the Cold War

The last expression of the concept of Entrenched Field appears during World War II, in which Portugal remained neutral. On that occasion, the Plan Barron for the defence of the capital was developed, named after the English officer who conceived it, based on the existing forts. The plan had two important innovations: Anti-aircraft for defence of the capital was for the first time used and the network of coastal batteries was extended, in order to cover the peninsula of Setúbal, beyond the Tagus bar. The justification was that the ships' heavy artillery had ranges of more than 25 km, so a battleship in the Sado estuary (Setúbal) could reach Lisbon with its pieces, without the defence artillery on the Tagus coast being able to fire back. Therefore, to defend Lisbon, it was necessary to fortify the Sado estuary and not just the Tagus.

The Plan Barron provided for 8 coastal defence batteries, which could be deployed from Cascais to Setúbal, equipped with pieces of more than 20 km in range, with 4 on the north bank and the same number on the south.³ The AA artillery was born at this time and concentrated on the defence of Lisbon, with modern English pieces.⁴ According to the plan developed with England in 1943 (when Lages Air Base/Azores was occupied by England), in the event of an attack on the Spanish border, the Portuguese had to ensure the defence of the Lisbon-Setúbal area, for at least three months. They had the support of the coastal defence batteries, the old batteries of the Entrenched Field and the modern AA defence network that has been developed since 1938. In an early phase, England only committed to sending naval units and some fighter squadrons of the RAF for the air defence of the capital. The expedition of a land expeditionary force remained open, without England committing as to

³ In its final version, the batteries, delivered to the Coastal Defence Regiment, were:

Cascais – Alcabideche – 234 mm pieces by Vickers

Oeiras – RAC – Vickers 152 mm parts

Oeiras – Lage – Krupp 150 mm pieces

Fort of Bom Sucesso – Belém

Raposeira - Trafaria

Raposa – Fonte da Telha – 234 mm Vickers

Outão – Serra da Arrábida – 150 mm Krupp

Albarquel – Serra da Arrábida – 152 mm Vickers.

⁴ The first plane shot down in Portugal crashes in December 1917, during the Sidónio Pais revolution. It was a small biplane that decided to fly at low altitude over the Camp of Rotunda to take some photographs, believing it was unbeatable. The revolutionaries of Sidónio Pais open fire with their Mauser-Vergueiro rifles and the plane is shot down.

the composition of such force or estimated date of arrival. The 1943 plan was the last version of the Lines of Torres defence concept, centred in Lisbon and updated with long-range artillery and the anti-aircraft component.⁵

When Portugal joined NATO as a founding member (1949), the whole concept of defence of Portugal changes, assuming a multilateral context, different from the past. Two defence plans were drawn up in 1949/1960: one with Spain, for the Portuguese participation of a force of three divisions in the defence of the Pyrenees line; another with NATO, to send a Portuguese expeditionary force to the Bordeaux area, in the south of France in the case of a Russian lightning offensive that would bring Russian tanks to the south of France in just three months. For the first time since 1147, Lisbon was no longer the core of Portugal's defence, which was secured many hundreds of kilometres from the capital. This means that only after 1949 the capital would be free from the constraints of the defence plans conceived for its development and could be able to carry out an urban planning that would follow different criteria.

Conclusions

Three frameworks characterized the development of Lisbon: trade, defence and international strategic context. Trade was the main reason for being birth in the Tagus estuary, the best natural harbour on the Peninsula, capable of hosting the largest fleets. The Phoenician and Greek presence in Lisbon reveals the importance of the city as a terminus of Mediterranean trade networks, which would be reinforced by the long colonization of Rome, responsible for transforming the city into the most important port of the province of Lusitania. The Moorish presence for more than four centuries (711-1147) reinforces this role and, for the first time, the city is surrounded by a continuous wall, becoming the centre of the defence system of the Tagus and Sado estuaries, with a network of a dozen castles. In the following two centuries (1147-1415), Lisbon would undergo another strategic role. It becomes the hub where the commercial networks of the Mediterranean meet those of northern Europe, an essential element for the development of trade

⁵ The two main ones were the 94 mm Vickers heavyweight 3.7 inch (QF 3.7 inch) and the medium 40mm Bofors, of Swedish origin but manufactured in England. Both were in service for more than half a century.

⁶ There were other plans later, but prepared only by Portugal, without the cooperation or England's agreement, so it can be said that the 1943 would be the last international plan. The subject was studied by the author in Portugal, and World War II and later Lisbon defence plans to 1943 are developed in the work of Jorge Rocha.

⁷ I recall that Spain was not a member of NATO at this time, because the main European states did not accept the Franco regime in the new organization. This forced Portugal to have two plans independent parties: one with Spain and the other with NATO.

and of the European cities. This allowed Portugal to create strong ties with three of the main Christian commercial entities at the time: the Kingdom of Aragon, the Republic of Genoa and, above all, England, with which the secular alliance was signed in 1373. In terms of defence this would be evidenced by the creation of the ambitious Fernandine Walls and the expansion of Lisbon to an area 7 times larger. After the 15th century, Lisbon takes on a new strategic role: the terminal point of the main ocean routes of three continents (Africa, America and Asia). In these centuries, the Portuguese navy was one of the most important ocean navies in the world, constituting the major defence of Lisbon, while the Fernandine Walls fell into disrepair, particularly as it turned out to be too small for a city that was expanding rapidly. Lisbon would then grow mainly towards the west, along the river, in the continuation of *Ribeira das Naus*, the main shipyard in Portugal and in the world back then.

With the fall of the 1st world system (end of the 16th century), Lisbon's worldwide importance is reduced. The city then acquires a new limited function: the commercial centre of the 2nd Empire, the Empire of Brazil, which could only exist with the naval support of England, ensured by the secular alliance. Lisbon remains at the centre of the Portuguese system, but it is no longer the heart of the world's trade. Nevertheless, around 6% to 9% of the Atlantic trade is carried out through the capital of Portugal, which is the main source of revenue for the monarchy. With the Napoleonic wars (beginning of the 19th century), Lisbon suffered a further decline with regard to the city's relative power and ceased to be the mandatory crossing point for trade with Brazil. The capital began to feel again the threats of a land invasion and Portugal understood that its defence could only be ensured within the framework of the Secular Alliance. This leads to the building of the Lines of Torres. In the liberal period of the 19th century, and until 1975, Lisbon becomes the centre of the 3rd Empire, the empire of Africa, gradually built over decades. The defence of the city is ensured by Lisbon's Entrenched Field, always within the notion of an understanding with England, but with a smaller dimension than the Lines of Torres. From 1910 onwards, in the unstable period that would then begin, Lisbon got a new role. It becomes the centre, not only political, but political/military of Portugal. It is in Lisbon here it is decided, arms in hand, who governs. This would result in multiple uprisings, coups and riots, all in the capital. The military manoeuvre that was then developed was only possible due to the change in urban plans since 1851, with the new city expanding to the north, characterized by large avenues, which opened up other military possibilities. The plans for Lisbon's Entrenched Field then developed, prevented the capital from becoming directly an industrial centre, with the modest national industries sent to the south bank or beyond the defensive perimeter. World War II essentially maintained the

concept of defending Portugal having Lisbon as the basis, therefore developing, in conjugation with England, plans in this regard. The emerging air power and the greater range of artillery brought two innovations to the defence plans: they began to cover the airspace, with a modern AA system, which was created in 1938, while the coast defence artillery has a longer range; the plans now include the joint defence of Lisbon/Setúbal. It is a defensive system that, as it had already happened in 1810, needed the collaboration of England to be effective.

With NATO (1949), a new defence doctrine emerged for Portugal. For the first time, Portugal would be defended far from Lisbon and based on multilateral cooperation that encompassed the North Atlantic. In this concept, the Portuguese military force is projected towards the south of France and towards the north of Spain. Portugal's defence lines are now very far from Lisbon, although it maintained the main forts of the Entrenched Field until quite late, namely those of the coastal artillery (many still active in 1974). A cycle is then completed. For the first time since the Phoenician colonization, three thousand years before, the development of Lisbon is no longer conditioned mainly by concerns related to defence. In the same way, the defence of Portugal is no longer centred on Lisbon. To note that Portugal is not a "natural" entity, dictated by geography. It is a political product, the result of strategic decisions taken over three millennia, since Phoenician times. In this long process, Lisbon was at the centre. Therefore, it was normal that it was also at the heart of Portugal's defence.

This study, even if rather summarized, proves that there is an intimate relationship between four vectors, which determine the evolution of Lisbon:

- 1) The long-distance trade networks that are at their origin; first linked to the Mediterranean, then to the Mediterranean/Atlantic and, finally, to the world. Lisbon is not only determined by these networks, but plays an important role in its evolution, especially from the 12th to the 20th century.
- 2) The international strategic and political system, which gives Lisbon a particular mission at each stage. The city allows an agreement of Portugal with maritime powers, the basis of the economy and national independence.
- 3) The national political system, centred in Lisbon and dependent until very late on income channelled to the city.

The capital's defensive system, which changes and expands over the centuries, but was the heart of Portugal's defence until the country joins NATO (1949). The defensive system, on the other hand, is highly constrained by technological conditions, mainly the evolution of military engineering and artillery, either gunpowder or earlier.

NUMANCIA: PARIDIGM OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN FREEDOM

Amalio DE MARICHALAR (Spain)

The importance of this Congress is to know what we are, and what we want to be. Numancia is the history of resistance to the domination of Rome of the Iberian Peninsula. It began in the year 153 BC, and after almost two centuries of Celt-Iberian wars and adamant resistance to the Roman invasions, the people of the Iberian Peninsula finally succumbed to Rome. This great battle lasted more than 20 years. Over this long period of time, several Roman generals and consuls had attempted to conquer Numancia by any means, all without success. The first was the Consul Nobilior in 153 BC. The battle began sometime in mid-September of 153BC, with skirmishes between the Romans the Numantines. In one of those attacks, the Numantines responded out to the plains. The elephants were behind the Romans, surprising the Numantines. In the beginning, this surprise strategy favored the Romans until suddenly an elephant was speared from one of the Numantine wall towers. The elephant's fright sent a panic to the rest of the elephant troop causing a rout in the Roman ranks and crushing many of them in the pursuant stampede. This was a resounding victory for the Numantines and an embarrassing defeat for Nobilior. Yet, despite the numerous defeats and casualties, he continued the attacks. Appian writes about these events and mentions as well, the hardships the Romans had to endure in the winter of 153- 152, whipped by icy winds from the north.

After successive defeats in the Iberian Peninsula since 141 BC, the Roman people demanded the intervention of a great general. In response, the Roman Senate called upon its most prestigious leader, "General Scipio Africanus". Scipio name was on everyone's lips since he had dealt with a similar struggle twelve years earlier in 147 BC, in the war against Carthage. Caton said: "Only he has intelligence. All the others are shadows". To prepare for the campaign he organized 4000 volunteers sent by princes such as Antiochus of Syria, Attalus of Pergamum, and Micipsa of Numidia, as they had done so earlier during the war of Carthage. This is how he built his army and established a level of confidence. Scipio was accompanied by an entourage of allies that who would later become very influential: Gaius Marius, Jugurtha, C. Graco Memmio, the poet Lucilius, Rutilius Rufus, Sempronio Asellio and Polybius, who through Appian narrates the events and their involvement. Appian was Greek, but very influential with Scipio both

politically and militarily. His older brother Emiliano Fabius Maximus was a great support for him and marched with him as his league. Fabio Buteo, son of Fabius Maximus served Scipio as Quaestor. Before accepting the challenge, General Scipio carefully studied the evolution of war and the strategy of their predecessors. He had come to understand that the Numantines were tough people and that hard winter weather was an added obstacle to the success of the Roman army. He, therefore, requested that the Senate advance the beginning of the calendar year, which was then March 15th (the Ides of March), to January 1st. This strategy would allow Scipio and his legions sufficient time to begin and complete the journey towards Hispania by spring, coinciding with better weather for battle and giving them a climate advantage. The Senate accepted and conceded this one-time exception to General Scipio. Later, in honor of his eventual victory over Numantia, the Roman Senate ruled to make this change permanent in the Roman calendar year. So, thanks to Numancia's sacrifice, today we begin the new year still on January 1.

Scipio Africanus also considered it very necessary to reorganize his army, morally drained after over 20 years of successive defeats. This was essential to restore the morale of an army that was always accustomed to winning. Once he arrived on the peninsula and Numancia, he had the opportunity to get used to the hostile terrain that he had come to know from the accounts of his predecessors. Scipio surveyed the land around Numancia and provoked several skirmishes with the Numantines to gauge the strength of his opposition. He quickly learned that the reports of the fierceness of these people were true. Even under the best conditions, Scipio realized that his task was not going to be an easy one.

After much scrutiny, he devised an innovative plan to encircle Numancia with a wall which would serve to deny the city of any reinforcements, food supplies, and water. In a famous statement transmitted to Appian and Plutarch (in his collection of Scipio's decisions), Polybius recounts: "The incompetent General is the one who launches an attack before it is necessary. In contrast, a good General only fights when it is necessary, just as a doctor does not use fire or knife before applying medical care..." One may think that this was a cautious strategy that General Scipio devised, however, considering that his army had a history of defeats and was battle weary, it made sense to have it concentrate on building walls rather than launch attacks. He thus decided to surround the city with seven army camps, all connected with a nine-kilometer-long wall. To create the element of surprise, the priority was to first build the wall, and several meters behind it, a field of stakes. As soon as they saw the Numantines observed this threat, they tried to undo the work but Scipio had foreseen this eventuality and continued building the fortifications. This was the most dangerous moment

for Scipio, who had established two previous camps, one at Castillejo and the other at Peña Renda to begin the defense of the entire enclosure of the stockade.

The wall was 4 meters thick and was interrupted with several watchtowers to prevent any hostile movement or escape. Once the enclosure completed, Scipio's army was 60,000 legionaries strong and the Numancian resistance totaled 8,000 people, 4,000 of which were women, elderly and children, and the other 4,000 were warriors. Numancia could only resist like this for 11 months. And having reached the limit of their resistance, they resorted to eating the flesh of their own dead. Scipio was finally able to declare an end to the war by capturing the last 50 survivors and taking them with him to Rome to show proof of his triumph.

In recognition of his triumphal entry into Rome, the Senate set from that time forward, the new Roman calendar to begin on January 1st of each year. After so many years, the end of the war was so valued for its importance that Rome recognized the deep and extraordinary value and valor of the Numantines despite their defeat. From that moment on, even though they were the victors, Rome praised the courage of the Numantines, their strength, their dignity, and their courage, honoring them to the status of epic myth and legend and bestowing upon them all of the virtues of a proud people. The recognition of this epic moment in history has survived over the centuries and is very much alive today.

Numancia: Paradigm of Values and Universal Symbol of Freedom of Humanity

From 2150 years ago Numancia contemplates us today from the perspective of a tragic moment in time 22 Centuries ago that historically became the greatest heroic feat of a people who died in defense of freedom: A remarkable military feat of such historic magnitude that it established the foundation of Europe itself. This epic legend has been inscribed with gold letters as one of the most outstanding examples of human valor. An historical treasure cherished and guarded by classical historians such as Polybius, Appian, Cicero, Estrabon, Tito Livio, Seneca, Plinio, Plutarch, Frontino, Floro, Valerio Maximo, Orosio, and modern as thinkers such as Cervantes, Goethe, Scopenhauer, Machado, etc... All this makes Numancia, a universal historical event of the first magnitude and an acknowledgement of the value of a people who before subjugation preferred to fight for their freedom, dignity, honor, and nobility with the greatest of sacrifice, resistance and courage known to mankind in defense of their homeland of independence, and of peace.

The knowledge and wisdom of Numancia passes through the fog of centuries and gifts us with imperishable values that represent a true eternal treasure celebrated by the best guardians of culture that we can imagine. Today this means upholding the highest goals that we can aspire towards in our modern society, which must urgently rediscover the best of itself within itself.

Numancia is a historical diamond with many facets. If we close our eyes for a moment, we can only imagine what twenty years of siege by the most important army in the world meant for a simple village of the peninsular Celtiberia with such unequal defenses. And that this little village was able to successively caused Rome to lose battle after battle, decimating its massive legions, and to nobly offer peace and forgiveness only to be rejected. Then again, to begin the battle over and over again with even greater losing odds. Perhaps we can start to understand the extraordinary, patriotic value of a people that defended the purest essence of freedom as the maximum expression of the dignity of humanity. This is where the strength and unmatched faith of this people lies; in the extraordinary defense of the supreme virtue of freedom and of the most essential values of humanity.

We are celebrating the 2150 anniversary of Numancia, and we are discussing the recognition of a new eternal city, separate yet alongside the eternal city of Rome. Numancia transmits to us the best of human values, such as freedom, dignity, honor, unity of efforts, solidarity, sacrifice, nobility, independence and peace. Rome contributed to us their language, religion, law, cities, citizenship, infrastructure, communications, the backbone of an empire, and the Greco-Roman and Christian cultures. And so together, Numancia and Rome, Rome and Numancia, established the origin of common European history and culture.

As was said recently in the European Parliament; the Numantinos were the first people to die in Europe in defense of freedom. This accomplishment, along with the efforts of the people who followed in their footsteps, with the heritage of Rome, establishes the most solid origins and roots of the creation of human rights and democracy in Europe. As the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union upholds, the Union is founded upon the universal and indivisible values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity, supported by the principles of democracy and the rule of law that places the individual at the center of these actions. Hence, the two pillars of Europe, for so many years torn apart by wars, are human rights and freedom. 2150 years ago, the law and freedom in Numancia were intertwined, first through struggle and after through coexistence. The law is the greatest contribution of Rome. Freedom of the people, outside the scope of Rome, is that of Numancia. Numancia defended this value while defending their

community even at the risk of annihilation, meaning that they fought not only in defense of their own existence but ultimately in vindication of human dignity and freedom. Numantinos and Romans, without even knowing it, created the roots of today's Europe, which together with Greco-Roman and Christian culture, formed the Europe of values, the Europe that conjoins law and freedom. "Cives Romanus Sum" is now transformed into "I am a European Citizen".

Numancia: Culture "Fourth Pillar" of Intelligent Sustainable Development

Numancia represent the essential values to support the culture, understood as "the best moral heritage of humanity", and with Portugal we have together include, "the culture" as a fourth pillar of sustainability. The principal pillar for the human progress, and together with peace and security and human rights, the only way to improve the democracy. I want to thank and honor here my mentors, Mr. Maurice Strong and Mr. Ricardo Diez-Hocheleitner after 30 years of long works. 32 years ago, we began working on Sustainable Development and on putting into place a viable plan of action. We proposed Numancia as a paradigmatic example of sustainable cultural tourism in preparation for our participation in the celebrated Rio '92 United Nations Earth Summit. After completing this work, we carried out the Local Agenda 21 proposed in Rio92 throughout the whole of the province of Soria. Our success distinguishing our project at the international level as the first province of a nation to reach consensus on the implementation of the Local Agenda 21.

In March 2001, we were able to communicate this accomplishment in an international conference held in Soria, Spain, headed by HRH the Prince of Asturias, in which relevant national and international personalities linked to many different sectors, and scholars from many disciplines convened for discussions on the topic of Sustainable Development. Likewise, we are tremendously grateful to Mr. Ricardo Diez-Hocheleitner, and I honor his memory too, champion of the value of education as a necessity for sustainable development for all of humanity. Sixteen years ago, we also began collaborating with and working inside Portugal to advance a real "Sustainability Action Plan".

From our work in Portugal, we went one step deeper into the advancement of the understanding of intelligent sustainable development as an absolute necessity in society today. We proposed to link the meaning of sustainability with culture; defining culture as the "best moral heritage of society". A definition that we have distilled and refined over many long years of discussion, and Numancia is the great sample! This definition of culture as

our best collective moral heritage, and as the “Fourth” and main pillar of sustainability, we now put forth as an innovative and progressive strategical advancement and as one of the main objectives of Intelligent Sustainable Development, so that, hand in hand with peace & security, and human rights Intelligent Sustainable Development can also be established as a fundamental pillar of democracy in the 21st Century. Perhaps, along with Rome, Numancia can be said to be the cradle of our Western European cultural legacy.

On January 29, 2018, we inaugurated the celebration of the European Year of Cultural Heritage with the joint visit to Numancia by the Ambassadors of Italy, Portugal, and Germany. The declarations that these made on this occasion have been essential in placing Numancia at the origin of the idea of freedom for all; communal European history and culture; origin and as the seed of our common European Civilization. There is no need to say any more than this...

We thank very much General Dominguez Buj and General Muñoz-Grandes and we also held in the heroic city of Numancia two historic military tributes presided by Spain’s Military Chief of Staff, General Don Francisco Javier Varela, in which we raised the flag of Spain over Numancia on the solemn occasion the 175th anniversary of its adoption by HRM [Her Royal Majesty] Queen Isabel-II for the whole of Spain. This was one of the most moving events in Numancia’s 22 centuries of history as it brought the oldest origins of Spain together with its 175 years of modern history under this symbol representing the best of Spain’s cultural-historical patrimony and the transcendental contributions it has offered to the world. These can include independence in the United States, the discovery of the new world, the first known circumnavigation of the world, a global language, religion, arts and culture, etc.... Moreover, this symbol represents our deep dedication towards achieving the universal good for mankind and wellbeing for our homeland. We also held in Numancia and had the privilege of having the President of the Portuguese Academy of History, Dra. Manuela Mendosa, to speak in Numancia. She offered her important perspective on the value of Numancia for Portugal as the last stronghold of resistance to Rome on the Iberian Peninsula; something that is also important for the birth of the Portuguese identity. She stressed the relevance of Spain and Portugal as the two first nations of Europe and the significance of Numancia for Portugal as a symbol a universal historical inheritance; a world heritage that belongs to all mankind under every flag.

We always thank very much Mr. Gustavo Araoz, Presidente of ICOMOS in his visit to Numancia there are sixteen years ago and Numancia has worked towards achieving denomination as UNESCO World Heritage Site for all of humanity, garnishing national and international support that

gathered more than 14,000 signatures. In this effort, we continue the work of my grandfather, the Vizconde de Eza, who originally donated the site of Numancia to Spain in 1907, that once formed part of our family estate where two Roman military outposts of the siege of Roman General Scipio on Numancia are still situated. From the 12th century, our family roots can be traced to the origins of this noble city from Warlord Megara from generation to generation linked to this heroic city.

On this occasion, I would like to invite all of you here today in this International Congress, and all others to visit Numancia and come to Soria, a province that holds an unmatched wealth of Romanesque art, historic landscape, and unique local culture. Numancia once again as an example which demonstrates a successfully executed action plan showing that culture and sustainable development can come together both in theory and in practice. Numancia is a gift of civilization that fills us with its imperishable values for the benefit of all of society. This gift of wisdom can help us to achieve the moral equilibrium that we so urgently need to lead our decisions towards the creation of the best possible world today leading towards a better world for tomorrow.

I want to thank the many people in Portugal who have helped us to take the necessary step of uniting culture and sustainability as the “Fourth Pillar” of Intelligent Sustainable Development. And also, for having been the place where it was proposed to establish Numancia as a universal example of this achievement.

Finally, I would like to thank this International Congress again for the honor of being here today with my wife, thank so much to General Dominguez Buj, General Francisco Javier Varela, the chiefs of the Air Army and the Navy, Coronel Fontana de Grassa and once more General Bisbal deeply, and all the Spanish delegation. Our belief is that Numancia, from 22 centuries ago, gives us the greatest proof of the worth and nobility of the human struggle for dignity, honesty, truth, and freedom in the fight to gain the supreme good for each person in society. Numancia is a treasure origin of freedom and highest symbol to keep it. A word symbol for all of us.

THE URBAN SETTLEMENTS: KEY FOR CONTROLLING AFRICA'S INDIAN OCEAN COAST

Prof. Dr. Thean POTGIETER (South Africa)

Introduction

Africa is often neglected in international and comparative history. This inadequate focus on the continent's fascinating and complex history may contribute to a poor understanding, misinterpretations, fallacies, and errors about its past. Although military historians do discuss African themes, studies are often associated with the colonial past and an effort to indicate that certain attributes of war could be illustrated against the background of different times and places. As warfare in Africa was a complex phenomenon that varied from region to region and evolved, the military history of Africa is multifaceted. Yet much of this history, including the maritime history, must still be "told".

By the end of the first millennium AD sub-Saharan Africa formed part of robust extended trade routes. Caravans moved across the Sahara, while seafarers traded along the East Coast of Africa as far south as Sofala. The Indian Ocean trade with Arabia, Persia, Oman, India, Indonesia, and China stimulated the development of about forty coastal cities with a flourishing Swahili culture. However, no comprehensive indigenous maritime defence capability developed in the region, which could be ascribed to the vastness of the surrounding oceans, the limited economic value of the sea itself (not trade) to the local inhabitants, and the lack of strong maritime enemies.

Due to growing consumer demands in Europe for Eastern goods and challenges with trade across the Eurasian continent, a sea route to India had to be found. The development of ocean-going ships made it possible for Europeans to undertake transoceanic voyages. The Portuguese appeared on the Indian Ocean scene at the end of the fifteenth century as Vasco da Gama reached India in 1498. However, the wealth and vibrant trade along the coast of Africa resulted in competition, conflict and conquest as the Portuguese realised that control over the wealthy Swahili city-states was essential for trade and power. Soon the Portuguese (followed by other powers) wrestled for control over many of the Swahili settlements, established coastal trading enclaves and erected forts (castles) along the coast. The sea was a determining factor in the history of the region, it brought trade, cultural influences, and conquest. Developments in European naval technology (including powerful ships with broadside-mounted cannons) made it possible to reach and project

power to the far corners of the world. Maritime power projection influenced events on land directly and along the East Coast of Africa, it meant that the era of city-states was replaced by a struggle between empires lasting centuries.

The focus of this paper is on the crucial importance of conquering urban settlements for control over coastal areas and trade networks along the East Coast of Africa. The sources utilised for compiling the paper are from different disciplines including history, military history, maritime studies, archaeology as well as etymology. Primary as well as secondary sources were utilised. The primary sources used are virtually available and were transcribed or translated. However, as many valuable sources are only available in Arabic (which the author unfortunately could not use) it limits this discussion.

Notes on Historiography

Reference to trade in the Indian Ocean and the coast of East Africa has consistently appeared in texts since ancient times. An early description of north-western Indian Ocean trade, the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* (voyage around the Erythraean Sea) is an anonymous Egyptian-Greek text probably created between 130–140 CE. It offers some first-hand perspectives of the pre-Islamic and early historical East Coast of Africa as far south as the coast of present-day Tanzania.¹ The Greek-Egyptian astronomer and geographer Ptolemy added to the knowledge of Africa and the East African Coast by consolidating information from various sources in his influential work, “Geographia” (circa 150 CE). It provided detailed maps and descriptions of the region and its peoples including Azania (now Tanzania). The Arab geographers, Al Masudi and Al Idrisi visited and described the East African coast in the tenth and twelfth centuries respectively, calling it the land of Zanj. The renowned Moroccan scholar Ibn Battuta provides unique accounts with rich detail about the East African coastline and its wealthy trade during the fourteenth century.²

The arrival of the Portuguese along the East Coast of Africa at the end of the fifteenth century was an unfamiliar experience to all involved. It stimulated various texts during the early stages of this contact and a lively, but divergent discourse evident in Arabic, Asian and Portuguese sources such as chronicles, discourses, letters, and poems, to name but a few. As the encounter wrought sudden changes in socio-economic and political spheres and

¹ Anonymous, *Periplus Maris Erythraei*. For a discussion see Eivind Seland, “The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea: A Network Approach,” *Asian Review of World Histories* 4, 2 (2016): 192–193.

² Derek Nurse and Thomas Spear, *The Swahili. Reconstructing the History and Language of an African Society, 800-1500* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), Chapter 1, <https://www.perlego.com>.

challenged worldviews, those involved understood and described the transformative situation and new realities they experienced within the context of past or inherited traditions. This is illustrated by how they referred to each other. The Portuguese referred to the inhabitants of the East Coast of Africa as “Moors”, while in Arabic sources the generic term “Franks” is used when referring to the Portuguese.

Views associated with culture, religion and economics dominated. Many elements of Swahili society elements, such as religion, architecture, and clothing amongst others, reminded the Portuguese (with alarm) of their earlier enemy from North Africa, the “Moors”.³ They searched for Christian allies, but “the dream of a universal Christian empire” stimulated hostility towards the many Muslim communities in the Indian Ocean. Some scholars later criticised the early Portuguese narratives of the explorations and conquests as histories with “a mixture of pragmatism and religious dogmatism” in which through an apparent objective view of events, they held an “aggrandizing view of themselves, their actions...” often glorifying “the killings and systematic plunder ... as deeds blessed by God”.⁴

The Portuguese provide an intricate picture of the Early Modern period where historical transformations were not only at the hands of Iberian conquerors but also stimulated by the conquered and those beyond the territories controlled by Western empires. The Portuguese were confronted with a “vast world” and as they did not have “great numbers” they did not “envisage mass conquest” yet they aimed at “an epistemological conquest... write down their explorations by focusing on their homeland”. They had to “impress the authority of their own writings on those they encountered, even if this meant writing a chronicle that had never been written before.”⁵ These histories lack details on the complex variety relating to the Islamic communities, specifically details on Asian and African Muslims.

Correspondingly, the incursions by the “Franks” are viewed as events set against a larger historical framework in Arabic texts. Franks is a term for European Christians of the Latin Church, emanating from their presence in the South and Eastern Mediterranean since the eleventh century. Indian Ocean societies were mostly unaware of them until Vasco da Gama (and the Portuguese) arrived and were placed in the category of Franks, and they are at

³ Adrien Delmas, “Writing in Africa: The Kilwa Chronicle and other Sixteenth-Century Portuguese Testimonies,” in *The Arts and Crafts of Literacy: Islamic Manuscript Cultures in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Andrea Brigaglia, Mauro Nobili (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 187.

⁴ Gabriel Mathias Soares “Arabic History writing in the context of Portuguese transgression in the sixteenth-century Indian Ocean.” *Global Histories* 8, No. 1 (July 2022): 10-11.

⁵ Delmas, “Writing in Africa,” 202-203.

times described in Persian and Arabic chronicles as “a violent lot ... given to devious acts and chicanery ...”.⁶

Discourses in Arabic texts were political and aimed at tackling the pressing challenges created by the European expansion. Notable texts lamenting the incursion of the Portuguese and encroachment over Muslim societies are the anti-Portuguese literature from the Western Indian Ocean (Malabar Coast) and the work by an unknown author about the history of Kilwa. It was probably finalised in the middle of the sixteenth century after the Portuguese occupation under the title “The consolation of the History of Kilwa” (*Kitāb al-sulwa fī akhbār Kulwa* in Arabic). Such works could be interpreted as an effort to understand the broader historical context and the response to the challenges caused by hostile foreign contact. They are founded in a re-examination of a heterogenous past and sought to justify the legality of Islam in this region.⁷

Two versions of the Kilwa Chronicle survived: the Arabic version as well as the Portuguese version published in the *Decades* by Joao de Barros in 1552.⁸ The origin of these texts remains an issue. The Chronicle narrates the founding story of Kilwa and the genealogies of the Kings of Kilwa, dating back to the end of the first millennium. As such genealogies are often associated with myth and might not be an authentic historical account, they do connect people within distant places, articulate notions of prestige and authority, and in this case provide identities related to the establishment of urban centres and an Indian Ocean thalassocracy.⁹ As such they provide social mapping by connecting East Africa to the wider Indian Ocean world.

The two versions agree on the genealogy of most of the Kings of Kilwa, but the Portuguese version includes some names which are not in the Arabic version, while the Arabic version indicates there are ten chapters while only seven survived. Omissions on the succession of rulers could be due to transmission errors and methods, political censorships, and competing notions of the geographic claims within the Indian Ocean. The two texts have contrasting views on the initial contact and confrontation.¹⁰ In the Swahili version, the arrival of Da Gama on the East Coast of Africa is narrated as follows: “They had three ships, and the name of their captain was al-Mirati [Vasco da Gama] ... they thought [the Franks] were good and honest men.

⁶ Soares “Arabic History writing,” 6 and 10.

⁷ Soares, “Arabic History writing,” 5-6.

⁸ Delmas, “Writing in Africa,” 190.

⁹ Carla Bocchetti, “Performing Geography in Global History,” *Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review* 51 (2016): 91-92.

¹⁰ Elias Saad, “Kilwa Dynastic Historiography: A Critical Study.” *History in Africa*, 6 (1979): 177–207. Bocchetti, “Performing Geography,” 91-92.

But those who knew the truth confirmed that they were corrupt and dishonest persons who had only come to spy out the land in order to seize it.”¹¹

The histories of African and Asian societies during the period of first interaction along the East Coast of Africa and in the Indian Ocean cannot only be reduced to a history of subjugation, with a focus on European actions that provide a limited role to non-Western role players. It is a history of complex relationships, intertwined with contact between different world views, conflict, enduring competition between regional and extra-regional actors and the globalisation of trade. It is evident from historical narratives that long-held traditions (religion, language, and social stratification, among others) provided a limited understanding of how this interaction would be a turning point not only for the region but also for the world.¹² It would go on to stimulate a considerable body of written history, which still largely reflect the early paradigms.

Swahili Coast

As mentioned above, references to trade along the East Coast of Africa and in the Indian Ocean date from antiquity. Sources have described the coastal communities as well as the extent of the trade. Facilitated by the predictable Monsoon winds, Arab traders brought products that included pottery, cloth, iron tools and weapons, glass vessels, wine, food, clothing and porcelain with northeast monsoon from the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf and further afield, while returning on southeast monsoon with African slaves, ivory, timber, myrrh, rhino horn, gold, dyes, and palm oil, amongst other. African goods reached markets in the Arabian and Greco-Roman worlds, India and China.¹³ By the ninth century trade with the Arabian Peninsula increased dramatically (during the First Imamate at Oman) and by the twelfth century it shifted to southwestern Arabia (Aden, Yemen, and Hadhramaut) and then to Oman.

There are different views on the origins of the term “Swahili”. The essential issue is whether should it be limited to the coastal culture emerging in the first millennium CE, or also include the older Stone Age coastal settlements. Of note is the following: an old African maritime culture emerged that influenced the African cultural landscape and although the Swahili population was mostly Muslim, they were not Arab. Many historians have used early accounts of travellers and Arab geographers to indicate that the Swahili culture and society were essentially Arab, but in the light of

¹¹ Delmas, “Writing in Africa,” 189.

¹² Soares, “Arabic History writing,” 7-8.

¹³ Seland, “The Periplus,” 195, 204. H.J. van Aswegen, *Geskiedenis van Afrika*, (Pretoria: Academica, 1980), 105-106.

“linguistic, archaeological, and ethnographic evidence” this is no longer a valid assumption.¹⁴ The culture could be seen as a fusion of African society with Arabs and other lesser influences. As trade was the lifeblood of the Swahili settlements they grew in strength and shared ideas, and customs (in culture, linguistics and religion). Resulting from conversion to Islam many beautiful mosques were created during the second millennium. Such buildings also saw the earliest uses of coral for constructing mosques during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.¹⁵

Archaeological traces date a Chinese presence along the coast back to the eighth century, with Chinese sources listing trade articles from Africa as gold, amber, yellow sandalwood, ivory and slaves. Between 1405 and 1433, Chinese fleets voyaged to East Africa, and after that Arabian, Persian and Indian traders ensured that the trade of Chinese products like porcelain and silk remained popular.¹⁶ Arab influence was for a long time essentially limited to the coast. They established trading posts in the interior but were not set on colonisation as their interests principally revolved around gold, ivory, slaves and trade goods. Despite their limited presence in the interior, the Arab trade had an important effect on the region.¹⁷

Good natural harbours and anchorages (in river valleys, lagoons and sheltered bays) facilitated trade and shipping. It also influenced the layout of ports, commercial facilities and substantially stimulated urban development. Kilwa, Mombassa and Zanzibar provided safe and easy access to shipping and became flourishing trading ports at an early stage. In the twelfth century, the Arab geographer Al Idrisi highlighted the importance of Kilwa and Mombasa as trading ports with good linkages with the hinterland.¹⁸ By the fourteenth century, the vibrant Swahili trading ports ranged from Mogadishu in the north, including Malindi, Mombasa, Zanzibar and Kilwa, to Sofala in the south.

The *Periplus* and later accounts highlighted that the trading ports were largely independent of one another, which created fragmented coastal politics. An interesting historical feature is that the Swahili states never amalgamated into a single empire. Their different governing arrangements, separate trade relationships, and unequal power, influence and wealth, could cause conflict, or lead to one exerting its power over a few others for a while (as Mombasa

¹⁴ Nurse and Spear, *The Swahili*, Chapter 1.

¹⁵ Nurse and Spear, *The Swahili*, Chapter 5.

¹⁶ J. De Visse, “Africa in inter-continental relations,” in *Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century. General History of Africa*, Volume IV, ed. Niane, D.T., Paris: UNESCO, 1984, 658-659.

¹⁷ Van Aswegen, *Geskiedenis*, 107.

¹⁸ C.B. Hoyle, *Seaports and Development: The Experience of Kenya and Tanzania* (Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 10-11 and 57.

in the twelfth century and Kilwa's control over a large portion of the coast before the arrival of the Portuguese).¹⁹ But even when Kilwa exerted such 'suzerainty' between the twelve and fifteenth centuries, its political power remained limited. Coherence was rather provided by common historical experiences, traditions, language, religion, and culture.²⁰

Conflict amongst the Swahili were usually localized and associated with disputes over trade monopolies between city-states. Sources provide scant information about Swahili armies, military organisations, military infrastructure, and provisioning during the first half of the second millennium and earlier. Some of the earliest Swahili forts (such as Kilwa and Pemba) were created both as seats of local power and to protect commercial interests and valuable trade goods. Architecturally these buildings showed military influences from Arabia, Persia and India. Various early forts were later converted into residences or palaces for rulers as the examples of Kilwa, Malindi, Gedi, Songo Mnara and Tumbatu indicate. Though these palaces had an initial military function, they were residences of local rulers because of the security and the protection they provided to the wealth they represented. In addition, as they were centres of government, were used for tax collection, and were warehouses for goods, they became visible symbols of the political system in place.²¹

In terms of armies, references to wars, soldiers, and commanders exist. The rulers of Kilwa engaged in various wars to establish, maintain, and expand their influence over the gold trade and a large portion of the coast. Military power was not the focus of Mombasa, but rather the building of relationships with strong allies.²² But not having a military or at least a defensive capacity seems to have been an exception. An Arab scholar of the tenth century, Al-Mas'ûdî, indicated that settlement along the coast was ruled by local kings, while each had its own army, and he added that given an emergency all men may be called to arms for defensive or offensive operations.²³ During his visit along the East Coast of Africa, Buttuta was impressed by the soldiers and commanders of the sheikh of Mogadishu, specifically in the context of ceremonial functions.²⁴

¹⁹ Van Aswegen, *Geskiedenis*, 106-107

²⁰ Nurse and Spear, *The Swahili*, Chapter 5.

²¹ Stéphane Pradines, et al., "L'art de la guerre chez les Swahili : les premiers forts d'Afrique orientale," *Journal des africanistes* 72 (2), 2002: 72, 76.

²² Meier, *Swahili Port Cities*, 27.

²³ Pradine, et al., "L'art de la guerre," 84.

²⁴ Nurse and Spear, *Swahili*, Chapter 5.

As Swahili cities often had military alliances with polities from the interior, it was a source of large numbers of troops when required. Portuguese sources indicate that by 1634 the King of Pate had an army of 3,000 armed “Moors” strengthened by African levies from the interior. The king of Ampaza (Faza), loyal to Portugal, had 1,500 armed Moors while Lamu (who paid tribute to the Portuguese) had a defensive force of 1,500 Moors. References to standing armies and professional soldiers became common by the eighteenth century as the Sultanates of Oman and Zanzibar employed many Hadrami Yemenis and Baluchis from Pakistan.²⁵

Before the sixteenth century, the capacity to defend the cities against ships was inadequate. Kilwa, for example, had only a few catapults and four guns by 1505, but they were not effectively employed. At the same time, the Portuguese commander (Francisco d’Almeida) indicated soldiers at Mombasa and Kilwa were armed with pikes, a few swords, bows and large arrows and had shields woven from palm leaves and stuffed with cotton.²⁶

As the Portuguese had realised that they would not be able to break the trade monopoly of the wealthy Swahili city-states and the rich Arab traders through peaceful competition, within twelve years they concluded an alliance with the Sultan of Malindi, captured and plundered various settlements (including Sofala, Kilwa, Mombasa and Zanzibar) and commenced with the construction of fortifications.²⁷ But despite establishing initial control or extracting tribute, the Portuguese badly disrupted the trade and were not able to effectively establish their authority along the coast. Their effort to monopolize the gold trade from Sofala and Kilwa destroyed it and resulted in the development of alternative trade routes.²⁸ From the late seventeenth century onwards, the Omanis were pushing the Portuguese out to become the dominant power along the coast. However, the Industrial Revolutions and technological developments (including superior weapons and communications) facilitated the further expansion of European influence and the ‘Scramble for Africa’. By the end of the nineteenth century, Britain was the dominant colonial power in the region and the “occupied territories becoming marginal participants in expanding colonial economies.”²⁹

²⁵ Pradines, et al., “L’art de la guerre,” 83

²⁶ Pradine, et al., “L’art de la guerre,” 84.

²⁷ C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese seaborne empire, 1415–1825*, (London: Hutchinson, 1969), 46, 51.

²⁸ Nurse and Spear, *Swahili*, Chapter 5.

²⁹ Thean Potgieter, ‘Culture, communities and society’, in *The Blue Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Working for a Sustainable Future*, ed. Donald Sparks, (Routledge, Oxon, 2021), 16.

Kilwa, Mombasa and Zanzibar as Illustrative Cases

Due to the entrenched nature of trade and commerce along the East coast of Africa, a long tradition of seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean preceded the arrival of the Portuguese. With sought-after commodities on offer, this maritime trade led to the development of about forty coastal cities (including Kilwa, Malindi, Mombassa, Zanzibar and Mogadishu) and a flourishing Swahili culture.³⁰ Some of these were strong city-states and fortified regional centres of power on whose control the dominance of the rich trade in the region depended. A long and complex history exists, but for this paper, brief attention will be given to three noteworthy examples, Kilwa, Mombasa and Zanzibar.

Kilwa, in the current Tanzania, was a significant commercial hub and an important Swahili city-state during the first half of the second millennium CE. The Kilwa chronicles provide information on the political development and the ruling dynasties from the Shirazi Princes in the tenth century onwards. It was known as a rich city and at the peak of its prosperity (between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries) Kilwa had more than 10,000 inhabitants, it dominated the Swahili Coast from Mogadishu to Sofala, while also exerting economic and cultural influence deep into the African hinterland.³¹

Merchants from Kilwa traded along the coast, and across the Indian Ocean in gold, silver, pearls, ivory, perfumes, exotic cloths, Arabian crockery, Persian earthenware and Chinese porcelain, amongst others.³² As a hub in the gold trade (coming from mines in the current Zimbabwe through Angoche and Sofala), Kilwa struck its own coins. Most of the minted coins were copper, but silver coins were perhaps already minted late in the eleventh century, and gold coins in the early fourteenth century. The coins reflected the names of Kilwa's rulers and Arabic script.³³ The first Portuguese visitors noted how gold was weighed and had to pay duties at Kilwa.³⁴

³⁰ Toyin Falola, ed., *Africa. African History before 1885*, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2000), 112.

³¹ Delmas, "Writing in Africa," 189.

³² Hoyle, *Seaports and Development*, 59.

³³ John Perkins, "The Indian Ocean and Swahili Coast coins, international networks and local developments," *Afriques*, 6 (2015). Open Edition Journals. <https://journals.openedition.org/afriques/1769>; and Isaac Samuel, "Kilwa, the complete chronological history of an East-African emporium: 800-1842," *Journal of African Cities, African History Extra*, Chapter 2 (2022). <https://www.africanhistoryextra.com/p/kilwa-the-complete-chronological>.

³⁴ Edward Pollard and Elgidius B. Ichumbaki, 'Why Land Here? Ports and Harbors in Southeast Tanzania in the Early Second Millennium AD,' *Journal of Island and Coastal Archaeology* 12, no. 4 (2017): 464.

Kilwa comprises two trading cities: Kilwa Kisiwani and Kilwa Kivinje. Kilwa Kisiwani is on a small island off the coast. Its first settlements date from the seventh and ninth centuries and it was consistently settled to the nineteenth century.³⁵ Kilwa's wealth during its peak is evident in the tempo of its fourteenth-century building projects which included the Great Mosque of Husuni Kubwa (with domes, vaults, and stone carvings), a palace complex, a trade emporium and extensive warehouse spaces.³⁶ In 1331-1332 Ibn Battuta described Kilwa as one of the most beautiful cities in the world, stating that although it was elegantly built with roofs from mangrove poles, a crucial attribute was its devotion and piety.³⁷ Kilwa Kivinje was a major slave trading centre and its peak caravans brought as many as 20 000 slaves per year from the Lake Nyasa region.³⁸

The importance of Kilwa as a major trading port was also due to its defensible island site and its capacity to safeguard supplies from the interior.³⁹ Due to monsoon winds, Kilwa was the southern stopover for seasonal sailings across the Indian Ocean. In between merchant vessels could remain in port for months, do repairs and provision, while awaiting their cargoes before sailing across the Indian Ocean. The vessels and their crews required the goods, services, and supplies, including wood, ropes, and sails, but also the spiritual and personal services the locals provided. This resulted in the creation of extensive warehouses, city, and port facilities as well as a maritime economy to support Indian Ocean trade.⁴⁰

The Portuguese were astounded by the prosperity of Kilwa and realised its power was in the extensive continental, coastal and Indian Ocean trade networks. Some of the ships at Kilwa were comparable in size to the Portuguese caravels.⁴¹ Their desire to control the East Africa trade networks inevitably resulted in conflict, despite the many written records of negotiations and pleas from the rulers of Kilwa aimed at avoiding it.⁴² In 1505 Francisco d'Almeida, the Viceroy of the Indies attacked and sacked Kilwa.

³⁵ Samuel, "Kilwa".

³⁶ Nurse and Spear, *The Swahili*, Chapter 5. Cynthia Clark Northrup, et al., *Encyclopedia of World Trade: from Ancient Times to the Present: From Ancient Times to the Present*, Volume 1., (Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2004), 178.

³⁷ Nurse and Spear, *The Swahili*, Chapter 1.

³⁸ Northrup, *Encyclopedia of World Trade*, 560.

³⁹ Hoyle, *Seaports and Development*, 59.

⁴⁰ Northrup, *Encyclopedia of World Trade*, 178. Soares, "Arabic History writing," 15.

⁴¹ Pollard and Ichumbaki, "Why Land Here?" 464.

⁴² Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Letter, Sultan Ibrahim of Kilwa requesting the Portuguese king not to attack Kilwa, 1505, in Samuel, "Kilwa". On the role of written correspondence see Delmas, "Writing in Africa," 188.

The Portuguese then built fortresses at Kilwa, Sofala, and Mozambique Island. They justified their conquest from the ancient genealogical of Kilwa's rulers, stating that as the King of Kilwa upon their arrival Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān (Abraham or 'Habraemo') was a usurper, they could place a Rukn al-Dīn (known to them as Mohamed Ancony) in power.⁴³

The Portuguese occupation of Kilwa was difficult and incomplete, lasting only to 1512. Mohamed Ancony was assassinated within a year. The Portuguese insisted that his son, and then his nephew, take the throne, but as they lacked legitimacy when the Portuguese left in 1512 Ibrāhīm (now 84) took the crown again.

The humiliating Portuguese occupation is discussed in the Kilwa Chronicle and written narratives from the point of view of both sides. After the Portuguese sacked and during their control, the wealthy trade that brought so much prosperity to Kilwa dramatically declined. Traders from the interior traded to the north with other Swahili ports, such as Mombasa, whereas Kilwa also was overrun by the Zimba people in 1578. As Kilwa was too dependent on trade it "declined to little more than a local village following the Portuguese disruption of the gold trade at Sofala."⁴⁴

Due to Mombasa's strategic location on the Indian Ocean trade networks, it was an important historical trading centre that changed hands many times during its fascinating history. Mombasa is perhaps the oldest constantly inhabited Swahili city and was probably founded in the early part of the first millennium.⁴⁵ As an independent city-state and a hub in Indian Ocean trade, Mombasa experienced significant growth for centuries and by 1151 the Arab geographer al-Idrisi referred to it as a prosperous trade centre also known for its iron production.⁴⁶

Exports from Mombasa included grain, timber, ivory, and enslaved persons from the interior, whereas mostly manufacturing goods (such as cloths, metalwork, porcelain, and beads) were imported from as far away as China. Mombasa had a reputation for competitiveness and unpredictability. As Mombasa's competitors envied its wealth, the city maintained its autonomy and guaranteed its safety by negotiating strong alliances with powerful allies. The Portuguese reported a large and wealthy town with thatched stone buildings. In 1498 Da Gama had to escape and foiled an attack aimed at avenging the Portuguese bombardment of Mozambique Island. But

⁴³ Delmas, "Writing in Africa," 191-192.

⁴⁴ Nurse and Spear, *The Swahili*, Chapter 5; Northrup, *Encyclopedia of World Trade*, 178.

⁴⁵ Meier, *Swahili Port Cities*, 26.

⁴⁶ Fidelis T. Masao and Henry Mutoro. "The East African Coast and the Comoro Islands," in *General History of Africa*, Volume III, ed. M. El Fasi (Paris: Unesco, 1988), 606, 611.

things changed for Mombasa. During the next centuries it had to continuously content with overseas incursions. The Portuguese sacked it repeatedly from 1500 onwards and occupied it intermittently in its endeavors to control the rich regional trade networks.⁴⁷

In 1585, the Turkish commander Emir Ali Bey, claimed that the Turkish Sultan sent him to free East Africa from the Portuguese yoke. With the support of Mombasa and others, they first attacked the Portuguese in the Red Sea. Bey then arrived at Mombasa with five ships to continue the struggle against the Portuguese, but he was defeated by a Portuguese fleet from Goa.⁴⁸ The Portuguese took control of Mombasa and in 1593 commenced the construction of a huge fortress called Fort Jesus. It was the symbol of Portuguese authority in East Africa for more than a century – but it was difficult to hold. After most of the Portuguese in Mombasa were killed in 1631, a Portuguese fleet failed to recapture the Fort, but when another fleet arrived in 1632 the fort was deserted.

The Portuguese and Omani struggle for control of the East Coast of Africa intensified in the second half of the seventeenth century and with it a bitter struggle for the control of Mombasa. In December 1698 Saif ibn Sultan with 3,000 men captured Fort Jesus after a thirty-three-month siege. However, control by both Portugal and Oman was fragile.⁴⁹ Dissension between the Swahili and their Omani overlord enabled the Portuguese to retake Fort Jesus in March 1728 and re-establish their authority. It was short-lived. Mombasa surrendered to local insurgents in 1729 and Omani control was soon re-established over the coast north of Cape Delgado. The Portuguese then abandoned East Africa north of Mozambique to the Sultan of Oman whose power, largely based on the slave trade, steadily grew.

Between 1741 and 1837 Mombasa was governed by an Omani family, the Mazrui, who saw themselves as independent rulers. However, as they struggled to maintain control over Mombasa, it became an unofficial British Protectorate from 1824 to 1826. Two Omani expeditions (in 1829 and 1833) were unable to retake this stronghold, but in 1837 Sultan Seyyid Said of Oman overthrew the Mazrui.⁵⁰ The Sultan ruled Mombasa from Zanzibar through a representative until 1888 when it became the main port of a British concession managed by the Imperial British East Africa Company. As the company became bankrupt, Mombasa and its surrounding coast became a British

⁴⁷ Meier, *Swahili Port Cities*, 27 and 42.

⁴⁸ Van Aswegen, *Geskiedenis*, 131-134.

⁴⁹ C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese*, 135-136; Van Aswegen, *Geskiedenis van Afrika*, 134-135.

⁵⁰ A.I. Salim, 'The East African coast and hinterland, 1800-45' in *General History of Africa* Volume VI, *Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s*, ed. J.F. Ade Ajayi, (Paris: Unesco, 1989), 220.

Protectorate in 1895. Mombasa was the administrative headquarters of British East Africa until the capital moved to Nairobi in 1907 and in 1963 it became part of the newly independent Republic of Kenya.

As history is shaped by geography, the Island of Unguja (referred to as Zanzibar) was directly in the Indian Ocean trade routes and accessible to traders and colonists from Africa, Arabia, and South Asia. In sailing directions (from the fifteenth century) the famous Omani geographer and pilot Ibn Mājid provided crucial information about the sailing season around the Indian Ocean, the ports along the coast of East Africa, as well as sailing to Zanzibar and Madagascar. Ibn Mājid's contribution is an exceptional representation of the Arabic navigational traditions and the shared Swahili geographical knowledge of the coast that made the socio-economic and cultural interaction blossom.⁵¹

Archaeological evidence indicates that agricultural and fishing communities existed in Zanzibar before the sixth century. Late in the first millennium coastal settlements engaged in the growing Indian Ocean and Africa trade and traders settled on the island. An early mosque inscription indicates that Muslims were already present in Zanzibar by A.D. 1107 and by the fifteenth century Zanzibar was another autonomous Swahili city-state along the East African littoral.⁵²

Despite the later importance of Zanzibar, it was not often referred to by the Portuguese during the sixteenth century. The Portuguese did demand tribute from the local rulers from the early sixteenth century onwards. But as their purpose was essentially commercial and not imperial, Zanzibar it was not closely administered. With the Portuguese power dwindling and the rise of the maritime state of Oman, the East Coast became a Portuguese–Omani battleground during the second half of the seventeenth century and early eighteenth century. Oman defeated the Portuguese in Zanzibar in 1652 and Zanzibar came under the influence of the Sultanate of Oman in 1698. In 1729 Omani control was re-established over the coast north of Cape Delgado as the Portuguese then abandoned East Africa north of Mozambique to the Sultan of Oman whose power, to a large extent based on the slave and ivory trade, steadily grew in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.⁵³ Besides its good trade routes into the African interior, Zanzibar also produced coconuts, cloves, and foodstuffs in quantity.

⁵¹ Bocchetti, "Performing Geography," 87-88;

⁵² Masao and Mutoro, "The East African Coast," 607-609. Pollard and Kenyera, "Swahili Coast," 933-940. Nurse and Spear, *The Swahili*, Chapter 3.

⁵³ Clark Reynolds, *Command of the Sea. The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires*, (London: Morrow, 1976), 228.

The Sultans of Oman were members of the Busaid dynasty, the ruling family of Oman since the middle of the eighteenth century. When one of the most important rulers of the Omani Empire, Seyyid Said, became Sultan in 1806 he consolidated and extended his authority along the coast and moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1840 (some sources indicate in 1832). Said added a modest palace to the old Arab fort and secured his interest along the Swahili Coast by sustaining an army of 6,500 men and a navy of fifteen ships.⁵⁴

Eradicating the slave trade along the East Coast of Africa was difficult because it was an important source of income to many Arab and Swahili states. Due to difficulties in intercepting slave ships, the trade was checked by inshore patrolling to hinder slave ships from picking up cargoes, concluding treaties and destroying slavery installations ashore.⁵⁵ After Sultan Seyyid Said signed an anti-slavery treaty with Britain in 1845, much of Zanzibar's commerce became based on ivory and other products. His heirs were reluctant to enforce the anti-slavery measures and during the 1860s the Zanzibar market might have peaked at as much as between 50,000 and 70,000 slaves per year.⁵⁶

Consistent British efforts to crush this trade with diplomacy, omnipresent naval patrols and blockades led to its decline and by the 1890s most of the vestiges of slavery in East Africa were destroyed. Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890, but relations became strained when Prince Seyyid Khalid took over the Sultanate in August 1896 with the support of the army. On 27 March 1897, British cruisers and gunboats demanded that Seyyid Khalid strike his colours. He ignored it and prepared his batteries, gunboat, and armed dhows for battle. After a British bombardment of thirty-seven minutes, his gunboat was a burning hulk, several dhows were destroyed, and the palace was severely damaged. Seyyid Khalid struck his flag.⁵⁷ Two hours later the British ships fired a twenty-one-gun salute in honour of Hamoud bin Mohammed, the new Sultan.

When the British protectorate over Zanzibar was terminated in December 1963, the Sultanate regained its independence. This was not to last. In January 1964 Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah was deposed in a bloody revolt and the republic thus created became part of Tanzania in April 1964.

⁵⁴ Falola, ed., *African History*, 326-328.

⁵⁵ Reynolds, *Command*, 344.

⁵⁶ I.N. Kimambo, "The East African coast and hinterland, 1845-80," in *Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s, General History of Africa*, Volume VI, Ed. J.F. Ade Ajayi (Paris: Unesco, 1989), 230.

⁵⁷ Anothy Preston and John. Major, *Send a Gunboat. A study of the Gunboat and its role in British policy, 1854-1904* (London: Longmans, 1967), 126-129, 155-156.

Concluding Remarks

East Africa has a long and intricate history with intertwining political, economic, cultural, and military elements. Ocean trade was vital to coastal communities, fostering the growth of Swahili settlements, traditions, and city-states.

Although Islam spread southwards along the coast of Africa, Muslims were key in developing what is referred to as the Swahili culture, but these coastal settlements were not Arab or Persian, but African, frequented by trading Arabs, Persians, Indians, and others. By the fourteenth century, the major Swahili trade ports along the Indian Ocean coast ranged from Mogadishu in the north to Sofala in the south. They served as the “stepping stones” for interaction with the interior as well as imperial conquest as their control made the domination of the immediate vicinity, trade with the interior, as well as maritime trade possible.

For a long time, the Swahili states had different governing systems and as they were unequal in power, conflict would erupt at times. Some states exerted control over a greater part of the coast at times, but despite many historic, language, cultural and religious commonalities they did not merge into a single empire. The arrival of the Portuguese at the end of the fifteenth century dramatically impacted the fortunes of the city-states along the coast. These states eventually succumbed to outside forces, such as Oman and European colonial powers, and later formed part of the newly created post-colonial states. The era of city-states was replaced by a struggle between empires lasting close to 400 years.

TOWNS FOR THE WAR THE CANTONMENT SYSTEM IN BRITISH INDIA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE RAJ'S DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL SECURITY

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Introduction

Since the half of the 18th century, the final decline of the time-honoured Mughal empire allowed the British East India Company (EIC) to assert its territorial control over a wide span of Indian territory. After the battle of Buxar¹ (1764), the Company was appointed the revenue collector (*diwan*) of the rich provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, becoming de facto the ruler of large areas of the lower Gangetic plain. In the following years, the Anglo-Mysore Wars (1766-99) and the Anglo-Maratha Wars (1772-1818) left it in control of large areas south of the Sutlej River, while expansion continued in the North: the North-Western Provinces (Rohilkhand, Gorakhpur, and Doab; since 1902, merged with other territories in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh) came under EIC's control in 1801, Delhi in 1803, Assam in 1828, and Sindh in 1843. Punjab, the north-west frontier, and Kashmir were annexed in 1849-56; Berar entered the EIC's domains in 1854 and Oudh in 1856.²

Over time, the spreading of the British domain led to growing institutionalisation. While preserving its private nature, the British Parliament's control over the EIC gradually increased. Following the 1772 financial crisis, the East India Company Act of 1773 forced the Company to recognise the government's ultimate authority over its Indian possessions and established the post of Governor-General, who (assisted by a four-member Council) had overall jurisdiction over the Company's territories. Under William Pitt the Younger, more government control came with the India Act of 1784. The Act created a Board of Control made by six government appointees to monitor and direct the Company's policies and gave the government the final decision over the EIC's nominations for its officials in

¹ For placenames, the essay follows the prevalent form used in the Raj period; when different, today's name (into brackets) follows the first instance.

² A short history of the EIC is in Philip Lawson, *The East India Company. A History*, (London-New York: Routledge, 2013). On India's vicissitudes in the Company's age, see, recently, William Dalrymple, *The Anarchy. The Relentless Rise of the East India Company*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).

India. In the following years, other acts further increased the Governor-General's authority over the Company's officials while increasing parliamentary control over the Company's activity.³

The spreading of the British domains also led to an expansion of the EIC's military instrument. Since the beginning, the Company's army (like the armies of its European rivals, first and foremost the French East India Company) was primarily made of native personnel (*sepoys*) dressed, equipped, and trained the European way. British troops (both from the Crown and the Company) only provided limited contributions. In 1796-1857, the EIC's Army grew from 70,000 to 350,000 men, with the European/native ratio decreasing from 0.23 to 0.13. The spreading of cantonments went hand in hand with the process: Barrackpore (Barrackpur), near Calcutta (Kolkata), and Dinapore (Danapur), in Bihar, dating to 1765; Dum Dum, the future main British India arsenal, to 1783; Meerut, in today's Uttar Pradesh, and Secunderabad, in the Hyderabad district, to 1806; Cawnpore (Kanpur) to 1811; Poona (Pune), on the Deccan plateau, to 1817. In the following years, the establishment of the new cantonments followed territorial expansion. In 1839, Ferozepore (Ferozpur), on the eastern bank of the Sutlej River, became the last British outpost facing Ranjit Singh's Sikh empire.

The British Cantonments in India: Towns for the War?

Cantonments were not simply garrisons. Instead, they were fully fledged "miniature towns". Since the beginning (the first cantonment law dates to 1789⁴), they hosted troops and materiel, but also soldiers' and officers' families, civilian followers, and all the people and services the forces needed for their military functions and live their everyday lives largely independently from the surrounding country. Over time, best practices emerged to choose the cantonments' locations according to "scientific" standards. For instance, the climate should have been suitable for outdoor training of the soldiers (especially when the cantonments hosted European troops), the cantonments' sites well drained, free from swamps and pools, and

³ Between 1776 and 1858, the British Parliament passed twenty-one East India Company Acts regulating the political and administrative aspects of the relationship between the EIC and the British state, plus eight East India Company (Money) Acts (the last two formally labelled East India Company Bonds Act in 1811 and East India Loans Act in 1858) regulating the financial aspects. Moreover, since 1793, with every twenty-year-renewal of the Company's charter, its commercial rights and trading monopolies were gradually whittled away. Parliament allowed the Company to retain its political and administrative duties in India, but the charter of 1813 included a clause asserting the Crown's undoubted sovereignty over all the Company's territories, while the 1833 Charter Act invested the Board of Control with full authority over the Company and further increased the power of the Governor-General.

⁴ K.M. Kulkarni, "Cantonment towns of India," *Ekistics* 46, no. 277 (1979): 214-220.

not subject to inundations of any kind in any season of the year. The evidence that the local population lived a healthy life and were generally free from malicious diseases was seen as another positive sign. The potential location should provide enough safe drinking water for the cantonments' needs. Finally, cantonments were generally located near rivers' banks, albeit experts disagreed about the pros and cons of this solution.⁵

Strategic considerations also affected the cantonments' location. The western border of today's Rajasthan, facing the bleak span of the Thar Desert, was seen as relatively safe. On the opposite, the Punjab plain did not present any real obstacle to the movement of potentially hostile forces, especially in its northern portion, intersected by the Indus and the "Five Rivers" (Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) from which the province derives its name. From this perspective, the geographical distribution of cantonments varied according to the strengths and weaknesses of the country's natural boundary. Hills stations, mainly in the Himalayas, were a class in itself. Often established as cantonments or sanatoriums during the 1820s, their role became more recreative around the mid-nineteenth century. In the same years, some of them assumed growing administrative importance, evolving into full-fledged summer capitals; this is the case, for instance, of Simla (Shimla, in today's Himachal Pradesh), whose political and administrative relevance drastically increased since Viceroy Lord Lawrence, in 1864, chose it as the Raj's summer capital despite its remoteness.⁶

Originally, cantonments were conceived as semi-permanent structures. At least in the early years, their establishment entailed some kind of agreement with the local authorities, which tried to limit both the risks to their position coming from a foreign military presence and the contact between troops and the local population. For instance, in 1807, *Nawab* Sadat Ali Khan II (r. 1798-1814) allowed the establishment of the Mardiaon cantonment in Lucknow upon conditions that it was only for the British troops and their followers; no market (*ganj*) was to be erected for traders or merchants; no moneylenders or inhabitants of Lucknow were to reside in the cantonment without the previous consent and approval of the *Nawab*; there was to be no fortified building there, besides the officers' bungalows and the magazine for artillery; the exercising ground was to be distinct from the

⁵ On these aspects see, for instance, *Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Sanitary State of the Army in India. With Abstract of Evidence, and of Reports Received from Indian Military Stations*, (London: Superintendence of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1864).

⁶ Swasti Sharma, *et al.*, "Evolution of Indian Hill Stations during the British Era: Problems and Prospects of Development," *Journal of the International Society for the Study of Vernacular Settlement* 9, no. 2 (2022): 114-129. On the hill stations as presidential capitals, see Queeny Pradhan, *Empire in the Hills. Simla, Darjeeling, Ootacamund, and Mount Abu, 1820-1920*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2017).

cantonment and was to be kept clear and ready for exercising of the troops, and was not to have any building; a ditch was to be dug round the cantonment to define the limits, and no extension beyond that ditch would be allowed; an informer, scout, or spy, was to be stationed in the cantonment to bring news to the *Nawab* since the cantonment was on land belonging to the *Nawab*.

The “Great Mutiny” (more appropriately, the Indian Rebellion of 1857) affected British India’s military system in several ways. The transfer of EIC’s power to the British government led to the disbandment of the Company’s military establishment, including the Addiscombe Military Seminary (which survived as the Royal Indian Military College until the amalgamation of the Royal and Indian Services in 1861) and the three presidential armies, replaced by a new military instrument, albeit still divided into the three semi-independent components of Bombay, Madras and Bengal.⁷ These developments heavily impacted its strength, ethnic balance, technical equipment, and European/native ratio, peaking at some 0.3 in the 1860s. Until World War One, Indian troops would have lagged one generation behind European units in terms of weapons and equipment: Artillery de facto became a European-only branch of service, the only exception being nine light mountain batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force and the formally independent Hyderabad Contingent. Uniforms, titles, and structures evolved to mirror a greater “Indian” identity. New ethnic groups replaced the old upper-caste Hindu and Muslim soldiers of the old Bengal Army. In the same way, the units’ geographic distribution evolved to cope with the new security needs of a country whose northern territories were growing increasingly crucial for the Raj’s domestic and external security.

The cantonment system underwent a similar transformation. During the Mutiny, their large concentration of troops had made cantonments one of the rebellion’s hotbeds. The first incidents had happened in Barrackpore, the theatre of a previous sepoy mutiny in 1824.⁸ Later, violence spread to Agra (a cantonment since 1805), Allahabad (today’s Prayagraj, in Uttar Pradesh, not a cantonment, but a critical administrative centre and the gateway to north-west India due to its strategic location at the confluence of the Ganges and Yamuna rivers), Ambala (a cantonment since 1825), and Meerut (a cantonment since 1803). Nonetheless, after the Mutiny, the cantonment system survived the reshuffle of the Indian security system. Keeping troops separated from the civilian population emerged as their primary domestic

⁷ On the Mutiny’s impact on the British Indian army’s organisation, see *The Army in India and its Evolution. Including an Account of the Establishment of the Royal Air Force in India*, (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1924), 18 ff.

⁸ Thomas E. Dempster, “The Barrackpore Mutiny of 1824,” *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 54 (1976): 3-13.

function. At the same time, they strengthened their role as an instrument to have the Indian element of the “new” armies under control, together with a higher European presence, a different recruitment strategy, and a careful balance of the various components of the nominally ethnically homogeneous units. The segregation between Europeans and “natives” became evident also in the cantonment’s structures, layout, spaces, and features.

On the external side, cantonments evolved into the pillars of a new defensive network commanding India’s turbulent north-western borders. Since the 1860s, new structures were built west and north-west of Ferozepore, mainly in Punjab territory, transforming the province into what one author called the garrison state.⁹ In Bengal, the old structures mostly retained their role. Built along the Grand Trunk Road (India’s “Grand Military Road”, along which the British army has been massed since Lord Dalhousie promoted its refurbishing¹⁰), their task was to support the Raj’s first defence line. In other parts of the country (especially in the Madras Presidency), their role declined, facing the shifting strategic priorities. The consequence was a growing imbalance in the cantonments’ territorial distribution. At the time of the Partition, in 1947, Pakistan inherited 23 cantonments. By comparison, by the mid-1860s, there were some 54 cantonments in the whole territory of the present-day Republic of India. At the same time, recruitment increasingly focused on the north-western regions, supported by an ethnographic approach looking at Sikhs and Muslim peoples as more “warlike” than the Hindu communities of the Gangetic plain and central and southern India.¹¹

In any case, cantonments retained their original traits of secluded and controlled social environments, physically separated from the neighbouring civilian settlements, both native and European. Segregation among different ethnic and social groups and functions tightened over time, in parallel with the evolution of Victorian sensibility over the race issue.¹² Gradually, cantonments emerged as self-contained structures with everything the troops needed, including shops, housing, barracks, hospitals, and other facilities.

⁹ Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State. The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947*, (New Delhi-Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005).

¹⁰ K.M. Sarkar, *The Grand Trunk Road in the Punjab [1849-1886]*, (Lahore: Punjab Government Record Office Publications, 1927).

¹¹ On the issue see, among others, Pradeep Barua, “Inventing Race: The British and India’s Martial Races,” *The Historian* 58, no. 1 (1995): 107-116, and Kaushik Roy, “Race and Recruitment in the Indian Army: 1880-1918,” *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 4 (2013): 1310-1347. The most influential theorisation on the “martial races” idea is, probably, that of Lt. Gen. sir George MacMunn, *The Martial Races of India*, (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., [1933]).

¹² On race relations in the British Indian Army, see, sketchily, Jeffrey Greenhut, “Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army,” *Military Affairs* 48, no. 1 (1984): 15-18.

Even when the neighbouring civilian settlements expanded, integrating the cantonments into the urban fabric, the latter preserved their own distinct identity. With the Cantonments Act, 1864, *ad hoc* legislation developed to regulate cantonment life, land rights, and the status of the army followers living inside. Over time, legislation evolved (especially with the two Cantonments Acts, 1889 and 1924), albeit in a somehow alluvial form, increasingly transferring to the Indian context the social, moral, and hygienic concerns of Victorian and post-Victorian Britain, with the basic idea that military efficiency, imperial prestige and the “white man’s burden” all required tight control over Indian and European troops’ demeanour, especially off-duty.

Protecting the Raj: The Cantonments’ Evolving Role

Between the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-81) and the end of the nineteenth century, the cantonments (especially those in and around Punjab) were also seen as springboards to push the Indian borders forward toward the southern Afghan plains and spread the British influence in the adjoining native states, such as Kalat and possibly eastern Persia. Between the late 1870s and the early 1880s, the Indian north-western border (albeit still not formalised) advanced again, reaching the southern tip of the passes linking Afghanistan to India. Due to the new security needs, the British military presence was strengthened throughout the region. Quetta, located in northern Baluchistan and commanding the transit through the Bolan and Khojak Passes between Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and Sind, briefly occupied during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42), came definitively under British control in 1876, soon evolving into a critical military outpost. Peshawar cantonment, west of the city and presiding over the southern tip of the strategically located Khyber Pass, had been established in 1868. Heavily garrisoned, these strongholds acted as pivots of British India’s defensive system, providing operational and logistic support to an extensive network of lesser positions.

At the same time, the larger cantonments took on greater administrative responsibilities. In 1877, Quetta became the seat of the British administration in Baluchistan (the Baluchistan Agency, which was responsible for both British Baluchistan and the province’s native states). With the establishment of the cantonment, Peshawar became *de facto* the British frontier headquarters.¹³ A similar process also affected other stations, such as Lahore and Rawalpindi, although the transformations did not detract from the cantonments’ military nature. In these years, Rawalpindi became a cornerstone of British military presence in India. An arsenal was established

¹³ Victoria Schofield, *Afghan Frontier. Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia*, (London: Tauris, 2003), 47.

in 1883 and the cantonment's population steadily increased from some 9,300 in 1868 to some 37,800 in 1891 and some 40,000 in 1901. By comparison, in 1891, Rawalpindi's population outside the cantonment was some 34,000. Over time, the city became the winter headquarters of the Northern Command and the main British military garrison in north-west India. In 1901, it hosted one battery of horse and one of field artillery, one mountain battery, one company of garrison artillery, one ammunition column of field artillery, one regiment of British and one of native cavalry, two of British and two of native infantry, and two companies of sappers and miners, with a balloon section.

A growing infrastructure network supported this development. In the second half of the nineteenth century, British India's road and railway system expanded mainly to fulfil the country's security needs. In forty years, the mileage of India's rail network grew from 838 miles in 1860 to 15,842 in 1880 and to 25,373 in 1901, mostly radiating inland from the three major port towns and Presidency capitals of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.¹⁴ The first cantonment station was opened in Bangalore in 1862. In the following years, railway connections reached all the other cantonments. The two most advanced outposts – Peshawar and Quetta – had their connections in 1883 and 1887, respectively, the former from Lahore *via* Rawalpindi, the latter from Sibi *via* the Bolan, first with a narrow-gauge Decauville line due to the difficulties of the terrain, later (1897) with an Indian- (broad) gauge connection. From there, lines extended up to the Indo-Afghan border, allowing a quick massing of troops if needed. Supported by a parallel network of military roads, the railway/cantonment complex became the backbone of the Indian defence system. The new infrastructures also allowed better control of the local tribes through a more effective military presence and involving them in their building and protection, as done with the Afridi tribes in the Khyber Pass area.¹⁵

At the end of the century, better Anglo-Russian relations following the demarcation of the Afghan borders led to the decline of the "Forward School" in British and Indian political circles. In the evolving international scenario, the cantonments' role further changed. The decline of the Russian threat made constabulary duties increasingly important. Since the conquest of

¹⁴ Daniel Thorner, "The Pattern of Railway Development in India," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1955): 201-216; John M. Hurd, "Railways," in *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, vol. II, c. 1757-c. 1970, ed. Dharma Kumar, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 737-760; Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress. Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 78-79.

¹⁵ Javed Iqbal, "Construction of Roads and Railways in the Khyber Pass During the British Period: A Positive Side-Effect of British Colonial Rule," *Central Asia* 61 (2008), https://www.asc-centralasia.edu.pk/Issue_61/08-CONSTRUCTION_OF_ROADS_AND_RAILWAYS.html.

Punjab, British and Indian troops had been constantly engaged in tiresome “butcher and bolt” operations to quell the unruly frontier tribes. Over time, the number and scale of these operations increased. Between 1893 and 1897, when the “Great Pathan revolt” exploded, Raj’s forces were involved in seven major military campaigns against the Mahsud (1894-95), in Chitral (1895), the Tochi Valley (1897), Malakand (1897), Tirah (1897), Buner (1897-98), and against the Mohmand (1897-98). Suppressing the Pathan revolt in 1897-98 imposed a heavy toll. It would take until April 1898 to bring the tribes to terms. By that date, British Indian forces had suffered some 2,000 casualties, 1,000 in the Tirah campaign alone out of some 34,000 combat soldiers and over 19,000 support personnel.

The withdrawal of the British presence behind the administrative border and the creation of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1901 also boosted the cantonments’ role. From a military perspective, the idea behind the NWFP was the attempt to regain strategic depth, leaving between the political and administrative borders a wide tribal belt only partly under British control. This «modified close border policy» looked at the frontier tribes as independent subjects, not subject to the rules and laws enforced in the adjacent settled districts; for this reason, the Political Officers posted in the tribal belt had no administrative duties (except in Malakand), but «served as the Government’s agent to the tribes, conducting relations between the independent tribes and the Government of British India».¹⁶ In the revised arrangement, regular troops should have been less involved in law and order duties, and strain from frontier expeditions should have been reduced. However, expectations evaporated quite soon. During World War One, frontier areas in the NWFP and Baluchistan erupted into unrest, requiring large-scale British involvement to quell the uprising.

Against this background, in 1903-1909, the Kitchener reforms linked the new, radically reformed Army of India’s divisional structure to the cantonments’ territorial distribution. With the external security of the north-western borders as its primary aim and a clear-cut distinction between domestic and external responsibilities, the reform streamlined the existing structure, abolishing the three Presidential Armies, amalgamating them into a single Army of India also including the Punjab Frontier Force, the Hyderabad Contingent and the other local forces, and allotting the existing units to ten new divisions (division from 1st to 9th stationed in Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Quetta, Mhow, Poona, Meerut, Lucknow, and Secunderabad respectively; the Burma Division was unnumbered) and four unnumbered

¹⁶ Brandon Marsh, *Ramparts of Empire. British Imperialism and India’s Afghan Frontier, 1918-1948*, (Houndmills, Basingstoke-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 22.

independent brigades, stationed in Kohat, Bannu, Derajat, and Aden¹⁷. Battalions were not permanently allocated to particular divisions or brigades. Instead, they spent some years in one formation, then moved to another elsewhere to provide all units with experience of active service on the Frontier and to avoid the risk of their “localisation” into static regimental stations.

This new structure further enhanced the cantonments’ dimensions and importance. As the *Census of India 1911* noted, for instance, recording the sharp increase in NWFP cantonment’s population over the previous decade: «[o]f the [province’s] total urban population [...] between one-fourth and one-fifth [...] reside in cantonments. In other words nearly one-quarter of the population concentrated in towns does not represent any spontaneous desire for town life on the part of inhabitants of the Province, but merely the fact that strategical considerations have led to the massing of large bodies of troops along the Frontier».¹⁸ In a mutually beneficial para-symbiotic relationship, these dynamics also affected the neighbouring towns, whose growth in extension and population generally benefitted from the cantonments’ presence. Sometimes, the same cantonment’s presence favoured the birth and the development of an adjoining civilian settlement. It was the case, for instance, of the Abbottabad municipality (in the early twentieth century the headquarters of the Hazara district and the Abbottabad *tahsil*), which was created in 1867, several years after the cantonment’s formation (1853), as an evolution of the local bazaar initially established to supply the cantonment’s needs.

¹⁷ In the new arrangement, eight numbered divisions and the four independent brigades were banded into three territorial commands: Northern (Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Lahore Divisions plus the Kohat, Bannu, and Derajat Brigades), Western (Quetta, Mhow, and Poona Divisions), and Eastern (Meerut and Lucknow Divisions plus the Aden Brigade). The Army Headquarters retained direct control over the Secunderabad and Burma Divisions. Upon mobilisation, all numbered divisions should deploy a complete infantry division, a cavalry brigade, and a number of troops for internal security or local frontier defence.

¹⁸ *Census of India 1911*, vol. XIII, *North-West Frontier Province*, (Peshawar: Commercial Press, 1912), 15-16. According to the Census’ figures, cantonments’ population increased from 61,828 people to 70,254 (+13 per cent) in 1901-11, while the population of towns other than cantonments increased by 12 per cent (from 197,102 to 221,460 people) in the same period. However, according to the same source, at a deeper analysis «the growth of cantonment population has outpaced that of other towns more than these figures would suggest», reaching around 23 per cent compared to only three per cent of non-cantonment towns, «or half the rate of increase in the rural population of the [North-West Frontier] Province».

Concluding remarks

Although the 1922 Army's reform led to a new reshuffle of British India's military establishment, the cantonment system survived largely unscathed also in the interwar period. Since the early twentieth century, cantonments have evolved into permanent structures. From the administrative side, the Cantonments Act 1924 had transferred their administration to a partly elective Cantonment Authority, which gave the civilian element greater relevance while preserving the cantonments' essentially military nature. At the time, the Act was the last of the normative provisions that had ruled cantonments' life and legal status over time, particularly regarding land rights. In the same year, a new Cantonments Land Act (later replaced by the Cantonments Land Administration Rules 1937) was adopted to provide a uniform set of rules and put an order in the records of the different military estates, which had previously evolved in a tumultuous and sometimes incoherent way. Administrative rationalisation was probably the main activity in the interwar period due to the vast amount of land the British Indian military establishment had amassed, such as actual and abandoned cantonments, stations, outposts, camping and training grounds, ranges, and airfields.

In 1947, at the time of the Partition, India and Pakistan inherited a system which, by the end of World War Two, had left a lasting imprint in both the military and civilian realms. Unsurprisingly, all the successor states retained – and strengthened – the cantonment system. By the early 2020s, cantonments in the Republic of India have increased to 62, in Pakistan to 56, and in Bangladesh to 30, accounting for a fair share of urban areas in all these countries. For instance, Karachi's six cantonments (Clifton, Faisal/Drigh Road, Karachi Cantonment, Korangi Creek, Malir, and Manora Island), each ruled by its Cantonment Board, account for about 5 per cent of the total town's area.¹⁹ Some cantonments (such as Malir, in Karachi) have evolved into well-off residential areas through a sort of gentrification process.²⁰ Some others (possibly the majority) have retained the originally predominant military dimension. In this sense, although the cantonments' territorial distribution still highlights a strong orientation toward external security, their domestic role is

¹⁹ Korangi Creek and Faisal cantonments cover an area of 34.5 and 42 square kilometres (km²), respectively; Malir cantonment one of 42 km², and Clifton and Karachi cantonments of 52 and 12.46 km², respectively. In a city spread over 3,500 km², the area covered by cantonments, therefore, accounts, for some 5.2 per cent. However, since the area falling under the jurisdiction of the Cantonment Boards stretches beyond the cantonments' formal boundaries, their influence is far greater, with the mayor of Karachi complaining in the Supreme Court that the City District Government of Karachi managed only 36 per cent of the city area.

²⁰ Muhammad Ali Nasir, "Reading Malir Cantonment in Karachi, Pakistan: Some Notes on Residential Barracks and Spatial Dynamics," *Contemporary South Asia* 22, no. 4 (2014): 362-376.

equally evident, confirming the relevance that “law and order” considerations had in their establishment.

The debate currently ongoing about the future of Indian cantonments is further proof of their permanent importance. The decision the Indian government took in the spring of 2023 about derecognising cantonments, handing over civilian areas to local municipal bodies, and transforming the remains into exclusively military stations²¹ highlights how the coexistence between civilian and military structures has grown increasingly troublesome, mainly where towns’ expansion had led to the cantonments’ inclusion into the same towns’ fabric, as it happened in almost all the main urban areas. More importantly, the topic highlights how civil-military relations have evolved in recent years and how the perception of the costs and benefits related to living in a secluded environment has changed, especially in the eyes of the civilian population. In the background, there is the thorny issue of decolonising the public space: a problem whose relevance is not only linked to the role cantonments had in connection with British imperial domination (the Indian government’s decision explicitly labels cantonments as «archaic colonial legacies») but has gained increasing attention in the public debate due to its relation with present-day structures of power and privilege.

²¹ See, for instance, Saroj Chadha, “The debate on derecognition of cantonments,” *Times of India*, 10 May 2023, [accessed 15 December 2023], <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/blunt-frank/the-debate-on-derecognition-of-cantonments>, and Anirudh Burman, “Freeing up Cantonments for Urban Growth,” *Carnegie India*, 1 June 2023 [accessed 15 December 2023], <https://carnegieindia.org/2023/06/01/freeing-up-cantonments-for-urban-growth-%7C-democratic-backsliding-pub-89865>.

**URBAN WARFARE: FROM ANTIQUITY
TO THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II**

BURNING DOWN (ABANDONED?) CITIES FIRE IN ROMAN-SASANIAN URBAN WARFARE IN THE RES GESTAE OF AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS

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Introducing Ammianus

In 360 CE, the troops of the Sasanian king Shapur II are gathered at the shores of the Tigris, preparing the siege of the Late Roman stronghold of “*Bezabde, which its early founders also called Phaenicha*”.¹ The ancient author of the cited passage perceives the double-site, divided by the river in modern Turkey, as a single military complex, being part of the *limes* in the Roman Near East. In fact, the structures consist of an older Hellenistic-Parthian fortress on the east bank (*Phaenicha/Fenik*) with some 4th century Roman additions, and a Late Roman castle on the west bank (*Bezabde/Eski Hendek*).² In short, it was “*a very strong fortress, placed upon a hill...which sloped towards the banks of the Tigris, and where it was low...it was fortified with a double wall*”.³ Ammianus Marcellinus,⁴ the ancient historian giving us insight into the Roman-Sasanian campaigns of 359–363 CE, writes as a contemporary witness. He has seen, if not Bezabde itself, at least the region in

¹ Amm. Marc. 20.7.1, trans. J. C. Rolfe, respectively.

² Bezabde/Phaeniche (maybe Strabon’s Pinaka (*geogr.* 16.1.24)) is one of the few places mentioned in this paper we can archaeologically track. The construction plans for the Cizre-dam initiated a scanty survey (1988–1990) that allows, with some certainty, the identification of the site with the fortress mentioned by Ammianus. Guillermo Algaze et al., “The Tigris-Euphrates Archaeological Reconnaissance Project. Final Report of the Cizre Dam and Cizre-Silopi Plain Survey Areas”, *Anatolica* 38 (2012): 1-115, here 42-5, 80-5; Anthony Comfort and Michał Marciak, *How Did the Persian King of Kings Get His Wine? The Upper Tigris in Antiquity (c. 700 BCE to 636 CE)*, (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2018), esp. 95-7, 101.

³ Amm. Marc. 20.7.1.

⁴ For details on the historian and his work, i.a. Stephan Berrens, “Ammianus Marcellinus und die Belagerung befestigter Orte im spätantiken Gallien,” in *Der umkämpfte Ort. Von der Antike zum Mittelalter*, ed. Olaf Wagener, (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 2009), 261-278; Norbert Bitter, *Kampfschilderungen bei Ammianus Marcellinus*, (Bonn: Habelt, 1976); Gary A. Crump, *Ammianus Marcellinus as a Military Historian*, (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1975); Frank Trombley, “Ammianus Marcellinus and Fourth-Century Warfare,” in *The Late Roman World and Its Historian. Interpreting Ammianus Marcellinus*, ed. Jan Willem Drijvers/David Hunt, (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 17-28; Michael Hanaghan and David Woods (eds.), *Ammianus Marcellinus from Soldier to Author*, (Leiden: Brill, 2022); Klaus Rosen, *Studien zur Darstellungskunst und Glaubwürdigkeit des Ammianus Marcellinus*, (Bonn: Habelt, 1970).

question, on the fringes of the *Imperium Romanum* of the border zone shared with the Persian Empire under the rule of Shapur II.⁵ In 359 CE, after having settled conflicts in the east and therefore being able to concentrate troops against the west, the king marches into Roman territory. Without major military accomplishments until summer,⁶ Shapur is heading for Amida. Among the defenders of the city is Ammianus Marcellinus, serving as *protector domesticus* on the eastern frontier.⁷

⁵ The region in question encompasses Mesopotamia, the land between the rivers Euphrates and Tigris. Of the mentioned sites, Amida is the northernmost on the shores of the Tigris, Bezabde lying further southeast. The other sites of mainly uncertain location are situated in the middle section of the Euphrates. The southernmost city considered in this paper is Ctesiphon, c. 35 km southeast of modern Baghdad. The region is not to be mingled with the Roman province Mesopotamia; for regulations on the *regiones Transtigritanae*, cf. Karin Mosig-Walburg, *Römer und Perser. Vom 3. Jahrhundert bis zum Jahr 363 n. Chr.*, (Gutenberg: Computus, 2009). The region can be characterized as a generally urbanized area (for the definition of an ancient city cf. Rinse Willet, *The Geography of Urbanism in Roman Asia Minor*, (Sheffield: Equinox, 2020)). In Late Antiquity, several sites are fortified or (re-)founded at strategically important places to enhance control and security. The name of the so-called Fertile Crescent reveals its importance for agricultural production. Transportation via the rivers and long-distance roads furthermore connects trade networks between Romans and Persians, and in extension with Arabia, India, and China. These factors result in their desirability throughout the centuries, above all, at a time where the upper part formed a contested border zone with shifting accentuations of power, in this case the two empires with their respective buffer zones: the Late Roman realm on the eve of its division and the Sasanian commonwealth under the long reign of Shapur II. Berrens, "Ammianus," 263-4; 272-5; Comfort and Marciak, *Upper Tigris*; Crump, *Ammianus*; Peter Edwell, *Rome and Persia at War. Imperial Competition and Contact, 193-363 CE*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2021); Greg Fisher, *Between Empires. Arabs, Romans, and Sasanians in Late Antiquity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 30-3; Susan Pollock, *Ancient Mesopotamia. The Eden That Never Was*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁶ This could partly be due to the evasive strategy of Emperor Constantius II, enforced by the Roman scorched earth policy. Shapur might have, however, indeed planned to turn north from the very beginning: Rosen, *Glaubwürdigkeit*, 21-31. Another reason according to Amm. Marc. 18.7.9-10 is the flooding of the Euphrates causing Shapur's detour, rejected by Rosen, *Glaubwürdigkeit*, 44-6 as this is to be expected earlier. Maybe it is not the king's primary goal to openly confront the Roman army, but rather providing plunder for recently incorporated troops of the *gentes* formerly harassing the eastern borders, consolidating cohesion of the Persian army, and enhancing his legitimacy. Either way, it seems unlikely that he honestly strives to reconquer all claimed territories according to the constructed hereditary title of the Achaemenid Empire (cf. Amm. Marc. 17.5.3-8); an attempt to permanently occupy and administer the 'romanized' areas of the East, can only be registered as early as the 6th century. The king nonetheless manages to realign the boundaries of his empire while benefitting from advantages concerning security policy. Matthew P. Canepa, *The Two Eyes of the Earth. Art and Ritual of Kingship between Rome and Sasanian Iran*, (Berkeley et al.: Univ. of California Press, 2009); Comfort and Marciak, *Upper Tigris*, 23; Crump, *Ammianus*, 45; Fisher, *Between Empires*, 31-3; Rosen, *Glaubwürdigkeit*, 30.

⁷ For details concerning this rather vague military status, see Bitter *Kampfschilderungen*, 1-2; Crump, *Ammianus*, 6-10; Trombley, *Ammianus*. Basically, *protectores domestici* were

After 73 days of heroic fighting (and, though not explicitly written in his narrative, mainly of waiting), the city is stormed by the Sasanian troops. Ammianus seizes an opportunity to escape and, although eventually returning to the army, he does not seem to resume reportable military service until the Persian campaign of Constantius' II successor Julian four years later (and even then, obviously not in his former position).⁸

30 years later, Ammianus, originally probably from Syria and Greek-speaking, writes a history of the Roman Empire in Latin from the ancient capital of Rome and for his audience there. Having received a classical education, he is well acquainted with the ancient epics, poems, and historiographies treating the great wars of the past. With his *Res Gestae*, Ammianus wants to continue the history of Tacitus, beginning where the latter stopped, at the death of Nerva in 98 CE.

While the first 13 books are lost to us, the preserved parts from 353 CE onwards give us an impression of the time Ammianus has already experienced as a contemporary witness.⁹ The *Res Gestae* have eventually been extended to the 31st book, ending with the death of Valens in 378 CE.¹⁰ In spite of having been criticized for not writing in the Latin of Ciceronian standard, and for neglecting military details, the value of this source evolves in the extraordinarily long passages, where Ammianus is actually *involved* in the events he narrates: c. 255 years are covered in 13 books, whereas the roughly 25 years of his life as a contemporary are described in 18 books. The few months between the eve of the Persian attack on Roman territory and Ammianus' escape from Amida alone cover 16 chapters.¹¹

individuals, subordinate to officials like Ursicinus, former commander-in-chief of the army in the East, whom Ammianus was assigned to. He seemingly served as an aide without specific regular tasks, but a broad range of functions, including counselling and administrative tasks (cf. the lengthy descriptions of his special missions: Amm. Marc. 18.6.10-1, 18.6.20-7.2).

⁸ Unfortunately, he remains silent about his role after having fled from Amida and during the 363 CE invasion. His potential desertion in the face of an enemy might have had some effect on his military status, other theories range from having resigned his commission after the forced retirement of Ursicinus in 360 CE, and voluntarily returning or being reactivated for the new campaign, to retreat from military service thanks to the lack of imperial control over staff officers, or up to suspension. In Julian's expedition, he surely was an observer, maybe a participant, but everything else remains obscure. For a discussion of the theories, see Bitter *Kampfschilderungen*, 1-3; Crump, *Ammianus*, 10-3, 28.

⁹ Bitter *Kampfschilderungen*, 1-2, and Crump, *Ammianus*, 23-31, 129-130 discussing sources and methods of Ammianus.

¹⁰ Bitter *Kampfschilderungen*, 10; Crump, *Ammianus*, 121.

¹¹ Amm. Marc. 18.4 introducing the future theatre of war, ending with Shapur's final assessment in 19.9.9.

He calls himself a former soldier and a Greek, “*miles quondam et Graecus*”¹², but, though influencing the narrative, the soldier mainly remains in the background, while the *Graecus*, the man of letters, seizes the high ground. Notwithstanding its paucity on military details, scholarship is incrementally giving credit to his self-description. Anyway, being *protector domesticus* should not be mistaken for being a common foot soldier. Thus, we have to bear in mind that Ammianus was somehow involved in the Roman-Sasanian conflicts of the 4th century; three decades later, however, he appears as an *author*. Ancient Historiography has always been *literature* with the aim to entertain and to give moral instructions by comparing their composers’ respective times with the ‘good old days’ and their ‘good old *exempla*’. To sum up, Ammianus must not be seen as mere theoretician. He knows the environment, the actors, and the circumstances of the siege of Bezabde, but, in contrast to Amida, he was not on site when the fight evolved. Drawing on literary conventions and reports of witnesses, he fills the description of the battle at Bezabde with details, emotions, and suspense.

‘Elemental Warfare’ and the Fire Fights of Bezabde

“*On his first attack the king [Shapur II, C.K.]...advanced to the very edge of the trenches. But becoming the target of repeated missiles..., he was protected...and got away unhurt....He courteously urged the besieged, ...to put an end to the blockade by a timely surrender...but...no answer was made. ...[B]efore the beginning of the next day the entire force of the Persians fiercely attacked the rampart,...clouds of arrows flew thick and fast*”.¹³

After a few days, weak parts of the walls were attacked with battering rams, but they only

“*moved forward with difficulty, since the fear of stones...and of arrows kept them off, yet neither the ballistae nor the scorpions ceased, the former to hurl darts, the latter showers of stones and with them blazing wicker baskets, smeared with pitch and bitumen. Because of the constant fall of these..., the engines were halted...and the constant shower of fiery darts and brands set them on fire. ...[T]he besiegers were fired with the greater desire to destroy the town. ...[F]inally...the enemy pushed on the rams, huge stones coming thick from the walls, and varied devices for kindling fire, debarred them from going forward. However, one ram, ...which was covered with*

¹² Amm. Marc. 31.16.9.

¹³ Amm. Marc. 20.7.2-6.

wet bull's hide and therefore less exposed to danger from fire...made its way...to the wall. ...[I]t weakened a tower and overthrew it.”¹⁴

“[A] hotter fight raged within the walls... The king, ...having long burned with desire of taking Phaenicha, since it was a very convenient stronghold, did not leave the place until he had firmly repaired the shattered parts of walls, stored up an immense quantity of supplies, and stationed there an armed force of men.”¹⁵

The passage reveals several important components of what one might call ‘elemental warfare’: Defences and attacks taking advantage of the elements. (This is, so far, no official *terminus technicus*; then again, it highlights the systematic use of water, air, earth, and fire as a weapon, as strategic means, or as part of a defensive system within the broader range of ‘ecological warfare’.)¹⁶

Water of the rivers is used for securing the sites; wet cloths and hides serve as a protection against fire.¹⁷ On other occasions during those campaigns, dams are flooded, or canals drained to delay the enemy’s advance.¹⁸ Cutting-off water, as well as food, can be a potent weapon to achieve surrender by blockade, as Shapur warned the defenders of Bezabde. This, on the other hand, usually takes a long span of time since the cities of Mesopotamia are well aware of the threat, therefore having made sufficient efforts to guarantee especially the supply of water.¹⁹

Walls are built of *earthen* materials such as stones. During the siege of Amida in 359 CE, dams are mainly built out of soil and wood,²⁰ higher than the city walls themselves – Amida’s death sentence, as the collapse of the dam of the Roman side, built to match the height of the Persian one from the outside, levelled the space between, and therefore granted access for the attackers. Below the walls, tunnels are dug to undermine the structures and take the settlement from within, like Maiozamalcha experienced in Julian’s

¹⁴ Amm. Marc. 20.7.10-3.

¹⁵ Amm. Marc. 20.7.14, 16.

¹⁶ Cf. the comprehensive overview of ‘ecological warfare’ in Antiquity in Oliver Stoll, “De fluminum derivatione et vitiatione aquarum – Von der Verwüstung der Natur im Territorium des Feindes oder zur Verteidigung eigenen Landes. Ökologische Kriegführung und Umweltkrieg in der Antike,” *MBAH* (forthcoming).

¹⁷ Cf. the advice in the earliest known Greek military manual of Aeneas Tacticus, esp. 33-5.

¹⁸ Amm. Marc. 24.1.11, 24.6.2.

¹⁹ E.g., Amm. Marc. 18.9.2, 19.5.4-5; Crump, *Ammianus*, 99, 110-1.

²⁰ Flammable material might be at hand and faster to build with, but less solid: During the attempted recapture of Bezabde, the Persians, carrying “*fire-pans..., pushed live coals into the joints of one of the mounds, which was built of the boughs of various kinds of trees, of rushes, and of bundles of cane. These, as soon as the dry fuel caught fire, at once burst into flame*” (Amm. Marc. 20.11.23).

assault of 363 CE. In building trenches, earth is removed, and used for erecting ramparts as components of permanent or temporary defence systems. The crops of the land are furthermore destroyed by friend and foe to deny the respective enemy its fruits.²¹

Missiles are flying through the *air* – actually, or at least potentially, as the ‘*fear of thrown stones and arrows*’ at Bezabde suggests, already a mild version of psychological warfare. Regarding Amida, Ammianus explicitly reports the covering of a Gallic sally by their comrades on the city walls firing “*the hurling engines..., but without discharging any missiles*”,²² hence holding off the enemies by sheer imaginative force. Finally, smoke obstructs the view and makes it hard to breathe.

Its source, *fire*, is the last of the elements: First, as a metaphor, when a “*hotter fight raged (proelium...exarsit)*” and the Sasanian king has “*long burned (flagrans) with a desire of taking*” the city.²³ Second, as a weapon: In the passage above in the form of ‘*blazing baskets, with pitch and bitumen*’, or of ‘*fiery darts and brands*’ setting machines ablaze, notwithstanding the means to distinguish them.

Shortly after the seizure of Bezabde, the Roman emperor Constantius II tries to retake the city – and fails. But at least he gives the new Sasanian masters a good fight: After several days, the defenders “*all strove...to set fire to them, constantly hurling firebrands and blazing darts. ...[T]imbers were covered with wetted hides and rags..., so that the fire fell on them without effect*”²⁴. Against the battering ram “*they poured down*”, amongst other means, “*scalding-hot pitch. ...Making a sudden rush through the gates, they attacked...hurling upon the rams firebrands and baskets made of iron and filled with flames*”²⁵. A last great effort was undertaken by a sally of the Persians,

“*with still greater numbers of men*” – probably meaning: civilians – “*carrying material for setting fires drawn up among the armed soldiers; then iron baskets filled with flames were hurled upon the woodwork, as well as...other things best suited for kindling fires. And because the pitch-black clouds of smoke made it impossible to see,*

²¹ Amm. Marc. 18.7.3-4, 18.7.8, 24.1.14-5, 24.7.4, Rosen, *Glaubwürdigkeit*, 28, see below.

²² Amm. Marc. 19.6.10.

²³ Amm. Marc. 20.7.14, 16. Metaphors of fire (also of water and weather), esp. depicting violence and war, are a common feature to Ammianus’ style: Bitter, *Kampfschilderungen*, 135-6, 150-1.

²⁴ Amm. Marc. 20.11.13.

²⁵ Amm. Marc. 20.11.15-6.

...all the siege-engines were destroyed by the spreading flames...[,] some brave men [were] barely rescued in a half-burned condition”²⁶

Smoke is not only a byproduct, but also a strategic means to either blur the sight, make it difficult to breath, or even kill enemies, e.g., advancing through narrow tunnels.

In short, fire is a major feature of those sieges of Bezabde in 360 CE – first, by the Sasanian king Shapur, then the failed one, by the Romans under Constantius. Fire arrows²⁷ and thrown firebrands are the most common weapon to ignite flammable material (including people). Equally, spilling hot oil or pitch from the walls seem to be a regular defence of a fortified settlement. But there are more ‘elaborate’ methods, like the mentioned firebombs of bitumen or naphtha, a kind of petroleum that cannot be distinguished by water.²⁸ The problem with fire is: Used on a large scale, it is hard to control. With the scorched earth policy, the Romans tried to slow down Shapur’s advance, burning down their fields and fruits. “[T]he mighty violence of that raging element consumed all the grain...and every kind of growing plant, so utterly that from the very banks of the Tigris all the way to the Euphrates not a green thing was to be seen”.²⁹ Though indeed contributing to the Persian delay, also the affected villages themselves, or “*what remained of*” them, “*was hideous from the utmost destitution*”³⁰ – not to speak of the effects on the wildlife.

Concerning fortified settlements of all kinds, fire is not only used while storming them, but also to deliberately destroy their infrastructures in cold blood. It is the simplest method to wipe out built environment, especially, when made of an easily flammable material. The main alternatives are systematic demolition and slighting, which, however, require too many

²⁶ Amm. Marc. 20.11.18-9.

²⁷ Cf. the excursus Amm. Marc. 23.4.14-5.

²⁸ Amm. 23.6.16, 23.6.37-8. The excavations of Dura, e.g., shed light on the use of such items in the mines of the ‘war below’: Oliver Stoll, “The Roman Armies in the Near East,” in *A Companion to the Hellenistic and Roman Near East*, ed. Ted Kaizer, (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2022) 337-49, here 346; Conor Whately, *A Sensory History of Ancient Warfare. Reconstructing the Physical Experience of War in the Classical World*, (Yorkshire/Philadelphia: Pen&Sword Military, 2021), 112, 116.

²⁹ Amm. Marc. 18.7.4.

³⁰ Amm. Marc. 24.8.2. Cf. Paneg. Lat. 4,21 for fire out of control after the storming of a city. How devastating could the scorched earth policy possibly have been in an empire famous for its infrastructures and trading networks providing supplies? Could the affected people expect some relief by compensation through the state, or rather the provincial administration, other cities and territories of the region, or local benefactors? Instances in the *Res Gestae* range from utter catastrophes (24.8.2, 25.2.1, 25.8.1, 25.8.15, 28.6.6, 31.3.8) to fast recovery (21.5.4, 27.10.5).

resources in those campaigns, where time and manpower seem to be a decisive factor. Demolition, while being commonly used to gain access to a fortress, is not to be found in the aftermath of the narrated sieges of 359–363 CE.

Julian's Campaign of 363 CE

Burning down cities, in contrast, often occurs either after, or even entirely without any combat at all, as the example of Julian's retaliation campaign in 363 CE shows.³¹ It is a determined march forwards to the Persian capital, its speed decisive – at least, in Ammianus' narrative, where all his favourite characters, Julian above all, have the positively associated attributes of determination.³² But indeed, it takes Julian less than 3 months to cover (and fight along the way) the approximately more than 1,000km distance by foot from Antioch to the Sasanian capital Ctesiphon, where he is forced to retreat.³³

Before the tragic end of the campaign, however – with Julian being deadly wounded³⁴ –, he leaves a trail of burnt cities along the Euphrates: Parts of the troops were sent “*to capture the fortress of Anatha, which, like many others, is girt by the waters of the Euphrates*”³⁵ – again, this element as a resource of protection of a place. Julian convinces the defenders to surrender, “[a]t once the whole fortress was set on fire; ...its commander...was given the rank of tribune. As for the rest, they were treated kindly” – not killed, that means – “*and with their families and possessions were sent to Chalcis, a city of Syria.*”³⁶

“*After storming and burning the first city to which we had come*”³⁷ – remark the first person, indicating Ammianus' presence, but also the exaggerated ‘storming’ as the town had surrendered – after that, the army passes Thiluta and Achaiachala. The settlements surprisingly remain neutral. A very peculiar passage, as fortified towns are left in the army's back without any security measures like the commonly used hostages to guarantee the agreement. Thereafter, destruction continues, as the source casually remarks:

³¹ Regarding the earlier campaigns, Ammianus is less specific about locations or methods, mainly referring to whole regions (e.g., Amm. Marc. 18.6.9).

³² Despite being overambitious and practically reckless at times, criticism concerning Julian is mainly restricted to internal affairs. Rosen, *Glaubwürdigkeit*.

³³ Comfort and Marciak, *Upper Tigris*, 24. Amm. Marc. 24.7.1 assures us that Julian's council decides not to besiege Ctesiphon, “*since the city...was well defended*”, and Persian reinforcements are expected to arrive while the Romans are still waiting for the rest of the divided army. Probably, permanent occupation was never intended.

³⁴ Amm. 25.3, Lib. or. 18.

³⁵ Amm. Marc. 24.1.6.

³⁶ Amm. Marc. 24.1.8, cf. Zos. 3.14.4.

³⁷ Amm. Marc. 24.1.12.

“*The next day another castle, which...had been abandoned, was burned in passing*”.³⁸

So, while they leave two inhabited settlements behind that could either attack from the rear or at least inform the Persians about the advance of the Romans, they burn down an abandoned castle, the structures of which (depending on its size, left supplies, and state of preservation) could still serve strategic purposes by sheltering and nourishing a passing army. But there is for sure no urgent necessity to eliminate them.

Julian advances to „*the city of Diacira... This place was without inhabitants, but rich in grain and fine white salt; ...After burning the city, and killing a few women whom we found*”,³⁹ they went on without additional violence being mentioned.⁴⁰

“*[W]e...took*”, Ammianus continues, “*possession of the town of Ozogardana, which the inhabitants had likewise deserted through fear of the approaching army.*”⁴¹ The escape of the civilians may have saved their lives, but not their left belongings: “*After burning this city also*”,⁴² the author shortly remarks, they headed for Pirisabora, also known as Peroz-Shapur/Misiche.⁴³ A fierce fight evolved, and eventually the cornered defenders asked for peace. The Romans counted “*only 2500*” prisoners, but, at least, “*[i]n this citadel there was found a great abundance of arms and provisions; of these the victors took what they needed and burned the rest along with the place itself.*”⁴⁴

In this case, the soldiers were ‘lucky’ to get their hands on the enemy, proving their brave fighting for glory. Or how else would one explain their

³⁸ Amm. Marc. 24.2.2.

³⁹ Amm. Marc. 24.2.3, cf. Zos. 3.15.2.

⁴⁰ But why mentioning esp. sexual violence, when in 31 books just on one occasion (Amm. Marc. 31.8.6-8) it is explicitly expressed concerning free-born, Roman women, not some of presumably lower status in enemies’ territory?

⁴¹ Amm. Marc. 24.2.3.

⁴² Amm. Marc. 24.2.4. Nearly the same wording is used by Zos. 3.15.3-4 about Zaragardia. Ammianus is, however, not listed as one of his sources; regarding the invasion of 363 CE, both might have drawn from Eunapius, again derived from another participant. Crump, *Ammianus*, 26-7; cf. Otto Veh’s Introduction in Zosimos, *Neue Geschichte*, 1-23.

⁴³ Cf. ŠKZ §8. Zos. 3.17-8 refers to it as Bersabora, nowadays, it is called al-Anbār. The city has been proposed as one of several places where the Persians could gather their troops listed by feudal obligations (A. D. Lee, “Campaign Preparations in Late Roman-Persian Warfare,” in *The Eastern Frontier of the Roman Empire. Proceedings of a Colloquium Held at Ankara in September 1988*, vol. 1, ed. David H. French and Christopher S. Lightfoot, (Oxford: BAR, 1989), 257-265). This would explain the explicit mentioning of the arsenals and granaries, see below.

⁴⁴ Amm. Marc. 24.2.22.

fury on the opposed occasion? An unnamed “*city which ...had been abandoned by its Jewish inhabitants, was burned by the hands of the angry soldiers*”⁴⁵.

In Maiozamalcha, they do get their revenge on a large city, again with double walls. “*And when all the preparations for destroying the city had been completed*”⁴⁶, the Romans advance despite the “*torches and fiery shafts*”⁴⁷ being thrown upon them. At last, the city was taken from within by undermining. Close by, however, the Persians have taken refuge in tunnels. Roman soldiers “*gathered straw and faggots and piled them before the entrances of the caves. The smoke from this...killed some by suffocation; others scorched by the blast of fires, were forced to come out and met a swift death; and so, ...all had fallen victims to steel or flame*”⁴⁸ – both the city and its men. “*Thus a great and populous city, destroyed by Roman strength and valour, was reduced to dust and ruins.*”⁴⁹

At the end of Julian’s campaign, according to Ammianus’ narrative, at least eight cities and forts are burnt down (not to mention smaller villages and farmhouses). One, Anatha, after capitulation without confrontation. Another, Pirisabora, following its surrender after combat. Two, an unnamed castle and Maiozamalcha, are burnt down after storming – in the latter case admittedly in a highly rhetorical manner, postulating to have it ‘*reduced to dust*’.

Nearly every attacked site Ammianus mentions meets fire in battle, though always in combination with battering rams, undermining, and other means of demolition. It is therefore not the first choice of weapon, but rather one component in the complex siege warfare of Roman-Sasanian conflicts. In half of the eight cases of incinerated settlements, in contrast, Ammianus gives a short remark about the use of fire against *abandoned* places.

Can fire then be labelled the preferred mean of deliberately destroying built environment in the (possibly urbicidal) aftermath, or rather: in the absence of any fight? It is for sure a swift method, saving time, men, and resources and it is often chosen despite the lack of control and limited results regarding permanent structures (i.e., stones, bricks, etc.).

⁴⁵ Amm. Marc. 24.4.1, emphasis added. Might they furthermore be angry because of the missed opportunity to make hostages? To exercise violence against the Persian enemy (or Jews?) or to violate esp. women? Because the refugees have taken their values with them? Or might it just be Ammianus’ narrative highlighting the vigorous warriors?

⁴⁶ Amm. Marc. 24.4.13.

⁴⁷ Amm. Marc. 24.4.16.

⁴⁸ Amm. Marc. 24.4.29-30.

⁴⁹ Amm. Marc. 24.4.30.

Devastated Settlements? Thoughts about Building Techniques

Talking of which – How devastating could those destructions have been? The seemingly devastated Amida, “*only a heap of ashes*”⁵⁰ after the Persian attack, is soon to be repopulated with the displaced inhabitants of Nisibis after the treaty of 363 CE. The modern town of Diyarbakır still presents its changed, but intact walls nowadays, built out of long-lasting basalt.⁵¹

The problem is: Of most places Ammianus mentions, we do not even know the name, let alone the location.⁵² Therefore, we do not have archaeological evidence on architecture and settlement patterns. The most common building material in this region are sun-dried mudbricks, hardening when exposed to high temperatures.⁵³ At least most defensive walls and public buildings would have been built out of stone.⁵⁴ Pirisabora, e.g., hosts an

⁵⁰ Amm. Marc. 20.11.5.

⁵¹ Zos. 3.34.1. Fortified by Constantius II. (Amm. Marc. 18.9.1), much has been repaired over the centuries. Nevertheless, it is one of the best-preserved fortifications of Late Antiquity. For Details on Ammianus’ siege description see Christina Kecht, “Kriegerische Könige und fliehende Soldaten. Ammianus Marcellinus zwischen Kampfeifer und Todesfurcht” (forthcoming). Cf. Comfort and Marciak, *Upper Tigris*, UNESCO, *Diyarbakır Fortress and Hevsel Gardens Cultural Landscape* [accessed 14 August 2023], <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1488>.

⁵² Apart from Amida, we just know the location of Bezabde/Phaenicha. The fortress was, however, not destroyed by fire in the aftermath, but reinforced by Shapur II. Diacira might be present-day Hit. Anatha, Thilutha, Achaichala, Ozogardana, and Maiozamalcha cannot be located (Edwell, *Rome and Persia*, 225, Geo Widengren, “Sources of Parthian and Sasanian History,” in *The Cambridge History of Iran. Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods*, vol. 3,2, ed. Eshan Yarshater, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1261-83, here 1269). The other affected forts are brought up without specifying even their names.

⁵³ Lacking trees esp. in South Mesopotamia, burnt bricks were only used when necessary. Constant care is indispensable, more so with strong evaporation of salty groundwater. In general, this construction method using clay or silt, mingled with organic connecting material and sometimes further admixture of sand and pebbles, is in use from the Neolithic on up to our times. Uwe Sievertsen, “Bauwissen im Alten Orient”, in *Wissensgeschichte der Architektur. Vom Neolithikum bis zum Alten Orient*, vol. 1, ed. Jürgen Renn et al., (Berlin: Neopubli, 2014), 131-280, here 205-6; Pollock, *Mesopotamia*, 37, 45-6, 53.

⁵⁴ Building stones, like timber, are not everywhere a local resource, but more common in Northern Mesopotamia and Syria. With the expansion of control beginning as early as the 3rd millennium BCE, transportation of building material over long distances became increasingly effortless and should generally not be considered a hurdle in Roman-Sasanian times. Nonetheless, we can assume that most residence buildings, esp. of poorer social classes, would have consisted of easily accessible and cheaper material, constructed according to traditional methods and designs (cf. Pollock, *Mesopotamia*, 49, 53). The foundations of Mesopotamian mudbrick houses, however, are usually built of stone. Amida, e.g., is standing on a plateau of basalt. Cf. Comfort and Marciak, *Upper Tigris*, 125; UNESCO, *Diyarbakır*; Pollock, *Mesopotamia*, 41-3, Sievertsen, “Bauwissen,” 131-4. 214-9.

especially strong double wall on naturally less fortified points, “built of bitumen and baked brick, a kind of structure...than which nothing is safer”⁵⁵ – including destruction by fire.

Timber is mainly used for beams and posts, but often thick enough to persist a relatively long period of burning thanks to its protective layer of coal.⁵⁶ In 3rd century Rome, according to Herodian, the praetorians set fire to the city in the 238 CE Civil War by heading purposefully for the wooden doors and balconies.⁵⁷ In any case, at least the interior – like wooden furniture or mattresses out of reed –, would be ablaze in seconds.

City houses furthermore stand close to each other; nonetheless, extra fuel would be needed at several different locations to spread the flames when surrounded by clay and stone. Finally, diffusion depends not only on fire-barriers through open places and thick walls, but also on the spatial distribution and air circulation of each and every inhabited building.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Amm. Marc. 24.2.12, cf. Zos. 3.18.5. Bitumen is furthermore used as a water barrier, as mortar, and sometimes for paving. In larger quantities, however, it might have been relatively expensive due to the processing by heating: Pollock, *Mesopotamia*, 79, Sievertsen, “Bauwissen,” 206. 213-4. Thin baked bricks at Bezabde, to take an archaeologically known example, point to a Late Roman dating. They are used in combination with ashlar blocks of basalt and limestone. Cf. Algaze et al., “Cizre Survey,” esp. 43.

⁵⁶ The persistence of timber depends on its thickness and density. Native to the region in question are oak trees and pistachio, to a lesser extent juniper, pine, walnut and maple trees, alders, elms, and sycamore trees in the open forests of northern, mountainous parts of Mesopotamia. Further in the south, those are replaced by date palms, poplar trees, and tamarisks, especially along the waterways (others, mainly for roofs beams of more than 5m room length, might be imported). Another factor concerning the extent of destruction is the combination with other building material, as well as cavities. Finally, the function of timber as a load-bearing component must be considered. Cf. Pollock, *Mesopotamia*; Sievertsen, “Bauwissen,” 219-220; Ruth Tringham, “Destruction of Places by Fire,” in *Destruction. Archaeological, Philological and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Jan Driessen, (Louvain-la-Neuve: UCL, 2013) 89-107, Thilo A. Hoffmann, *Brandschutz*, (München: Detail, 2018).

⁵⁷ Herod. 7.12.5, transl. E. C. Echols. I thank Florian Wieninger for this hint. In Upper and Middle Mesopotamia, the wooden elements would comprise beams for the inhabited flat roofs, posts, pillars, wall constructions, and doors: Sievertsen, “Bauwissen,” 219.

⁵⁸ While in smaller villages spaces between buildings tend to be wider apart, there might be a higher distribution of reed as building material, esp. in the marchlands further south (still being built nowadays); furthermore, it is used for mattresses, furniture, vessels, fuel, or as dividing walls and enclosures. In larger cities there are open areas like garbage dumps, courts and gardens, public squares, ruins, etc. Pollock, *Mesopotamia*, Sievertsen, “Bauwissen”. Even if we do know the layout of a city wall, we cannot be sure if the built environment within filled the space: Ephesos, e.g., has 386.5ha of walled area, the road system, in contrast, just covers 185ha (Willet, *Geography*, 164). The buildings inside are expected to be of different size and shape, too diverse to calculate every possibility of convection currents for settlements we cannot archaeologically trace. Those considerations are based on Tringham, “Destruction”. The cases she studied (Neolithic sites i.a. in Central Anatolia) display purposefully ignited fires in separate

The physic structure of the city itself, to summarize, might not be literally razed to the ground. Then again, this is just an assumption without archaeological evidence. For the surviving inhabitants we can nonetheless expect terrible losses of personal belongings, valuables, and possibly livelihood.⁵⁹

In contrast of the scarce documentary sources, however, there are various comparative linguistical studies demonstrating the close connection of Ammianus' *Res Gestae* with the typical siege descriptions of the great authors before him: In addition to directly citing Homer, he draws heavily from his Greek and Roman predecessors.⁶⁰

Is it then, at least in some cases, possible that the historian's accounts are mere phantasy and exaggeration? Though writing decades after the events, Ammianus, still appeals to an audience chronically and personally close enough to the events and their respective witnesses not to be entirely misled.⁶¹ Apart from that, those conflicts of the 4th century must still be seen as principally unbounded wars⁶² in a highly contested border zone. Of course, we must assume utilization of each element to win a battle at all costs.

burning areas at high temperatures up to 1,400°C. In a surrounding of mudbricks, additional fuel would be needed, at least, enough wooden parts inside. Thick flat roofs result in convection currents, increasing the heat and possibly resulting in burning of wood cores without soot. Combustions with open rooms "*forming a hot layer of hot fuel-rich smoke in the upper part of the building*" (Tringham, "Destruction," 97), can be distinguished in her excavations.

⁵⁹ In a society with close vicinity of living and working areas, destruction of the unit home/workplace has inestimable consequences, esp. for poorer social classes with limited prospect of extensive exogenous help. Roman historians, usually writing for an upper-class audience, are mainly concerned about peers and leading figures, Ammianus being no exemption. Surely, many people directly suffered from torching of granaries and other storages of basic necessities. Although many settlements continued to exist, it is a decisive feature of New Military History to contribute to a history from below, taking into consideration the fates of the people living within the urban structures.

⁶⁰ Esp. the influences of Thucydides, Polybios, Sallust, Livy, Virgil, and Tacitus should be mentioned. Out of the long list of scholars examining the credibility and literary character of the *Res Gestae* I hereby just mention Rosen, *Glaubwürdigkeit*, Crump, *Ammianus*, Bitter, *Kampfschilderungen*, and most recently Hanaghan and Woods, *Ammianus*.

⁶¹ Consider the many contemporary reports, cf. Otto Veh's Introduction in Zosimos, *Neue Geschichte*, 1-23.

⁶² Karl-Heinz Ziegler, „Vae victis. Sieger und Besiegte im Lichte des Römischen Rechts," in „Vae victis!“. *Über den Umgang mit Besiegten. Referate gehalten auf der Tagung der Joachim Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Hamburg am 31. Oktober und 1. November 1997*, ed. Otto Kraus, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 45-66. There are, however, unwritten morally/religiously sanctioned rules, bilateral treaties, diplomatic contacts, and different controlling mechanisms like exchanging hostages.

Why Burn Down (Abandoned) Cities?

Fire may not be the most destructive measure against cities made of partly non-flammable material. But it seems to be an economical weapon for achieving sufficient devastation without undue investment of time, men, and material. Therefore, fire is the first choice against abandoned structures, especially in time pressing campaigns in enemy's territory. If, instead, there is the possibility to take a strategically, economically, and socio-politically important city without overstretching one's resources in exerting control over the territory, both sides are expected to rather preserve the structures.⁶³ Why then burn down populated cities when they could be taken? Julian might have had other goals than permanent occupation – and/or simply not enough troops to do so.⁶⁴ His army is divided, with the bulk of 65,000 men accompanying him, while the rest is being sent to strengthen the allegiance of the Armenian king. They were supposed to reunite with Julian in Assyria after their march along the Tigris, but only reach their comrades in the retreat.⁶⁵

Why does Julian therefore burn down abandoned settlements? One hint may lie in the above-mentioned violence as an outlet for angry soldiers. More likely though, the emperor mainly destroyed potentially useful infrastructure and left stocks.⁶⁶ What *did* Julian thus want to achieve with his campaign if not occupation? Revenge? Imitating the Great Alexander? Earning glory and charismatic legitimacy? Preventing Shapur from further assaults, securing Roman territory?⁶⁷ We may never know for certain, but we must acknowledge that the region has always been – and perhaps, always will be – a contested zone between different forces.

⁶³ Mosig-Walburg, *Römer und Perser*, 285-6. Shapur therefore secured Bezabde with personally supervised reinforcements and a garrison. However, despite of further excavation being necessary, the survey at Eski Hendek/Fenik did not reveal any Sasanian pottery (Algaze et al., "Cizre Survey"; Comfort and Marciak, *Upper Tigris*, 25). The site disappears from written record after the peace treaty of 363 CE. At least for some time, the Sasanians took possession of the city with Constantius failing to recapture it. Amida, on the other hand, being too far beyond Shapur's core sphere of influence with strong forts in his back along the *limes* remaining Roman, is not permanently annexed, but maybe part of a psychological strategy bringing war into Roman territory. According to Crump, *Ammianus*, 14-6; 52-3, the siege took too much time and manpower for maintaining the plans of invasion. This, however, strongly depends on Shapur's main goal: for discussions of alternatives, see above.

⁶⁴ Other emperors before him, despite sacking Ctesiphon, have not tried to occupy the city or other Persian regions where they had won major military victories. Seemingly, they mainly aimed for control and influence on Northern Mesopotamia and adjacent regions. Fisher, *Between Empires*, 30; Crump, *Ammianus*, 57-8.

⁶⁵ *Amm. Marc.* 23.3.5, 25.8.16; *Zos.* 3.13.1; Rosen, *Glaubwürdigkeit*, 173.

⁶⁶ Similar, Edwell, *Rome and Persia*, 224.

⁶⁷ Ammianus lists belligerence, security measures, and aspiration to glory as *casus belli*, but most of all revenge (22.12.1, 23.2.1). Crump, *Ammianus*, 57; Mosig-Walburg, *Römer und Perser*, 297-304, Rosen, *Glaubwürdigkeit*, 157.

LES FRANÇAIS A L'ASSAUT DE L'IMPRENABLE BERG OP ZOOM (SEPTEMBRE 1747)

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Introduction

La ville de Berg op Zoom est aujourd'hui une petite ville côtière des Pays-Bas méridionaux, peu connue des Européens. Si elle mérite notre attention, c'est parce qu'elle était au milieu du XVIII^e siècle une formidable place de guerre ; l'une des places fortifiées les plus puissantes d'Europe. Et parce qu'elle fut, malgré cela, prise d'assaut par les Français en septembre 1747, lors de la guerre de Succession d'Autriche (1740-1748).

C'est à ce titre que la ville est mise en valeur aujourd'hui à des fins touristiques : depuis un certain nombre d'années, la municipalité s'est attachée à sortir de l'oubli les témoignages les plus remarquables du passé militaire de Berg op Zoom ; or tous ces lieux ou objets mis en valeur sont liés au siège de la ville par les Français en 1747!

Il reste en particulier un seul vestige à l'air libre de l'ancienne enceinte, au nord-est de ce qui est aujourd'hui le centre-ville : un ouvrage détaché que l'on appelait un ravelin ou une demi-lune (annexe 1). C'était un ouvrage en maçonnerie de forme grossièrement triangulaire, construit en avant du mur d'enceinte et entouré d'un fossé. A la mi-septembre 1747, c'est une construction semblable à celle-ci que les Français ont escaladée, mais au sud-est de la ville : le ravelin Dedem. La seule différence étant que le fossé du ravelin Dedem était sec, alors que le fossé entourant ce ravelin-ci était (et il est toujours) rempli d'eau, parce qu'il se situe sur le parcours de la petite rivière qui traverse Berg op Zoom, la Zoom. C'est la raison pour laquelle ce ravelin n'a jamais été détruit, contrairement au reste de l'enceinte, qui a laissé la place à l'expansion urbaine.

Il y a aussi à Berg op Zoom une très grande maquette de la place fortifiée, réalisée entre 1748 et 1751 – juste après le siège – sur l'ordre du roi de France, Louis XV. Cette maquette, de plus de dix mètres sur six, s'inscrit dans la tradition des nombreux plans-reliefs réalisés aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles pour instruire l'état-major militaire français sur la façon de défendre ou d'attaquer les places concernées. Cette maquette est actuellement exposée, sur un plan incliné, dans le palais-musée appelé *Markiezenhof*. Ce palais est l'un des rares bâtiments qui n'aient pas été détruits par le siège, et c'était en

1747 le quartier général du baron de Cronström, officier général qui défendait la place.

L'empreinte matérielle de ce siège, si vive encore aujourd'hui dans l'espace urbain, incite à comprendre davantage pourquoi les Français voulurent prendre Berg op Zoom en 1747, alors que la place était réputée imprenable ; pourquoi le siège fut si long, et si difficile ; et dans quelles circonstances les Français prirent finalement la ville, elle qui avait victorieusement résisté aux deux sièges précédents.

Une place réputée imprenable,... que l'on veut pourtant prendre

Le siège de Berg op Zoom : diversion ou objet principal ?

Au printemps de 1747, les Français s'apprétaient à entamer le territoire des Provinces-Unies, après avoir conquis les Pays-Bas autrichiens durant les années précédentes. Dans l'esprit de Louis XV, il s'agissait par-là d'accélérer les négociations en vue de la fin de la guerre. Cette guerre, la guerre de Succession d'Autriche, avait d'abord vu pour théâtre d'opérations principal la Bavière et la Bohême, où l'Autriche avait combattu les Prussiens, et les Impériaux soutenus par les Français. Entre 1744 et 1748, le théâtre d'opérations principal s'était déplacé dans ce que l'on appelait « la Flandre », c'est-à-dire les Pays-Bas autrichiens. Une coalition des Autrichiens, des Anglais et des Hollandais (appelés « les Alliés ») y combattit les Français, commandés en chef par le maréchal de Saxe à partir de 1745. Parallèlement, il y eut un théâtre d'opérations secondaire en Italie du Nord ; la guerre continuait aussi sur mer et aux colonies.

Des négociations secrètes avaient commencé, mais elles n'étaient pas satisfaisantes. Le roi de France voulait la paix, mais pas à n'importe quel prix. Les Provinces-Unies, sans être formellement en guerre, fournissaient de l'argent et des troupes aux Alliés. Les Français jugèrent qu'il était temps d'essayer fermement de détacher les Hollandais de leur alliance avec l'Angleterre, pour affaiblir cette dernière et la forcer à des négociations dans un sens favorable à la France. Le moyen était militaire, à savoir, menacer les Provinces-Unies d'une invasion.

Deux verrous en défendaient l'accès : d'une part, Maastricht, à l'est. Cette ville, qui était détachée du territoire des Provinces-Unies proprement dit, en faisait tout de même partie, avec un statut particulier, lié à des héritages dynastiques. Le deuxième point d'accès était Berg op Zoom, à l'ouest du Brabant hollandais (ou Brabant septentrional) et à l'embouchure de l'Escaut. Il s'agissait donc d'assiéger l'une de ces deux forteresses.

Pour comprendre cette alternative, il faut d'abord dire que la manière la plus commune de faire la guerre à cette époque était une conquête méthodique du territoire, par des sièges successifs, qui étaient autant de points d'appui. C'est ce que les Français pratiquèrent entre 1744 et 1746, pour conquérir les Pays-Bas autrichiens. Il n'y eut pas plus d'une bataille par campagne militaire ; en 1744, il n'y en eut pas du tout. Car les batailles étaient coûteuses en hommes, et peu décisives.

Or il n'était pas possible d'attaquer entre ces deux places, à l'est de Berg op Zoom. En effet, dans une zone couvrant près de 300 kilomètres, les Hollandais avaient établi une de leurs lignes de défense par les inondations, ce que l'on appelait une « ligne d'eau » – ou *waterlinie* en néerlandais. Cette ligne-ci était la *Zuidwaterlinie* (ligne d'eau du sud). Dans cette zone, si la frontière du pays était menacée, les Hollandais inondaient leur territoire par un savant système de canaux et d'écluses, jalonné de forts. Il était impossible de faire progresser ou vivre une armée d'invasion dans ce terrain.

Maurice de Saxe décida en juin d'attaquer Maastricht. Les Alliés essayèrent d'empêcher cela par la bataille de Lawfeld, près de Maastricht, le 2 juillet 1747. Les Français en sortirent victorieux, mais comme les Alliés se retirèrent en bon ordre et masquèrent Maastricht, le siège de cette place devint impossible. Le siège de Berg op Zoom fut donc décidé, même s'il paraissait plus difficile, « par l'art et par la nature », comme on disait alors.

La Pucelle

Ce siège était difficile parce que, d'une part, l'enceinte fortifiée de la ville avait été entièrement reprise et complexifiée au début du XVIII^e siècle selon les plans d'un ingénieur militaire hollandais réputé, Menno van Coehoorn. Une réalisation bien plus forte que l'ancienne enceinte du XVII^e siècle, avec pour éléments majeurs : un plan en étoile ; des fortifications basses, en partie masquées, du côté extérieur du fossé, par un glacis en pente douce, de façon à éviter que les boulets de canon puissent faire des brèches dans la partie verticale des remparts, qui était en maçonnerie (voir l'annexe 2a). Sachant que le sommet des fortifications était en terre (comme on le voit sur le ravelin de l'annexe 1), donc ne pouvait pas provoquer d'éboulement des murs. Le chevalier de Ray explique bien le système, dans ses *Souvenirs* écrits en 1787 ou 1788 :

« Le système de Coehoorn est connu : des murailles dont le revêtement est partie en pierre et brique et partie en terre où les boulets pénètrent sans décombres, de sorte qu'il faut être dans le chemin couvert même pour les

battre en brèche, et au moyen de ses éboulements préparer le passage du fossé, pour monter à l'assaut.¹ »

Coehoorn est resté dans l'histoire comme l'équivalent du célèbre ingénieur militaire français Vauban. Et l'enceinte de Berg op Zoom fut considérée comme le chef d'œuvre de Coehoorn.² A l'été 1747, la place était de plus dotée d'environ deux cents bouches à feu, bien plus que n'en avaient les assiégeants... Elle était réputée « imprenable³ ».

D'autre part, le site géographique protégeait la ville. C'était l'autre raison accréditant l'idée d'une ville imprenable. En effet, elle est bordée à l'ouest par la mer, ou plus exactement par l'estuaire de l'Escaut. Et cet estuaire était de plus, à cette époque, un delta compliqué, encombré de nombreuses îles. Donc la ville ne pouvait être « investie », comme on disait en poliorcétique ; c'est-à-dire qu'une armée ne pouvait en faire le tour, pour l'isoler et empêcher son ravitaillement.

De fait, la ville avait déjà été assiégée deux fois, en 1588 et en 1622. A chaque fois, ce fut un échec, le siège avait dû être levé. La ville y gagna son surnom : « La Pucelle.⁴ »

L'été 1747, autour de la ville et dans la ville

Le commandement et les forces en présence

Du côté français, ce fut le comte de Löwendal, 47 ans, lieutenant-général, qui fut chargé d'attaquer Berg op Zoom, à la tête de 20 000 à 25 000 hommes.⁵ Maurice de Saxe lui confia cette mission pour qu'il pût, après sa réussite future, prétendre au titre de maréchal de France, dont il avait l'ambition.⁶ Löwendal était un ami de longue date du maréchal de Saxe. Petit-fils du roi de Danemark, il était comme Maurice un étranger au service de France ; comme lui de lignée royale par le biais de la bâtardise ; et un homme

¹ Chevalier de Ray, *Réflexions et souvenirs... Classés, annotés et suivis d'un Précis des guerres de 1741 à 1762, par Lucien Mouillard*, (Paris / Limoges: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1895), 34-35. Pour mémoire, le chemin couvert d'une enceinte fortifiée se trouvait au sommet du glacis, protégé des attaquants par un parapet.

² Jean-Pierre Bois, *Maurice de Saxe*, (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 407.

³ Ray, *Réflexions et souvenirs*, 37.

⁴ Voir par exemple: Reed Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession*, (New York: St-Martin's Griffin, 1995 [1^{re} éd. 1993]), 319.

⁵ Nous reprenons ces chiffres à la suite de: Olaf van Nimwegen, « Het beleg van Bergen op Zoom in 1747 », *De Militaire Spectator*, (JRG 166, 9-1997), 418-424, ici: 420.

⁶ Fadi El Hage, *La guerre de Succession d'Autriche (1741-1748). Louis XV et le déclin de la France*, (Paris: Economica, 2017), 196-197.

de guerre de valeur, qui avait été entre autres au service de la Russie et avait combattu dans toutes les guerres de l'Europe dans les années 1720 et 1730.

En face, le général-baron Isaac Cronström, d'origine suédoise, fut chargé de la défense de la ville, avec une garnison de 4000 hommes;⁷ ce qui était « une nombreuse garnison⁸ ». Cronström avait reçu du prince Guillaume IV d'Orange-Nassau (stathouder général des Provinces-Unies) le commandement en chef sur l'espace compris entre l'Escaut et la Meuse ; et c'est pour sa fonction pendant ce siège qu'il est resté le plus connu dans l'Histoire. Il jouissait d'une longue expérience militaire, mais en 1747, il n'était plus pris au sérieux par le gouvernement de Londres, proche allié des Hollandais, qui le jugeait gâteux. Lord Chesterfield, secrétaire d'Etat britannique des affaires étrangères, porte sur lui en 1747 un jugement peu amène : « *that wretched doating animal who was trusted with the defence of this most important fortress.*⁹ » Il est vrai que le général-baron de Cronström avait déjà 86 ans, et était réputé sourd. Les Etats-Généraux refusèrent néanmoins son retrait, tout en lui donnant pour adjoints et conseillers le prince de Hesse-Philipstadt et le prince de Saxe-Hildburghausen¹⁰ ; ce dernier prit le commandement des lignes de Steenberg.

La défense de la ville était en effet renforcée au nord par un camp retranché de 16 000 hommes, en arrière d'une ligne de trois forts appuyés à Berg op Zoom : les forts de Moermont, Pinsen et Rovere. Ce camp retranché et ces forts formaient un ensemble connu sous le nom de « lignes de Steenberg¹¹ ».

Les Français attaquèrent logiquement Berg op Zoom par le côté le moins fort, le sud-est. (annexe 2b)

⁷ Chiffre donné par : Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession*, 319.

⁸ Voltaire, *Précis du Siècle de Louis XV*, dans : Voltaire, *Œuvres historiques*, édition présentée par René Pomeau, (Paris: Gallimard, 1957 [1^{re} éd. 1768]), 1451.

⁹ Matthew Smith Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748*, (London / New York: Longman, 1995), 174.

¹⁰ Cerisier (Antoine-Marie), *Tableau de l'histoire générale des Provinces-Unies*, t. 10, (Autrecht: B. Wild, 1784), 392-393.

¹¹ Ce que l'on appelait des « lignes », au pluriel, étaient une série de positions défensives, continues ou discontinues, avec des forts, qui formaient en effet une ligne de défense. Dans la même veine, on connaît pour la même période les « lignes de la Lauter », en Alsace. On disait simplement à l'époque « les lignes », et chacun savait ce qu'il fallait y entendre. Cf. Voltaire, *Précis du Siècle de Louis XV*, 1451, parlant de Berg op Zoom: « Outre ces défenses, outre une nombreuse garnison, il y avait des lignes auprès des fortifications, et dans ces lignes un corps de troupes qui pouvait à tout moment secourir la place. »

Des étapes classiques, pour une durée inhabituelle

Löwendal arriva devant la place dès le 12 juillet. Dans la nuit du 14 au 15 juillet, les Français ouvrirent la tranchée (comme on disait à l'époque) et commencèrent à construire la première parallèle.

Les étapes de ce siège furent classiques, à l'égal des autres sièges conduits par les Français en Flandre depuis 1744. Après avoir investi la place au mieux, on s'en approche en creusant des tranchées successives, parallèles au point des remparts choisi pour l'attaque, la première tranchée étant creusée hors de portée du canon des défenseurs. Entre les parallèles, on creuse de petites tranchées de communication, en lignes brisées (zig-zag), pour avancer en évitant un tir en enfilade venu des remparts (voir l'annexe 2b). On sécurise les tranchées avec des gabions, c'est-à-dire de gros paniers remplis de terre. Les soldats se transforment en terrassiers, avec pelles et pioches... Un siège était un énorme chantier. L'armée de Löwendal fournit chaque jour au service de la tranchée.¹²

Au niveau des parallèles étaient positionnées les batteries de canons (chacune à trois ou quatre canons), pour entamer le mur d'enceinte de la place ; et des batteries de mortiers, à tir courbe, qui projetaient des bombes et des boulets rouges pour détruire et incendier la ville.

De part et d'autre, cet été là, on se canonna sévèrement. On subit de lourdes pertes, plusieurs centaines d'hommes chaque semaine. Les assiégés faisaient des sorties nocturnes, en vue de détruire les travaux d'approche et les batteries de canons des Français. Ces derniers atteignirent toutefois le glacis de la place dès la fin de juillet. A Berg op Zoom, dès que l'on eut atteint le chemin couvert, la guerre des mines, guerre souterraine, joua aussi un grand rôle.¹³

A partir de la mi-août, après plusieurs tentatives meurtrières, les troupes de Löwendal réussirent à s'emparer successivement de quatre « lunettes » du chemin couvert, au sommet du glacis, en avant des bastions Coehoorn et Pucelle (voir les emplacements sur l'annexe 2b).

Les raisons de la longue durée du siège

Chacun des belligérants espérait que l'autre allait se porter en force du côté de Berg op Zoom. Ce ne fut pas le cas. Ni le duc de Cumberland, qui commandait en chef les Alliés cette année-là, ni Maurice de Saxe ne voulaient

¹² Ray, *Réflexions et souvenirs*, 34.

¹³ Ray, *Réflexions et souvenirs*, 35 ; El Hage, *La guerre de Succession d'Autriche*, 197. (El Hage se base ici sur le livre du colonel Augoyat, *Aperçu historique sur les fortifications*, 1860.)

dégarnir de troupes le secteur de la Meuse, à l'est, pour ne pas se mettre en mauvaise posture du côté de Maastricht, objectif principal.

En dépit des demandes pressantes du prince d'Orange-Nassau, Cumberland ne déplaça donc pas son armée vers le nord ; il envoya seulement à Cronström une faible armée de secours, commandée par le baron de Schwartzenberg, qui arriva avec des ordres très vagues. Elle fut postée du côté de Steenberg, au nord de Berg op Zoom, d'où elle se contenta d'entraver les communications des Français, sans vouloir la bataille. Parallèlement, le plus que Cumberland était prêt à faire, était de détacher vers Berg op Zoom autant de troupes que les Français en détacheraient eux-mêmes de leur armée principale.¹⁴ Les assiégeants, de leur côté, n'obtinrent pas non plus de Maurice de Saxe des renforts aussi importants que ceux demandés par Löwendal, qui leur auraient permis d'accélérer les opérations. Donc le siège traîna en longueur.

Il traîna d'autant plus en longueur que les assiégés pouvaient être facilement ravitaillés en munitions de guerre et en marchandises par le port, depuis les autres provinces du pays ; notamment par des bélandres, ces bateaux de commerce plats pour le cabotage. On lit par exemple dans un magazine mensuel anglais de ce temps, *The Gentleman's Magazine*, pour la date du 23 août, l'information suivante : "the garrison receiv'd a supply of cannon." (sans que le rédacteur précise qui a fourni ce ou ces canons à la ville, ni par quel itinéraire). On lit encore dans la même livraison du *Gentleman's Magazine* qu'une riche dame âgée envoya à Berg op Zoom 1000 livres en argent et en provisions, et promit de répéter son cadeau chaque semaine, tant que la garnison défendrait la place.¹⁵

Les assiégés pouvaient aussi bénéficier des lignes de Steenberg pour relever ou renforcer les effectifs en hommes de la garnison, c'est-à-dire pour « rafraîchir la place », selon le vocabulaire de ce temps.

D'autre part, la progression des troupes françaises était difficile car on se souvient que le terrain était défavorable, insalubre, empli de marécages, et de polders facilement inondables. Un terrain propice aux fièvres, donc à la forte mortalité des soldats. Voltaire s'en fait l'écho, dans son histoire du règne de Louis XV : « Les maladies des assiégeants, campés dans un terrain

¹⁴ William Augustus de Cumberland, *The Duke of Cumberland's Campaigns in Britain and the Low Countries, 1745-1748: A Selection of His Letters*, ed. Alastair Massie and Jonathan Oates, (Stroud: The Army Records Society, 2018), 36 et 274-275.

¹⁵ *The Gentleman's Magazine*, août 1747 (vol. 17, issue 8), 402, colonne 2, pour la date du 23 août.

malsain, écrit-il, secondaient encore la résistance de la ville. Ces maladies contagieuses mirent plus de vingt mille hommes hors d'état de server.¹⁶ »

Le siège fut donc difficile. Toutefois, en deux mois, la progression des Français avait été réelle. Selon le journal du duc de Croÿ, brigadier, présent au siège, celui-ci ne fut possible que par une sorte de miracle météorologique : l'été 1747 fut en effet étonnamment chaud et sec autour de Berg op Zoom, de façon tout à fait inhabituelle, à tel point que l'on se serait cru en Italie, écrit le duc de Croÿ. Il commença à pleuvoir seulement la veille de l'assaut.¹⁷

La prise de Berg op Zoom et ses conséquences

Les Français à l'assaut, et les excès de la soldatesque

Löwendal décida d'un assaut parce qu'il redoutait qu'avec la lenteur des opérations en cours, il fût obligé de lever le siège, du fait de l'arrivée de la mauvaise saison et, partant, de la fin des opérations militaires de la campagne de 1747... De fait, entre la mi-août et la mi-septembre, les Français avaient seulement réussi à s'emparer, au sommet du chemin couvert, des quatre lunettes qui encadraient les deux bastions Pucelle et Coehoorn. En septembre, il y avait des brèches dans ces bastions et dans le ravelin Dedem, faites par l'artillerie française. Mais ces brèches n'étaient pas encore jugées praticables.

Malgré tout, Löwendal planifia l'assaut pour le 16 septembre, vers 4h30 du matin – à la pointe du jour, comme on disait –, simultanément sur ces trois objectifs. L'avocat parisien Barbier qui, comme beaucoup de ses contemporains, suivait les opérations du siège dans les gazettes, rapporte dans son journal un bon mot que l'on prêta alors aux grenadiers :

« La nuit du 15 au 16 de ce mois de septembre, le comte de Lowendal, à quatre heures du matin, a tout fait préparer pour l'assaut. Nos grenadiers ne demandaient pas mieux ; on dit qu'ils disaient au général que le bâton¹⁸ qu'il attendait était dans la place, et qu'ils lui demandaient la permission de l'aller chercher ; on leur a d'ailleurs promis une récompense considérable à partager entre ceux qui auraient le bonheur d'en revenir.¹⁹ »

¹⁶ Voltaire, *Précis du siècle de Louis XV*, 1451. Ce chiffre de 20 000 hommes est confirmé dans : Ray, *Réflexions et souvenirs*, 36.

¹⁷ Emmanuel de Croÿ, *Mémoires de ma vie*, édition critique des carnets 32 à 34, mémoire de Maîtrise de David Benoist, Paris, Université Paris-Sorbonne, 1997 [revu et corrigé en 2017], 165, 168, 222, 226.

¹⁸ C'est-à-dire le bâton de maréchal de France.

¹⁹ Edmond-Jean-François Barbier, *Journal d'un avocat de Paris*. Tome VII, 1745-1747, (Clermont-Ferrand: Paleo, Sources de l'histoire de France, 2005), 251.

L'effet de surprise joua un rôle décisif. En effet, il était admis à l'époque que l'on devait se rendre maître de tous les ouvrages extérieurs d'une place avant d'en tenter l'assaut.²⁰ Or ce n'était pas le cas, le ravelin Dedem étant encore aux mains des assiégés, de même que les réduits des angles rentrants du chemin couvert. Et Cronström, en bon ingénieur, pensait sans doute que l'on ne devait jamais s'écarter des règles admises pour qu'un assaut réussît.

Les trois ouvrages fortifiés visés offrirent peu de résistance, alors que chacun d'eux était théoriquement bien défendu, par un capitaine et une centaine d'hommes... Les soldats commandés pour l'assaut (notamment des compagnies de grenadiers, que l'on utilisait toujours en première ligne pour ces vives escalades), se ruèrent dans le fossé, puis à l'attaque des trois forts ; ils franchirent le rempart et, une fois dans la ville, ouvrit les portes. Les Français se rendirent maîtres de la ville en ayant perdu seulement de 400 à 500 hommes.²¹ Ils firent plus de mille prisonniers de guerre parmi les soldats de la garnison, qui étaient encore plus de trois mille à cette date dans la forteresse.²² On s'empara entre autres de dix-sept bélandres, qui étaient retenues dans le port par la marée basse. Ironie du sort, sur les coffres d'approvisionnements divers trouvés dans ces navires était inscrit, en gros caractères : « A l'invincible garnison de Berg-op-Zoom²³ » !

Une partie de la garnison s'enfuit vers le camp des lignes de Steenberg. Cronström lui-même, tout aussi surpris par l'attaque que ses hommes, n'en attendit pas l'issue mais se sauva vers les lignes, et le roi de Prusse Frédéric II (qui était bien loin du siège !) assure dans ses écrits qu'il s'y sauva « en bonnet de nuit et en robe de chambre²⁴ ». Il vaut mieux croire les termes d'une feuille volante imprimée par les Français deux jours après la

²⁰ Ray, *Réflexions et souvenirs*, 37.

²¹ Perte de 400 hommes selon: Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, *Mémoires sur les campagnes des Pays-Bas en 1745, 1746 et 1747*, (Göttingen: Jean-Frédéric Roewer, 1803), 287-288. Perte de 500 hommes selon: Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession*, 320, et la note 20. Browning reprend le chiffre donné par: Jon Manchip White, *Marshal of France: The Life and Times of Maurice, Comte De Saxe*, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1962), 225-228.

²² Van Nimwegen, « Het beleg van Bergen op Zoom in 1747 », 424, colonne 3.

²³ Voir par exemple : Voltaire, 1452 ; Ray, 39.

²⁴ La source unique, sur cette fuite nommée « en bonnet de nuit et en robe de chambre », est probablement Frédéric II. Information reprise dans: Franz Crousse, *La guerre de la Succession d'Autriche dans les provinces belgiques. Campagnes de 1740 à 1748*, (Paris: Baudoin et C^{ie}, 1885), 100 ; Crousse se base sur: Heeren, *Mémoires sur les campagnes des Pays-Bas*, 283-284. On trouve aussi la réf. à cette information de Frédéric II dans: Bois, *Maurice de Saxe*, 410. Source: Frédéric II, *Histoire de la guerre de Sept Ans*, t. I, dans: *Œuvres historiques de Frédéric II roi de Prusse*, (Berlin: Imprimerie royale R. Decker, 1847), 14-15.

fin du siège : « M. de Cronstrom & le Prince de Hesse Philipsdal se sont sauvés en chemise à cheval²⁵ ».

De façon inattendue, une fois maîtres de la ville, les soldats français quittèrent toute discipline militaire et entrèrent dans une espèce de furie : ils s'enivrèrent, se mirent à voler, à tuer, à violer. En quelques heures, 2000 habitants furent tués, 1000 autres furent blessés²⁶. L'opinion publique en fut choquée. Des gravures largement répandues à l'époque fixèrent la mémoire des ruines de Berg op Zoom.

Au total, les Alliés perdirent le jour de l'assaut quelque 5000 hommes, tant tués que blessés ou faits prisonniers ; ils en avaient perdu 5000 autres pendant toute la durée du siège.²⁷ Le duc de Croÿ évalue la perte des Français, durant le siège, à 6000 hommes au plus;²⁸ mais on a vu que leur perte, le jour de l'assaut, fut limitée.

L'Histoire a retenu que le butin des soldats et des officiers fut énorme. Non seulement les Français pillèrent la ville, mais ils s'emparèrent aussi du camp des lignes de Steenberg, que les ennemis avaient abandonné avec précipitation, se repliant sur le corps de réserve de Schwartzemberg. On lit dans la feuille volante précitée, du 18 septembre : « un Grenadier entr'autres du Regiment de Normandie, a eu pour sa part une cassette où il s'est trouvé la valeur de quinze mille livres. » (annexe 3) Barbier dut avoir accès à de telles feuilles volantes, lui qui écrit :

« Le pillage a été si considérable, qu'on dit qu'un régiment a eu pour sa part cinquante mille écus, plusieurs grenadiers ont eu pour eux seuls quatorze ou quinze mille livres, et l'on dit que tous les effets pillés ont été vendus à grand marché²⁹ [...] »

Pour donner la mesure de ces fortunes soudaines, propres à frapper les esprits, il faut préciser que la solde d'un grenadier n'était pas de plus de 120 livres par an environ;³⁰ sachant que le salaire annuel d'un ouvrier non

²⁵ Feuille volante intitulée: *Du Quartier du Roi, le 18. Septembre 1747* (annexe 3). Les « feuilles volantes », petits imprimés, étaient vendues par des colporteurs qui parcouraient villes et campagnes. (Annexe 3).

²⁶ Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession*, 320.

²⁷ Feuille volante, *Du Quartier du Roi, le 18. Septembre 1747* (annexe 3) ; chiffres repris, avec davantage de détails, par Pajol (comte), *Les guerres sous Louis XV*, t. III, (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1884), 561-562.

²⁸ Emmanuel de Croÿ, *Mémoires de ma vie*, 195.

²⁹ Barbier, *Journal d'un avocat de Paris*, 252.

³⁰ Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat, *La petite guerre au XVIIIe siècle*, (Paris: Economica, 2010), 572-573. On y donne en exemple la solde journalière pour chacun des grades des compagnies à pied et des compagnies à cheval du régiment de Grassin. Pour les salaires des soldats en général :

qualifié, sous Louis XV, était plus ou moins de 200 livres par an.³¹ Nantis de leurs prises, les soldats de Löwendal transformèrent leur camp en un vaste marché, où vinrent se fournir un grand nombre d'habitants et de marchands d'Anvers, entre autres des Juifs, lit-on dans le journal de Barbier et dans les souvenirs du soldat Charles-Etienne Bernos. On y vendait des porcelaines, des tapis et tentures, de riches vêtements, de l'orfèvrerie, des tableaux, et même de petits meubles portatifs. C'est ce que décrit Bernos, qui était soldat du régiment de Limousin et secrétaire de l'aide-major de ce corps.³²

L'assaut, le droit et la stratégie

Les pratiques de la soldatesque de Löwendal à Berg op Zoom choquèrent le public. Il convient de se demander aussi ce que prescrivait le droit de la guerre.

D'abord, il faut souligner que les assauts de places étaient rares. En principe, si une place assiégée ne pouvait obtenir un secours extérieur, elle capitulait après une défense honorable, sans attendre l'assaut. Une défense honorable impliquait d'avoir utilisé toutes les ressources possibles pour la défense et, par exemple, qu'une brèche ait déjà été faite dans l'enceinte de la place. Toutes les villes assiégées par les Français en Flandre entre 1744 et 1748, soit 21 villes,³³ capitulèrent entre quelques jours et trois semaines après l'ouverture de la première tranchée. Dans le cas de Berg op Zoom, vu la force de la place, on estimait, côté français, que le siège durerait environ trois semaines.³⁴ Mais par exception, après plus de deux mois de tranchée ouverte (64 jours exactement), la ville n'avait toujours pas capitulé... A ce moment, Cumberland lui-même, mal informé, croyait que la place pouvait tenir encore trois semaines ou un mois, et que les Français, rattrapés par l'arrivée de la mauvaise saison, seraient obligés de lever le siège. Il fut donc surpris de la prise de la ville.³⁵

Or il était admis qu'en cas d'assaut, on ne pouvait répondre du sort de la garnison. Les traités juridiques de l'époque qui traitent du « droit des gens » en cas de guerre (ce que l'on appellerait aujourd'hui le « droit international des conflits armés ») précisent la règle. Le plus connu de ces traités est celui

Marcel Marion, *Dictionnaire des institutions de la France*, (Paris: Picard, 1989, réimpr. de l'édition de 1923), article « Solde ».

³¹ Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, *La vie quotidienne des Français sous Louis XV*, (Paris: Hachette, 1989 [1^{re} éd. 1979]), 80 et 298.

³² Charles-Etienne Bernos, « Souvenirs de campagne d'un soldat du régiment de Limousin (1741-1748) », *Carnet de la Sabretache*, 1902, 10^e vol., 668-690 et 737-762, ici: 759.

³³ Funck et d'Illens, *Plans et journaux des sièges de la dernière guerre de Flandres*, (Strasbourg: Melchior Pauschinger, 1750), tableau non paginé.

³⁴ Mouillard, *Précis des guerres de 1741 à 1762* (dans Ray, *Réflexions et souvenirs*), 309.

³⁵ Cumberland, *The Duke of Cumberland's Campaigns*, 293.

de Réal, écrit dans les années 1720-1740 et publié *post-mortem*. L'auteur y énonce : « Des troupes assiégées qui ne veulent point capituler, & qui réduisent l'assiégeant à monter à l'assaut, s'exposent et exposent les habitans à être passés au fil de l'épée.³⁶ »

Réal soutient que celui qui était habilité à juger si le gouverneur d'une place assiégée avait bien défendu sa place, ou s'il avait exagéré en ne capitulant pas assez vite, c'était le général des assiégeants. Dans notre cas, c'était le comte de Löwendal.

A cet égard, les choses ne furent pas claires. Le comte de Löwendal assura le roi qu'il avait pris toutes les dispositions possibles pour éviter au maximum les débordements. Barbier doute cependant que les ordres aient été fermes en ce sens. Il écrit dans son journal :

« Mais nos officiers conviennent en général que nos troupes sont plus cruelles et plus âpres au pillage qu'aucune autre, et il est à croire, dans cette occasion, qu'on aura fait semblant de mettre ordre, et qu'on les a laissées faire pendant trois ou quatre heures, tant pour punir les Hollandais et les Zélandais principalement, que pour satisfaire et récompenser nos soldats des fatigues et des risques de ce siege.³⁷ »

Löwendal lui-même toucha manifestement une part du butin ; et il paraît que ce n'est pas par hasard qu'il put s'acheter six mois plus tard le château de La Ferté Saint-Aubin, en Sologne, non loin du château de Chambord (ce dernier étant le château de Maurice de Saxe).³⁸

Conclusion

En dépit des efforts de la cour de Versailles pour ne retenir que la gloire de la prise de Berg op Zoom, les deux protagonistes principaux de cette affaire, le vainqueur comme le vaincu, le comte de Löwendal comme le général-baron Cronström, laissèrent une image en demi-teinte.

Cronström fut critiqué pour avoir laissé prendre Berg op Zoom, et l'on moqua son grand âge. Toutefois, il était soumis à des pressions de la part de ses alliés autrichiens, encore en septembre. Ces derniers voyaient l'automne arriver – donc la fin de la campagne militaire –, et ils croyaient que la place pouvait encore tenir au moins trois semaines, et qu'il était encore possible de faire lever le siège aux Français, sans engager de bataille, seulement en les entravant dans leurs convois de subsistances... Cronström était un militaire

³⁶ Gaspard de Réal, *La science du gouvernement*, t. V, contenant le droit des gens, (Paris: Les Libraires associés, 1764), 460.

³⁷ Barbier, *Journal d'un avocat de Paris*, 252.

³⁸ Bois, *Maurice de Saxe*, 411.

expérimenté, et dans le cas de Berg op Zoom il était lucide, donc pessimiste ; le 10 septembre, il pensait que la ville ne pourrait peut-être pas tenir dix jours. Son tort fut donc de tergiverser, de se laisser influencer, et de ne pas prendre l'initiative de capituler à temps après une défense très honorable.

Du côté des Français, après le siège, la position personnelle de Löwendal était délicate. Certes, il avait emporté la place, mais dans des conditions de violence qui choquaient les mœurs du temps. Le maréchal de Saxe comprit qu'il fallait agir de manière tranchée, car le parti qui lui était hostile à la cour du roi de France pouvait se servir de cette victoire controversée pour décrier ses propres actions à la guerre. Il exprima donc à Louis XV une alternative en forme de provocation qui est restée célèbre, et qui força en quelque sorte la décision du roi : il n'y avait pas de demi-mesure possible, assura Maurice ; suite à la prise de cette ville, soit il fallait faire pendre Löwendal, soit le faire maréchal de France!³⁹ Il était évidemment impensable de faire pendre un si glorieux général. Il fut fait maréchal de France dès le 17 septembre.

La prise et le pillage de la ville eurent un effet psychologique considérable sur les Hollandais. Ces derniers étaient incertains du sort de leur territoire en cas d'invasion des Français. Or, si les Provinces-Unies étaient envahies par les Français, l'Angleterre avait à craindre pour l'intégrité de son propre territoire... Cela œuvrait dans le sens d'une accélération des négociations pour une paix générale, que souhaitait le roi de France.

Sur le terrain, le siège de Berg op Zoom préparait celui de Maastricht (on disait que la paix était dans Maastricht), et ce dernier ouvrit effectivement la campagne de 1748. Cette nouvelle perspective d'agrandissement des territoires occupés par les Français, au détriment des Provinces-Unies, hâta effectivement les négociations pour une paix générale, à laquelle souscrit, cette fois, l'Angleterre.


³⁹ L'exhortation de Maurice de Saxe a été reprise par de nombreux historiens. Parmi les ouvrages et articles que nous avons cités, on la trouve dans ceux de Pajol, Mouillard, Browning, Van Nimwegen. On la trouve aussi par exemple dans la biographie de Louis XV publiée par Jean-Christian Petitfils (Paris: Perrin, 2014), 434.

ANNEXES


Annexe 1: Le ravelin de Berg op Zoom (vestige de la forteresse de 1747). © Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat (photo du 25 mai 2023)




Annexe 2a: Profil de l'enceinte de la place de Berg op Zoom, par Le Rouge (agrandissement de la carte ci-après). © Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat – Coll. privée.



Annexe 2b: Plan des attaques de Berg op Zoom en 1747, par Georges-Louis Le Rouge. © Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat – Coll. privée.



Annexe 3: Exemple d'une feuille volante diffusée par les Français en septembre 1747, contenant les dernières nouvelles du siège de Berg op Zoom. Dim : env. 26,5 x 20,5 cm. © Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat – Coll. privée.



THE DESTRUCTION OF ATLANTA AND SHERMAN'S "MARCH TO THE SEA:" THE IMPACT OF A U.S. CIVIL WAR MILITARY OPERATION ON URBAN SPACE AND POPULATION

Fred L. BORCH (USA)

Introduction

In September 1864, Union Army General William T. Sherman decided to make the people themselves experience the horrors of war. He marched to Atlanta, a major city in Confederate Georgia, and burned it-destroying everything of military value in this urban area. His actions also forced the city's population to flee.

Ten weeks later, he launched his famous-or infamous- "March to the Sea." Taking some 60,000 soldiers and heading towards Savannah, Georgia, Sherman adopted a deliberate policy of destroying all communication and transportation facilities. He and his Union troops also confiscated large quantities of food. What the soldiers did not seize, they often destroyed. As Sherman put it, his military strategy was to "make Georgia howl."¹ From Savannah, Sherman and his troops turned north into South Carolina and ultimately marched into North Carolina. The destruction of urban space and the civilian infrastructure in South Carolina was arguably worse than that wrought on either Georgia or North Carolina. Sherman's decision to inflict suffering on the South's civilian population played a major role in ending the war because of it helped break Southern morale and hastened the end of the Civil War. It is a good historical example of the effects of armed conflict on urban space and populations.

This paper first provides some context by looking at the controversy about slavery in the United States in the 1850s and how it led to the Civil War. It then examines General Sherman's background and discusses the Union's overall military strategy before taking a closer look at Sherman's March to the Sea. It concludes with a discussion of the legality of Sherman's military operation under the Law of Armed Conflict before providing some final thoughts about the March to the Sea in military history.

¹ Brooks D. Simpson & J. V. Berlin, eds., *Sherman's Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman, 1860-1865* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999), 731.

Where Are We in History? and why?

In the 1850s, the Southern states became increasingly vocal in claiming that their slave-based economies were an integral and permanent part of the United States. They also insisted that those who owned people had the legal (and moral) right to transport these enslaved men and women to any state—and those territories that would become future states. The majority of Northerners were willing to permit slavery to continue in the United States, but were opposed to *the expansion of slavery* into “free” states and western territories; Northerners wanted to restrict enslaved people to the Southern states. After the election of Abraham Lincoln as U.S. president in 1860, most Southerners were convinced that Lincoln and his Republican Party wanted to severely restrict the rights of slaveowners, if not ultimately abolish slavery. Consequently, some southern states decided to leave the Union—secede from the United States—to establish a new country called the Confederate States of America.

Abraham Lincoln insisted after he was elected that he would not dismantle slavery. But many Southerners in slave states, convinced that Lincoln and the Republicans were opposed to White supremacy and slavery, decided to secede from the Union and create a new nation—the Confederate States of America. As Alexander H. Stephens, the Confederate Vice President later explained, the “cornerstone” of the Confederacy was founded “upon the great truth at the negro is not equal to the white man, [and] that slavery, [and] subordination to the superior [White] race, is his natural and normal condition.”² South Carolina was the first state to leave the Union. Other states followed it.³

The war that followed (starting in April 1861) was about preserving the union. In mid-1862, however, Lincoln realized that he had to strike at the Confederacy’s economic foundation—its slave-based economy—if he was going to win the war and keep the Union together. After January 1863, the war was transformed into a fight for freedom for enslaved Black men, women, and children. Eighteen months later, by mid-1864, many in the North were tired of the war—and a “Peace Platform” in the Democratic Party appealed to many voters. Perhaps a negotiated peace with the Confederates would end the

² Alexander H. Stephens, “Cornerstone Address, March 21, 1861,” *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, vol. 1, ed. Frank Moore (New York: O.P. Putnam, 1862), pp. 44-46, <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1861stephens.asp> (last accessed Aug. 9, 2023)

³ South Carolina was the first state to leave the Union. It was followed by Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas. These seven slave states formed the Confederate States of America on February 8, 1861. After the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861, four more states—Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina—left the Union to join the Confederacy.

war? Lincoln rejected the idea of a negotiated peace (because that would mean the end of the Union) and was determined to continue the war.

Sherman's Background

Born in Ohio in February 1820, William Tecumseh Sherman graduated from West Point in 1840. He was sixth in his class and was commissioned as an artillery second lieutenant in the 3d U.S. Artillery. He fought in the final phases of Florida's Second Seminole War from 1840 to 1841. He also completed tours of duty in Georgia—and this gave him a familiarity with the Southern geography that would make him famous 20 years later.⁴ Sherman did not serve in the Mexican-American War as he was in the newly captured territory of California performing administrative duties. Discouraged that he had not seen action in Mexico, and not certain that the “vagabond life” of an Army officer was what he wanted, Sherman resigned his commission as a Regular Army officer in 1853. He pursued a number of civilian business ventures (banking and law) but was not very successful.⁵

After the outbreak of the Civil War in April 1861, Sherman returned to the Army as a colonel of the newly raised 13th U.S. Infantry. The Union was short on experience in the officer ranks and Sherman's West Point education—and his political connections (his brother was a U.S. senator and ally of President Lincoln)—made him a logical choice for a commission in the rapidly expanding Union Army.⁶ In February 1862, Sherman was in Tennessee with Major General Ulysses S. Grant's expedition against Forts Henry and Donelson. Sherman fought well at the bloody battle of Shiloh on April 5-6, 1862. Although he discounted reports that Confederate troops under were nearby and consequently failed to have his men prepare defensive positions (dig trenches, send out reconnaissance patrols), Sherman fought bravely after being attacked. His troops were nearly overrun by Confederate General Albert S. Johnston but Sherman rallied them and conducted an orderly retreat. Sherman himself was wounded (shot in the hand and shoulder) and had four horses shot from under him—but he was alive to fight another day. Later in 1862—foreshadowing what he would do in Georgia and the Carolinas—Sherman ruthlessly suppressed Confederate guerilla operations around Memphis, Tennessee, when he authorized the burning of farms and homes to discourage resistance.

⁴ Edwin Bearss, *Fields of Honor: Pivotal Battles of the Civil War* (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 2006), 355.

⁵ David Smith, *Sherman's March to the Sea* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 17.

⁶ John C. Fredriksen, *American Military Leaders* (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 719.

Sherman's Military Strategy from March 1864 through August 1864

In March 1864, Grant was called east by Lincoln to assume duties as the Union Commander-in-Chief. This resulted in Sherman being responsible for the Union war effort in the west—as the commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi.

The plan was for Sherman to advance from Chattanooga across Georgia to Atlanta and then Savannah, cutting the remaining Confederacy in half. Grant, meanwhile, would advance on Richmond, pinning Robert E. Lee to the defense of the Confederate capital. As Sherman put it: "If you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic I think ol' Uncle Abe [Lincoln] will give us twenty days leave to see the young folks."⁷ By May 1864, Sherman had a force of 100,000 men in Tennessee. Opposing him was Confederate Joseph E. Johnston. He had only 65,000 men but Johnston was a strong defensive position in the mountains of western Georgia. Over the next weeks and months, Sherman and Johnston maneuvered against each other—with the Confederate forces slowly giving up ground. Impatient with his progress against the enemy, Sherman acted recklessly on June 27, 1864 and attacked Johnston at Kennesaw Mountain. The Union suffered heavy losses of men and materiel. But despite Sherman's errors on the battlefield—which might have benefited the Confederacy had Johnston remained in command—Confederate President Jefferson Davis was unhappy with Johnston. Believing that Johnston was too cautious, Jefferson fired him and replaced him with the much more aggressive General John Bell Hood. True to his character, Hood foolishly went on the offensive. Sherman deployed all his forces well, beat off Hood's attacks, and slowly surrounded Atlanta.

Destruction of Atlanta and the Impact on the Urban Area and Civilian Population

Hood was forced to abandon Atlanta and Sherman captured the city on September 2, 1864—declaring "Atlanta is ours, and fairly won."⁸ It was an important victory because Atlanta was a key railroad junction. The capture of the city also was politically important because President Lincoln's reelection in November was very much in doubt and Sherman's victory boosted Lincoln's prestige. The victory encouraged more than a few war-weary Northern voters to stick with Lincoln and support him for another term as U.S. president.

⁷ James Lee McDonough, *William Tecumseh Sherman: In the Service of My Country: A Life* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2017), 116.

⁸ Smith, note 3, 8.

Sherman ordered all civilians in Atlanta to leave the city. He then ordered his troops to burn all storehouses, machine shops, mills and factories “within the lines of enemy defenses in Atlanta.” As the fires also consumed many private homes and stores, much of Atlanta was destroyed.

The Union troops also destroyed miles and miles of railroads in Georgia. Railroad ties were heated and then twisted so that they were unusable. A section of track was pulled up and the rails were laid across wood, which was then lit. When the iron began to soften, the rails were either bent or twisted around a nearby tree. Union soldiers called these “Sherman’s neckties.”⁹

The “March to the Sea” and its Impact on Civilian Infrastructure in Georgia and the Carolinas

After the burning of Atlanta, Confederate General John Hood attacked Sherman’s supply base at Nashville, Tennessee. Sherman decided that he would not engage with Hood. Rather, he sent Union generals George H. Thomas and John M. Schofield in pursuit of him. They ultimately defeated Hood at the Battle of Franklin (November 30, 1864) and Nashville (December 15-16, 1864). By November 15, 1864, Sherman had 60,000 men ready for his “March to the Sea.” He had cut his own supply line, and had split his army into two wings, with two corps in each wing: XV and XVII Corps were on the right and XIV and XX Corps were on the left. This permitted Sherman to threaten two targets at once—and the Confederates would not be able to resist two Union movements at the same time and would be required to choose where to defend.

As for supplies, Sherman had 2,500 wagons (with another 60 wagons as ambulances). His operational concept was to keep the wagons stocked with food and live off the land—destroying anything and everything that his Army did not need. But Sherman did not advocate indiscriminate violence. Rather, he was “quite precise in directing it against the property (but not the persons) of wealthy Southern die-hards whose assets had been largely untouched by the war.”¹⁰ Sherman took 20 days’ supplies with him when he left the Atlanta area. Each brigade in the four corps also was tasked with organizing foraging parties that would be on the flanks of the columns. Special Field Orders No. 120, issued November 9, 1864, allowed “liberal” foraging for the purposes of feeding the Soldiers, but required commanders to establish foraging parties under the command of “discreet officers.” It disallowed Soldiers from entering people’s homes or “committing any trespass.”

⁹ <https://encyclopediaofalabama.org/media/shermans-neckties/> (last accessed Jul. 25, 2023).

¹⁰ Thomas E. Ricks, “War Stories,” *New York Times Book Review* (Nov. 11, 2018), 13-14.

The Field Orders also permitted the destruction of mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc., but withheld that authority to the Corps-level commanders. However, if Sherman's forces were "unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted." The Orders also permitted the appropriation of "horses, mules, etc." but required the "discrimin[ation] . . . between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly."

Finally, in all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance."

Foragers worked in parties of 30-50 soldiers, with one or two officers in charge. They would leave camp every morning and travel 5-6 miles, visiting nearby farms and plantations and taking whatever they could find. The Union troops would seize livestock (usually hogs and chickens) and food (molasses, honey, hams), from the local civilians they encountered during their march. At the end of each day, the foraging parties would rendezvous with the Union wagon trains to unload supplies. Foragers would often leave on foot in the morning and return riding horses and mules.

There was little control over the foragers-with the result that personal property (gold, jewels) sometimes were stolen. There also were acts of robbery, pillage and violence.

In this famous "March to the Sea," Sherman cut a 60-mile wide swath of destruction across the state. His troops marched some 235 miles and captured Savannah on December 21. Sherman then presented the city to President Lincoln as a Christmas present.

In Savannah, Sherman obtained additional reinforcements and then headed north into South Carolina. He and his Union soldiers were particularly hard on the citizens of this state, believing that as the first state to secede from the Union, it was not only more blameworthy than other Confederate states but also that its destruction would hurt Confederate morale the most.

Sherman faced light resistance and captured Columbia, the state capital on February 17, 1865. The city was destroyed by fires that began that night and continued into the next day. While some claim that Sherman intentionally set fire to the city, most historians believe that the fires resulted from the burning bales of cotton that the retreating Confederates under General Wade Hampton III left behind.

Moving into North Carolina, Sherman's men did relatively little damage to civilian property and infrastructure—at least when compared with Georgia and South Carolina. This is likely because Union troops recognized that North Carolina had been reluctant to leave the Union, being the second from last state to secede (Tennessee was the last).¹¹ Sherman defeated Joseph Johnston at Bentonville, North Carolina on March 19-20, 1865. On April 26, 1865 (15 days after the surrender of Robert E. Lee at Appomattox), Johnston surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. The Civil War was over – at least for Sherman.

The Legality of Sherman's attacks on Civilian Infrastructure and Population under Law of Armed Conflict in 1864 and Law of Armed Conflict Today

Military necessity is a core principle of any military operation during an armed conflict because it permits combatants to *lawfully* carry out harmful acts—acts that may result in the killing of civilians and the destruction of civilian property. Military necessity justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and as efficiently as possible—unless those measures are prohibited by the Law of Armed Conflict.¹² Were Sherman's attacks on civilian infrastructure and population “militarily necessary?” Since his intent was to deprive the enemy of food and materiel, and hurt the Confederacy's ability to wage war, then the March to the Sea falls into the category of a militarily necessary operation.

But was it legal? Was the March to the Sea permissible in 1864 under international law as it then existed? Were Sherman's attacks on civilian property and infrastructure permitted under the *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, which President Lincoln had promulgated as General Orders Number 100 in 1863 and which governed Sherman's military operation? Paragraph 14 of General Orders No. 100 provides that “military necessity” permits “those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and *which are lawful* according to the modern law and usages of war.”¹³ Paragraph 21 states further that “*the citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of war.*”¹⁴ (emphasis supplied) Finally, paragraph 22 states that “the

¹¹ North Carolina seceded on May 20, 1861 and Tennessee on June 8, 1861. The Civil War began when South Carolina troops fired on Fort Sumter in April; South Carolina had seceded from the Union on December 20, 1860.

¹² Gary D. Solis, *The Law of Armed Conflict* (3d ed.) (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2021), 218.

¹³ War Department, *The 1863 Laws of War* (New York: Stackpole Books, 2005), 36.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property and honor *as much as the exigencies of war will permit.*" (emphasis supplied)¹⁵ Read together, it follows that Sherman's March was not a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict in 1864-1865. What about today? Article 54.2. of Additional Protocol I suggests Sherman might well be in violation of the Law of Armed Conflict as it exists today: It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, crops, livestock, etc. for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population, whatever the motive, whether to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.¹⁶ The law prohibits *intentional* attacks on civilians and civilian property—was this what Sherman did?

Conclusion

Sherman's March to the Sea resulted in the destruction of the cities of Atlanta and Columbia—as well as many other farms and plantations in Georgia and the Carolinas. The Union also captured a total of 13,294 cattle and 7,000 horses and mules. Nearly 10 million pounds of corn were seized and over 300 miles of railroad destroyed.

The exact dollar amount of damage will never be known; Sherman thought \$100,000,000—a huge amount for America in the nineteenth century and a loss from which it would take Georgia years to recover from. About 4/5 of the damage was simply waste and destruction. As for the Carolinas—it was more of the same—but more so in South Carolina.

Sherman is probably the most controversial general of the U.S. Civil War. Some see him as the prophet of modern war while others condemn him as a ruthless barbarian for his attacks on civilians. British military historian B. H. Liddell Hart claimed that Sherman was "the most original genius of the American Civil War" and "the first modern general."¹⁷

A postscript on Sherman: When he died in 1891, he was the last four-star general of the U.S. Army (other than the Army Chief of Staff) until the rank was revived in 1944. The Army named its most famous World War II tank, the M-4 *Sherman*, in his honor.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-54?activeTab=undefined> (last accessed July 25, 2023)

¹⁷ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American*. Da Cap Press, 1993, 430.

THE ZARAGOZA DOESN'T SURRENDER:¹ EFFECTS OF THE NAPOLEONIC SIEGES 1808-1809

Col. Gerardo LÓPEZ-MAYORAL HERNÁNDEZ (Spain)

People and society need to defend their possessions against other groups being essential cities' defence. On war and cities, there are two main types of operations: Battles and sieges.² In History, sieges are numerous, as old as the world. Some experts think that they would disappear after WWII but, curiously, was just on the contrary (Bayreuth, Sarajevo, Dubrovnik, Grozny...). They are the ultimate moment of war, when the rest of options fail, normally a consequence of not defeating the enemy as planned. But everything should be considered before taking the decision to set up the siege and its consequences.³ They are, in essence, psychological operations and normally require astuce, human imagination, inventions, determination or ingenious to resist or survive (Tyre). Always they are singular events which nowadays attract media interest.⁴ But most important, they make up the most intense war operations which fully involve civilian population, at least in some phases, supposing an exceptional people's effort on casualties and the logistics' support of the troops with complex sanitary evacuations which oblige to economize resources transforming the aspect and the behaviour of the population (black market, money exchange, etc.). On our period, previously to Peninsular War there were a lot of continuous periods of confrontation between France, Britain and Spain. Alliances and loyalties were consistent with hostility (1702-1808). The events in the Spain of 1808 were part of a wider European conflict which started with the confrontation of the European monarchies and its allies of the 1793 French Revolution. The Napoleonic intention was to injure as much as possible British interests in the heart of Portugal.⁵

¹ Benito Pérez Galdós: *Zaragoza. Episodios Nacionales*, (Madrid: Librería Editorial Hernando, Primera serie, 1941), 247.

² George Roux: *La Guerra napoleónica en España*. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, colección Austral, 1971), 127.

³ Jean Louis Dufour: *La guerre, la vie et le soldat*. (Paris: Eds. Odile Jacob), 109.

⁴ El Álamo, 1836; Toledo, 1936; Bayreuth, 1982; Sarajevo, 1992.

⁵ Mariano Alonso Baquer, "La conducción de las operaciones en la Guerra de la Independencia" (Cap. 1) in *La Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1814). El pueblo español, su Ejército y sus aliados frente a la ocupación napoleónica*. (Madrid: MINISDEF., 2007), 30. See appendix 1 & 2.

Zaragoza Doesn't Surrender: Effects of the Napoleonic Sieges 1808-1809

ZARAGOZA'S SIEGES (1808-09)	1809												1808											
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
TREATIES NAPOLEON JOSEPH CHEES	AUSTRIA'S WAR												AUSTRIA'S WAR											
ARMY & NAVY																								
SP AUTH	AUSTRIA'S WAR												AUSTRIA'S WAR											
TROOPS																								
BASLEA'S PROMISE'S PEACE	AUSTRIA'S WAR												AUSTRIA'S WAR											
UPRISING - BATTLES																								
SIEGES	AUSTRIA'S WAR												AUSTRIA'S WAR											
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1900	1808												1809											

Table 1: Napoleonic Invasion of Spain General Time Chart: Chronologic Events & Sieges

Spain, in theory, still was a great power but ineffective with a contradictory internal situation and interference between internal policies over the Spanish foreign policy. Known this situation by Napoleon, he decided to make Spain a satellite state and adopted, at first, during 1808, by force, tactical decisions oriented towards the full occupation of the Spanish territory⁶ which finally triggered several actions and reactions.⁷

To understand what happened in the Iberian Peninsula between 1808 and 1814 we need to consider that there was a war in Portugal during 1807-1808, followed by a war of Spain during 1808-1809 which, in 1810, became a war of Spain and Portugal.⁸ As Alonso Baquer explains, we admit the complexity of the denomination, that, at least, there were two overlapping wars, the French “*Guerre d’Espagne*” with the British “*Peninsular War*”.⁹

Where resistance was possible, the urban multitude ended the hesitations of the higher Spanish society, in a first act on 2 May 1808 in Madrid. After the Royal Family exile’s attempt, the unanimous and energetic revolt became a strategic change not well understood by Napoleon. Some noblemen, clergy and military joined the population. The uprisings spread out region to region creating several “*Juntas*” as a former first stage to a new political power.

Two were the specific differential aspects of Napoleonic campaigns during the Spanish War: *Guerrilla’s* fight and sieges.¹⁰ Too much has been written on “*guerrilla*” but probably less on sieges. They were normally enforced by a technical impossibility to defeat the enemy but, in this case, with a new component: The active participation of the civilian population in the defence, a form of urban resistance which supposes efforts and privations shared by the whole people, normally with some epic personal examples.¹¹ Spanish population will suffer many hard sieges on strategic cities.¹² As

⁶ Alonso Baquer, “La conducción de las operaciones en la Guerra de la Independencia” (2007), 39.

⁷ José María Jover Zamora et al., *España: Sociedad, Política y civilización (siglos XIX-XX)* (Madrid, Areté, 2001), 18.

⁸ Alonso Baquer, “La conducción de las operaciones en la Guerra de la Independencia” (2007), 27.

⁹ Mariano Alonso Baquer, “Las ideas estratégicas en la Guerra de la Independencia” in *Fuerzas Armadas Españolas. Historia Institucional y Social*, ed. HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ-BARBA, Mario y ALONSO BAQUER, Miguel (Madrid: Alhambra, ASORI), 2: 230.

¹⁰ Francisco Escribano Bernal, “Los sitios en la Península Ibérica (1808-1814): mucho más que mitos”, *Revista de Historia Militar* (Madrid, IHCM., nº extraordinario, 2009), 195.

¹¹ Palafox, Agustina of Zaragoza or Alvarez de Castro in Gerona.

¹² On statistics, during the 72 months’ war (May 1808 until April 1814), just in eight there were no important siege operations. Between June 1809 and October 1812, always one siege is in execution, overlapping sometimes five of them.

Escribano says,¹³ our “*Independence War*” was probably the last scenario for a generalized use of these actions ending in Sebastopol or Stalingrad.

On different phases and scenarios, and according with Serrano’s chart,¹⁴ between February and March 1808, we can note the occupation by the French of strongholds and fortresses closing the border in case of invasion which made safe the area allowing new units’ entrance without problems. During the first moments of the war, summer 1808, we observe the siege of Zaragoza (penetrations from the Pyrenees) and the two first more symbolic Gerona’s sieges to ensure Barcelona’s communications with France.

Then, just the attack to Valencia a fortified city, not a true siege. Finally, in winter 1808, a second Zaragoza’s siege (communications knot and mythic case after the first one) and Rosas (danger of a possible British navy base close to the main way to France).

Zaragoza’s Sieges: 1808-1809

Taking into account the chaotic events of this war, Colonel Priego, suggested studying the Peninsular War¹⁵ following a chronological pattern, except for 1808, differentiating two parts: The Spanish population’s uprising followed by the French repression ending with the French Ebro’s withdrawal after Bailen’s defeat and, second, the own Napoleon’s campaign in Spain (November 1808 – January 1809).¹⁶

Resistance & Revolution

The main uprising of the Spanish people in Madrid on 2 May 1808 in relation with the trip of the rest of the Royal Family to France was furiously repressed by Murat between 2 and 5 May 1808, which opened big tensions and ended in the war with the sporadic and almost simultaneous (*organized*

¹³ Escribano Bernal, “Los sitios en la Península Ibérica (1808-1814): mucho más que mitos”, (2009), 201.

¹⁴ Antonio Serrano Montalvo, “El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades”, in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*. (Cátedra “General Palafox” de Cultura Militar, AGM., Zaragoza, 1958), 506.

¹⁵ The Spanish Army consisted of the active Army (around 100,000 men, veterans, except 15,000 in Denmark and 20,000 in Portugal; a grand total around 80,000), provincial militias (30,000) and urban militias (some type of reserves in the cities), not so bad if conveniently organized and employed. They were peripherally deployed except some concentrations in Galicia and Cadiz-Gibraltar. Thus, operations in Spain were of three types: Regular Army, militia and guerrilla, with a same political purpose.

¹⁶ Juan Priego López: *Cómo fue la Guerra de la Independencia*. Edición del bicentenario (Madrid: Edit. San Martín. 2ª edición, 2008), 16. Main sources: Arceche (“*Guerra de la Independencia. Historia Militar de España de 1808 a 1814*”, Madrid, 1868-1903, 14 vol.), Oman (“*A History of the Peninsular War*”, Oxford, 1902-1915, 5 vol.) and Grasset (“*La Guerre d’Espagne*”, Berger-Levrault, Paris, 3 vol. 1914, 1925, 1932, not finished).

conspiration?) uprisings in the different outlying provinces and gathering in scattered elements of the partially disbanded Spanish Army.¹⁷

The defence of Zaragoza became a concern for the French in Madrid. The conscience of the population changed in just one month, from uncertainty to opposition and hate, which was dangerous, also for Napoleon because his proximity to France and the value of the Ebro river communications.

As already appreciated by the Romans, one of the main features of the Spanish character was not to flinch after the defeat or adversities in spite of the winners' courage and discipline which again occurred in our war.¹⁸ This was the secret of the long and stubborn resistance of the Spanish population in the different invasions suffered in its territory included the XIXth Century's French one.¹⁹ Lacking enough military resources, Zaragoza guaranteed its luck to its population patriotism.

The city was in the centre of the Ebro's valley, a key communications' junction in the Northeast to control Aragon's region and ensuring supplies' line to Catalonia's troops. A small tributary river (Huerva) in the Eastern flank offers some points able for defence with, inside the city, a central old core of small and narrow streets among the houses' blocks of stone. Founded by the Romans, it was also important as capital of the ancient Aragon's Kingdom and his population was very proud of his past, a solid race famous by his obstinacy. With more than 60,000 people, they are mostly catholic with many churches, convents and the Virgin of Pilar's temple, for pilgrimages. During the transit from the XVIIIth to XIXth centuries, its society was also a reflection of the rest of cities and villages of the region with the typical contradictions of the ancient society and a minority opened to transformation and renovation.

General Palafox tried to approach some members to form a "Junta" with some selected authorities and was hidden until the events were more mature. After Madrid's uprising, on 6 May, some natural leaders were mobilizing the population against the French but without a clear head. On 24 May, the situation exploded and he was invested as new Captain General, writing his first "proclama", a public edict of the declaration of war, establishing some centralization through specific city functional committees. He also rapidly started to organize the Aragon's Army based on local militia forces and others, a total of five "Tercios" (4,000-5,000 men) who left to fight

¹⁷ Vincent J. Esposito and John Elting R.: *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars* (London: Greenhill Books and Pennsylvania, Stackpole Books, 1999), Campaign in Spain: Map 84.

¹⁸ José Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*. (Madrid, Imprenta Depósito de la Guerra, 1878) II: 359.

¹⁹ José Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia Militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, 51-52.

in Tudela. On 6 June Palafox concentrated forces in Zaragoza and reinforced the northern border with France.

Supplies were a big problem with the difficulty to organize an army although they tried to improvise as much as possible. The scarcity of ammunition was solved with creativity. Groceries were also limited and prices were rising every day. The bad feeding and the lack of hygiene will be later on important causes of mortality. Simultaneously a war's economy was imposed by Palafox and his intendent. Justice had three Courts and the Audience with a military specific commission to examine expedients, a difficult task sometimes not completely equal for everybody...

From the very beginning there were two “*order-disorder*” conflicts: One, external with the French invaders and, second, internal, avoiding the revolution of the population, a difficult balance between the different local institutions and with Palafox who ordered more military disciplined measures.²⁰ The inhabitants of the city began to be called as the “*Zaragoza's defenders*”²¹ spread out in the entire city.²²

First Siege²³

On 6 June 1808 General Lefebvre left Pamplona (4,000) to Tudela towards Zaragoza without waiting for General Verdier coming from Vitoria with the same objective. After a quick confrontation, he was in Zaragoza on 15 June. The situation he saw at first made him to assume that a determined attack would easily overthrow any resistance but he didn't foresee the will of an open city as Zaragoza.²⁴ As known, Zaragoza was not a fortress and probably was not defendable. Palafox had reinforced it with the rests of the Tudela's advanced position easily taken afterwards by Verdier. Then, they withdrew to Alagón, and again, finally to the city. He still was probably thinking to defend it from outside, because inner conditions were not so good.²⁵ During the next

²⁰ A difficult particular issue was also the xenophobia against the French residents whose imprisonment avoided major problems. Luis Sorando Muzás: “En la retaguardia” in *Los Sitios de Zaragoza 1808-1809* (Zaragoza: HERALDO DE ARAGÓN. Monográfico bicentenario, 2008), 192.

²¹ José Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 75.

²² As Arteche states, it's difficult to carefully examine at this exact time which was the character of the revolution that was really taking place in the Spanish population to understand the internal feelings mixed with the intention to resist to invaders. José Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*. II: 400.

²³ See, Appendix 3

²⁴ Charles Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), I: 145.

²⁵ Zaragoza's force, 1 June: 8,070 men: Artillery men and civilians, 250; veterans and some deserters from other units, 700; “*aragoneses*”, enlisted, 3,500; people out of service in reserve,

days, he left to closer villages to gather possible reinforcements for Zaragoza and the civilians took the initiative in the beginning without any defence plans as Ibieta describes. He also was not able to cut off any French supplies in its way from Pamplona and Tudela to Alagon.²⁶

To stop the uprising, General Verdier arrived also to Zaragoza from Pamplona on 15 June with two Divisions,²⁷ deploying the artillery in Torrero's Hills, starting the "first siege". His first attack in "Eras del Rey" was the foreword of the immortal defence of Zaragoza,²⁸ a new name for the glorious Spanish patriotic sieges.²⁹ This action infused in the population some encouragement to continue with the defence of the city.³⁰ Lacking soldiers and sappers to execute all defence works, the civilians³¹ worked alternating with other combat tasks as patrols, guards and advanced posts.³² The determination and aggression of local inhabitants took completely the French by surprise.³³ Verdier noted it was impossible to take the city and asked for reinforcements which arrived on 26 June trying to modify his plans.

Inside the city, the authorities' understood the clear dependence of the local population in the extreme desperate situation. The lower social classes were totally integrated in the feelings of the rest.³⁴ The fiercest fighting was around the gates of the city, mainly in Portillo's West Gate where took place the personal intervention of Agustina (*de Aragón*) shooting herself a cannon, obliging the French to withdraw for more reinforcements and to organize a new attack. After some other attempts (more the 200 losses) Verdier concluded with some reluctance that the city only would fall through a regular siege. On 3 July, the French started building parallel trenches approaching the city, which took twelve days to reach the first convents outside the city. After

2,000; cavalry, 170. Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 347.

²⁶ Herminio Lafoz, *Los Sitios. Zaragoza en la Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1809)*. (Zaragoza: Caja de Ahorros de la Inmaculada de Aragón, 2000), 48.

²⁷ 3,000 soldiers and a siege train with 30 cannons, 4 mortars and 12 howitzers.

²⁸ Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), I: 149.

²⁹ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 84.

³⁰ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 314.

³¹ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 318.

³² Palafox: "Churches are full of women, old men and children; the rest managed weapons". Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 319

³³ Nick Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*. (Great Britain, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 40.

³⁴ Ronald Fraser, *La maldita Guerra de España. Historia social de la Guerra de la Independencia 1808-1814*. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006), 259.

one month of works and bombings, the main assault³⁵ became embroiled in a ferocious street-to-street and house-to-house fighting. French troops have never experienced before this form of combat and soon were suffering considerable losses from the Spaniards firing down from upper windows and rooftops.³⁶

Finally, on 11 August, Palafox knew about the great victory in Bailén which would have national consequences, changing deeply the events. Madrid was abandoned and the French Army was in movement towards the North. Lifting the siege of Zaragoza was just a question of time. Verdier took the decision to stop it and maintain positions to prepare the withdrawal by night. Next day, 14 August, the enemy had disappeared blowing up Saint Engrace's Bridge and St. Francis' convent. The defenders thought it was a Virgin's miracle.³⁷

Nothing as different to Napoleon's strategic and tactical manoeuvre war as the combats in Zaragoza whose resistance and defensive procedures were not known until the moment. During the first siege and taking into account the streets' configuration of the city, the Spaniards discovered the "barricade" easily defendable, to detain the superiority of French infantry and cavalry as a basic obstacle which not needed any particular tactical manoeuvre or instruction.³⁸ The tactical and psychological combat advantages of the French Army (mobility, artillery, etc.) disappeared with the tenacity of the tactical plan of the "zaragozanos" stocked among the ruins.

Women also participated widely in the defence (Agustina, Bureta's Countess, etc.) with some success, a frenetic popular defence sometimes undisciplined to the established authority, selecting some popular leaders.

In spite of the French superiority, Verdier had been defeated without controlling the geographical space. In a real tactical sense, the blockade of the city was not complete because the defenders always maintained a Northern weak communication with external forces. Lifting the siege was a major blow in the prestige and martial reputation the French Army, which softened the impact of Napoleon's initial success while the Spanish propaganda started to highlight the victory something embarrassing for the emperor.³⁹

³⁵ 13 battalions: 9 French and 4 Polish.

³⁶ Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, 42.

³⁷ Verdier destroyed a total of 54 guns, mortars and howitzers and marched westwards. Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, 42.

³⁸ Miguel Artola Gallego: "La Guerra de la Independencia" in *Historia de España. La España de Fernando VII.* (Madrid, Espasa Calpe. Ramón Menéndez Pidal, 1968), 108.

³⁹ Charles Esdaile in Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, 42.

OPERACION	DIA 08						DIA 09						DIA 10						DIA 11						DIA 12						DIA 13						DIA 14						DIA 15					
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Table 2: Zaragoza's First Siege's Time Chart

Second Siege

After Dupont's defeat in Bailén (July 1808), the strategic French situation in the Peninsulas was disturbed and Napoleon was obliged to directly intervene and took the personal decision to go to Spain. At the end November, winning in Somosierra, he entered Madrid in December almost simultaneously with Moore's retreat to La Coruña and opened the time for the second siege of Zaragoza. Before departing back to Paris at the end of the month, he sent out orders to Joseph to cope with the non-compliance of the Spaniards in the strictest terms. He thought again that, after the capital was taken and the armies beaten⁴⁰, the nation would submit.⁴¹ Zaragoza was an unfinished item which had been considerably delayed. General Castaños was again defeated in Tudela on 23 November and Lannes slowly advanced to Zaragoza with IIIrd and Vth Corps, a Cavalry Brigade and a siege's train (35,000 men). After the first battle, Palafox reached Zaragoza with more than 32,000 troops, supported by 15,000 armed civilians and 150 artillery cannons. He still had some time to rapidly fortify in deep the improvised fortifications of the weak city as much as possible (Colonel Sangenis) with the first siege's experience and collecting three months' supplies and provisions,⁴² arming the population and the closest areas reinforcements. Women and the clergy also supported their morale.

On 21 December the French were ready. Moncey dispatched a courier to Palafox on 22 December offering the capitulation but he again denied it.⁴³ After some assaults' attempts, on 30 December, they were opening the *parallels'* trenches for attacking external convents and to approach the city. Already in 10 January 1809, there were no groceries since some weeks and the soldiers were very weak. Dead were not buried. Gangrene and typhus' epidemics were spreading out; no medicines. Between Spaniards, military martial Courts have also to maintain the discipline with death penalties. Losses were considerable on both sides. The determination of the defenders was a bit undermined but Zaragoza's example was invaluable to the nation and Europe.

Lannes arrives to his command post on 22 January with Napoleon's orders to take Zaragoza by any means. The population suffered the effects of the siege but the defence was still in place until the French entrance from the East, the last phase, fighting house- to-house with underground mines. On 24

⁴⁰ In that moment, around 135,000 Spanish soldiers against 290,000 French, more than twice.

⁴¹ Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, 102.

⁴² See J. Belmas Zaragoza's description. J. V. BELMAS, *Journaux des sièges faits ou soutenus par les Français dans la péninsule de 1807 à 1814 / rédigés, d'après les ordres du gouvernement, sur les documents existant aux archives de la guerre et au dépôt des fortifications* (Chez Firmin Didot Frères, 1836-1837) II: 202.

⁴³ The terms of surrender were also truly rejected.

January, he sent out another message for capitulation and Palafox refused it again.⁴⁴ At the same time, Palafox addressed another *proclama* to the population asking for some more efforts of the different parishes to avoid the surrender.⁴⁵ On 28 January, the terrible bitter assault started reporting to Napoleon. Each building was as a fortress, flat-to-flat, room-to-room... Losses were huge by both parts.⁴⁶ The heroic final fanatic Zaragoza's resistance started on 29 January. The internal defence, by neighbourhoods, as the assaults using mines were something new (29 days of external attacks; 24, internal assaults).⁴⁷

On 13 February there were some desertions and signs of tiredness are shown by the defenders. Palafox got ill on 15 February and was replaced by the "Junta" starting negotiations. On 18 February, the situation was not sustainable being totally surrounded. The capitulation was on his way ending on 21 February.⁴⁸ Zaragoza's second siege had been a Palafox decision not accepting combat in open place, occupying the city. Operating methodical and carefully, replacing artillery fire and mining for infantry assaults, Lannes broke finally Palafox's fanatical (incompetent for someone?) resistance.⁴⁹ After two months' siege, they surrendered as the rest of the maintowns of Aragon without a big resistance.

Some historians think that this siege was not as meritorious as the "victorious" first one and characterized by a less popular and civilian nature mainly because the no so much active important participation of the civilians although the special circumstances for each one are maybe not totally taken into account.⁵⁰ Technically, as seen, the first one was not as siege in itself, just an imperfect blockade⁵¹ lifted by Bailen's victory.

In this second one, none of the dispersed Spanish armies were in condition to support the city and Zaragoza returned back to be the Spanish

⁴⁴ "Surrender? I don't know surrender; after dead, we will talk on it". The rest of his comrades said "Win or die, Life to Ferdinando, Life to Spain!" Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 351-352.

⁴⁵ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 439-440.

⁴⁶ French were 22,000 men in that moment.

⁴⁷ J. V. BELMAS, *Journaux des sièges faits ou soutenus par les Français dans la péninsule de 1807 à 1814...*, 215.

⁴⁸ Expressively described by General Lejeune, "... still with a proud feeling in their livid faces". Lannes also reflected some months later before dying in Essling if really this effort had been necessary...

⁴⁹ Esposito and Elting, *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars*, Map 91.

⁵⁰ Maybe this participation was not as important as in the first one during the external phase and they were reserving some energy for the next phase inside the city but, anyway, the efforts were more than important. Even that, the inner fight took 23 days in comparison with 10 days during the first siege, maintaining the fight until the last moments.

⁵¹ Priego, *Cómo fue la Guerra de la Independencia*, 330-332

resistance symbol. Local character was much over the war context. Trying to finish with the myth, a form of propaganda, they created maybe another bigger one. In this second part, there was a secret affective emotional law, the memorial honour.⁵²

Concerning possible Palafox's tactical errors,⁵³ he concentrated 40,000 defenders in a place which could be defended by just 25,000...⁵⁴ Military authorities of Zaragoza were convinced that locking up the troops in the city was harmful but nothing was done.⁵⁵ He didn't neither make any big scale sorties⁵⁶ nor took good profit of the three weeks' French delay. His conduct has been sometimes judged as controversial, but, anyway, he will always be morally attached to Zaragoza. As important psychological agent during both sieges, he wrote a lot of public proclamations, psychological actions to increase the morale and to counter indiscipline acts.⁵⁷ No unity among the Spanish commanders without a Supreme Commander also favored civilian disorders and indiscipline, which lacked some efficacy in the heroic resistance.

⁵² "The dead of the first siege called their alive counterparts of the second..." Gregorio Cayuela Fernández and José Ángel Gallego Palomares, *La guerra de la Independencia. Historia Bélica. Pueblo y nación en España 1808-1814* (Salamanca, Eds. Universidad, 2008), 195.

⁵³ Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War*, 141.

⁵⁴ The Spanish Reserve forces had been concentrated in Zaragoza included some other troops from Valencia and Murcia, a considerable force organized and relatively disciplined able even to operate in some tactical actions. This fact also feeds the controversy of the possibility to have made some exits to harass the enemy or not. Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 317-318.

⁵⁵ "Palafox was fluctuating and undecided": Agustín Alcaide Ibieta, *Historia de los dos Sitios que pusieron a Zaragoza en los años de 1808 y 1809 las tropas de Napoleón*. (Madrid: Imprenta de D.M. de Burgos, 1830 Facsimil, 2 vol., suplemento y erratas), II: 46.

⁵⁶ Oman qualifies Palafox of not being a very capable officer but not as a coward or a marionette of someone... although his personal influence with continuous harangues and proclamations was important for the population, maybe more typical for a patriot than for a military. He was able to link population and regular Army: Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War*, 142.

⁵⁷ "These speeches maybe higher quality than his military leadership". Ronald Fraser, *La maldita Guerra de España. Historia social de la Guerra de la Independencia 1808-1814* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006), 359.




Table 3: Zaragoza's Second Siege's Time Chart

Surrender - End

The impossible resistance left the city in ruins, completely destroyed and full of corpses. Around 54,000 losses (soldiers and civilians) were registered. Palafox, sick, proposed a three days' truce, denied by Lannes. He finally resigned giving the power to the Junta on possible negotiations for capitulation, controversial issue although most part of the population was in favour to surrender. On 20 February started the negotiation conditions and, after Lannes's agreement,⁵⁸ Zaragoza finally surrendered. Next day on 21 February, General Lejeune and the rest of the French Army were in formation to witness the exit with honours of the defenders. 8,000 people of the garrison were authorized to leave the city.⁵⁹ Defenders left out the city leaving their arms with or without uniforms by Portillo's Gate in the presence of Lannes.⁶⁰ Compassion and respect were seen in the faces of the French units. Palafox was imprisoned and conducted to Vincennes (France). On 22 February Lannes entered discreetly Zaragoza to attend a mass in the cathedral. The city surrendered but the war still went on.⁶¹ French troops stayed in Zaragoza until 1813 in Aljafería's Castle and the conditions of capitulation in general were accomplished with some particular exceptions.

Summary and Final Conclusions

As stated in my foreword, I try to focus not in the more military issues but mainly just on urban, social and populations' effects' conclusions. Sieges were a typical feature of the Independence War, maybe due to orographic reasons combined with the poor agriculture which didn't allow French mobility. This war also reflected the tendency to "total war" which characterized Napoleonic Wars and Zaragoza was the maximum example.⁶² As a strategic enclave, when Napoleon knew that Zaragoza has uprising, its conquest was a priority, a clear example of the improvisation and meditated calculation in the first moments of this War, allowing time to organize the Spanish resistance and defence. But Zaragoza's case was also special: During the first siege, no big defensive walls, scarce garrison and artillery men with a mixture between soldiers and armed civilians which stopped the French direct assaults; during the second one, building parallel trenches techniques and a mines' war also during the internal final house-to-house phase with new types

⁵⁸ He also was a bit obliged to end the terrible fight.

⁵⁹ At the capitulation, 21 flags and standards were also taken by the French (Invalides).

⁶⁰ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 505.

⁶¹ Lafoz, *Los Sitios. Zaragoza en la Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1809)*, 89.

⁶² José Herrero Vicente, "Vencedores y vencidos" in Serrano Montalvo (2008), *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza* (Zaragoza, 1958), 506. (also in *Revista de Historia Militar* n. 91).

of operations (barricades, fortification of houses by armed garrisons), a form of combat for which they were not prepared but rapidly adapted... the unique case of fighting so many days within the city, the unique big city sieged and the only place where convents were fortified in a modern way during the war.⁶³ As in the rest of Spain, in Zaragoza, the society was divided and fractured. It was an agrarian community, artisans and guilds with not too much power, some nobles and a powerful clergy, a prominent state in the Spanish XVIIIth century who influenced the conduct of the population.⁶⁴ Also they received some influence of the *Illustration* (“*les lumières*”), European (French) movement with different answers.⁶⁵ The “*Juntas*” joined the four classical arms of the society: Church, nobles, gentleman and university or council. Military and civilian authorities were in a controversial situation to follow the recommendations of the “*Supreme Junta*” accepting the invasion or uprising, but just few of them took the second option!

The defence of the city, after all, was a military mistake. Tactically, Palafox thought that the defence should be from and not outside the city, maybe still confident in external support. For Zaragoza’s population, the city in itself was a trench. The Spanish discover the value of the *barricade* to stop the French superiority. The tenacity of the defenders stuck to the ruins made the advance more difficult which facilitated the French failure in Zaragoza. The city, at the end capitulated by epidemics, an extreme example of the sieges during this Independence War. The capital itself became the international symbol of the popular resistance, a global resistance spirit.⁶⁶ The “*zaragozanos*” were ready to fight until dead because the fidelity to their homeland, to the Virgin and to their King. Without any doubt, the person of General Palafox was the soul of both sieges, inducing unexpected reactions because of his presence or words. He multiplied inventions and fortune solutions. Outside everything was destroyed but inside almost everything was collected for producing powder or protecting walls.⁶⁷ Sometimes criticised but always understood.⁶⁸ Maybe, also Napoleon was obsessed by discrediting him, but probably he also learned from the Zaragoza’s resistance.⁶⁹

⁶³ Escribano, *Los sitios en la Península Ibérica (1808-1814): Mucho más que mitos*, 224.

⁶⁴ Serrano, “El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades”, in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 56.

⁶⁵ Guillermo Pérez Sarrión, “Una sociedad dividida y fracturada” in Serrano, 51-52.

⁶⁶ Pedro Rújula, “El levantamiento popular de Zaragoza” in Serrano, 32.

⁶⁷ This was a marginal solution for small cities and not valid in big scenarios like Paris, Moscow or Saint Petersburg against modern motorized armies.

⁶⁸ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 510.

⁶⁹ Serrano, “El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades”, in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 208-209.

His principles for population as defence against tyranny, freedom and nation were combined with other more classical myths as religion, monarchy and tradition. People of Zaragoza were also stimulated not only by the Palafox's allocutions but also supported by the clergy. They were exercising a popular authority that someone has considered as part of the XIXth Century's revolutionary cycle in Aragon.⁷⁰ Rumours were also frequent and he tried to send papers and messages to the different nationalities of Napoleonic armies inviting them to desertion with false news on war in other fronts.⁷¹ Thousands of Spanish women took also an important active part in civilian resistance, particularly in the defence of the city. Most of them tended the wounded, cooked and brought forward ammunition or water, but others even took up arms beside the men. The individual episode of *Agustina* lifted the morale of the defenders and was the binder of many other anonymous individual actions.⁷² Monks were also deeply involved and convents were usually strongholds, improvised hospitals or ammunition stores.

On health and medical assistance, as capital of Aragon in 1808, Zaragoza had the most important healthy institutions of the time to warranty the assistance to the population⁷³ but nothing was prepared for the first siege or former combats, relapsing the assistance on the civilian centres of the city or on the spontaneous surgeons which finished to invent tactical procedures keeping as close as possible to the front.⁷⁴ No health specialist was part of the *Junta* which could have been useful. Nonetheless, after the first siege, some measures were taken in October 1808 as part of a militarization for the second siege (Health Commission): Small first aid kits in units, centralization of hospitals, health echelons and other improvised measures.⁷⁵ On the other side, the French bombing of hospitals was part of the psychologic war.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ Serrano, "El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades", in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 13.

⁷¹ Something similar was also repeated in Spanish Civil War in 1936 (Toledo).

⁷² Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 562-563: "*Las mujeres de Zaragoza, animadas así, se organizaron en compañías y se dividieron los distintos barrios de la ciudad que debían de defender*".

⁷³ Luis Alfonso Arcarazo García, "La Sanidad Militar Española a comienzos del siglo XIX. La organización de la asistencia médica durante los Sitios de Zaragoza (1808-1809)" in *Revista de Historia Militar* (Madrid, IHCM., nº extraordinario, 2009), 68-73.

⁷⁴ Arcarazo, "La Sanidad Militar Española a comienzos del siglo XIX. La organización de la asistencia médica durante los Sitios de Zaragoza (1808-1809)" in *Revista de Historia Militar* (2009), 47.

⁷⁵ Arcarazo, "La Sanidad Militar Española a comienzos del siglo XIX. La organización de la asistencia médica durante los Sitios de Zaragoza (1808-1809)" in *Revista de Historia Militar* (2009), 59-73.

⁷⁶ Just in one day, the assistance could reach 13,000 patients. Arcarazo: "La asistencia sanitaria en Los Sitios" in Serrano, "*El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades*", 37.

In another context, the war can be seen as part of a internal political Revolution (Spain and America) whose first phase was 1808-1814, giving to the Spanish liberalism a specific mythical model, the new 1812's Constitution, an emotional nationalism and a union between liberals and the Army, a special relation between “*militarism*” and “*civilism*”.⁷⁷

Our *Peninsular War* was one of the longest Napoleonic campaigns but military conquest cannot always give the political victory as it was the case.⁷⁸ Anyway, the war was a national catastrophe with a very negative impact in urban areas, completely devastated being rebuilt in the next years and century.⁷⁹ Casualties and victims were huge entailing a national and local social tragedy.

Finally, on the literature and arts' repercussions of these events, although the best praise for Zaragoza were the Lannes' words close to his death in Essling⁸⁰ and General Lejeune's, an historic and epic event like these sieges had a lot of influence in literature, theatre, poetry and opera or music (folklore), painting and cinema: Goya (notary of horror), Galdós, Richard Ford (counter vision), Locke, Ticknor, Byron, Hugo, Jardiel, Chomón or, even, Marshal Lannes or General Lejeune⁸¹ themselves as witnesses of the events for the future.

130 years are the separation between the end of Napoleonic Wars and WWII, a period of changes earmarked by some continuity elements. With the Napoleonic manoeuver and mobility, siege's war seems to be ended although still in WWI enormous defensive lines were created (Maginot), even in WWII (Atlantic Wall) considering cities as fortifications. In Zaragoza, Palafox

⁷⁷ Maybe one of the conclusions of the war, will be the military pretension of holding power, as depositaries of the national will in a new counter-revolutionary phase, deeply studied later by Professor Seco Serrano.

⁷⁸ David Chandler, *Las campañas de Napoleón. Un emperador en el campo de batalla. De Tolón a Waterloo (1796-1815)* (Madrid, La Esfera de los libros, 2005), 702.

⁷⁹ Nonetheless, curiously, at the end, the French presence also produced a change of character in the life of the city of Zaragoza. Suchet, military, cultivated and good leader, was the highest French authority in Zaragoza and his most important goal was to normalize the life in the city. During the next five years, the life of the population was under the influence of the Empire. In 1813, in silence, all French left exploding the main bridge, with the exception of 400, some still injured in hospitals. Rújula, *La Zaragoza francesa (1809-1813)* in Serrano “El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades”, in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 236.

⁸⁰ Gómez de Arceche y Moro, Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814, II: 513-514. “¡Qué guerra! ¡Qué hombres! Un sitio a cada calle; una mina bajo cada casa. ¡Verse obligado a matar a tantos valientes, o mejor, a tantos furiosos! Aquella guerra es horrible: se lo he escrito al Emperador; la victoria da pena”.

⁸¹ Serrano, “El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades”, in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 245-278.

showed a big merit and determination as General Lannes writes in his letters,⁸² something that also will take place later on in 1936 during the Spanish Civil War (Toledo's Alcazar) and similar epic conducts in other sieges.


Today, cities have proliferated with a lot of consequences in the evolution and preparation of war. 53% of the population lives in cities, normally big cities, which seem to indicate that war in the future, will happen mainly in these areas, not so much at the open country. The same nature of the city has changed and war is becoming more and more "civilian"... If true, our obligation will be to define adequate State security and defence's policies adapted to these new situations.⁸³ But cities are always dangerous and suppose a lot of risks. No nation is completely able to totally protect its own cities. Soldiers hate mortal urban combat where everything is more "civilian". Tomorrow, peace should be urban, if not, cities still will be objectives to attack and to defend, a contradiction.

⁸² "Never Sire, I had seen so much endeavour in the enemy to defend a city. I have seen women come to die in the wall. Sire it's a war that provokes horror..."


⁸³ Dufour, *La guerre, la vie et le soldat*, 10.

Appendices


Appendix 1: Europe 1808



Appendix 2: Peninsula's Invasion & Deployment




Appendix 3: Zaragoza's 1st Siege (Oman)⁸⁴



⁸⁴ OMAN, Charles. *A history of the Peninsular War*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Vol. I, 1902), 160.

Appendix 4: Zaragoza's 2nd Siege (Oman)⁸⁵



⁸⁵ OMAN, Charles. *A history of the Peninsular War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Vol. II, 1902), 135

A CITY UNDER SIEGE: BUCHAREST DURING THE 1848 REVOLUTION AND CRIMEAN WAR 1853-1856

Amb. Dr. Dumitru PREDA (Romania)

Introduction

The European XIXth century is characterized by the struggle in the South-East of the continent, including the Balkan Peninsula, between the six Great Powers of the time, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Habsburg Empire, France, Great Britain, and later Germany.

At the mid-XIXth century, the Romanian area looked like this: two principalities Țara Românească (Wallachia) and Moldova – the Danubian Principalities – were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire; other provinces were under foreign occupation for a longer or shorter time: Dobrogea (from the XVth century under the Ottomans), Transylvania (from the end of XVIIth century under the Habsburgs), Bucovina (northern Moldova, since 1775 under the same Habsburgs) and Bessarabia-Moldova between Prut and Nistru rivers (since 1812 under the Russian Empire).¹ Although divided and often suffering the interference, control and military occupations of the Imperial Powers, the geo-political reality highlights the (partial) preservation of Romanian statehood. This would favour the effort of national reawakening and the gradual winning of the Romanian unity and independence in the following decades. From the end of XVIIIth century and the first half of XIXth century, we assist at an international revival of the “Oriental Question” connected to an increasing struggle of the Balkan peoples for emancipation and national liberation. But a State without independence, always on a

¹ Academia Română [Romanian Academy], *Istoria Românilor* [The Romanian History], vol. VII/I, coord. Dan Berindei, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2003, passim; Keith Hitchins, *The Romanians, 1774-1866*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996; Neagu Djuvara, *Între Orient și Occident. Țările Române la începutul epocii moderne* [Between East and West. The Romanian countries at the beginning of the modern era] (1800-1848), Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 1995. See also Leonid Boicu, *Geneza „chestiunii române” ca problemă internațională* [The Genesis of the “Romanian question” as an International Issue], Editura Junimea, Iași, 1975; Gheorghe Platon, *Istoria modernă a României* [The Modern History of Romania], Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1985; Idem, Gheorghe Platon, *Românii în veacul construcției naționale* [Romanians in the age of national building], Bucharest, 2005; *Istoria militară a poporului român* [The Military History of the Romanian People], vol. IV, Editura Militară, Bucharest 1987. All these books have extensive bibliographies.

threatening (Ottoman) suzerainty and a dangerous (Russian) protectorate, was like a bird without wings, capable of an effort, but which cannot advance towards the sky.

A main feature characterizes the entire period: War is seen as a normal recourse in this fierce competition when the means of a very active and subtle diplomacy did not achieve the achievement of the proposed objective.




In my intervention, I will talk only about Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia, a city under siege, in the period 1848-1856, from the Revolution that found its last European bastion here to the complex events surrounding the Crimean War. Its path towards modern development and affirmation as an important European center experienced a decisive turning point in those years.

I. Essential Coordinates of Bucharest: Officially documented in 1459, although notes about a certain fortress are earlier, temporarily the princely residence, it becomes the capital of Wallachia in 1661. A little town, initially, crossed by a small river Dîmbovița, located in the South-East of the country, in the Romanian Plain, Bucharest has developed gradually, coagulating the surrounding villages around the old historical center. Numerous churches, larger fortified inns were built; also, it appears the first road paved with wooden beams, the Mogoșoaia Bridge (1692), later renamed Calea Victoriei in 1878, after the 1877-1878 War. In 1786 our City was surrounded by defensive walls. And the foreign visitors mentioned that

Bucharest had about 50,000 inhabitants, 360 Greek (Orthodox) churches, one Catholic and one Lutheran. Later, in his book published in 1839 (*Coup d'œil sur la Valachie et la Moldavie*) the French Raoul Perrin says that it had 1,500 streets and 130,000 inhabitants. Ten years later there were 160,000 registered.

The majority of foreign travellers who arrived these times in Wallachia perceived a picturesque city, full of colour, but mud and disorder.² A curious city, closer to the Eastern ones but with a certain flavour that was missing from both South-East European and Ottoman-Turkish cities. We cite: “*Bucharest is a special city that does not resemble any of our European capitals, aligned and with a uniformity that makes the artist despair. The long and winding streets, like Italian streets, refuse any law of harmony*”. A city of contrasts! The streets are paved with wooden beams ... Nearby in the center of the city there are numerous rows of open shops, Turkish-style bazaars that are protected from the midday sun by a wooden eaves ... The houses are arranged around the Royal Court and the Metropolis, in artisan-merchant districts (mahala).



Bucharest, as all Romanian provinces, was affected during the XVIIIth century and beginning of the XIXth century by the Russian-Austrian-Ottoman wars of 1716-1718, 1736-1739; 1768-1774; 1787-1791/1792; 1806-1812, mainly material and human destruction, but also territorial seizures from the Romanian territory, with a deep impact on the morale and population's

² See *Călători străini despre Țările Române în secolul al XIX-lea/Foreign Travellers about the Romanian Countries in the XIXth Century*. Serie nouă/New Series, coord. Daniela Bușă, vol. V, VI, Editura Academiei Române, București, 2009, 2010, passim.

mentality (we read: “a country completely stripped, desolate, looted and burned”). But also, the City-Capital was touched by natural disasters (earthquakes, floods), fires (as the biggest of 1847) and epidemics (plague), that bring great damages.³



Bucharest, Capital of Wallachia



³ George Potra, *Bucureștii văzuți de călători străini* [Bucharest seen by foreign travellers, the XVI-XIX c.], București, 1992; Cf. N. Iorga, *Istoria românilor prin călători* [The History of Romanians through travellers], Bucharest, 1981, *passim*.

II. Regarding the title of my paper, I would like to clarify from the beginning: It is not a question of a classic siege, but of a state of siege suffered by the inhabitants and authorities under the pressure of foreign invasions and occupations, a state with many and various consequences for the city and for the entire Romanian space. In this regard, there are many testimonies that attest fears and reactions of both high classes and humble beds of the Capital's population. The frequent invasions of foreign troops in almost all the country, as reported by several witnesses, produced especially in the towns close to the Danube, as Bucharest, caused their inhabitants to leave the city, taking with them all they could and fleeing wherever they could, fleeing in terror to the mountains and forests; when they returned to their houses found nothing left of them, everything had been plundered, burnt, destroyed.

The period chosen for my study is one dense in military events and confrontations, with special consequences for everyday life, but also lasting for the geopolitical map of the European continent.

It is important to complete with a main trait of the entire XIXth century: The priority goals of St. Petersburg's policy – characterized by pragmatic realism, which will sacrifice even Slavic and Orthodox interests of those who constituted its reserves in the enemy camps, were constantly the reduction of the preponderance of the Ottoman Porte through a double diplomatic and direct military action, encouraging the liberation struggle of the Christian peoples under Ottoman domination. Having already become a member of the concert of European Powers till the end of the 18th century, the Third Rome would be for a period of more than a hundred years an arbiter of peace and war in the South-East and also on the continent.

On the other hand, the suzerain Sultans Empire prolonged its inevitable and profound crisis which obviously manifested itself on the military level, despite some successes, thanks above all to the support of Great Britain and France, interested to reduce the expansion of Europe's new *gendarme*.⁴

⁴ James J. Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878*, Stuttgart, 2000, passim.



III. The Revolution of 1848 represented a landmark moment for the city and Romania's history.⁵ The complex events that overcame the European continent were not the cause, but only the opportunity (Nicolae Bălcescu⁶) for the Romanians to assert their desire for freedom and justice, their aspiration for union and independence. Aspiration that the frequent interventions of the neighboring empires could not stop.

Bucharest would be the center of the movement in Wallachia. On June 11, 1848, its citizens took to the streets. „Domnitorul” (Ruler) Gheorghe Bibescu, knowing that he does not have the support of the army (*during the morning all the officers had come to him showing that they will defend the country from enemies, but they will not shed Romanian blood*), signed the “Islaz⁷ Proclamation” (the new Constitution), recognizing the provisional revolutionary government and its program adopted on June 9. After this act, the Ruler abdicates, leaves the Capital and retires to Transylvania.

⁵ Dan Berindei, *Revoluția Română din 1848. Considerații și reflecții* [The Romanian Revolution of 1848. Considerations and reflections], Fundația Culturală Română, Cluj-Napoca, 1997. Cf. Gheorghe Platon, *Geneza Revoluției Române de la 1848* [The Genesis of the Romanian Revolution of 1848], Junimea, Iași, 1980. I would like to point out that the issue of the 1848-49 Romanian Revolution is currently, in our country, into a complex process of investigating new sources, re-evaluating and deepening the events.

⁶ Nicolae Bălcescu (1819-1852), ideologue and leader of the Romanian Revolution.

⁷ *Islaz* = a little town in Romanați county (today Teleorman county).

Bucharest is becoming the seat of the Revolutionary Government and June 15, on Filaret Field (then called *Freedom Field*), about 30,000 people attend the taking oath of the leaders. A day before, the new government issues the first decrees: the establishment of the national flag with the motto “justice, brotherhood”, the civil (noble) ranks are abolished, the only difference being “that of virtues and services for the homeland”. Censorship is abolished, every Romanian having “the right to speak, write and print freely on all things”. The national guard is founded. The death penalty, “is prohibited. On June 16, all political prisoners are released.



After the Russian Consul is leaving the town, the conservative forces spread the rumour that the Russian imperial army had entered the country. The Revolutionary Government retreated to Târgoviște on June 28. But the popular desire in favour of the revolution brought him back to Bucharest.⁸

Russia, the Protecting Power, wanting to maintain its authoritarian control over Wallachia, asks the Porte to restore “order”. Suleyman Pasha, the Sultan’s brother-in-law, is sent to inform himself on the spot and take the necessary measures. Warmly received by the Government and the population, Suleyman is content to appoint instead of the provisional government a “Lordly Lieutenancy”; on July 29, 1848, the Ottoman Porte recognized it as legitimate, and the „Constitution” amended (with minor changes). But, under the pressure of Russia, accusing the Romanians of their aspirations for

⁸ See also *1848 la Români: o istorie în date și mărturii* [1848 to the Romanians: A History in Data and Testimonies], vols. 1-2, ed. Cornelia Bodea, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1982.

freedom and unity, and after the intervention of some reactionary elements (boyars), soon the Sublime Porte will refuse to confirm this recognition. More, they succeed to replace Suleyman Pasha with Fuad Pasha. As many analyses have pointed out, decisive for this change was the Ottoman Empire's conviction that Great Britain and France did not want to provide it with military support in a possible conflict with Russia.



On September 13/25, the Ottoman troops, structured on three columns (about 20,000 troops), proceed towards Bucharest. It was no possible armed resistance at the border, and either the Corps of thousands of volunteers and pandours, gathered at Râmnicu Vâlcea, did not go into action. The Ottomans arrested representatives of the Romanian Authorities, then they moved, step by step, to the occupation of Bucharest. Missing arms and leaders, men and women, young and old tried in vain to prevent the advance of the Ottoman units with cavalry and using bayonets and rifles. Hundreds of people were trampled by horses' hooves or fell to pieces by bullets and bayonets. Their brave resistance at Cotroceni hill was followed by the heroic battle engaged by the military garrison of the Capital with the third Ottoman column, led by Kerim Pasha, coming towards the barracks in Dealul Spirii garrison.



September 13/25, 1848, the Dealu Spirii Battle: The Ottoman troops violently attack the fire company that puts up strong resistance and breaks through the enemy lines and manages to continue the fight alongside the soldiers in the *Alexandria* Barracks on the Hill of Spirii.⁹ After a fierce battle that lasted approximately two and a half hours, the Romanian troops were dispersed. The Revolution is defeated, the Ottoman troops seize the city.

After the Russian troops entered Wallachia, on September 15/27, occupying the eastern region of the province, on September 20/October 2, around 7,000 Russian soldiers also come into Bucharest. A period of double Russian and Ottoman occupation begins that will last until April 1851. After an agreement signed between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, known in historiography as the Balta-Liman Convention, signed on May 1, 1849,¹⁰ the Romanian Danubian Principalities were reconfirmed as states identities under Ottoman suzerainty, but under tsarist protectorate (established next the Adrianople Peace, by an Organic Regulation in 1831). A persistently tense situation, affecting all classes and categories of the population. The last military occupations and the consequences of the repeated wars carried out in the first part of the XIXth century brutally affected the life and social-economic development of their inhabitants. Bucharest was directly under the impact of the foreign troops' requisitions and repressions. The testimonies of those years highlight many and several contributions to which they were exposed and at the same time the efforts to improve the institutional situation of the country.

IV. The Crimean War 1853-1856, considered to have been one of the last religious wars on the continent, began in July 1853 with the Romanian Danubian Principalities' occupation once again by the Russian troops.

A new period of foreign military occupations begins for Bucharest: Russian – from the summer of 1853 to July 1854, Ottoman – July 1854 to August 1854, and Austrian – 1854 to 1856. In his book *Roumania: the border*

⁹ C. Căzănișteanu, M. Cucu, E. Popescu, *Aspecte militare ale Revoluției din 1848 în Țara Românească* [Military aspects of the 1848 Revolution in Wallachia], Editura Militară, Bucharest, 1969; see also *Documente privind istoria militară a poporului român, ianuarie 1848-decembrie 1856* [Documents regarding the Military History of the Romanian People, January 1848-December 1856], Editura Militară, Bucharest, 1986, passim.

¹⁰ The Convention among others stipulated: a) the both Princes (Heads of Wallachia and Moldova Principalities) were appointed by the Sultan for a term of seven years, with the consent of Russia; the principle of life reign and the principle of electing the ruler by the country was cancelling; b) the Public Assemblies were replacing with legislative Divans (*ad-hoc Divans*), with a limited number of boyars appointed by the Prince; c) the appointment of extraordinary Ottoman and Russian commissioners to advise and ensure internal order; the restructuring of the land army was also stipulated; d) the stationing of Russian-Ottoman occupation troops in the two Principalities to repress any insurrectionary movement (25,000 soldiers on each side, later reduced to 10,000 on each side).

land of the Christian and the Turk (New York, 1858) the American military doctor surgeon James Oscar Noyes (1829-1872), attached to Omer-Pacha forces, on the way to Bucharest, impressed by the traces left by the battles and the retreat of the Russian forces, writes:

“Everywhere I saw the evidences of cruel war. We were obliged to ford the river, as the Russians in their hasty retreat, had destroyed the bridges. Deserted villages and dwellings burned to the earth, cornfields and vineyards trampled to the ground, whole districts uninhabited save by wolfish dogs and flocks of carnivorous birds still feasting upon the carcasses of horses and of men exhumed from their shallow graves – these were among the blessing left by Cossack hordes of the Czar to a land that otherwise would have smiled with peace and plenty”.¹¹



The Habsburg Command of the occupation troops in Bucharest
(Photo: Ludwig Angerer, 1856)

The new double Austrian-Ottoman occupation was as damaging for the Romanians as the Russian one, being marked by other abuses and brutalities towards the population, which led to an obvious tightening of living conditions and new tense situations. Despite these privations and painful trials, under the leadership of brave leaders, the national emancipation movement would advance.¹²

¹¹ James O. Noyes, *Roumania. The Border Land of the Christian and the Turk, comprising adventures of travel in Eastern Europe and Western Asia*, New York, 1858, p. 112-113.

¹² See the classic contribution of Leonid Boicu, *Diplomația europeană și cauza română* [European Diplomacy and the Romanian Cause] 1856-1859, Junimea, Iași, 1978; cf. Gheorghe

The Vienna negotiations (1855) and the Treaty of Paris (1856), which put an end to this great international conflict, will mark important steps for the destiny of the Romanian Countries, on their international status: recognizing the importance of the “Romanian Question” and the wide autonomy of the Danubian Principalities, they were placed on the European collective guarantee, granting the restitution of southern Bessarabia as well (annexed by Russia in 1812).

Conclusion

The “Romanian Question” becomes in the middle of the XIXth century a matter of European interest and the presence of the Romanian military factor will be more and more considered on the continental (échiquier) chessboard, the campaign of 1877-1878 demonstrating its indisputable value. Bucharest became a real European Capital and in 1913 Romania will host the negotiations for the Peace in Balkans (The Bucharest Peace Treaty)

Cliveti, *România și Puterile Garante* [Romania and the Guarantee Powers], 1856-1878, Junimea, Iași, 1988.

URBAN WARFARE IN A VILLAGE: THEORY, COURSE AND LEGACY OF THE BATTLE OF BAZEILLES OF 1870

Lt. Col. Dr. Heiner BRÖCKERMANN (Germany)

Introduction

The “Command and Control of Land Forces” military regulation, which was revised in 2022, has been a required reading for line and general staff officers of the army for nearly a hundred years. The regulation contains the traditional German command and control philosophy and associated command and control principles. Urban warfare is still a relatively new topic. In the German language, the term “urban warfare” has many equivalents: *Orts- und Häuserkampf* (combat in built-up areas), *Straßenkampf* (street battle), *Ortsgefecht* (urban engagement) or *Stadtkampf* (urban combat). From today’s perspective, it seems astonishing that German armies before World War I considered urban warfare a rather negligible type of warfare.¹ In addition, even then the sub-concepts of the topic from individual houses to large cities, mixed with operational principles, support requirements, commitment of forces and command echelons. Hybrid wars, digitalisation and cross-dimensional conduct of operations make it absolutely necessary today to take a look at the aspects of urban warfare. War takes place where people live and in regions that are important to people. It is assumed that in the future urban areas will become even more important to warfare.

The classic example of urban warfare in the armies of the German Empire before World War I dates back to the Franco-German War of 1870/71. It was the brutal episode of the fighting at Bazeilles during the Battle of Sedan. And what the “Command and Control of Land Forces” regulations describe today also had been the challenge in the fighting for built-up areas back then:

“Urban areas force commanders and troops to operate within a short period of time or even in parallel with different and varying intensities, and in different types of operations, if necessary. The often unpredictable behaviour of the population and the resulting rapid changes in the situation solidify complexity and dynamics. Mission-type command and control and freedom in mission accomplishment

¹ Adrian E. Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2014), 26-31.

are particular characteristics of the conduct of operations in urban areas. The lowest tactical levels are often the mainstay of combat in urban operations”.²

Typical aspects of the battle for built-up areas are: the employment of small combat units, the hampering troop movements, the dominance of close combat and the high probability of civilians influencing one’s own warfare in different ways, right up to active resistance. Plans must provide for limited command and control and restricted communication as well as for an urban battlefield that changes unpredictably as a result of destructions. The structural possibilities offered by a built-up area can grant inferior defenders temporary superiority. On the whole, combat in built-up areas is seen as an immense effort in terms of personnel and material with the risk of high losses and moral attrition among both the attacker and the defender.³

Combat in small localities or villages is usually done with small units and subunits only. Ordinarily, this refers only to problems of tactical command and control but not military operations. In the Franco-German War of 1870/71, however, a small village gained notoriety: Bazeilles. It is located on the outskirts of the town of Sedan, and in 1870 the vicinity of the fortress of Sedan was the reason for the importance of the village for coherence in the conduct of operations within the framework of a decisive battle of the war. And while Sedan became the symbol of the defeat of the French Empire and the reason for a German national holiday, Bazeilles became the symbol of the French will to resist and of a brutal German or Bavarian war furore. Although France was a “military loser”, the example of Bazeilles made them feel as “moral victor”.⁴

The Short History of Urban Warfare

The German history of urban warfare in modern military history is rather short. For Friderician Prussia, the decision needed to be sought in the open field. In the 18th century, built-up areas were considered unsuitable for the conduct of operations and were therefore avoided. If anything, light or free infantry battalions were considered suitable for a forced fight in built-up areas. On the other hand, battle orders were occasionally placed adjacent to built-up areas because as quasi blank space in the conduct of operations they were regarded as secure pillars of the vulnerable flanks. Even as early as in the 18th

² Kommando Heer, *Truppenführung. C1-160/0-1001*, (Strausberg: Bundeswehr, 2022), (16029) 133.

³ Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 29-30. In his list, Weinstein refers to the research done by Gregory John Ashford on cities in war.

⁴ Karine Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat. The War of 1870–71 in French Memory*, (Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 18, 174.

century, the military intended to torch buildings to further increase the obstacle effect of built-up areas.⁵

In the Napoleonic wars, the alleged protective character of built-up areas was used, for instance, to remove reserves in the rear from enemy fire. Battles with built-up areas were also regarded as a possibility to contain enemy forces that would not be available in the decisive battle. These were usually battles that used above all the outskirts of built-up areas. Built-up areas could also serve as a kind of brake for the assault wave. With well-defended individual farms and villages, as could be observed in the Battle of Waterloo near Hougoumont, La Haye Saint and Plancenoit in 1815, troops had contained considerable superior forces. The battles of the Wars of Liberation also show how the battle for built-up areas could virtually “swallow” larger formations, for example at Großgörschen/Lützen and Leipzig in 1813 as well as at Ligny in 1815.⁶

The industrialization and the development of the artillery caused the concepts of towns as fortified squares change towards considerations to fortify the town itself and larger buildings and installations for defence where the original fortification belts had fallen victim to town expansions. At the same time, modern infantry armament had given the defenders of built-up areas more advantages in terms of ranges and firepower. This is exemplified in the defence position of a bowling alley in a vanguard engagement near Frohnhofen in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. There, the Prussian losses of 65 troops were opposed to the loss of about 700 men in the attacking Hessian brigade. In the Franco-German war, too, combat in built-up areas was already a much-noticed aspect of the first battles of Wissembourg, Woerth and St. Privat. An engineer company had been assigned to the divisions to prepare built-up areas for the defence, and individual soldiers in the infantry battalions were to receive special training for this purpose.⁷ The analysis of the Franco-German War of 1870/71 was intended to contribute to the further development of doctrinal ideas about fighting in built-up areas in the German armies. Colonel Friedrich Immanuel (1857-1939) was one of the leading military writers in this respect who discussed this topic several times in comparisons.⁸

⁵ Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 35; Friedrich Immanuel, “Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften. Kriegstechnische Betrachtungen aus der neuesten Kriegsgeschichte,” *Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift*, no. 7, 8 (1916), 149.

⁶ Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 35-36; Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 150-152.

⁷ Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 37-38; Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 152-153.

⁸ Friedrich Immanuel became an officer in the Prussian infantry in 1879. A general staff officer since 1904, he was retired as colonel in 1919. During his term of service, Immanuel had been

For Immanuel, the fighting in and around Bazeilles in 1870 as part of the Battle of Sedan was a classic example of addressing fighting in built-up areas. At the same time, in the run-up to World War I, it was assumed that in consequence of the development of artillery the defence of a built-up area was doomed from the outset and could therefore be disregarded. However, if it needed to be taken into account than it was a task primarily for the engineer corps to deal with. Even during terrain exercises, built-up areas were usually disregarded. After all, by that time the experiences of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War had also been included in the analysis of combat in built-up areas. The significance of indirect artillery fire and the future value of built-up areas in the defence remained a matter of controversy. The Prussian Drill Regulations for the Infantry of 1906, therefore, contained only a few sentences on the topic in paragraph 434: “Massive, tenaciously defended built-up areas can become focal points of the battle. But one should take care not to accumulate too many assets in the built-up area itself.” And the experiences of the attackers and defenders in the battles of 1870/71 were summarised in regulations in similar length in paragraphs 436 to 438:

“If the enemy enters the built-up area, every section, every farmstead shall be defended. The reserves shall expel the hostile intruder with melee weapons. Expediently, the attacker will have stronger elements advance on the flanks of the built-up area from the outset. The artillery shall prepare the assault thoroughly; indirect fire is desired. Once the outskirts of the built-up area are taken, the intruding detachments seek to follow hard on the heels of the enemy and to use their melee weapons to push their ways through to the other side. They also need to work their way forward outside the streets through gardens and farms. Smaller elements shall be left out to seize the farmsteads that are still held by the enemy”.⁹

Paragraphs 74 to 76 of the Regulation on Field Fortifications were also dedicated to the defence of a built-up area:

“Key points are intended to prevent the hostile intruder from advancing further and to facilitate the recapture of the village. For this purpose, the defender selects fixed buildings or farmsteads in open places and road junctions and strongly fortifies them. A second line

an instructor at the War Academy and a regiment commander in World War I, among other things. He became known, however, as a military writer and editor of many specialist books. In addition, 44 articles in military journals were identified as having been written by him; Christian Haller. “Fachautoren in Militärzeitschriften der Weimarer Republik,” *Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte*, no. 14 (2012): 126.

⁹ Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 145-147, 160, citations on 145 and 160; Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 45.

of defence in the interior can only be considered where wide roads, open squares or creeks cut through the village, in parallel to the defence front. They are set up in a similar way to that of the boundary with numerous passages being left open. Where a minority is exposed to surprise attacks or is expected to mount continuous resistance, it may be advisable to place the defence into fixed buildings rather than on the outskirts. The defence capability of the latter must then be brought to the highest possible level so that the battle can be continued even in the event of a full envelopment.¹⁰

It was only in consequence of World War I that definitions were developed later in the Wehrmacht which slowly approach what is currently understood by the term “urban warfare”. The army manual *Heeresdruckvorschrift 300* describes the “urban engagement” as follows:

“Fighting for built-up areas happens frequently in battle, and it can shape the battle in densely populated areas. The importance of built-up areas in a battle depends on their location in the terrain as well as on their architecture and size. Connected groups of buildings, such as extensive industrial and mining facilities, are equally important as built-up areas. Towns and cities can also become combat areas.¹¹

Bazeilles 1870

Bazeilles with its stone buildings, the surrounding gardens and parks, including hedges and walls, as well as the small river Givonne was suitable for defence. The chateaus of Dorival and Monvillers were large buildings on the outskirts of the village, and Villa Beurmann was located on a fork in the centre of the village and offered excellent capabilities for action along the main street of Bazeilles. The Givonne river, in addition to hedges and walls, channelled the movements of the troops in the park of Monvillers. Bazeilles was located on the route from the German crossings over the Meuse toward the fortress of Sedan, and as a built-up area it channelled the troop movements to either bypass the village or move through its centre on the connecting road. On the far side of the village, there were the villages of Balan and La Moncelle.¹²

¹⁰ Quoted in *Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906. Kriegsgeschichtlich erläutert*, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1907), 219.

¹¹ *H.Dv. 300. Truppenführung* (225), citation in Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 28.

¹² Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 158; Freytag-Loringhoven, *Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906*, 220.

Général de Division Barthélémy Lebrun was in command of the French 12th Corps near Bazeilles, and since 1869 he had also been aide to Emperor Napoleon III. Lebrun described the battle in his memoirs. The 2nd French Infantry Division of Général de Division Lacretelle took up positions at La Moncelle. Behind them, east of Sedan there was the 1st French Infantry Division of Général de Division Granchamp. The newly formed “Blue Division” of the Marine Infantry (3e Division de Marche de l’Infanterie) of Général de Division Élie de Vassoigne was tasked with the defence of Bazeilles. The Marine Infantry Brigade of Brigadier General Charles Martin des Pallières was employed on site, and the 1st Marine Infantry Brigade of Brigadier General François Reboul was initially deployed west of Bazeilles near Balan with five artillery batteries. Martin de Pallières was wounded on 31 August. In the morning of 1 September, Reboul assumed battle command in the north of Bazeilles as well as between Bazeilles and Balan. The French had focussed their defence primarily on the main road in the village of Bazeilles and on the Villa Beurmann there, and had not intended to mount an all-round defence. In addition, barricades had been set up in the village.¹³

Two Bavarian corps, including the 1st Bavarian Army Corps of General of the Infantry von der Tann, were subordinate to the Commanding General of the German Third Army, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm. On 28 August, the Crown Prince had already committed his experiences and views on civilians who participated in battle in an irregular manner to his diary. According to this entry, at the time the German troops were already “maliciously” and “cowardly” ambushed by individuals. Countermeasures were to include torching of houses from which shots are fired, taking of civilian hostages or demanding contributions. For the day of Battle of Sedan, the Crown Prince had ordered the First Bavarian Army Corps to “detain the enemy and cooperate with the Army of the Meuse” without further specification.¹⁴

Originally, the fights surrounding Bazeilles are an example of the problems in war, here they mean “incompetence and confusion”. At first, French Marshal Patrice de MacMahon had emphasised the significance of the

¹³ Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 159; Friedrich Immanuel, *Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele zur Taktik der neuesten Zeit. 1870-1913. Eine Erläuterung der heutigen Grundsätze für Heer- und Truppenführung*, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1914), 124-126; *Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870-71: Redigiert von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des Großen Generalstabes. Erster Theil. Geschichte des Krieges bis zum Sturz des Kaiserreichs. Zweiter Band. Von der Schlacht bei Gravelotte bis zum Sturz des Kaiserreichs*, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1875), 1144.

¹⁴ Mark R. Stoneman, “The Bavarian Army and French Civilians in the War of 1870–1871: A Cultural Interpretation,” *War in History* 8, no. 3 (2001): 274; *Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870-71*, 1147.

place by issuing a stand-fast order to the 12th Corps of Général Lebruns. The village was to be retained, and maybe there would be a chance to break through and attack in south-eastern direction toward Mouzon. The envelopment attack of the Germans put the significance of Bazeilles into perspective. Moreover, it was not yet clear whether the French army would be able to withdraw in the north to Mézières. At around 7.00 a.m. Marshal MacMahon was wounded about 1000 meters north of Bazeilles. General Auguste-Alexander Ducrot, who had been appointed commander-in-chief by MacMahon, gave order to withdraw from Bazeilles to the northeast in the direction of Mézières over Lebrun's objections. That withdrawal, which was difficult to organise in terms of space and time, began in Bazeilles at 8.30 am. The marine infantry withdrew to Balan. However, the order did not reach all soldiers. And at 8.30 a.m., General Emanuel Félix de Wimpffen also had taken over the supreme order and stopped the initiated withdrawal. He evaluated the 12th Corps in its positions well and planned to break out towards Carignan in south-eastern direction. In Bazeilles itself, the urban engagement was conducted as a battle in the battle. In the end, between 150 and 200 marine infantrymen remained in Bazeilles, including some 60 soldiers in what would be called *Maison de la dernière cartouche* at the northern end of the main street. Other sources mention 120 soldiers at times at the house. 35 of them died before the ammunition was fired, and Major Lambert and his troops surrendered to the Bavarians under Captain Friedrich Lissignolo. For his bravery, he was allowed to keep his sword.¹⁵ But how had the day begun on the Bavarian side?

On 1 September 1870, the 1st Bavarian Army Corps attacked with some 40,000 soldiers at around 4.30 a.m. without prior reconnaissance. In the course of the day, they expected to connect with the Army of the Meuse under the command of Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, which attacked Sedan on the right side of the Meuse. Initially, fog facilitated the approach but also prevented artillery support. The French had failed to blow up the nearby railway bridge over the Meuse. The Bavarians had held the bridge the day before. There, elements of the 2nd Bavarian Brigade attacked together with Royal Bavarian 2nd Infantry Regiment "Crown Prince" the from the west across the Meuse. In the course of the day, the 3rd Bavarian Infantry Brigade intervened in the battle at the park of Montvillers and occupied La Moncelle. Finally, elements of the 4th Bavarian Infantry Brigade were to be set in motion to Bazeilles across the bridges. The marine infantry had moved into Bazeilles for defence. However, the population had not left the village completely, and

¹⁵ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 165-166; Joseph Lebrun, *Bazeilles-Sedan: Par le général Lebrun. Avec deux Cartes*, 5th Edition, (Paris: E. Dentu, 1884), 100-111, 121; Emmanuel Felix de Wimpffen, *Sedan*, (Paris: Librairie internationale, 1871), 168, 294.

in some cases, they provided support for their own soldiers and even mounted a joint defence.¹⁶

A private soldier of the Royal Bavarian Infantry Lifeguards Regiment, Florian Kühnhauser, described the battle in his memoirs a quarter of a century later. As part of the 1st Bavarian Infantry Brigade, his regiment crossed the Meuse on a pontoon bridge near Allicourt and attacked with a battalion the outskirts of the village in southwestern direction, with a battalion along the main road and with a battalion in the park in the east. Kühnhauser described the attack of lead company of his battalion without resistance into the centre of the village. There, the rifle and mitrailleuse fire started. The French used the Villa Beurmann to focus their efforts on the entire length of the main road. In addition to the first losses, the Bavarians were also afraid of coming under crossfire without protection. According to Kühnhauser, the first success in this situation was the torching of a corner house which forced some Frenchmen to withdraw into rear positions. The Bavarians, who had meanwhile occupied initial positions in the houses, fired indiscriminately in windows and roof lights allegedly to deter inhabitants and enemy soldiers. Engineers used their axes to open building entrances, and the Bavarians occupied more positions in the buildings. Kühnhauser describes the arresting of nine French soldiers and a craftsman who had participated in the battle in civilian clothing with a rifle. The latter was immediately shot. Elsewhere, he described an episode where a woman with a child wanted to prevent Bavarians from searching a house thus allowing French riflemen to evade. He also described the disregard of the Red Cross by the French and their crimes against the wounded. The use of artillery guns in direct laying against the Villa Beurmann ended with the artillerymen dying in infantry fire. To change the situation, the Bavarians were given order to torch the house using “firebrands” among other things, which Kühnhauser credibly described as: “The French were burnt out like wasps”. In this, the report contradicted the official statement of his Commanding General of 1870. Soon, the entire 1st Bavarian Army Corps, including more than 15 battalions and two guns, was involved in the battle for the small village against the French Blue Division and the French who were at times attacking from the north. In the course of the day, two brigades of the 2nd Bavarian Army Corps had also been brought up over the railway bridge. The last resistance described by Kühnhauser was fought in the north-western part of the village behind a barricade. Then, Kühnhauser’s regiment was withdrawn from the village to resupply ammunitions and also because subunits no longer

¹⁶ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 153-154; Nicolas Graff, “Petite Histoire de la “Maison de la Dernière cartouche,” *Le Souvenir français*, [accessed 30 July 2023] <https://le-souvenir-francais.fr/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Historique-Maison-de-la-Derniere-cartouche.pdf>. ; Freytag-Loringhoven, *Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906*, 221-224.

fought in body. Some 15 officers and 260 troops of this regiment were dead or wounded. In order to repel a counter-attack on the village of Bazeilles by the French in the afternoon, Kühnhauser's battalion was led forward bypassing the burning village and moved into its position at the northern exit of Bazeilles in the direction of Balan where elements of the Blue Division of the Marine Infantry had moved into new positions.¹⁷

At about 8.30 a.m. General von der Tann had ridden from the crossing site near Allicourt to the southern edge of Bazeilles to continue command and control of the battle. Shortly afterwards, a French counterattack on the gap between La Moncelle and the park of Chateau Montviller caused a serious crisis in the north and east of Bazeilles which lasted for about an hour. While the battle was still going on in the village, the tasks associated with the success of the Battle of Sedan were only the employment of reserves and artillery around the village. The connection with the Saxons had already been established. An outbreak of the entire French army to the east, however, was still feared at first. From 9.30 a.m., they were able to bring up fresh forces and both replace the battle-weary forces in the village and support the units outside the village in the direction of La Moncelle and then also in the direction of Balan. From 10.00 a.m., they also assumed that Bazeilles had been captured but due to the fires it did not need to be occupied with more troops. In the area of Bazeilles and La Moncelle, the concern was to prepare for another counter-attack by the French, which would indeed be carried out later from Balan. The engagements of the day ended at 6.00 p.m.. As a result of the ceasefire negotiations no further attacks would be launched. In the evening, von der Tann proceeded to Sedan Fortress and then through the burning villages of Balan and Bazeilles back to Remilly where he waited for further news. In the three days at Sedan, the 1st Bavarian Corps lost 145 officers and 2513 troops.¹⁸

¹⁷ Florian Kühnhauser, *Kriegserinnerungen eines Soldaten des königlich bayerischen Infanterie-Leib-Regimentes 1870-71*, (Partenkirchen: Leonhard Wenzel 1898), 66-77; Lebrun, *Bazeilles-Sedan*, 119; according to the history of the 16th Infantry Regiment, Kühnhauser initially probably encountered soldiers of 2nd Bavarian Light Infantry Battalion. According to this, there was gun shelling on a corner house, and the personnel in the corner house was "captured and killed". Britzelmayr, *Auszug aus der Geschichte des k. b. 16. Infanterie-Regiments Großherzog Ferdinand von Toskana und seiner Stammabteilungen: Für Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften bearbeitet von Hauptmann Britzelmayr*, (Passau: Kommissionsverlag M. Waldbauersche Buchhandlung, 1903), 34; Schmidhuber, *Der Deutsch-Französische Krieg 1870/71 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Antheilnahme der Bayern: Auszug aus dem Generalstabswerk. Mit 50 Plänen und 48 Bildern nach Original-Gemälden Moderner Meister*, (Landshut: J.F. Riet'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1900), 82-100.

¹⁸ Hugo (von) HELWIG, *Das I. bayerische Armeekorps von der Tann im Kriege 1870/71: Nach den Kriegssacten bearbeitet von Hugo Helwig. Hauptmann im Generalstab*, (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1872), 77-84.

For an ordinary soldier like Kühnhauser, it was impossible to make sense of the to and fro of the battle for Bazeilles. The described loss of track and control of closed units and subunits agreed with the large picture that was apparent to the Bavarian leadership but which the French had been unable to exploit. While the order to withdraw from Bazeilles issued by General Ducrot had not reached all forces in the area, the attacks for a break-out in south-eastern direction, for which General von Wimpffen was responsible, failed in the course of the day because of the resistance put up by Bavarian, Saxon and Prussian formations. While Kühnhauser's perspective concerned the centre of Bazeilles and the continuation of the attack via Balan, the 1st Bavarian Army Corps had created the prerequisites for the further attack on Sedan in the east and north-east by linking up with the XII (I Royal Saxon) Army Corps near La Moncelle. At around 11.00 a.m. the Saxons had nearly sealed off Bazeilles in the north. In addition, the artillery prevented the reinforcement of French troops from the north. In Bazeilles, the artillery was eventually able to fire twelve grenades at the Villa Beurmann thus rendering it unable to withstand attack. Three French officers and 120 marine infantrymen were taken prisoner there. The infantry on site, which soon occupied the villa, meanwhile consisted of Bavarian soldiers of two regiments and a light infantry battalion as well as of Saxon soldiers. And the last French defenders of Bazeilles persevered somewhat further down the road in the "House of the last Cartridge", as is well known.¹⁹

Controversies Over Fires and Crimes at Bazeilles

During the battle at Bazeilles, about 400 houses, including the town hall and the church, were burnt. 39 of the 2048 inhabitants died. Contemporary press reports exaggerated the civilian victims and reported hundreds of burnt victims and countless civilian deaths that had been burnt alive and had not been able to escape from their basements. About three weeks later, the first realistic woodcuts on the basis of photographs appeared in English newspapers, they were to confirm the horror reports about the battle, which was continued in contemporary media later during the siege of Paris.²⁰

¹⁹ Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 159-160; Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 40-41; Hugo von Helwig, "Ludwig Freiherr von der Tann-Rathsamhausen. Königlich Bayerischer General der Infanterie und Kommandierender General des Königlich Bayerischen I. Armeekorps. Eine Lebensskizze," *Militär-Wochenblatt. Beiheft*. no. 7., 8., 9. 1882: 25-427; Immanuel, *Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele zur Taktik der neuesten Zeit*, 129; Karl Woide, *Die Ursachen der Siege und Niederlagen im Kriege 1870: Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung des deutsch-französischen Krieges bis zur Schlacht bei Sedan*, (translated by Major Klingender), 2nd Volume, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1896), 281-285.

²⁰ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 154, 159.

The Commanding General of the I Bavarian Corps had already gained experience in dealing with criticism in the press after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. On 15 September 1870, the London Times published a letter by Duke Édouard Antoine Sidoine de Fitz-James. Fitz-James had visited Bazeilles, provided assistance and spoken to inhabitants. He wrote of Bavarian crimes, however, he exaggerated and mentioned numbers that did not bear scrutiny. The interest of the European press, however, was aroused. The Bavarians were soon supported by war correspondent Hermann Voget who published an emotional letter that many newspapers reprinted in excerpts. Voget justified firm action and described in turn the crimes of the inhabitants of Bazeilles:

“But the incineration of a village and the killing of individual inhabitants was not an act of base vengeance but an act of self-defence, and in a few individual cases a just punishment. If innocent people were also killed during the fire, then this was an accident, not a crime that could burden the German fighters. (...) But I witnessed these atrocities, witnessed the crimes that were the reason for the fire being thrown into the houses. I saw with my own eyes how an inhabitant of the village with the help of a woman tried to drag a wounded Bavarian from the street into a burning house; I saw how these two evildoers were knocked down by a fellow-soldier of the wounded, and how their still-twitching bodies were thrown into the same flames that they had wanted to be the wounded Bavarian’s grave. (...) When a woman takes a weapon and fires a lethal bullet at the soldier from an ambush, she is no longer entitled to the gentle consideration that is otherwise paid to her sex. Terrible things happened in Bazeilles. The atrocities I have seen there make a mockery of the culture of the 19th century. But it was the inhabitants of Bazeilles who by participating in the battle in defiance of all international law unleashed the passions, it is them who are to blame if their native village today is only a heap of rubble.”²¹

Notwithstanding this kind of public support, the Bavarian Army and the General in charge eventually deemed it important not to have to admit any mistakes, but they also did not to repeat the allegations against the inhabitants. And about a year after the battles of Bazeilles and the accusations in the press against the 1st Bavarian Army Corps and, in part, against the Prussian 8th Infantry Division, General Ludwig von der Tann published his statement. He begins with a compilation of the allegations as they had become known to him:

²¹ “Die Einäscherung von Bazeilles, “ *Süddeutscher Telegraph*, München, III, Nr. 248, 23 September 1870, 2-3.

“Bavarians and Prussians are said to have set fire to the village in order to punish the inhabitants for their participation in the defence. The *Garde nationale* had largely remained, the inhabitants had fled to the cellars; women, children, all had been burnt. Out of 2000 inhabitants, less than 300 had remained who claimed that the Bavarians had pushed entire families into the flames and shot women who had wanted to flee.²²

Later, the general referred to a statement by the mayor of Bazeilles indicating that a total of 39 civilians had been either killed, wounded or missing. According to that, only three men, two bedridden women and three children had died in the fire or from smoke inhalation. And neither were any houses deliberately set on fire, they caught fire only as a result of “mutual bombardment” and the “street and house-to-house fighting”. This view of the general, however, contradicted the memories of contemporary witnesses and the mayor’s report. While the number of victims could be verified, the mutual opinions regarding the fires remained in place.²³ However, the German reports in the official regiment history of the Lifeguard Infantry Battalion as well as Kühnhauser’s memories were clear about fires and alleged war crimes:

“Then Lieutenant von Ehrne resorted to another means, supported by Sergeant Gerstmaier he had fire thrown in one of the nearest French-occupied houses. Soon, the flame soon blazed happily away, the personnel had to flee the element and they approached between smoke and flames once again, this time successfully. Defying description, the battle was raging. The members of the 2nd Battalion, who had mostly fired the ammunition, fought forward with great urgency, driven by anger and bitterness they went berserk with the bayonet. Unfortunately, during the battle for the possession of this road, a remark had been made that local inhabitants participated in the battle in a treacherous and vicious manner.²⁴

For a long time, the role of the women of Bazeilles did not seem to be worth mentioning in French public memory. From the Bavarian point of view, the women had motivated the men to fight, even taken up arms and therefore

²² Helwig, *Das I. bayerische Armee-Corps von der Tann im Kriege 1870/71*, 88.

²³ Helwig, *Das I. bayerische Armee-Corps von der Tann im Kriege 1870/71*, 88-89.

²⁴ Franz Illig, *Geschichte des Königlich bayerischen Infanterie-Leib-Regiments von seiner Errichtung bis zur Rückkehr aus dem Feldzug 1870/71: Auf Befehl bearbeitet für den Unteroffizier und Soldaten von einem Lieutenant des Regiments*, (München: R. Oldenbourg 1881), Citation 52, 137-138. Hermann Ehrne von Melchthal (1843-1899) was Lieutenant Colonel and platoon leader in the 5th Company in 1870. For his achievements in Sedan he was awarded an Iron Cross 2nd class. On 20 February 1871 he was awarded the Military Order of Max Joseph and enobled as *Ritter*.

had not behaved as women should, which further enhanced the general impression of the unlawfulness of civilian resistance.²⁵

The mayor of Bazeilles wanted to agree to the German statements on the cause of the fire only in 37 cases. In more than 300 instances the Germans had committed arson with petrol, matches and candles, he stated. There were also different assessments concerning the maltreatment of casualties. The exaggerations of chroniclers, including Émile Zola, were characterized by the patriotic duty to clearly emphasise the national victim of Bazeilles, which also supported the creation of legends. Apparently, there was never a specific accusation that could be linked to a person. The general accusation apparently sufficed to maintain the accusations against Germany in general. On the other hand, there was probably no public need for clarification in Germany because in retrospect, the described behaviour of the French in 1870/71 was indeed considered punishable. In any case, the official monument of Bazeilles, which dated back to 1875, listed the regiments involved and 27 names of citizens including one victim with an unexplained number of children. 16 names were not listed because of the will of the surviving dependents.²⁶

Bazeilles as myth and symbol

Bazeilles as victim of German warfare became the symbol of a national French victim role, and with the heroic defence by the marine infantry it was simultaneously the antithesis of the humiliating defeat of Sedan. It was also a kind of compensation for lack of valour in other places of the war. Commemoration in Catholic, anti-liberal clerical or republican, democratic-laicist commemorative discourses was initially influenced by the polarisation in the so-called Deux France question. From 1890 on, a centrist, general patriotic discourse prevailed in the public sphere. In addition to increasing militarisation, it also offered chances for a social compromise in “non-partisan patriotic sacred actions” of commemoration ceremonies at the time.²⁷

The possibility of multiple interpretation and own identification constituted the success of the painting *The Last Cartridges* (Les dernières cartouches) by Alphonse de Neuville. The room was painted with nearly photographic accuracy. Neuville, however, had not painted the fighting soldiers of the marine infantry as would have been historically correct. By painting different uniforms, he provided a cross-section of French Army soldiers of 1870, offering quasi a possibility of national identification. The

²⁵ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 157-158.

²⁶ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 155-156, 159-161.

²⁷ Andreas Metzinger, "Kriegsgedenken in Frankreich (1871-1914): Studien zur kollektiven Erinnerung an den Deutsch-Französischen Krieg von 1870/71," Ph.D. Dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg i. Br., 2002, 242.

blue uniforms of the marine infantry seemed too grim and ultimately boring to the artist. And he was right. His painting achieved almost iconic status. It did not matter that he assigned Major Arcène Lambert a central role and not Captain George Aubert as would have been correct. Lambert proved to be an exceedingly mean fellow soldier when, many years later, he denied Aubert a rectification of history and even tried to undermine Aubert's credibility in the military by alleging that he had been a Dreyfus supporter and a "Jew".²⁸

Among the people in the *House of the Last Cartridge* was Joseph Gallieni, lieutenant of the 3rd Marine Infantry Regiment. As military governor of Paris in 1914 and organiser of the taxicabs to the Marne, he would later become a hero of World War I. In remembrance this supported the symbolic meaning of the house as a place where the better France was represented. In 1900, Bazeilles was even awarded the Order of the Legion of Honour. A similarly symbolic event was the erection of the neo-Gothic crypt at the cemetery of Bazeilles, an ossuary. It was erected between 1878 and 1890 and served as the final resting place for 998 French and 1061 German soldiers. Until 1914, the bones of the Germans could be seen on the left side and the bones of the French on the right side. In World War I, the German occupation forces had the German casualties buried. For the French victims, it was not so much a resting place but rather a place of encounter. Of the spooky kind, however. Even the guard could not get used to the horrible sight. Some of the skeletons still wore pieces of uniform and their wedding bands. The bones of the dead could be seen by visitors, like in old catacombs. Only in this case, it was not a pragmatic solution for lack of space or an idyllic "memento mori", but was charged with national myths. The visitors were able to meet the dead heroes quasi in person. In the view of the believers, the dead had ascended to heaven, while modern Republicans believed in the return of the restless skeletons on the day of revenge on the Germans. This extreme form of a culture of remembrance was accompanied by a domestic struggle of the French Republic against the influence of the Catholic Church in public in the late 19th century up to the separation of state and church in 1905. The Catholic Church in France did not accept this without protest. Thus, the military culture of remembrance before World War I was also a question of the assertion of religious views in public space and as an important element of patriotism.²⁹

Bazeilles and Sedan belonged to the same battle, however, from the perspective of politics of memory, they did not fit together. While the defeat

²⁸ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 26-153, 166-170.

²⁹ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 69-70, 162-163; Annette Becker, "Monuments aux morts après la guerre de sécession et la guerre de 1870-1871: Un legs de la guerre nationale?" *Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains*, no. 167 (1992): 29; Antoine Champeux, "Bazeilles, lieu de mémoire européen. Bazeilles, ein europäischer Ort des Gedenkens."

of Sedan marked the inglorious downfall of the Empire, the defence of Bazeilles is remembered as part of the eternally strong France that showed its potential also in the defeat. When the town of Sedan wanted to raise funds for a war monument in 1890, the French Prime Minister refused to become honorary chairman of the monument committee and even prohibited the collection of money within the army. The town and inhabitants of Sedan were stigmatised for a long time. In 1897, their monument came into existence nevertheless, with the bas-reliefs highlighting the cavalry attack of Division Marguerite near Floing and the honourable defence of Bazeilles.³⁰

For a long time, France did not have a public museum remembering the war of 1870/71. The famous *Maison de la dernière cartouche* owes its existence to the owners and its survival to this day to the marine infantry who uses it to cultivate a power place of their tradition. Nevertheless, in its character the small museum reflects the suffering and the hardships of war which are expressed in the core of the museum, a room maintained in the original with the damages caused by the fighting, a flag of the Red Cross, pieces of bread and the painting by Neuville. This originality, from the entire house to the bread crumb marks the attractiveness of this special memorial site and museum to this day.³¹ Since 1951, the French marine infantry commemorates the battles of 1870 each year on 1 September and cultivates the memory of Bazeilles in its barracks, museums and memorials. Today, the core of this commemoration is connected with the “House of the last Cartridge”. Since 1952, four marine infantry regiments and a regiment of the marine artillery have borne the honorary name “Bazeilles 1870” on their flags.³²

Conclusion

The fighting for the village of Bazeilles on 1 September 1870 no longer serves as a military example of how urban warfare can succeed. Rather, the events are a warning for generations to come. The particular commemoration of the defence of the homeland in Bazeilles is unique in view of the events of 1870 and of the original tasks of the French marine infantry. The exception to the rule of 1870 thus founded a long tradition and connected the marine infantry of France in a particular manner with the homeland. The German soldiers employed in Bazeilles had altogether earned many war decorations on 1 September 1870. In Germany, the victories of the Franco-Prussian War did not establish military traditions that endured to the present.

³⁰ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 84-87.

³¹ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 122-124.

³² Champeux, “Bazeilles, lieu de mémoire européen. Bazeilles, ein europäischer Ort des Gedenkens.”


Military service in Europe is connected to international values and norms. Experiences of past conflicts and wars as well as international law have been included in the command and control regulations of the Bundeswehr. According to the Doctrinal Principles for the Command and Control of Land Forces, the population in urban spaces is accorded particular protection:

“The inhabitants usually do not (cannot) leave the urban area even if or when it becomes the scene of intensive military action. In their planning, commanders consider evacuation possibilities for the population as well as the handling of the remaining population and their protection. This includes their reception and subsequent (initial) treatment.”³³

German citizens in uniform defend their constitutional state. Tradition today, therefore, does not include the Bavarian General von der Tann but his grandson, General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel. As military commander in France he implemented the plot against Hitler in Paris on 20 July 1944. Although the resistance ultimately failed, it was a sign for the better Germany and for values that are important to the German democracy today.

Appendices

Appendix 1: N.N. Map Sedan 1870 (ZMSBw)



³³ Kommando Heer, *Truppenführung*, (16037) 134.

LISBON AND THE LARVAE CIVIL WAR OF THE 1ST PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC (1910-1933)

Asst. Prof. Dr. António Paulo DUARTE (Portugal)

Introduction

Portugal has had a Republican Regime for almost one hundred and thirteen years. The Portuguese 1st Republic had revolutionary origins. It was proclaimed on the 5th of October 1910, after a brief armed fighting in the centre of the Portuguese Capital, Lisbon, that lasted for three nights and two days. As one of the revolutionaries said, in the rest of the country, the Republic was instituted by the telegraph. Even if indeed it was easy to create the Portuguese Republic, its life was very hard and brief. The Portuguese 1st Republic lasted for only fifteen years, and died, as has lived, by the use of armed force. A revolutionary regime, as the majority of the founders believed, was born, as such, by armed revolution, echoing another much more famous revolution, born one hundred and twenty-one years before the Portuguese 1st Republic, the French Revolution. and as it happened with the French Revolution, the Portuguese Revolutionary Republic was also permeated till the end by inherent political violence. Indeed, the Portuguese 1st Republic, as has been said by one of the most outstanding Portuguese poets and writers, who lived all the drama of the Portuguese 1st Republic, was never more than an interregnum. This poet and writer was Fernando Pessoa.¹

The reality could be that the Portuguese 1st Republic was no more than a prolonged larvae civil war, with active bursts of intermittent civil war (?). Fernando Rosas in “Lisboa Revolucionária” (Revolutionary Lisbon)² developed the concept of “Intermittent Civil War” for the 1st Republic period. The intense political fighting permeated the conditions for revolutionary events and for bursts of civil war, in which belligerent political parties tried to solve the challenges that prevented for each one to achieve their main goals. Fernando Rosas says that the political disorder and government instability weren’t an issue in itself but the result of more profound ideological oppositions and political contestations. The impossibility of negotiating a

¹ Pessoa, Fernando, *Prosa Publicada em Vida*, Ed., Richard Zenith, (Lisboa: Círculo dos Leitores, 2006), 354-356.

² Rosas, Fernando, *Lisboa Revolucionária, Roteiro dos Confrontos Armados no Século XX*, (Lisboa: Tinta-da-China, 2007), 34, 39.

middle way consensus for distinct parties' views led to the political war and to the bursts of civil war.³

António Telo, following the idea of Fernando Rosas, stressed that the pursuit of political hegemony by the Portuguese Republican Party, known as “Democráticos” (“Democrats”), the main party in the Portuguese 1st Republic, a radical party in the ideological terms of the time, basically due to its strong anticlerical and anti-Catholicism position and action, created a strong political current to opposing it. This opposition was exacerbated by the attempt of the Portuguese Republican Party to control the Portuguese Army by inserting in the Barracks the civilian element, in connexion with radical republican sergeants and officers. The result was a completely divided army that created the conditions to be used as an instrument for controlling the political power by the different warring parties.⁴

Accordingly with these historiographic perspectives, the text will present the political evolution of the Portuguese 1st Republic, beginning with the opposing ideologies and revolutionary violence and ending in the larvae civil war and the intermittent civil war. After that, it will continue with the long list of battles for the Portuguese 1st Republic – from the monarchic incursions to the Madeira Island insurgency, from 1911 to 1931, with spasms yet in 1932. In the Portuguese 1st Republic larvae civil war, World War One would mark a peak in political violence and in the sequence of intermittent small civil wars. Indeed, in 1917, the crisis of the Portuguese Republic was so intense that the republican regime was thought at the time, to be in jeopardy. Some time will be dedicated to understanding that particular period in the chronology of the Portuguese 1st Republic larvae civil war. In the Portuguese 1st Republic larvae civil war Lisbon was the most relevant epicentre of the battles for the Portuguese 1st Republic. As the main topic of the text, the role of Lisbon will be explained before entering the “modus operandi” of the warring parties for conquering the political power by subjugating the city to its armed power.

In the end, the conclusion would discuss the characteristics of the Portuguese 1st Republic larvae civil war, questioning if that political period was more a revolutionary moment than a true political regime.

³ Rosas, Fernando, *A Primeira República, 1910-1926, Como Venceu e Porque se Perdeu*, (Lisboa: Bertrand Editora, 2018), 121-128.

⁴ Telo, António José, “Revolução e Contra-Revolução em 1915 – O primeiro ciclo da beligerância portuguesa”, in *O Assalto à Escola de Guerra, 1915-2015*, (Porto: Academia Militar/Fronteira do Caos, 2015), 7-51, here, 10-13, 18-22.

The Origins of the Portuguese 1st Republic – A Quick Overview

The *Partido Republicano Português* (The Portuguese Republican Party) was created in 1879. Two of the main thoughts of the republican's view, were its older regard to the revolutionary vision of the 22 (1822) Portuguese Constitution, indeed the first Portuguese Constitution, and its democratic principles, as its immersion in the myths of the French Revolution. The party gained support in the main cities of Portugal, among the new middle class of tertiary professions and in the recent urban proletarian class.⁵

The crisis of the Regeneration (*Regeneração*) and of the Oligarchic liberal Monarchic Portuguese Regime strengthened the Portuguese Republican Party.

In the late nineteenth century, Portugal's intent to occupy the territories between Angola and Mozambique, gaining the opposition of the British Empire and the outbreak of the colonial crisis – the English Ultimatum and the loss of the territories between Angola and Mozambique – helped the growth of the Portuguese Republican Party, given the impact the crisis had on the image of the Portuguese Monarchy and in its own crisis.⁶

By the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the political reformist view of the Portuguese Republican Party gave way to a revolutionary option – throwing off the power, by a revolution, by force, of the Portuguese Monarchy.

The first conspiracy in 1908 ended in the Regicide – the assassination of King Carlos I (the first). Instead of a strong reaction by the Portuguese Monarchy, all assisted the enfeeblement of the monarchic institutions.⁷

So, in 1910, an armed revolt, mixing civilians and militaries, in general from sergeant ranks, mobilized, in general, by a secret organization named *Carbonária*, with officers from the *Maçonaria* (Masonry) adherent to the Republican ideology, dominated the capital of Portugal, Lisbon, in two days armed fighting and laid down the last Portuguese King, D. Manuel II (the second), which was only twenty years of age, who started a long exile in the lands of its Majesty, the King of Great Britain, from where he never returned alive to Portugal.⁸

⁵ Valente, Vasco Pulido, *O Poder e o Povo*, (Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 1999), 15-17.

⁶ Valente, “*O Poder e o Povo*”, 32-33.

⁷ Telo, António, *A Primeira República, I, do Sonho à Realidade*, (Lisboa: Editorial Presença, 2010), 78-83.

⁸ Almeida, João Miguel, *D. Manuel II. A Biografia do Último Rei de Portugal*, (Barcarena, Manuscrito Editora, 2022), 68-74, 110-118.

The Institution of the Portuguese 1st Republic

The Republicans, conquering the political power in Lisbon, informed the rest of the country of the proclamation of the Portuguese Republic by telegraph.

However, the easy conquest of power in Lisbon was illusive, and indeed, what happened from 1910 – Proclamation of the Portuguese 1st Republic to the Institution of the 1933 Portuguese Estado Novo (New State) Constitution was an Intermittent Civil War (accordingly with Fernando Rosas and António Telo); or more precise, a Larvae Civil War in which erupted bursts of civil war (the Intermittent Civil War), in what indeed was a very long Revolutionary Process; a long political turmoil, the end of nineteenth century Portuguese Liberalism – in the search for a stable orderly political regime. As we have already presented, the search for a hegemonic power by the *Partido Republicano Português* (PRP) (Portuguese Republican Party), an ideological radical party, strongly anticlerical and anticatholic, firmly atheist indeed, created the conditions, not only for fragmenting the Republican camp, but also for producing a strong and violent opposition by the monarchists and Catholics political currents.⁹ The Portuguese Republican Party policy for controlling the Portuguese Army by inserting in the Barracks radical civilian elements in connexion with radical republican sergeants and officers fragmented the discipline and the military order creating an excellent condition for mobilizing elements of the army for fighting for the political parties and currents.¹⁰ With the Country and the Portuguese Army divided by strong and completely politically opposed parties and currents, the instrumental use of armed force to impose hegemonic political ways was open to a larvae civil war and to burst of engaged civil war.

A set of multiple crises (social, national – the political community – political, revolutionary and war). Indeed, violence, social, diffuse social, and political violence, in the top of the process, war, civil war, characterized the existence of the Portuguese 1st Republic. From top to bottom, from the end to the beginning, from the superstructure to the infrastructure (in a Marxist sense), the set of crises developed in the following manner:

Armed Violence – War – Civil War – To achieve Political breakthroughs; To reimpose some political order; to ensure a solid way to the future means a hegemonic dominance and that necessity catalysed a firm and violent opposition, in a vicious circle of hegemonic efforts and revolutionary and war reactions;

⁹ Valente, Vasco Pulido, *A «República Velha» (1910-1917). Ensaio*, (Lisboa: Gradiva, 1997), 23-25.

¹⁰ Telo, “*A Primeira República*”, 360.

Revolutionary Violence (Transformative violence) – reduced access to the Portuguese Parliament – only republican parties; Catholics and monarchists were banned from access to the Parliament; the electoral system had a restricted representation [and a vote controlled by Caciques (voter’s chieftains)];¹¹ The impossibility to create a negotiated middle way produced an ascension to the extremes, a reciprocal action (accordingly with the Clausewitz’s concept) in which each side react to the possibility of the other achieved its way;¹²

Political Violence – the political party system is incapable of consensus and of political and societal reforms; Strong opposing and divisive ideological perspectives – Republicans versus Monarchists and Catholics; and between liberal-conservative and radical Republicans;

National – Community Violence – social violence transformed into violent grievances demonstrations against violent police and military repression of civil demonstrations;

Popular and Social Violence – poverty and analphabetism – produced a diffuse social violence, familiar, social and criminal, an unordered society, prone to spasms of violence, (some sort of Thomas Hobbes¹³ – a war of all against all)

In a very systematic view, appeared two distinct identities and visions of Portugal, two Confronting Ideologies:

Republicans

Republic (República)

Revolution (Revolução)

Democracy (Democracia)

Fatherland (Pátria)

Patriotism (Patriotismo)

Equality (igualdade) and Citizenship (Cidadão)

Secularism (Secularismo)

¹¹ Matos, Luís Salgado de, *Tudo o Que Sempre Quis Saber Sobre a Primeira República em 37.000 Palavras*, (Lisboa: ICS, 2011), 81-87.

¹² The reciprocal action of Clausewitz, Carl Von, *On War*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) (1976), 75-80.

¹³ On Thomas Hobbes view, the text follows, Morujão, Alexandre Fradique, “Hobbes (Thomas)” in, *Logos Enciclopédia Luso-Brasileira de Filosofia*, 2, (Lisboa/São Paulo: Editorial Verbo. s/d), 1161-1166, here 1164.

Atheism (Ateísmo)

Anticlericalism (Anticlericalismo)

Positivism and Scientism (Positivismo e cientismo);

Monarchists and Catholics

Monarchy (Monarquia)

Religion (Religião)

Catholicism (Catolicismo)

Counter-Revolution (Contra-revolução)

Conservative Liberalism (Liberalismo Conservador)

Anti-Jacobins (Anti-Jacobinos)

Tradition (Tradição)

Order (Ordem)

Hierarchy (Hierarquia)

Submission (Submissão) and Subject (Súbdito); ¹⁴

Their antinomy gives way to continuous political violence and civil war battling, as we will see.

The present antinomy, of course, it's a simplification of the complex political and ideological reality of the Portuguese 1st Republic, in which as usually happens, several political crossroads exist. However, the radical positions, the extremes, somehow, slide the political agents in one or the other creating the conditions for the larvae and the intermittent civil war.

From Political Violence to Civil War The Battles for The Republic

A long set of small armed conflagrations, never prolonged, no more than two or three days with the exception of the “Monarquia do Norte”, but even this had happened in a small period of three weeks. However, in spite of the short time of each event, all were armed clashes, that opposed armed organized forces in a clearly delimited space and time (which are important elements to conceptualize a battle and a war, as would be seen ahead):

¹⁴ For an overview of the republican ideology, for example, sees Ramos, Rui, *A Segunda Fundação (1890-1926)*, In José Mattoso, Coord., *História de Portugal*, 6, (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, s/d), 401-433. An example of the multiple ideologies that cross the Portuguese 1st Republic could be looked at Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, Coord., *História da Primeira República Portuguesa*, (s/l: Iniciativas Editoriais/Figueirinhas, s/l): 534-581.

3/5 October 1910, Lisbon – The foundation of the Portuguese 1st Republic;

5-16/10/1911, North Border of Portugal (Vinhais e Montalegre), First Monarchic Incursion, end in failure;

6-8/7/1912, North Border of Portugal (Chaves), Second Monarchic Incursion, end in failure;

14/15 May 1915, Lisbon – The triumph of the radical republicans and the total belligerency war project;

19-21/5/1917, “A Revolta da Batata” – Potato Revolt, Lisbon – Popular uprising with de assault to general stores in Lisbon by hungry and angered proletarian population – the assaults kept on for the rest of the summer;

3/8 December 1918, Lisbon – the defeat of the radical republicans – and an attempt to revive the Portuguese 1st Republic;

19/1-13/2/1919, Lisbon and Oporto – The “Monarquia do Norte” Monarchy of the North and the last monarchist attempt to restore the Monarchic Regime in Portugal. The “Nova Velha República” (The New Old Republic) survives;

19/10/1921, Lisbon – The “Camioneta Fantasma” (ghost-truck) and the “Noite Sangrenta” (Bloody Night), after a failed Coup, the assassination of three famous republican political leaders – António Granjo, Carlos da Maia, Machado dos Santos (the hero of the Rotunda, which assured the victory of the Republican Revolution in 1910);

18/4/1925, Lisbon – A failed “Military Coup” attempt to end the Portuguese 1st Republic;

26/5/1926 – Starting in the North, the city of Braga, a military movement and a progressive massive concentration of troops, came down to Lisbon, ending the Portuguese 1st Republic. It started the “Ditadura Militar” – Military Dictatorship, an “interregno” (interregnum) which would lead to the Estado Novo;

Two failed attempts to restore the Portuguese 1st Republic are smashed with a high degree of determination and violence:

3-9/2/1927, Oporto and Lisbon, The February 1927 Revolt;

The Madeira Revolt, from 4/4 to 2/5/1931, with sequels in the Azores and Portuguese Guinea.

In 1933, with the consolidation of the Estado Novo Regime, even if it is plausible to assume that this regime was no more than a long interregnum, the intense violence of the Portuguese 1st Republic gave way to a more stable and orderly political situation.¹⁵

The Portuguese 1st Republic and World War One

The First World War intensified the Portuguese political crisis:

To the dichotomy Monarchists/Catholics – Republicans (and of course, between liberal conservatives and radical republicans) another was added – guerristas (pro-war belligerents) and antiguerristas (antiwar belligerents). The Guerristas were basically the radical Republicans; the Antiguerristas were, by the contrary, a vast sum of distinct, even opposed, political perspectives, from pacifists to moderate interventionists, from anarchists to ultra-conservative Catholics, all united against the radical republicans, the Portuguese belligerency and the military intervention in the Europeans Theatres of War, even more if in France, in Flanders. The more cohesive radical Republicans achieved their intentions and in 1917 a Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (60.000 troops) was sent to Flanders in France.¹⁶

However, that was not the end of the story and the World War saw the apex of the first phase of the Portuguese 1st Republic (1910-1919) and its more deadly and violent years, an intensification of the larvae civil war and of the intermittent civil war. During the war, the dichotomic political oppositions became quite virulent and accelerated the conditions for the bursts of intermittent civil war, trying to challenge the way chosen by those who had the power – pro-belligerents or anti-belligerents:

20 and 25 January 1915 – “Movimento ou Golpe das Espadas” – Movement or Coup of Swords – a military officers protest that forced the President of the Republic, Manuel de Arriaga, to dismiss the republican radical government and the associated military preparation for the war;

¹⁵ For a general overview. Rosas, Fernando, “Lisboa Revolucionária” (Revolutionary Lisbon) gave an account of almost all lot these events. For the Monarchy of the North, also, Silva, Helena Moreira da, *Monarquia do Norte, 1919*, (Lisboa: Quidnovi, 2008). On the resistance to Military Dictatorship and the creation of the New State (Estado Novo), see Farinha, Luís, *O Revirvalho. Revoltas Republicanas contra a Ditadura e o Estado Novo, 1926-1940*, (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1998).

¹⁶ Telo, António, “Um Enquadramento Global para uma Guerra Global”, in “Portugal na Grande Guerra”, *Nação e Defesa*, n° 139, (2014): 11-12.

14/15 May 1915, Lisbon – a strong and violent armed revolution that marked the triumph of the radical republicans and the total belligerency war project, changing the situation created by the “coup of the Swords”; It assured the path to war led by the radicals of the Portuguese Republican Party;

19-21/5/1917, Potato Revolt, Lisbon – Popular uprising with de assault to general stores in Lisbon by hungry and angered proletarian population – the assaults kept on for the rest of the summer; along that year the republican radical war project enters in progressive and profound crisis;

3/8 December 1917 Lisbon – Another armed revolution defeated the radical Republicans pro-belligerent government – and attempted to revive in another way the Portuguese 1st Republic;

19/1-13/2/1919, Lisbon and Oporto – The “Monarquia do Norte” Monarchy of the North and the last monarchist attempt to restore the Monarchic Regime in Portugal. The “Nova Velha República” (The New Old Republic) survives¹⁷

The Larvae Civil War and the Centrality of Lisbon

Lisbon, and in a lesser way, Oporto were the epicentre in the Battles for the Republic – all real changes in the political situation resulted from the armed battles that decided the fate of the republican governments and almost all were fought in the streets of the Capital, as we can see:

3/5 October 1910, Lisbon – The foundation of the Portuguese 1st Republic;

14/15 May 1915, Lisbon – The triumph of the radical republicans and the total belligerency war project;

19-21/5/1917, “A Revolta da Batata” – Potato Revolt, Lisbon – Popular uprising with de assault to general stores in Lisbon by hungry and angered proletarian population;

3/8 December 1918, Lisbon – the defeat of the radical republicans – and an attempt to revive the Portuguese 1st Republic;

¹⁷ On the relation between these events and the war, see as an example, Duarte, António Paulo, “A Guerra Civil Larvar e a Beligerância Portuguesa na Grande Guerra”, in António José Telo (Coord.), *A Grande Guerra: Um Século Depois. Atas*, (Lisboa: Academia Militar/Fronteira do Caos, 2015), 78-99.

19/1-13/2/1919, Lisbon and Oporto – The “Monarquia do Norte” Monarchy of the North and the last monarchist attempt to restore the Monarchic Regime in Portugal. The “Nova Velha República” (The New Old Republic) survives;

19/10/1921, Lisbon – The “Camioneta Fantasma” (ghost-truck) and the “Noite Sangrenta” (Bloody Night), after a failed Coup, the assassination of three famous republican political leaders – António Granjo, Carlos da Maia, Machado dos Santos;

18/4/1925, Lisbon – A failed “Military Coup” attempt to end the Portuguese 1st Republic.

So, Lisbon was central to achieving political dominance in Portugal. Of course, Lisbon was the Capital of Portugal for almost seven thousand years, but even more than this, it was virtually the only urban modern and proletarian city amid an “ocean of rurality” (as said Fernando Rosas).¹⁸

Lisbon with 450.000 habitants and Oporto with 200.000 habitants (some other small cities around them) were the only contemporary industrialized urban societies in a country where the majority of the inhabitants were still left with the Ancient Regime patterns. Indeed, after these two greats urban, for Portugal, cities, the third city was very small. With a population of 25.000 inhabitants, Setúbal, which was near Lisbon, was also a proletarian urbanisation, closely linked to the Portuguese Capital, Lisbon. All other Portuguese towns were yet Old *Ancien Regime* cities. And Urban proletarian means organized and disciplined political parties and from them political armed bands.¹⁹

The Fate of the Portuguese 1st Republic Armed Forces

In the Liberal Monarchy, as in the Portuguese 1st Republic, the Portuguese professional elites were profoundly intertwined. It was usual to see militaries in politics, as deputies, members of the cabinet or even, party leaders, as in technical state services. The Army and the Navy had several dozens of Republican officers, from general and admiral grade (like one of the most important leaders of the Republican revolution – Admiral Cândido dos Reis), to lower ranks officers. In the army, there was even an organization of Republican Officers, the “Young Turks”, clearly related to the Republicans²⁰. Carbonária, on the other side, had a strong presence in the sergeant’s ranks.

¹⁸ Rosas, Fernando, “Os Cinco Erros Capitais”, *Público*, 13 September 2010.

¹⁹ Telo, “*A Primeira República*”, 53-55.


²⁰ Duarte, António Paulo, “Jovens Turcos”, in Maria Fernanda Rollo (General Coord.), *Dicionário de História da I República e do Republicanismo*, (Lisboa: Assembleia da República – Coleção Parlamento, 2014), 2, 541-545.

The conspicuous presence of politics in the army and in the navy created the perfect storm in their discipline and hierarchy. It was impossible to ensure discipline and respect for the hierarchy in a politized and ideologized armed forces, even more so when both, more the army than the navy, were very porous to the civilian political element.

Added to that already disruptive situation, was the persecution of officers who were political and ideological opponents of the Republicans, and after some time, also, of other officers who were Republican opponents of the dominant Republican party, who control the government. The armed forces started to be mobilized by the political parties to stand on their side, in the intermittent civil war. What happened was the division of the armed forces and one of the most conspicuous idiosyncrasies of the fighting in that period, each side mobilized a mixed force of civilian-military battle forces.²¹ Only by the end of the Republican Regime the army and the navy, reorganized internally, started to work as cohesive corporations, and assured the control of the armed power, then, of the country, The Military dictatorship.

The Battlefield of the First Republic – Win the Political Power in the Battles of Lisbon

To understand the technical mechanics of the Lisbon Battleground, it's better to start with a simpler scheme, as presented above:



Scheme 1: The battlefield mechanics of the Lisbon Intermittent Civil Wars

²¹ As has been already above presented.


The city was born around Lisbon Castle, in the East Higher Ground of the actual downtown. The maritime expansion and empire gave ground to the downtown (“A Baixa”, in the Portuguese language, below). And then the city expanded to the west higher ground (The “Bairro Alto”, in the Portuguese language, the High Neighbourhood). The names are very significant in Lisbon’s geography and geostrategy.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the city expanded to the north higher ground, the Rotunda, the Roundabout, encircling the downtown, the centre of the city by three higher grounds. The fourth square of the encirclement was the river Tajo. The downtown was the centre of political power, where were situated the government buildings and institutions.²² Basically, all military strategies to overthrow by force the political power implied wedging government-armed defenders into a crossfire. In that sense, all military strategy implied encase one of the battling parties in the downtown, being beaten by the other, which controls all, or almost all de heights of Lisbon. The party that controls the Rotunda and the Tajo, and encases the enemy in downtown space, beat the adversary and won. It was the case of the Republicans in 1910 and the opponents of the radical and belligerent Republican government in 1917. The big difference between 1910 and 1918 resulted from the forces positioned in River Tajo, the Portuguese Navy, which in its military intervention supported the Republican Revolution and didn’t act in the 1917 military-civilian coup. The failure of the Military Coup in 1925 resulted, in its military part, from the incapacity of the rebellious army to control the river Tajo and mainly, the Lisbon Castle, and its heights, from where they were shelled in the Rotunda. The decision of the government to fight the military coup however was helped by the failure of the military strategy to control Lisbon by force.

The fight in the May 1915 revolution was centred in the river Tajo and the dominance by the challenging force of the river – the Armada was with the radical republican revolutionaries – decided who would win the fight. 1915 battle was also quite strategic to control the extremities of the line of the river (as seen in the below scheme) which inhibited the government army from achieving by land the control of the river line of Lisbon. Indeed, by controlling the main naval barrack (in Alcântara) – “O Quartel dos Marinheiros” (the Sailors Barrack) and the “Arsenal da Armada” (Naval Arsenal) (in the Terreiro do Paço) and from taking by assault the “Arsenal do Exército” (Army Arsenal) where are today the Portuguese Lisbon Military Museum, the radical republicans, challenging by armed force the installed power, could control

²² Rosas, “*Lisboa Revolucionária*”, pp. 19-28. Telo, António José, *História da Marinha Portuguesa. Homens, Doutrinas e Organização, 1824-1974*, (Lisboa: Academia da Marinha, 1999), 214-216.

Lisbon and its port and impose the defeat to the Republican moderate government, making it fall. A new political power, the radical republicans of the Portuguese Republican Party, installed in the government, could pursue its belligerent policy and ensure the Portuguese participation in World War One on the side of the allies.



Scheme 2: The battlefield mechanics of the Lisbon Intermittent Civil Wars

It is relevant for winning to have the Lisbon urban proletariat with the battling party. They control the street with the “artilharia civil”, “civilian artillery” civilians armed with makeshift bombs, for throwing them at the opponent’s armed forces. They narrowed the opponent’s manoeuvre and created one more condition for its defeat. Given that the Lisbon East and West heights were in general proletarian boroughs land, the side that assured the proletarian support, in general, won the fight. Trying to defeat who controlled the Rotunda was in that situation difficult. If the proletarian was on the side of the armed band which was situated in the Rotunda, their opponents had to cross enemy land, suffering from disruptive civilian fire and bombs, never assuring any surprise effect, after having to try to assault a fortified position. As such, in 1910 and 1915 and in 1917 and 1918, the proletarians were with the winners and helped them to win the intermittent civil war.

On the contrary, like a traditional challenge, the rebellious who occupied the Rotunda, did not need to make offensive operations anymore. They could be positioned defensively and wait for the action of the government, which needed to show that it had control of the city. To assault the Rotunda meant trying to make an involving manoeuvre, assaulting on several sides the very strong defensive position. It never worked. The civilian artillery constricted the assailants, and the terrain, consisting yet of rural paths

and farms, diffculted the manoeuvre and the liaison between the involved forces. Besides, the attacker was also shelled by the rebellious artillery situated in the Rotunda.

In sum, the party that controlled the Rotunda and the river Tajo and had with them the proletarian population of Lisbon won that particular intermittent civilian war battle. In the end, it was the country that assured the control of Lisbon. On 28 May 1926, the army started a march in Braga, in the north of Portugal, and came down to Lisbon. Other forces joined the military column from Braga, and in the end, almost all Portuguese army was marching to the Capital 15.000 men. On arrival, they simply closed the Parliament and replaced the President of the Republic. The Portuguese 1st Republic ended on that day.²³ Even small, the armed clashes that happened during the Portuguese 1st Republic could be seen as a war. They have the form and the substance of a war confrontation and indeed, also of a classical form of battle. If we look at the definition of war of Clausewitz and at the fight between the political Portuguese belligerents, it could be easily seen the correlation between concept and practice:

Clausewitz's concept of war ²⁴ :	Portuguese Intermittent Civil War:
<p>A large duel; “To compel our enemy to do our will”; By the use of violence/sheer force; “War, therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will”. The ascension to the extremes; the reciprocal action; The political element – war as an instrument.</p>	<p>The confrontation of armed force – a mix of civilian and military elements, organized, confronting each other, in clearly defined positions (political and military); The aim: to defeat its opponent; By the use of armed force – violent fighting; To achieve a radical transformation; The use of brute force and violence to a transformative aim – Changing the government, changing the regime; To change the political situation and redefine the Republican Regime; Always opposing party groups – monarchists against republicans/radicals versus moderates/traditionalists; ...</p>

Table 1: The Intermittent Civil War and the Concept of War

²³ The analysis, of the way the intermittent civil war worked, is based on several works, much of them already cited. Some other sources used to understand the subject are the following: Martins, Rocha, *Pimenta de Castro, Ditador Democrático*, (Lisboa, Bonecos Rebeldes, s/d); Martins, Rocha, *Sidónio Pais, Ídolo e Mártir da República*, (Lisboa, Bonecos Rebeldes, s/d). Moniz, Jorge Botelho, *O 18 de Abril de 1925*, 2^a Ed., (Lisboa: 1926), Pereira, Cláudio, *História do 14 de Maio de 1915 - A Revolução Portuguesa*, (Lisboa: CP e M. Pinto Vieira, 1915). Ferrão, Carlos, *Relatórios sobre a Revolução de 5 de Outubro de 1910*, Prefácio e Notas de Carlos Ferrão, (Lisboa: Publicações da CML, 1978). Santos, Machado, *A Revolução Portuguesa, 1907-1910*, (Lisboa: Sextante Editora, 2007) (1912).

²⁴ Clausewitz, “*On War*”, 13-14, 20, 28-29.

If the reader follows the schematic exposition above presented, it will be absolutely understandable how the way the concept of war that Clausewitz presents correlates with the way the small Lisbon battles, and the intermittent civil war are instrumentalized – in a violent fighting – by the politicians to achieve the political aims of the belligerents organized ideological parties.

Indeed, the fighting appears, not as “urban guerrilla warfare”, but, as has been seen, as an armed confrontation around delimited positions – the Rotunda, The Tajo River, some Barracks in key positions, the Castle, and so on. The armed fighting could so, be seen, as a traditional form of battle, even if in urban terrain, a battle around delimited positions, in which the possession or the lack of possessions decided the armed confrontation and who is the winner. As noted by John Keegan, “a battle obeys the dramatic unities of time, place and action”²⁵, and it has been established, that the intermittent civil war in the Portuguese 1st Republic, was fought in a clear terrain, at a specific time and a unified action, as the definition of author followed mention.

The Portuguese 1st Republic was indeed, no more than an interregnum, marked by a larvae civil war, in which extreme bursts of intermittent civil war tried to transform into a more orderly political situation.

Conclusion

In 1910, an armed rebellion, mixing civilians and militaries, mostly from sergeant ranks, mobilized by the secret organization named Carbonária, with officers from the Maçonaria (Masonry) adherent to the Republican ideology, dominated the capital of Portugal, Lisbon, in two days of armed fighting and laid down the last Portuguese King, D. Manuel II (the second).

The Republicans, conquering the political power in Lisbon, informed the rest of the country of the proclamation of the Portuguese Republic by telegraph.

However, the easy conquest of power in Lisbon was illusive, and indeed, what happened from 1910 – Proclamation of the Portuguese 1st Republic to the Institution of the 1933 Portuguese Estado Novo (New State) Constitution was an Intermittent Civil War; or more precisely, a Larvae Civil War in which erupted bursts of civil war (the Intermittent Civil War), in truth, a very long Revolutionary Process; a long political turmoil, the end of nineteenth century Portuguese Liberalism – in the search for a stable orderly political

²⁵ Keegan, John, *O Rosto da Batalha*, Trad. José Vieira de Lima, (Lisboa: Editorial Fragmentos, s/d), 12.

regime. A set of multiple crises (social, national – the political community, political, revolutionary and war).

Lisbon, and in a lesser way, Oporto, were the epicentre in the Battles for the Republic – all real changes in the political situation resulted from the armed battles that decided the fate of the republican governments and almost all were fought in the streets of the Capital.

Basically, all military strategies to overthrow by force the political power implied wedging government-armed defenders into a crossfire. In that sense, all military strategy implied encase one of the battling parties in the downtown, being beaten by the other, which controls all, or almost all de heights of Lisbon. The party that controls the Rotunda and the Tajo, and encased the enemy in downtown space, beat the adversary and won.

It is relevant for winning to have the Lisbon urban proletariat with the battling party. They control the street with the “a artilharia civil”, “civilian artillery” civilians armed with makeshift bombs, to throw them at the opponent’s armed forces. They constricted the opponent’s manoeuvre and created one more condition for its defeat. Given that the Lisbon East and West heights were in general proletarian land, the side that assured the proletarian support, in general, won the fight.

The rebels who occupied the Rotunda needed nothing more to make offensive operations. They could be positioned defensively and wait for the action of the government, which needed to show it had control of the city.

All these battles show that indeed there never have been a stable regime in the Portuguese 1st Republic. The Portuguese 1st Republic was never a regime, only a way to something else, never achieved, a long revolutionary process, an unstable situation, and in sum, as Fernando Pessoa said, an *Interregnum*.

THE DESTRUCTION OF DUBLIN FROM 1916-22

Lar JOYE (Ireland)

Synopsis: “The Destruction of Dublin from 1916-22”

In my paper I examine 2 themes of the XLVIIIth Congress of the ICMH: battles in residential areas and their effects on the city during modern industrial period and Civil Wars, Revolution and Urban Warfare. From 1914 to 1922 Ireland experienced a World War, an insurrection, a war of independence and finally a Civil War. Dublin the capital city of Ireland took the brunt of these wars: during the 1916 Rising the British Army destroyed the city centre with artillery, in the War of Independence (1919-21) the Irish Republican Army burnt down historical buildings and finally the Irish Civil War (1922-23) started with the destruction of the Law Courts and Public Record Office as the newly created Free State Army attacked the anti-treaty forces there. I will look at the city that was destroyed from 1916 to 1922, the impact it had on Irish History and discuss the recent discovery of the artillery guns the first shot of the Irish Civil War.

1. The Destruction of Dublin from 1916-22

From 1912 to 1922 Ireland experienced a World War, an insurrection, a war of independence and finally a Civil War. Dublin the capital city of Ireland took the brunt of these wars. During the 1916 Rising the British Army destroyed the city centre with artillery including the General Post Office (GPO). In the War of Independence (1919-1921), the Irish Republican Army burnt down government buildings including the Custom House and the British Army destroyed houses, villages and much of Cork City. Finally, the Irish Civil War (1922-23) started with the destruction of the Four Courts and National Archive as the newly created Free State Army attacked the anti-government forces who opposed the peace treaty with the British Government. This led to destruction to large parts of Dublin of 7 years along with the GPO, Custom House and Four Courts which when you visit the city today has disappeared and the city was rebuilt. In this paper I will examine the destruction of Dublin through those 3 buildings; GPO, the Custom House and the Four Courts which had been built during Georgian era when Ireland was ruled by England.

2. Georgian Dublin

Historian Ciaran Brady has described the 800-year English relationship with Ireland as “repeated spasms of violence, repression and exploitation alternated with periods of attempted reconciliation, reform and development – each interrupted by longer spells of indifference, irresponsibility and neglect”.¹ During the 18th Century Dublin was a city of contrasts, the beautiful buildings and squares of Dublin have been described as “gorgeous Mask of Irelands Distress”, where a powerful wealthy Protestant aristocracy protected British interests in their own local parliament. The contrasted with the poor and mainly Catholic population. By 1750 the population of Dublin was 125,000 people making the city “the ninth largest in Europe more populous than Madrid or Berlin, about the same size as Milan”.² This was surprising given “Irelands peripheral location”³ and the fact was not a capital of an independent country.


From 1714 to 1830 when Four King Georges sat on the Throne in London and Dublin experienced “golden age for building in the city, as Dublin based dreamers made architectural history”.⁴ Central to this change was the Wide Streets Commission set up in 1758 to turn the old medieval city of Dublin into modern European City. During this time among the fine civic buildings and residential squares that were built three stood out; the Custom House (1791) the Four Courts (1802) and General Post Office (1815). Following on from the American revolution and French Revolution a Rebellion broke out in 1798 but was quickly suppressed in Dublin and moved to the counties outside the city where when it ended in September. It is estimated that 30,000 people had been killed. After this the British Government decided to take direct control of Ireland in 1801 and Ireland saw an economic decline throughout the 19th Century as Anglo-Irish Elite moved to London.

¹ Ciaran Brady, “Ireland : In the shadow of the fond abuser’ in Peter Furtado (editor), *Histories of Nations: how their identities were forged*, (London, 2012), p. 70.

² David Dickson, “Dublin – The making of a Capital City”, (London,2015) p 152.

³ *Ibid*, p. 152.

⁴ Trevor White, “A little History of Dublin”, (Newbridge, 2023) p. 53.



Map showing from the left Four Courts, GPO and Custom House (Dublin Port Archive)

3. World War One and the 1916 Rising

By 1900 Ireland had become a reluctant part of the British Empire but a Cultural Revolution (Gaelic revival) inspired a new generation of revolutionaries. The outbreak of World War 1 changed everything as it paused any plans for any form of Irish self-government or Home Rule which was placed on hold for the duration of the war. While over 200,000 Irish men volunteered to join the British Army, a small and secret organisation called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) decide to hold a rebellion. The IRB followed the principal that the enemy of my enemy is my friend and looked for weapons from Germany. The Rising started with an attempt to smuggle 20,000 Rifles from Germany but they were captured by the Royal Navy, ending the hope of country wide rebellion does. However, the rebellion went ahead in Dublin when 840 rebels took to the streets on Easter Monday, 24th April. The revolutionaries carried out a surprise attack on several historic buildings and based their headquarters in the General Post Office but were quickly surrounded by the mainly Irish Regiments of the British Army. More reinforcement arrived from England and by the end of the revolution there were 20,000 British Army soldiers in the city.

Prior to the Rising one of the leaders, a trade unionist James Conolly, argued that regular armies were ‘badly handicapped’ in urban fighting and that ‘really determined civilian revolutionists’ could be victorious”.⁵ Due to the preparations for the Battle of the Somme there were only 8 field artillery guns

⁵ Charles Townsend “Easter 1916 – The Irish Revolution”, (London, 2005), p. 112.


in Ireland held in a barracks in Athlone in the centre of Ireland. Lt John O’Beirne one of the many Irish Roman Catholics in the British Army brought 4 artillery guns to Dublin where they began to bombard the rebel positions around the GPO on the Wednesday 26th April, the third day of the Rising. Fire took hold in the city as buildings containing newspaper printing presses, paint stores and heating oil and the Dublin Fire Brigade could not put them out due to the fighting. One rebel Oscar Traynor remembered “As far as I can remember, the shells started late on Wednesday. They were shrapnel shells, and the amazing thing was that instead of bullets coming in it was molten lead, actually molten, which streamed about on the ground when it fell”.⁶ Two large fires now raged in the city at Henry Street and Sackville Street⁷ and they joined up on Thursday 27th April in what the Chief Superintendent of the Fire Brigade Thomas Purcell described as the “the Great Fire”.⁸ The next day the GPO now on fire was evacuated by the rebels and after 6 days they were forced to surrender. The British Army artillery and subsequent fires destroyed 200 buildings costing £2.5 million.⁹ A week of urban warfare had left 500 people dead and 2,614 wounded, the majority killed were 276 civilians including 35 children. The citizens of Dublin were shocked that the British Army would destroy what they still felt was the second city of the Empire with artillery fire. However, although taken by surprise the response from the British Army was fast, well thought out and by using overwhelming firepower ended the rebellion, proving James Connolly wrong in the assessment of regular armies being handicapped in urban fighting. The leadership of the Rising were tried in military courts, with 90 sentenced to death but this stopped after 16 executions. This was due to the fact the execution policy changed public opinion which had initially supported the British Government and now demanded full Independence and the creation of a Republic.

⁶ Bureau of Military History Witness Statement, Oscar Traynor No 340, p. 16.

⁷ Sackville Street was renamed in 1924 O’Connell street in honor of the 19th Century nationalist Daniel O’Connell.

⁸ Las Fallon, “Dublin fire Brigade and the Irish Revolution”, (South Dublin Libraries, 2012), p. 42

⁹ Lorcan Collins, “1916 The rising Handbook”, (Dublin, 2016), p. 112.



Insurance map of the destroyed area around the GPO

4. War of Independence

The War of Independence (January 1919 to July 1921) remained essentially a guerrilla war that followed a format that we saw throughout the 20th Century. The conflict has been described by Dutch Historian Joost Augusteijn as “not a consequence of careful planning or design but a result of a mixture of coincidence, unintended outcomes and local initiatives”.¹⁰ Throughout the war as well as ambushes and shootings the Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacked telegraph lines, dug trenches to restrict British Army movement and burnt 200 police stations and tax offices. In an effect they used the land as a fifth column¹¹ with the aim to make Ireland ungovernable.

¹⁰ Joost Augusteijn, “Military conflict in the War of Independence” in John Crowley et al, “Atlas of the Irish revolution (Cork University Press, 2017), p. 348.

¹¹ Justin Dolan Stover, “Enduring Ruin – Environmental destruction during the Irish Revolution”, (Dublin 2022).

The police force called the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) also attacked buildings, in particular by burning creameries, this started in North Tipperary from 9th April 1920 at Rearchcross with 18 creameries destroyed during the war in that county and 48 overall in Ireland. To help the RIC an Auxiliary Division was created in July 1920 to support them and at its height it had a full strength of over 2,000, broken into 22 companies. It was one of these Auxiliary units, K Company, that was involved in largest unofficial reprisal when over the night of 11th & 12th December in Cork City 57 buildings were burnt down, covering over 5 acres of land costing €2,500,000 and the loss of 2,00 jobs.¹²

As the British Army became more involved in the war in 1920, they attacked 90 towns where they are based in retaliation. A policy of official reprisals was introduced in December 1920 when martial law was imposed in Counties Kerry, Cork, Limerick Tipperary and later extended to Clare and Waterford. The first official reprisal occurred in Middleton County Cork on 29th December 1920 when 6 houses were destroyed as a response to an earlier ambush. Internationally reprisals effected public opinion, indeed “Photographs of ruined buildings provided the sorriest of commentaries on British administration of Ireland at a time when imperialism was at its least popular and the rights of small nations uppermost”.¹³

In Dublin during January 1921 the IRA under political pressure from Eamon de Valera, President of the Dáil Eireann (The revolutionary parliament) decided to move away from small attacks to a large -scale attack to grab world attention to Ireland. The Custom House was the headquarters of the Local Government Board for Ireland and held historically important tax information on Ireland and it was decided to destroy it. The attack happened on 25th May 1921 with over 100 IRA volunteers attacking the building with pistols, capturing the staff and burning a elegant building of the 18th Century. The British Army and Police responded very quickly and a gun battle began while the building burned. Outgunned over 80 IRA volunteers were captured, 5 killed and 5 civilians killed. The leader of the attack writing 20 years letter that “the story of the destruction of the Custom House is one of brave endeavour as well as one of outstanding success. To it has been ascribed, rightly or wrongly, the ending of the war with the forces of occupation”¹⁴. This view is still supported by some historian but Professor Diarmaid Ferriter argues it was a “military fiasco”¹⁵while Henry Robison of the Local

¹² “The Burning of Cork” in John Crowley et al, “Atlas of the Irish revolution (Cork University Press, 2017), p. 382-383.

¹³ Michael Hopkinson “The Irish War of Independence”, (Dublin 2002), p. 80.

¹⁴ Bureau of Military History Witness Statement, Oscar Traynor No 340, p 67.

¹⁵ Diarmuid Ferriter, “A Nation and not a Rabble, the Irish revolution 1913-1923.

Government Board of Ireland at the time felt it was “probably the stupidest thing Sinn Fein ever did”.¹⁶



Custom House on fire (Dublin Port Archive)

5. The Irish Civil War

During the Summer of 1921 a Truce was agreed between Irish nationalists and the British Government and peace breaks out in Ireland. In the autumn of 1921 negotiations began on a Treaty between Britain and Ireland in London. The Treaty was eventually passed by the Dáil (the Irish Parliament) on 7th January 1922 by a vote of 64 votes to 57 and a Provisional Government was created to administer the new small nation which was called the Irish Free State. Sadly, the Treaty caused a split in the IRA over 70% of the IRA still want to fight for full independence and create a modern Republic. On 26th March the IRA leadership held an Army Convention in Dublin and voted to repudiate the Treaty, on 14th April they took over the main complex in Dublin called the Four Courts, along with several other historical buildings. A standoff occurs and eventually Pro-treaty forces under increasing British political pressure and now forming a government bring in artillery to open fire on the Four Courts. Thus, beginning the Irish Civil War and over 3 days from 28-30 June the buildings are destroyed including the National Archives of Ireland. In 1860's Public Records Act (Ireland) created a national archive to

¹⁶ Pdraig Yeates, “City In Turmoil: Dublin 1919-21 (Dublin, 2012), p. 275.

collect admin, court, probate and census records and a new building opened with enormous 6 storey building with 100,000 sq feet of shelving covering 700 years of history. During the bombardment Anti-Treaty forces stored ammunition there and since then a debate has raged over who was responsible for the explosion. We do know that on 30th June 1922 explosions destroyed the Four Courts and the archive building wiping out 700 years of Irish history. As the Four Courts is on fire the fighting moves to Upper Sackville Street near where the main fighting had occurred during the 1916 Rising. Now the top end of that street is destroyed including the Gresham, Granville and Hammam hotels. When the fighting in Dublin had ended on 5th July 80 buildings had been destroyed and 80 people killed which included 35 civilians. The Civil War ends in April 1923 with over 1150 homicides, executions and deaths as result of gunshots including over 77 Anti treaty volunteers executed under the Emergency Powers Bill. It divided the nation and for many years the two leading political parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail represented the opposing sides of the Civil War.




Explosion of the Four Courts. (National Museum of Ireland)

Conclusion

In conclusion the destruction of such a large part of Dublin City over 7 years of war by 3 different fighting forces: the British Army, the Irish Republican Army and the Free State Army left a large 2 km sq metre destroyed area in central Dublin along with 282 buildings. The fires in Dublin during 1916 and 1922 were started by small number of 18pdr Field Artillery Guns, while outside the Capital City, the British army had attacked 90 towns and Cork City during the War of Independence. The IRA used petrol and fire to destroy the Custom House.

Debates occurred in 1920's about how the buildings should be rebuilt and the city remodeled however in the end and for mainly financial reasons it was decided to rebuild modern if cheaper versions of the GPO, Customs House and Four Courts. In many ways the citizens of Dublin after the trauma of 7 years of fighting during of Dublin wanted their city to look like it did before 1916 and not to have a new city to represent the ambitions of new nation state.



18pdr Field Artillery Gun Used During the Irish Civil War

Over the last 10 years Ireland has had a Decade of Centenaries Programme which is ending this year. The focus has been on the different traditions on the island of Ireland and the initiative provided opportunities to focus on the everyday experience of ordinary people living in extraordinary times, as well as on the leaders and key actors in these events. It also aimed to offer fresh insights and constructive dialogue, and to foster deeper mutual understanding among people from the different traditions. As part of this fresh insights program in 2022 the National Archives launched with Trinity College Dublin “Beyond 2022: Irelands virtual record treasury”¹⁷ which aims to create a virtual reconstruction of the National Archive that was destroyed in 1922. This year after 7 years of research and restoration work, the 18pdr field artillery gun that fired the first shot of the Civil War, located in a field outside Washington DC in 2016,¹⁸ was placed on display at the National Museum of

¹⁷ <https://www.nationalarchives.ie/our-archives/collaborative-projects/beyond-2022-irelands-virtual-record-treasury/>.

¹⁸ Kenneth L Smith-Christmas “9168- Ivy Patc Gun Launch “ICOMAM Magazine Issue 29 June 2023, pp 16 to 20. <https://icomam.mini.icom.museum/the-magazine/>.

Ireland by the Irish Defence Forces.¹⁹ Finally in 2018 Ireland signed the Hague Convention²⁰ and committed itself to protect historical buildings, libraries, museums and archives in time of war. The destruction of the GPO, Custom House and Four Courts would now be treated as a war crime.

¹⁹ Return of 18pdr guns used in the Bombardment of Four Courts. <https://www.museum.ie/en-IE/Press-and-Media-Information/Latest-Media-Releases/09-February,-2023-The-18pdr-Field-Gun-9168-Lost-an>.

²⁰ Comdt Lar Joye (AR) The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Impact of Hague Convention Act, 2017 in Defence Forces Review 2020, pp. 212-219.

WAR AND THE CITY: THE BRITISH IN OCCUPATION OF ISTANBUL, 1918-23

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Daniel WHITTINGHAM (Great Britain)

Introduction

This paper explores the topic of “War and the City” using the example of Britain’s role in the Entente’s occupation of Constantinople/Istanbul between 1918 and 1923.¹ The official historian Cyril Falls noted that “The conclusion of peace with Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne actually took four years and nine months, which was nine months longer than the war [with the Ottoman Empire 1914-18] had lasted.”² The British force of occupation – the Army of the Black Sea – demonstrates the growth of Britain’s reach, and the extent of its liabilities. It also allows us to see the interconnectedness of Britain’s problems, which are so often examined in isolation from one another. The Army of the Black Sea’s responsibilities stretched from Salonika to Constantinople, to Anatolia, to the Caucasus, and beyond to the Trans-Caspian and the Russian Civil War.

This paper will firstly assess the British army in its role as an occupying force. It will secondly look at the relationship between the British occupation and the complex geopolitical questions concerning the fate of the remnant of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. Thirdly, it will show how the army grappled with new responsibilities, as Constantinople became the centre of a major humanitarian crisis. Fourthly, the history of the Army of the Black Sea also demonstrates the fragility of inter-Allied relations, as diverging interests and mutual suspicion produced considerable friction. Finally, the paper will briefly explore the 1922 Chanak/Çanakkale Crisis, “Britain’s gravest strategic crisis between the 1918 Armistice and Munich”.³ The paper shows that the occupation’s success was limited. With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the British hoped that the ‘Eastern Question’, which hinged on the strategically vital Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits, had

¹ The British referred to the city as Constantinople, and this name will be used throughout for consistency.

² Cyril Falls, *History of the Great War... Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine: From June 1917 to the End of the War*, Part II (London: Macmillan, 1930), 625.

³ John R. Ferris, “‘Far Too Dangerous a Gamble’? British Intelligence and Policy During the Chanak Crisis, September-October 1922”, in *Power and stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865-1965*, eds. Erik Goldstein and B.J. McKercher, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 136. This crisis was referred to as the Chanak Crisis by contemporary observers and will be so called here for consistency. The city is called Çanakkale in Turkish.

been solved once and for all. However, the Army of the Black Sea could not enforce implementation of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). Neither could the Greeks, later described by Churchill as Britain's "proxy" from 1919 onwards.⁴ Britain was forced to climb down in the Chanak Crisis, precipitating the fall of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George; and in 1923 the Army of the Black Sea evacuated Constantinople and the Straits. However, despite all that, the agreement over control of the Straits proved workable, and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) was the most successful of all the peace treaties.

The Army of the Black Sea is somewhat underrepresented in the literature. The war diaries are incomplete but still in decent shape.⁵ The British official historian of the First World War, James Edmonds, wrote a volume each on the occupations of Germany and Constantinople, but only the former was sanctioned. Edmonds wrote the latter in summer 1944; but it remained in the archives until 2010, and consequently is rarely cited.⁶ In terms of modern scholarship, most books on the end of the Ottoman Empire tend to view the 1922 departure of the last Sultan, Mehmet VI Vahdettin, merely as a tragic postscript. However, some recent studies have sought to redress the balance by looking at the empire's final years in more detail.⁷ The Chanak Crisis deserves more attention than it has received: David Walder's book remains the only full length study.⁸ Nur Bilge Criss has written on Istanbul under the Allies, but this is the story of a city under foreign occupation, rather than a military history.⁹ Daniel-Joseph MacArthur-Seal has also written extensively on the occupation period, combining social, cultural, political, and military perspectives.¹⁰ The Turkish War of Independence is a central event in Turkish historiography, but it is less well served in the English language literature. Edward Erickson's recent book remedies that deficiency, although it is centred on the Nationalist experience and focuses less on the British side.¹¹ This paper

⁴ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*, (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1929), 377.

⁵ The National Archives (TNA), War Office: First World War and Army of Occupation War Diaries, WO 95.

⁶ James Edmonds, *History of the Great War... The Occupation of Constantinople 1918-1923*, (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2010).

⁷ Ryan Gingeras, *The Last Days of the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Allen Lane, 2022); Michelle Tusan, *The Last Treaty: Lausanne and the End of the First World War in the Middle East*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

⁸ David Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, (London: Hutchinson, 1969).

⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, *Istanbul Under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923*, (Boston: Brill, 1999).

¹⁰ Daniel-Joseph MacArthur-Seal, *Britain's Levantine Empire, 1914-1923*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

¹¹ Edward J. Erickson, *The Turkish War of Independence: A Military History, 1919-1923*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2021). The British used the terms "Nationalists" and "Kemalists" to describe the troops fighting under Mustafa Kemal's Ankara Government. This will be the terminology used here.

forms part of a larger book project, that will examine the “wars after the war” in the Ottoman Empire and its successor states, from the point of view of the British and British military strategy.¹²

Britain as Occupier

The Ottoman Empire recognised defeat in autumn 1918. The Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30 October 1918. Clause 1 provided for the opening of the Straits and allowed the British to occupy the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts. Clause 7 gave the Allies “the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.”¹³ This, as it turned out, could be (and was) interpreted liberally by the Allied powers. The Ottoman delegation asked that “there may be no question of occupying Constantinople unless some definite necessity arises”. Again, this gave the latitude to formalise the occupation of the city in due course.¹⁴

The British established their headquarters in the Military School at Pera on 17 December. General Sir George Milne took command of what would officially, from 13 May 1919, be called the Army of the Black Sea.¹⁵ The objects of the occupation were twofold: to ensure fulfilment of the Armistice terms (and ultimately the peace terms), and to safeguard Constantinople and the strategically vital Straits.¹⁶ On 11 January 1919, Milne was asked to assume responsibility for policing. As such, the Allies formed an International Police Commission and later, an Inter-Allied Military Court (in September 1919). An Inter-Allied Commission was set up “to deal with questions that arise under the Armistice”, and other commissions were put in place to deal with issues such as prisoners of war and sanitation.¹⁷

Later accounts described the feelings of optimism that existed in the aftermath of the British victory. Churchill later wrote that the mood in the Ottoman Empire as a result of defeat was: “let us be chastised by our old friend, England”. Milne believed that the British flag had been “held in honour from Merv to Smyrna”.¹⁸ However, at the time there were dissenting voices: these grew louder after the Greek landings at Smyrna/Izmir on 15 May 1919,

¹² Daniel Whittingham, *Britain and the Middle East After World War I: Policy, Strategy, and Military Operations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

¹³ Edmonds, *Constantinople*, 36.

¹⁴ TNA, Calthorpe to Admiralty, 31 October 1918, WO 106/1433.

¹⁵ Edmonds, *Constantinople*, 6.

¹⁶ TNA, The Army of the Black Sea, 6 December 1920, WO 106/1434.

¹⁷ Edmonds, *Constantinople*, 7-9

¹⁸ Churchill, *World Crisis: The Aftermath*, 360-361; Alfred Rawlinson, *Adventures in the Near East 1918-1922*, rev. ed., (London: Jonathan Cape, 1934), 108.

and the consolidation of the Nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal.¹⁹ Nur Bilge Criss has shown that in Constantinople, resistance to occupation was beginning to crystallise before the Greek landings, or Mustafa Kemal's famous landing at Samsun on 19 May. For example, the *Karakol* movement was already organising underground resistance.²⁰ W.H. Deedes, the British Military Attaché at Constantinople, noted on 15 December 1918 that until it was possible to send officers into the interior of the country, it would not be possible to get an accurate picture of the progress being made with Ottoman demobilisation. He was also keen that the British take every chance to impress upon the Turkish public "the extent of the Entente victory and the defeat of the Central Powers and here especially the part played therein by Great Britain. These are truths, as yet, little comprehended here."²¹

As 1919 wore on, it became increasingly apparent that the armistice was breaking down. British troops were involved in skirmishing on the railway at Eskişehir in September 1919.²² On the night of 26/27 January 1920, a band of Nationalists removed 8,500 rifles, 30 machine guns, and half a million rounds of small arms ammunition from stores on the Gallipoli Peninsula.²³ The Nationalists held Congresses in Erzurum (July-August 1919) and Sivas (4-11 September 1919), which laid the platform for the movement. In October, Milne established a line of delimitation for the Greek Army of Occupation. The 'Milne Line' was no peaceful border but an active military front. The Nationalists agreed to the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*), which set out the borders of a sovereign Turkish homeland and proclaimed its freedom from external interference. Worse still for the British, the Ottoman Chamber voted to agree to the National Pact on 28 January 1920.²⁴

Such breaches of the Armistice convinced the British that a formal, *de jure* military occupation of Constantinople was the only way to enforce compliance. On 5 March 1920, the instructions issued to Constantinople as agreed by the Supreme War Council noted that the peace terms being proposed needed to be imposed by force. The suggestion that a recurrence of breaches would justify harsher terms showed a hardening of attitudes.²⁵ The General Staff nonetheless issued a stark warning: "The position is one which can be dealt with politically more effectively than by military measures on the part

¹⁹ The Greek name is Smyrna; the Turkish name is Izmir.

²⁰ Criss, *Istanbul Under Allied Occupation*, 94-114.

²¹ TNA, Report from General Deedes, Constantinople, WO 106/1435.

²² TNA, Army of the Black Sea General Staff, War Diary, 18 September 1919, WO 95/4950.

²³ TNA, Thwaites to Hankey, 6 February 1920, CAB 24/97/76.

²⁴ Gingeras, *The Last Days*, 136-137, 139-140; Erickson, *Turkish War of Independence*, 48.

²⁵ TNA, Terms of Instructions Issued to the High Commissioner at Constantinople, 5 March 1920, CAB 24/100/5.

of the Allies. If it is to be dealt with militarily, protracted operations by fully equipped armies must be prepared for.” It was, the General Staff noted, undesirable to include in the peace treaty any conditions which the Allies were not prepared to enforce.²⁶

The plan for the occupation was worked out at a conference on 10 March. The occupation itself, on 16 March, met with no serious resistance. The British occupied the Ottoman War Office and Ministry of Marine, took control of the post and telegraph, and proclaimed military law. Preparations were thorough: Milne also ordered that British troops were not to enter any mosques, unless in case of urgent military necessity, and precautions were taken for the disarming of Ottoman troops, the prevention of fires, and the evacuation of any wounded. However, the attempt to arrest Cholak Kemal Bey, commander of the Ottoman 10th Division, led to a skirmish in which two Indian soldiers, and nine Turks, were killed, with several more wounded.²⁷ However, at a time when Britain was demobilising after the First World War, and faced with political instability in Ireland, India, and Egypt, further deepening the commitment could not be contemplated.

British troops stationed along the Anatolian railway looked increasingly isolated and were in danger of becoming embroiled with Nationalist forces. Although there was concern at the War Office about the security of Constantinople’s food supply, realities on the ground proved more pressing. Milne decided to withdraw the troops, with Brigadier-General Montague-Bates put in charge of the withdrawal operation. Nationalist bands demolished key bridges and skirmished with British troops, but the operation was completed on 27 March.²⁸

At San Remo, in April 1920, the Allied leaders decided the allocation of conquered territories of the Ottoman Empire as League of Nations Mandates. Ahead of the conference, on 1 April, the General Staff produced a memorandum which concluded that no settlement would be possible until Greek ambitions were curbed.²⁹ However, the Allies were trapped in a bind, wishing for a favourable peace settlement but lacking the means to enforce it. On 19 June 1920, the Nationalists attacked British positions around Ismid/Izmit.³⁰ As a result of the threat to Constantinople and the Straits, the Greeks exploited the opportunity to request British backing for an offensive. The Greek army commenced operations on 21 June, taking Bursa and

²⁶ TNA, General Staff, The Situation in Turkey, 15 March 1920, CAB 24/101/67.

²⁷ TNA, Army of the Black Sea General Staff, War Diary, 16 March 1920, WO 95/4950.

²⁸ TNA, Army of the Black Sea General Staff, War Diary, 27 March 1920, WO 95/4950.

²⁹ TNA, Greek Territorial Claims in Turkey, WO 32/5772.

³⁰ British documents call it “Ismid”, and this name will be used for consistency.

Adrianople/Edirne in July.³¹ After some delay, the British finally declared the occupation zone as an area of active operations, following Milne's legitimate protest that the army could hardly be run otherwise.³² However, in practice the British occupying force largely took on the role of observers, especially after the fall of the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos in November 1920. The events of spring and summer 1920 marked, as now seems clearer in hindsight, a point of no return for all sides. The formal military occupation of Constantinople could not be anything other than a deepening British commitment, while the Greek advance in summer 1920 saw them take more territory without finishing the war. For the Nationalists, the formal military occupation of Constantinople by the Entente, and the fall of Bursa to the Greeks, were propaganda gifts. As a result of the occupation, the Nationalists established their own government – the Grand National Assembly (*Büyük Millet Meclisi*) – in Ankara on 23 April.

In October 1920, Milne was succeeded in command by General Sir Charles Harington. Major-General Sir T.O. Marden was appointed his principal subordinate and tactical commander. Marden later wrote that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir Henry Wilson, told him that “You are going to the quietest part of the British Empire.”³³ It could well be that this was Wilson's famous sense of humour, for the contemporary documents reveal his anxiety regarding the growing vulnerability of the British position at Constantinople. In 1921, the occupying force tried to preserve neutrality as the struggle between the Greek and Nationalist armies reached its climactic phase. Meanwhile the British looked for a way out on favourable terms, but at the London Conference in early 1921, the Greek and Nationalist representatives refused to back down. The Greeks therefore launched further offensives under the personal command of the recently restored King Constantine I (1913-17; 1920-22). In July 1921 they captured Eskişehir, and in August they marched on Ankara. This was the climax of the war; the Nationalist victory on the Sakarya River (August-September 1921) meant that from now on, Mustafa Kemal had the initiative.³⁴

Wilson argued that the British force was now too weak to enforce peace terms and had to come away. According to his diary, he put this in his usual idiosyncratic fashion to the Cabinet on 1 June:

³¹ TNA, Diary of Main Events in the Near East Since the Armistice, 4 November 1922, WO 106/1416.

³² Edmonds, *Constantinople*, 12.

³³ T.O. Marden, ‘With the British Army in Constantinople: A Personal Narrative’, *Army Quarterly*, XXVI (1933), 265.

³⁴ Erickson, *Turkish War of Independence*, 179-238.

“Winston [Churchill] wanted to reinforce Constantinople and make a “posture”, and then try to come to terms with Kemal. Curzon [British Foreign Secretary, 1919-24] wanted to open negotiations with the Greeks and Turks, and Lloyd George did not know what he wanted. I said that the positions out there and in Ireland were substantially the same, and the choice of solutions the same, i.e. either knock the gentleman on the head – or – come out. In Ireland we *must* knock the gentleman on the head so we *can't* come out. In Turkey we *can't* knock the gentleman on the head and so we *must* come out – but come out and make love to Kemal [Emphasis in original].”³⁵

The Greeks, in the words of Michael Llewellyn Smith, were now “trapped in a maze with no exit”, unable to win the war but also unwilling to abandon their gains. In 1922 they precipitated a crisis with Britain by redeploying troops to Thrace, prompting British concerns of a threat to Constantinople. As Llewellyn Smith has noted, this was a desperate gamble to get out of the war, but the Greeks’ bluff was called. Harington insisted on the inviolability of the neutral zone around the Straits.³⁶ The redeployment left the Greeks more vulnerable to defeat when the Nationalist offensive finally came. It also provided a precedent for Britain to again insist on the inviolability of the neutral zone after the Greeks had been defeated and they came face-to-face with the victorious Nationalist army.

Geopolitics

The military situation had deteriorated in large part because of the Allies’ unwillingness or inability to untangle the complex mess of problems posed by the post-war Middle East. Constantinople sat at the heart of a range of complex geopolitical questions relating to the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. Peace across the wider region depended on the Entente’s ability to draw up and enforce a successful treaty. This was the crux of the problem.

The situation of the British at Constantinople was negatively affected by the precedence given to making peace with Germany. Given that for Britain Germany had been the principal opponent, this is perhaps not surprising; but the unprecedented difficulties of peace-making caused significant delays. Peace with Germany was signed on 28 June 1919, but British policymakers remained tied up in questions surrounding the execution of its terms,

³⁵ C.E. Callwell, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, II, (London: Cassell, 1927), 294.

³⁶ Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922*, new ed., (London: Hurst, 1998), 266, 277-280.

especially the imposition of reparations. This helped to delay the Ottoman treaty until 1920, and even then, the minutes of international conferences designed to discuss the Turkish question show how other matters repeatedly intruded. For example, although the conference at San Remo was summoned primarily to discuss the Ottoman treaty, several issues relating to the peace with Germany required attention, especially the reparations question.³⁷

The position of Constantinople itself had of course been at the centre of the so-called 'Eastern Question' for over a century. The Dardanelles Offensive in 1915 had opened the question of how the spoils of war would be divided in the event of victory. The Russians claimed the city, and this was supported by the British and French. However, the Dardanelles Campaign failed, and Russia dropped out of the war. The British now enjoyed an unprecedented opportunity to remake the map of the Near East. However, it was easier to agree on some form of international control for the Straits than to decide whether the Sultan should be allowed to remain in the city; in the Cabinet, the discussions began to heat up in late 1919 once the peace with Germany was concluded, and it became clear that the USA would not take on a League of Nations Mandate. Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, favoured expulsion, whereas Edwin Montagu (Secretary of State for India, 1917-22) led the opposition. The armed forces generally supported Montagu.³⁸ Curzon believed that Turkey's presence on the vital strategic point of the Straits had not done any good. He also believed that the Turkish Nationalists would be harder to defeat if they possessed Constantinople than if they were confined to Anatolia. The Allies could also settle the cause of intrigues which had led to war – such as the Straits question – once and for all.³⁹ Montagu conveyed Indian opinion, including the concern that depriving the Turks of their capital would represent a dangerous interference with the Caliphate. His arguments on the question of resourcing also made sense: as he put it in his memorandum of 18 December 1919, "The Government is continually seeking means of economy. I know of nothing which will make for greater expenditure than to make a peace which will involve us in large military commitments."⁴⁰ Curzon was forced to admit defeat in January 1920.

Britain and the Ottoman Empire finally signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920. The terms were harsh. The Treaty imposed a series of military and financial restrictions. It also divided the remnant of the Ottoman

³⁷ Rohan Butler and J.P.T. Bury, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 1st Series, Vol VIII, 1920*, (London: HMSO, 1958), 2.

³⁸ A.L. Macfie, 'The British Decision Regarding the Future of Constantinople, November 1918-January 1920', *Historical Journal*, 18, no.2 (1975), 391-392.

³⁹ TNA, Lord Curzon, The Future of Constantinople, 4 January 1920, CAB 24/95/95.

⁴⁰ TNA, Edwin Montagu, The Turkish Peace, 18 December 1919, CAB 24/95/27.

Empire into Entente zones of influence; and envisaged the creation of an independent Armenia and Kurdistan. The treaty further discredited the Ottoman regime, while providing more fuel for the Nationalist cause.⁴¹

Humanitarian Crisis

The example of the Army of the Black Sea also shows how armed forces were forced to take on a range of tasks that stretched far beyond the narrowly military, in the unstable and often violent aftermath of the First World War. Constantinople became the centre of a serious humanitarian crisis, and the Allies had to feed the city's population, as well as cope with an influx of refugees from the Russian Civil War.

The Bolsheviks seized power in the October/November Revolution of 1917. On 3 March 1918 they signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the First World War. Britain's initial intervention in Russia was launched to keep open an Eastern Front against Germany. Following the Armistice, Britain continued to support the White opposition to the Bolsheviks. The British felt that they could not abandon the White armies they had been supporting; there was also some expectation, especially in 1919, that the Bolsheviks would collapse, and the former Russian Empire would break up. Britain's policy was fraught with contradictions: there was never a coherent policy regarding how much to give the Whites, and it was not possible to square Britain's support for the new republics that formed in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Russian Empire with the fact that the Whites favoured the restoration of Russian control over these same republics. In January 1919, Lloyd George proposed a conference to be held on the Princes Islands in the Sea of Marmara, but this idea did not get far: the Whites refused to talk to the Bolsheviks, and lack of Allied unity also doomed the project.⁴²

In mid-1919 it did indeed appear that the Whites would triumph; but the Reds counterattacked and pushed back Anton Denikin's army on the Southern Front. In March 1920, Milne travelled from Constantinople to oversee preparations for the evacuation of White soldiers and civilians from Novorossisk on the Russian Black Sea Coast. The Bolsheviks entered the city on 27 March.⁴³ Denikin relinquished command to Pyotr Wrangel in April. The end of the Polish-Soviet War allowed the Bolsheviks to focus on the

⁴¹ *Treaty of Peace with Turkey*, (London: HMSO, 1920).

⁴² Richard H. Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921*, 3 vols., (Princeton: University Press, 1961-73). On Prinkipo, see Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations*, II, 115-116.

⁴³ TNA, Army of the Black Sea General Staff, War Diary, Outline Diary of Events During Commander-in-Chief's Visit to Novorossisk, WO 95/4950.

reconquest of the Crimea: Wrangel's main achievement was the November 1920 evacuation of most of his army, the second major wave to arrive at Constantinople.⁴⁴

As a result of these evacuations, there were 30-40,000 Russian refugees in Constantinople in 1921; possibly as many as 90,000. In the words of Pinar Üre, "White Russians, while they were escaping from one collapsed empire, found themselves in the political turmoil of yet another collapsing empire."⁴⁵ The challenge was considerable: the British had struggled to keep the city's population fed in 1920, even without this vast influx. As the General Staff noted on 24 March 1920, "We are running a great risk of having this City, cut off from all its victualling grounds by the Nationalists, being left helpless and turbulent on our hands."⁴⁶ The British and French authorities provided shelter and supplies for the refugees, but this was a considerable and largely unprecedented undertaking. Many of these White Russians subsequently moved on, but some of them elected to stay, and ultimately take Turkish citizenship and names.⁴⁷

Inter-Allied Tensions

Fourthly, as the example of this humanitarian activity shows, the British had to work with their coalition partners; but the story of the occupation is one of increasing inter-Allied tension. The challenges of peace-making led to Anglo-French friction. Mutual suspicion grew more acute: the war against Germany had concentrated minds, but now wartime promises over the division of the Ottoman Empire had to be honoured. This tension was manifested from the strategic all the way to the local level.

At Constantinople, General (later Marshal) Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, commander of Allied Army of the Orient, became increasingly unpopular among the British. Franchet d'Espèrey staged his triumphal entry into Constantinople on 8 February 1919. The exact division of command responsibilities between he and Milne caused friction, and although Milne was subordinate to Franchet d'Espèrey, there was some dispute over the extent to which the former could take decisions over military matters without reference to the latter. The British also believed that Franchet d'Espèrey was interfering in British business by attempting to micromanage. By 13 February 1919, Milne was complaining to the War Office that "Continued action of this nature

⁴⁴ Evan Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War*, rev. ed., (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2008), 374.

⁴⁵ Pinar Üre, 'Remnants of Empires: Russian Refugees and Citizenship Regime in Turkey, 1923-1938', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 56 no.2 (2020), 207.

⁴⁶ TNA, Minute, Victualling of Constantinople, 24 March 1920, WO 32/5621.

⁴⁷ Üre, 'Remnants of Empires', 207-221.

will undermine our position in Turkey as General D'Esperey is posing as a Military Dictator over the whole of Turkey."⁴⁸

Of course, the British were not innocent victims here. They wanted to keep the French out of "Turkey in Asia". For example, Lloyd George believed that Britain's preponderant role in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire meant that it was entitled to a greater say in the peace settlement. There is no doubt that the British gave back as much as they got, but by January 1920, relations had broken down completely, with Milne complaining to the War Office that he would be unable to respond to any crisis if he needed to do so under the command of Franchet d'Espèrey.⁴⁹

As the Treaty of Sèvres unravelled, the British and French disagreed over the question of whether to come to terms with the Nationalists. On 20 October 1921, Henry Franklin-Bouillon signed the Treaty of Ankara with the Nationalists, effectively ending France's war. This prompted furious reaction in Britain. The British believed that the French had signed a separate peace, contrary to their alliance obligations. Curzon called it "an act of great treachery".⁵⁰ Anglo-French relations would reach something of a nadir in 1922, as Britain's occupation of Constantinople reached its crisis point.

The Chanak Crisis

The Chanak Crisis of 1922 was the most serious diplomatic crisis the British faced between 1918 and the Munich Crisis in 1938. Kemal waited until the Nationalist forces were ready before launching his offensive (now called the Great Offensive, *Büyük Taarruz*), which began on 26 August 1922. This decisive victory drove the Greek army from Anatolia and uncovered the British position on the Straits. British and Turkish troops faced each other in a tense stand-off.

The Cabinet met on 7 September to discuss the developing crisis. There was some confidence that Harington's force was sufficient to discourage an uprising, and that the fleet would deter the Nationalists from attacking. However, the gravity of the situation was apparent: as Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, noted, "If the Turks take the Gallipoli Peninsula and Constantinople, we shall have lost the whole fruits of our victory". It was agreed that any attempt on the city would be resisted.⁵¹ By 15 September, it was clear that the city could not be held by a skeleton force.

⁴⁸ TNA, Milne to War Office, 13 February 1919, WO 32/5606.

⁴⁹ TNA, Milne to War Office, 29 January 1920, CAB 24/97/40.

⁵⁰ Quoted in David Gilmour, *Curzon: Imperial Statesman*, rev. ed., (London: Penguin 2019), 533.

⁵¹ TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet, 7 September 1922, CAB 23/31/1.

Austen Chamberlain neatly summed up the collapsing assumptions of British policy since 1918:

“Previously the argument had been that if we held Gallipoli we could send forces into the Marmora [sic], that these forces could dominate Constantinople and so dominate Turkey. Was this true? We were now at Constantinople and we did not appear to be able to dominate Turkey.”⁵²

The Cabinet decided to reinforce. The War Office gave Harington his instructions. He was advised that:

“... the foundation of British policy in that region was the Gallipoli Peninsula and the freedom of the Straits. It was of the highest importance that Chanak should be held effectively for this. Apart from its military importance, Chanak had now become a point of great moral significance to the prestige of the Empire. It would be regarded as a valuable achievement if it could be held. A blow at Chanak would be a blow at Great Britain alone, whereas, Constantinople and Ismid were of international consequence, affecting the whole of the Allies. In comparison with Chanak, the Cabinet regarded Constantinople as second and Ismid as third The Ismid Peninsula was regarded by the Cabinet as at once the most difficult to hold and if lost, as the least fatal.”⁵³

However, the British found that they were on their own. The French and Italians would not permit their troops to be embroiled. Curzon travelled to Paris to meet French Premier Poincaré, but their conversations grew heated; at one point on 22 September, a shaking Curzon walked out of the council room.⁵⁴ Nor would the Empire come to Britain’s aid; Churchill’s appeal to imperial solidarity received a cool reception. The crisis also played out against a rising tide of criticism at home. The *Daily Mail* printed its call to “Stop This New War!” on 18 September – this was certainly the most hostile comment, but the Lloyd George Government was undoubtedly vulnerable.⁵⁵

The peak of the crisis occurred when Turkish cavalry crossed the neutral zone boundary on 23 September. There were daily conferences as Cabinet Ministers decided on a response. Military opinion weighed heavily. At a meeting on 25 September the CIGS, the Earl of Cavan, “explained it was not the military policy to withdraw from Constantinople before we were

⁵² TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet, 15 September 1922, CAB 23/31/2.

⁵³ TNA, Meeting of a Conference of Ministers, 20 September 1922, CAB 23/31/3.

⁵⁴ Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, III, (London: Ernest Benn, 1928), 304.

⁵⁵ Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, 228-231.

compelled to do so.” However, he expressed his concerns: “It was certain that as soon as an attack on Constantinople was developed there would be a simultaneous rising in the city”, he noted, “and in fact our General was operating from a hostile capital.” The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, noted that any interference with shipping on the Bosphorus, as a pre-emptive measure against attack, might be unduly provocative and precipitate a crisis.⁵⁶

The Cabinet decided on a hard line: as David Walder put it, despite everything “they were resolved to embark upon a war with Turkey over a city which they were prepared to give up to the Turks and a neutral zone which was disavowed by nearly all the nations which had created it.”⁵⁷ On 29 September, Ministers authorised Harington to use force. They pressed on after hearing Cavan’s decisive intervention regarding the potentially disastrous consequences of delay: it might put the small British force in jeopardy, the Nationalists would gain a further manpower advantage, and countermarching orders would cause confusion.⁵⁸

Harington sat on the authorisation to issue the ultimatum. Instead, he opted for negotiation, and signed the Armistice of Mudanya on 11 October. Harington as the ‘man on the spot’ took the key decisions. His resolution has been praised for saving Britain from war, but his game of bluff ran considerable risks.⁵⁹ The *Daily Mail* claimed that Harington had brought back “peace with honour” – an often-used phrase now more associated with the Munich Crisis 16 years later.⁶⁰ Harington later wrote of the gambles taken by both sides during the crisis: “The Turk was not bluffing at that moment; he was elated with victory and far from tired.”⁶¹ The decision to negotiate had been the correct one: war was in neither side’s best interests.

War and the city had brought about the fall of the British government: Lloyd George resigned on 19 October. At Lausanne, a hundred years ago this year, the long war in Turkey finally came to an end. The Ottoman Empire was one of its casualties, the Sultan departing the city on a British boat in November 1922. On 2 October 1923, the British flag was lowered at Constantinople, and Harington and his men returned to Britain, in what he later called “a wonderful ‘send off’ from a so-called enemy country.”⁶²

⁵⁶ TNA, Meeting of the Cabinet, 25 September 1922, CAB 23/31/4.

⁵⁷ Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, 285.

⁵⁸ TNA, Meeting of a Conference of Ministers, 29 September 1922, CAB 23/31/5.

⁵⁹ Ferris, ‘Far Too Dangerous a Gamble’, 148-149.

⁶⁰ Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, 319.

⁶¹ Charles Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, (London: John Murray, 1940), 153.

⁶² Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, 139

Conclusion

The use of armed force was vital to the execution of British strategy; but the example of the occupation of Constantinople also shows the limits of British power. The carve-up of the Ottoman Empire presented immense possibilities for Britain, but it quickly became clear that the military liabilities were too extensive. The occupation of Constantinople was initially successful. The British also improvised a response to a major humanitarian crisis. However, the Treaty of Sèvres was by far the least successful of the treaties, because, as James Edmonds wrote in the official history, “A treaty is only effective as long as it can be enforced.”⁶³ The Chanak Crisis resulted in a bloody nose for Britain, and it helped bring down the Lloyd George Government. Paradoxically the outcome was the Treaty of Lausanne, the last and most durable of the peace treaties.

⁶³ Edmonds, Constantinople, 17.

INVASION OF IZMIR AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL STRUGGLE (1919-1922)*

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Prelude

The Mudros Armistice Agreement signed after the First World War, constituted the last link in the sequence of activities carried out to oust the Turks first from Europe and then from all of Anatolia, within the context of the “Eastern Question-Oriental Question”¹. Anatolia was shared by the Allied Powers and attempts of invasion started. In this fight for sharing, the Great Powers allowed Greece to go to İzmir to achieve its ambitions of grabbing a big bite.

* This proceeding contains some materials previously discussed in my master’s thesis with the title of 1919-1922 Yılları Arasında İzmir’de İktisadi Durum, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İzmir, 1998.

¹ Bülent Durgun, *Balkan Harbi’nde Osmanlı Ordusu’nun Ulaştırma Faaliyetleri (1912-1913)*, İsbankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, Nisan 2018, p. 2-6; Kemal Beydilli, “Şark Meselesi”, *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/sark-meselesi>, (25.01.2022); Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi V. Cilt*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 4. Baskı, Ankara, 1983, p. 203-204; Suat Muhtar, “Şark Meselesi”, *İstişare*, Cilt 1, Sayı 18, 14 Kanunusani 1324, s. 840-844; William L. Langer and Robert P. Blake, “The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and Its Historical Background”, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Apr., 1932), p. 468-505; Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question In Greece and Turkey*, Constable and Company Ltd, London, Bombay, Sydney, 1922, p. 160; Seymour Doğu Sorununu tarihin başlangıcına kadar dayandırmaktadır, bkz., Charles Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War 1870-1914*, Yale University Press, Tenth Printing, 1918, p. 194-195; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi VIII (Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri (1876-1907))*, 3. Baskı Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1988, s. 78-80; *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of Balkan Wars*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Division of Intercourse and Education, Washington D.C., 1914, p. 21; Norman Dwight Harris, “The Effect of the Balkan Wars on European Alliances and the Future of the Ottoman Empire”, *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, Vol. 10, Tenth Annual Meeting (1913), p. 105-111; Stephen P. Duggan, “The Balkan Adjustment”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1913), p. 628, 645; Stephen P. Duggan, “Balkan Diplomacy I”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1917), p. 39; R. J. B. Bosworth, “Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent, Frank Cass&Co.Ltd., England and USA, 1996, p. 52; Ulrich Trumpener, “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent, Frank Cass&Co.Ltd., England and USA, 1996, p. 107-126; David Starr Jordan, “The Balkan Tragedy”, *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Oct., 1918), pp. 120-135.

Contrary to the spirit of the Mudros Armistice Agreement, the Greeks,² without spending a lot of effort and paying a price in the First World War, together with Izmir, took the biggest share from the “sick man of Europe” Ottoman Empire, on the grounds of the articles of the Treaty, with reasons that do not exist in reality. The unlawful invasion was tried to be camouflaged and legitimized technically, and under the auspices of the “Supreme Council” and under the protection of the ships of the Entente States, soldiers landed in Izmir.³ Venizelos expresses British support for the Greek invasion of Izmir as follows:⁴ “...The friendly relations between us started with the **Big Four**’s suddenly inviting me and asking: If we were capable of occupying Izmir? Yes, I answered and they gave the order to invade. I requested the escort of a British navy to the Greek convoy in order to prevent the possibility of an incident. The British Navy escorted the Greek convoy. Later, when I wanted to invade Eastern Thrace before the execution of the Treaty of Sevres, they gave a positive answer.

When the Greek representative in Istanbul, Mr. Katehaki, went to the British command to notify that Greek Army had received orders to invade Eastern Thrace and demanded the means of landing, which Greek Army did not have any in her inventory, the British staff confined all the means of landing at their disposal. Not satisfied with this, he sent one of the biggest battleships of the British Navy to protect the Eastern Thrace landing...Before the expiration of the six-month deadline given to Turkey for the execution of the Treaty of Sevres was over, I applied to the British Government and explained that we needed to prepare for the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres. What I wanted was, apart from the ammunition that had to be supplied, 3,500,000 sterling for the expenses of the war effort in Asia Minor and the participation of the British Air Force. Mr. Lloyd George explained that he found them quite natural. When was our friendly relationship not proven?”

Within the framework of its Great Ideal Megali Idea, Greece has gradually expanded its territory since 1821 and intensified its preparations to reach its goals in Western Anatolia.⁵ On the pretext of saving the Greek people

² Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (A Study in the Contact of Civilisations)*, Constable and Company Ltd., London, 1922, p. 79.

³ Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, p. 52.

⁴ E.K. Venizelos, *Küçükasya Felaketinden Kimler Mesuldür: Bugünkü İktisadi Müşküllerimizin Geç Kalmış Sebepleri*, Başvekil E.K. Venizelos’un üç tarihi demeci, Milli Matbaa, Atina, 1932, p. 34.

⁵ Hamdi Ertuna, Necati Ökse, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Megalo İdea*, Gnkur Basımevi, Ankara, 1985, p. 43-44; Mustafa Kemal, *Söylev (Nutuk) II*, Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1973, p. 453-454; Brian W. Beeley, “The Greek-Turkish Boundary: Conflict at the Interface”, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 3, No. 3, Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World (1978)*, p. 352.

living in Anatolia from the pressure of the Turks, the Greeks, who went to Izmir on May 15, 1919, did not encounter any intervention “to prevent regrettable events”, but from the first day, until they left Anatolia, murdering, torturing, raping, plundering and pilfering were kept.⁶ As a result of the massacres, thousands of Muslims were killed, forced to flee or left their ancestral homeland, and migrated to Anatolia. In the two years following the tragedy of the Invasion of Izmir, 325,000 Muslims left their homes, workplaces, fertile vineyards, shops and production areas and migrated to the mountains or to the interior of Anatolia.⁷

There was a total of 8 (eight) Greek divisions responsible for the invasion in the Izmir region⁸. In addition to this, İzmir Port and the roads extending from İzmir to the east (especially railways) had strategic importance in terms of supplying and reinforcing the Greek army in Anatolia. In this context, it is possible to say that most of the production opportunities and products are mobilized to the Greek army to feed and support the Greek army in the daily life of İzmir.

The provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Ottoman Delegate on 10 August 1920, regarding İzmir, were as follows:⁹

“İzmir Region: The borders of this region include the area of more or less Kuşadası, Ödemiş, Salihli, Akhisar, and Kemer pier. This region will remain under Turkish sovereignty, but Turkey will give the right to use this sovereignty to Greece. A Turkish flag will be found in one of the outer castles of Izmir as a sign of Turkish sovereignty (A strange sovereignty). The region will be administered by a commission consisting of British, French, and Italian representatives, and Greece and Turkey will each give a representative to the commission. A regional assembly (Izmir Parliament) will convene and this assembly will be able to make a referendum five years later and decide to add Izmir and its region to Greece for good. Thus, all rights and values in the region will belong to Greece; The symbolic sovereignty of Turkey, which is already displayed on paper and with a flag, will also come to an end. In addition, the Turks in these lands that will leave Turkey will also become Greek nationals.”

⁶ Talat Yalazan, *Türkiye’de Yunan Vahşet ve Soykırımı Girişimi I (15 Mayıs 1919-9 Eylül 1922)*, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1994, p. 1-18.

⁷ *Türkiye’de Yunan Fecaii Birinci Kitap*, Dâhiliye Nezareti Neşriyatı, Matbaayı Ahmet İhsan ve Şürekâsı, İstanbul, 1921, p. 16.

⁸ Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, Türkiye Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1960, p. 501.

⁹ Şerafettin Yamaner, *Sevr ve Lozan (Öncesi ve Sonrasıyla)*, Harp Akademileri Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p. 53-54.

It would be useful to remember Kazım Karabekir Pasha's assessment here.

“A perfect partition in themselves! A term for the gradual, that is, civilized extermination of the Turks in two or five years for İzmir! What is the need for two years for the Greeks! A few weeks after the announcement of the Greek administration, it can come into the presence of world civilization with a dirty face and is not ashamed of declaring that it is ready for the dream.”¹⁰

Some try to explain what was done as an attempt to get rid of the barbarians or as an attempt to take revenge.¹¹ In any case, the Turks have been harmed by this. During the invasion, commercial life was dominated by the minorities through which by foreign elements.¹² Under the shadow of the flags of the invading forces and ships, minorities and foreign elements were able to trade freely.¹³ Another important issue was that the Greek forces were financed by wealthy local Greeks who were then Ottoman citizens.¹⁴

Throughout history, İzmir has always been found valuable as a trade center, as it has been the gateway to Western Anatolia. The wealth of Western Anatolia was collected in İzmir -especially after the Industrial Revolution- and transferred to Europe and imperialist countries. The manufactured goods from Europe to İzmir were distributed and consumed in Anatolia, thus the region was caught in a double-sided exploitation grip. Local minorities and foreign groups called “Levantine” formed the main actors and the most profitable ones in this two-way trade conducted in İzmir. The great wealth of the hinterland was the economic reason that lay behind the scenes of the invasion of İzmir.¹⁵

¹⁰ Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, p. 721.

¹¹ Hanri Nahum, *İzmir Yahudileri*, İletişim yay., İstanbul, 2000, s. 197.

¹² Erkan Serçe, “Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında İzmir ve İzmir Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası”, *İzmir Ticaret Odası Tarihi (19. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla)*, p. 69; Süleyman Vasfı (Adıyaman), “Bir Gümrükçünün İşgal Yılları Anıları”, *Üç İzmir*, p. 255; Zafer Toprak, “Yayınlanmamış Bir Monografiden İzmir 1920–1921”, *Üç İzmir*, p. 228; Özlem Yıldırım, “İtibar-ı Zirai Birlikleri Kanunu ve Aydın İncir Müstahsilleri Kooperatifinin Yeniden Canlanması”, *Tariş Tarihi*, Türkiye Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Tarih Vakfı, Tariş Tarihi Projesi, İzmir, 1993, p. 66; Kamil Su, *Sevr Antlaşması ve Aydın (İzmir) Vilayeti*, Kültür Bakanlığı yay., 1. baskı, Ankara, Mayıs, 1981, p. 8–11; Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, p. 27–41.

¹³ Feridun Ergin, “Birinci Dünya Savaşında ve Atatürk Döneminde Fiyatlar ve Gelirler”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, III/7 (Kasım, 1986), p. 65.

¹⁴ Yaşar Aksoy, *İzmir, Smyrna Efsanesinden Gerçeğe*, İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür yay., 1. baskı, İzmir, Ocak, 1990, p. 153.

¹⁵ Ergün Aybars, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi I*, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Yayınları, Dördüncü Bası, Ankara 1995, p. 229; Salahi R. Sonyel, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*, I, 2. baskı, T.T.K. Basımevi, Ankara, 1987, p. 95; R. Funda Barbaros, Gülcan Paker, Beyza Sümer, Yaşar Aksoy, *Ege Bölgesi Sanayi Odası'nın 50. Yılı*, Tükelmat AŞ., İzmir, Eylül, 1995, p. 3; Aksoy, *İzmir, Smyrna Efsanesinden Gerçeğe*, p. 153.

The economic foundations of the invasion of İzmir can be inferred from an agreement signed with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Sforza, and Bekir Sami Bey on 12 March 1921, which says “during the London Conference... According to the agreement..., Italy will defend the return of İzmir and Thrace to Turkey at the Conference; and in many provinces of Southern Anatolia, concessions would be granted”.¹⁶ While the Western states were trying to prepare their public opinion for the Greek invasion campaign, which was carried out with economic interest concerns, the Greeks also made an irritation to support these efforts.¹⁷ Under these conditions, the Turkish bourgeoisie was compelled to make its national revolution before it could complete its primitive capital accumulation.

Invasion of İzmir

With the start of the invasion; Life, which had already deteriorated during the First World War, became more and more complicated. On the one hand, while the Turks leaving the city, on the other hand, Greek immigrants were settled in the dwellings evacuated by the Turks. Invading authorities took control of every part of the city, with the excuse of ensuring public order. With martial law declared after the invasion, a ban on leaving the city was introduced. With the prohibition, the people had to get permission to go to their fields, vineyard, or garden.¹⁸ The villagers, on the other hand, became unable to commute to the markets in their towns and suburbs. In addition to the permission problem, there were also possibilities such as local supporters and invading soldiers blocking the roads of the villagers and usurping their valuables. The ad hoc solution that the people set out en masse to eliminate this possibility did not constitute a resolution either.¹⁹ These robberies, plundering, extortion, and rape, which the invading forces started with the local Greeks and Armenians, continued unabated, even intensified, until the last day of the invasion. The Greeks and local accomplices kept carrying out these plundering²⁰ and assimilation activities without even waiting for the dark of the night, in daylight, in front of the representatives of the Entente States,

¹⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol, Cem Sar, “1919–1939 Dönemi”, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1990)*, Siyasal Kitabevi, 8. baskı, Ankara, 1993, p. 32.

¹⁷ Richard Lewinshon, *Esrarengiz Avrupalı Zahoroff*, Çeviren: Cem Muhtaroğlu, İletişim yay., 1.baskı, İstanbul, 1991, p. 117; Aybars, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi I*, p. 227–237; Kenan Kırkpınar, “Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde İngiliz Basını ve Kamuoyunda Türk İmajı”, *ÇTTAD.*, I/3 (1993), p. 171.

¹⁸ Kamil Su, *Manisa Yöremizde İşgal Acıları*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları Kültür Eserleri Dizisi, İkinci Baskı, Ankara Ağustos 1986, p. 29.

¹⁹ Halide Edip Adıvar, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Falih Rıfkı Atay, Mehmet Asım Us, *İzmir'den Bursa'ya*, Atlas Kitabevi, 3. Baskı, İstanbul -1980, p. 122.

²⁰ Selahattin Tansel, *Mondros'dan Mudanya'ya Kadar II*, Başbakanlık Basımevi, Ankara, 1973, p. 182.

and in the most public place.²¹ Not only in Kemeraltı, but also in various regions of İzmir, the businesses and shops belonging to the Turks were selected and plundered one by one by the Greek soldiers under the guidance of the local Greeks, and everything worthwhile was usurped²². The same incidents were performed during the seizure of government offices by the Greek authorities.²³ Even Venizelos had to admit that it was the Greeks who caused the chaos and plundered. While Venizelos was distributing money for propaganda purposes,²⁴ he sent 250,000 T.L. to compensate those injured in Aydın and Nazilli.²⁵ Consul Horton's comments that was justifying the murder committed by the Greeks are noteworthy in terms of indicating the Western perception of Turkey and Turks:²⁶

“What was obvious to me was that the brutality and violence that the Greeks inflicted immediately after the landing was quite natural, which those familiar with human nature could have predicted... it was nothing less than a miracle that the situation would be restored.”

However, the massacres and plunders described in the publications of *İzmir Disaster in the Vicinity I-II*, which contains the reports from the military authorities about the invasion of İzmir, Ayvalık, Aydın, and its environs by the Greeks and the local Greek atrocities, had not connection with civilization and humanity.²⁷The Greek troops, who came to İzmir in a raid style with the arrangements of the British Admiral Calthorpe, attacked the Turks with unprecedented brutality, without recognizing the sacredness of family privacy and the sanctity of the clergy and religious institutions, and started to plunder the city. This invasion was welcomed with great enthusiasm by the local Greek people. Local Greeks covering the entire length of the walkway greeted the Greek soldiers waving Greek flags, throwing flowers, applauding, and cheering “Zito”. The number of Turks killed in İzmir and its suburbs (including the Urla peninsula and its villages) within the first 48 hours of the invasion has exceeded 2000.

²¹ Bayram Bayraktar, “Mütareke’de Yunanistan’ın Ayvalık Politikası”, *Ç. T. T. A. D. I/2*, İzmir 1992, p. 88.

²² Tansel, *Mondros’dan Mudanya’ya Kadar II*, p. 177; Bayraktar, Mütareke’de Yunanistan’ın Ayvalık Politikası”, p. 89.

²³ *Türk İstiklal Harbi II/1*, p. 57.

²⁴ *DH-KMS*, Dosya 54/2, Belge no. 35.

²⁵ Tansel, *Mondros’dan Mudanya’ya Kadar II*, s. 186; Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, The Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio and London, England 1988, p. 67.

²⁶ Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, p. 66.

²⁷ *Mülhakatta İzmir Fecaii I-II (İzmir, Ayvalık ve Aydın ve Havalisinin Yunanlar Tarafından İşgali ve Yunan Mezalimi Hakkında Makamatı Askeriye’den Mevrud Raporlar)*, Matbaa-ı Askeriye, Dersaadet, 1335.

The local Greek gangs, who were armed months before the invasion, cooperated with the Greek soldiers in this atrocity. The Greeks established special entities according to the characteristics of their actions. These units have raped, committed robbery, looting, arson, and started fires. On May 15, 1919, when the Greeks occupied İzmir, 57 Ottoman officers were killed and some of them were injured in the terror movement, and the massacre and looting continued increasingly. The Greek detachments with bayonet entered the barracks, marched all the commanders and officers in the barracks, including the Corps Commander, along the cordon in the form of a captive convoy, to the Passport pier, to the Patris ferry, which debarked Evzon Battalion, and imprisoned hostages in the deck of the ferry. Meanwhile, another Evzon detachment raided the government building, entered the governor's office, and wounded the governor, the provincial officers, and the soldiers they captured in the barracks with bayonets and butts. While the convoy was being taken to the ferry, 9 officers were martyred by fire, bayonet, and buttstock strikes along the way, with the participation of Greek soldiers, civilians, and local Greeks, 21 officers were injured, and the fate of 27 officers remained unknown. The atrocities, murders, and tortures that the Turks were subjected to during the invasion for three years, in the center of Izmir, in its hinterland and its neighborhood, Western Anatolia and Thrace, have been tried to be summarized above as it is included in the documents and reports. However, it is also known that there were many more atrocities whose documents have not been found or documented.²⁸ Even historical artifacts had their share of looting, theft, and plunder. All valuables were pillaged from the ruins of Sard, except for the sarcophagus and broken jugs, which were difficult to transport. The damages in the region during the invasion period are as follows:²⁹

²⁸ *Türkiye'de Yunan Fecayii I-II*, Dahiliye Nezareti Neşriyatı, Matbaayı Ahmet İhsan ve Şürekası, İstanbul, 1337; *Mülhakatta İzmir Fecaii I-II (İzmir, Ayvalık ve Aydın ve Havalisinin Yunanlar Tarafından İşgali ve Yunan Mezalimi Hakkında Makamatı Askeriye'den Mevrud Raporlar)*, Matbaa-ı Askeriye, Dersaadet, 1335; Talat Yalazan, *Türkiye'de Yunan Vahşet ve Soy Kırımı Girişimi I (15 Mayıs 1919-13 Eylül 1921)*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1994; Talat Yalazan, *Türkiye'de Yunan Vahşet ve Soy Kırımı Girişimi II (13 Eylül 1921-9 Eylül 1922)*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1994; *Askerî Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, Batı Anadolu'da Yunan Mezalimi*, Sayı: 93, Ocak 1992; *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Milli Mücadele ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Md.lüğü Yayınları, Ankara, 2007, pp. 26, 191, 213-237; *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Balkanlar'da ve Anadolu'da Yunan Mezalimi II (Anadolu'da Yunan Mezalimi)*, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Md.lüğü Yayınları, Ankara, 1996; Genelkurmay ATASE D. Bşk.lüğü Arşivi; İSH Koleksiyonu Kls.84, Dos.23, 23AA, 23AB, 23AC, 23AD, Kls.93, Dos.73, 73AA, 73AB, 73AD, 73ADA, 73AE, 73AF, 73AG; *Yunan Ordusu İzmir'de Ekler*, Harp Tarihi Dairesi Neşriyatı, Atina, 1957, s. 20-25.

²⁹ Yücel Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, T. C. Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1994, p. 5; Vedat Eldem, *Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomisi*, T. T. K. Yayınevi, Ankara 1994, p. 218-219.

Real Estate Damages	Number of (*1000)	Cost (*1000.000 Lira)
Izmir City	19	176
Other Cities	54	305
In Towns and Villages	87	177
Total	160	658
Securities Damage		
Furnishings, Commercial Commodities, Cash, Agricultural Tools, Grains, etc.	-	567
Animals and Transportation Vehicles		
Bovines	695	65
Ovine (sheep goats)	2592	44
Transport Vehicles	25	3
Total		112

The distribution of the damage to the suburbs/counties/districts is as follows:³⁰

Type Suburb/county/district	Real Estate (1000.000 lira)	Securities (1000.000 lira)	Animal	Total
Izmir	230	65	20	315
Saruhan	132	112	11	255
Aydın	59	111	4	174
Bursa ve Kütahya	44	43	14	101
Ertuğrul	22	4	7	50
İzmit	37	98	10	145
Eskişehir	60	23	37	120
Karesi	70	90	2	162
Sair	8	5	7	20
Toplam	662	567	112	1342

Damage and loss were widespread in all areas under the Greek invasion. It was determined that the damage had been relatively higher in İzmir, where the Greek invasion lasted the most compared to other regions³¹. Ali Fuat Pasha reveals the situation with all its clarity in the report he wrote to the Istanbul Government, which he asked to act according to the wishes of the nation.

“The province of Izmir was devastated, the province of Aydın fell into misery with the immigration of one hundred thousand Muslims, and more than fifty thousand Muslims were martyred. National

³⁰ Eldem, *Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomisi*, p. 219.

³¹ Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 38; Vasfi, “Bir Gümrükçünün İşgal Yılları Anıları”, p. 248,

Struggle is not against the Great Powers, but against the cruel and ruthless Greeks who caused this persecution. Please ask British General Milne not to cause any more violence.”³²

Especially in the first years of the invasion, it is known that the local Greeks and Greeks were looking for any opportunity to buy and /or seize the land and real estate title deeds and the lands of Turks. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman government also comprehended the Greeks’ plan to claim lands and claim a legal sovereignty right in the region here, and tried to prevent this, albeit partially, with loans to be given by Ziraat Bank. The Greeks were not idle either. They tried to oppress the people by spreading speculative news and forced Turks to flee due to the persecution they faced.³³ The Turkish people, who had fallen into misery with the effect of the First World War and the previous wars, were dragged into poverty and deficient with the policies implemented by the Greek and local Greek minorities during the invasion period. “Men with assets worth hundreds of liras need a bite”.³⁴ The following incident faced by Fatih Rıfki Atay constitutes an interesting example in terms of displaying the situation:

“People are without money, without food, and animals. The first day I came, I saw a man on the street pointing at me like a mute. It turned out that he was speechless from hunger and thirst. This man was a retired Colonel...”³⁵

This misery of the time included all the people in the invasion area, without discriminating city or town. The people had to give up production to defend themselves. The people, who could not produce even for their livelihood, were condemned to starvation. Diseases caused by hunger and bad conditions were the icing on the cake.³⁶ Although İzmir and its surroundings have rich lands for crop yielding and varying overall agricultural output; war, and invasion caused a decrease in production. Transportation disruptions had a negative impact on the stability of food prices in 1921, and a decrease in price hikes was not on the horizon. Food prices displayed a continuous upward trend in this period.³⁷ Many of the Turks, who were taken into custody by the Greeks, died during the interrogation. The environments in which they were kept under surveillance were kept far from sanitary and hygienic conditions, and their treatment was inhumane. In addition to the tortures, food items such

³² Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, p. 146.

³³ Tansel, *Mondros'dan Mudanya'ya Kadar II*, s. 198.

³⁴ Su, *Manisa Yöremizde İşgal Acıları*, p. 87.

³⁵ H. Edip Adıvar, *İzmir'den Bursa'ya*, p. 67: 28 Eylül 1922'de Turgutlu'da cereyan etmiştir.

³⁶ Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 13, 25.

³⁷ J.K. Birge ve diğerleri, *İzmir'deki [Küçük Asya], Bazı Sosyal Koşullar Hakkında Bir Araştırma İzmir 1921*, p. 45.

as “a rusk, a box of sardines-canned- and some dried figs³⁸” were given as food. Along with ordinary snatchings, shop and house pilfering can be observed by scanning of the periodicals of the time. Even the local Greeks were uncomfortable with the security environment.³⁹ The brutality and cruelty committed by the invaders was totally out of control. So much so that, in addition to the brutality inflicted on the Turks, “They raped more than three hundred local Greek girls in Manisa, Menemen and other places.”⁴⁰

However, some Greeks earned a lot of money under the protection of the Ottoman sultans during the First World War, they did not hesitate to donate this money to the Greek army to slaughter the Ottoman Turks. Despite all the massacres, rape, torture, looting, and extortion committed by the invaders and local accomplices, the Ottoman Government perceived no harm in delivering food to the Greek soldiers. The same attitude was also followed by foreign nationals. For example, “British Officer Hover”, who traded licorice root in Anatolia before the First World War, organized Greek espionage in the First World War and was assigned to control the region during the invasion period. Hover was able to ignore the persecution of the Turks during these duties. Another contradictory situation exists in the fact that Turks continue to shop from Greeks while Turkish tradesmen remain futile.⁴¹ Intellectuals in the military prison in Izmir were rescued by the people before the invasion. Those imprisoned in the general prison with despicable crime, escaped by breaking the doors with the invasion on 15 May. These, like Greek soldiers, gangs, deserters, Greek deserters, and Armenian gangs, have plagued the villagers and the people together with the Efes, whom Türkan Çetin described as “Social Bandits”.⁴²

Effects on the People and Repercussions

As mentioned earlier, the living standards of the Greek refugees who migrated to Izmir and the Turkish refugees who migrated from Izmir to Anatolia could not reach the level of humanitarian living conditions during this period despite the help and efforts of many Turkish, Greek and Allied institutions and organizations.⁴³

³⁸ Vasfi, “Bir Gümrükçünün İşgal Yılları Anıları”, p. 242.

³⁹ Zeki Arıkan, *Mütareke ve İşgal Dönemi İzmir Basını (30 Ekim 1918- 8 Eylül 1922)*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara 1989, s. 254.

⁴⁰ Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele’de Ege Çevresi*, p. 5.

⁴¹ Arıkan, *Mütareke ve İşgal Dönemi İzmir Basını (30 Ekim 1918- 8 Eylül 1922)*, p. 252- 254; *DH- KMS*, Dosya 54/ 1, Belge no. 16; *T. İ. H. I*, s. 137.

⁴² Kazım Özalp, *Milli Mücadele (1919-1922) I*, T. T. K. Yayınevi, 2’nci Baskı, Ankara, 1985, p. 7; Türkan Çetin, “Kurtuluş Savaşı Yıllarında İşgal Bölgesi Köy ve Köylüsü”, *ÇTTAD. I/3*, s. 180.

⁴³ *Ahenk*, 16 Teşrinisani 1335; *Şark*, 25 Şubat 138; Zeki Arıkan, “İzmir- Kasaba- Aydın Demiryolu İşçilerinin Bir Muhtırası”, *Tarih ve Toplum*, Sayı: 49, Ocak 1988, p. 51-56; Engin

During this period, in addition to the hospitals controlled by various nationalities, Turks had a well-managed and modernly equipped hospital. Of course, there was a need for the construction of new hospitals to meet the need.⁴⁴ It can also be said that İzmir's sanitary department closely monitored the health situation of the city and demonstrated the necessary sensitivity to various requirements.⁴⁵

During this period, when epidemics were widespread and affected many people due to malnutrition, a local official in each sanjak, province, and municipality, working in coordination with the World Health Organization, operated bacteriological and chemical laboratories on behalf of the government.⁴⁶ The health organization in İzmir, which had recently suffered from regional epidemics, was part of the Ottoman Empire's structure adapted from the superior French system. In practice, however, due to the lack of trained personnel, infrastructures such as hospitals and laboratories, the success of the French system was not achieved. In addition to a general lack of knowledge on the part of the authorities, there was also carelessness and negligence in the quarantine activities that had to be applied to the immigrants.⁴⁷

Diseases such as malaria, smallpox, syphilis, and spotted fever were among the most common epidemics.⁴⁸ The Hilal-i Ahmer (Red Crescent) Society was trying to overcome the inadequacy of the hospitals with some medicine and treatment aids. However, these efforts were not enough to achieve complete success in the fight against epidemics caused by the deteriorating living conditions due to the invasion. The epidemics, which had

Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, İzmir 1993, p. 160 - 165, 222 - 229; Engin Berber, "Kurtuluşun Sonra İzmir'de Yunan İşgal Dönemine Tepkiler", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Sayı 8, Cilt: III, Mart 1987, pp. 443-460; Alptekin Müderrisoğlu, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Mali Kaynakları I*, Kastaş yay., 1. baskı, İstanbul, Nisan, 1988, p. 34; Gotthard Jaeschke, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ile ilgili Belgeler*, Çeviren: Cemal Köprülü, T. T. K. Yayınevi, Ankara 1971, p. 47- 48; Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 9- 31, p. 128-129; *1930 İstatistik Yıllığı*, Başvekâlet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Ankara, 1930, p. 100.

⁴⁴ Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey, (A Politico-Ekonomico Interpretation, 1908-1923 Inclusive, with Selected Chapters by Representative Authorities)*, The Macmillian Company, New York, December 1924, p. 176; Yaşar Aksoy, *İzmir, Smyrna Efsanesi Gerçeğe*, İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür yay., 1. baskı, İzmir, Ocak, 1990, p. 50; Su, *Sevr Antlaşması ve Aydın (İzmir) Vilayeti*, p. 44.

⁴⁵ *Ahenk*, 25 Teşrinisani 1335.

⁴⁶ *Ahenk*, 25 Teşrinisani 1335; Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 156-166.

⁴⁷ Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 156; Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, p. 165 -166, Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mücadele (Türkiye'de Zorunlu Göç) 1923-1925*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, Eylül 1995, p. 9.

⁴⁸ *Ahenk*, 27 Teşrinisani 1335; Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 155; Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 13, 26, 85.

become uncontrollable in the last days of the Ottoman Empire, had also greatly affected the people of Izmir.⁴⁹

In addition to the individual assistance of the wealthy elite in meeting the various needs of the relatively low-income Turkish immigrants,⁵⁰ the Greeks had established a dispensary and “started to meet the medical and pharmaceutical needs of the Turkish immigrants settled in the mosques and madrasas in the vicinity free of charge.”⁵¹ Doctors examined patients, who were unable to come to the dispensary, in their homes. In addition to providing medical aid to the Turks,⁵² the Greeks also provided financial aid for this purpose.⁵³ However, all these efforts were not a solution to the victimization of the Turkish element, which was most affected by the invasion.

“More than 500 of the 10,000 migrants in the Söke region died from hunger and deprivation. The remaining ones tried to take shelter in mosques, police stations, and ruins and struggled in the agony of death. Unable to find food, these poor people ate wild grass. Amidst this grim scene, Turkish officers voluntarily took part in the relief work of the Red Cross. Some European nationals also volunteered for relief work. Despite this, the suffering of the people, who were writhing in hunger and misery, was increasing day by day.”⁵⁴

It was estimated that 4% of the deaths in 1921 were caused by food insufficiency. However, not all of the problems in accessing food due to food shortages and high prices can be included in this figure. Many diseases either directly or indirectly caused by food shortages were observed in Izmir during this period.⁵⁵ On the other hand, daily life continued. Cinemas and theaters continued to operate, albeit for reasons such as serving various propaganda and providing financial resources for various purposes. While there was a decline in theater audiences compared to the past, it is known that there was no change in the demand for cinemas.⁵⁶ Upon taking his office Steryadis, with great determination, banned gambling and closed brothels as one of his first

⁴⁹ Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 9-10; Tansel, *Mondros'dan Mudanya'ya Kadar II*, s. 147; Kazım Çavdar, *İzmir*, Bilgehan Matbaası, İzmir, 1986, p. 55-56.

⁵⁰ *Ahenk*, 20 Şubat 1338.

⁵¹ Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, p. 165.

⁵² Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, p. 165.

⁵³ Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, p. 68-70.

⁵⁴ *Türk İstiklal Harbi II/2*, p. 143.

⁵⁵ J.K. Birge ve diğerleri, *İzmir'deki [Küçük Asya], Bazı Sosyal Koşullar Hakkında Bir Araştırma İzmir 1921*, Uluslararası Amerikan Koleji Araştırma Komitesi, Çev. Aykan Candemir, İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, İzmir, 2000, p. 34.

⁵⁶ *Ahenk*; Oğuz Makal, “İzmir Sinemaları”, *Üç İzmir*, p. 387-394; Eftal Sevinçli, “İşgal Yıllarından Cumhuriyet'e İzmir'de Tiyatro”, *Üç İzmir*, p. 379 -381; Oğuz Makal, “Tarih İçinde İzmir'de Sinema Yaşantısı”, *Ç. T. T. A. D. I/3*, p. 206.

acts to ingratiate himself with the local Muslim population which did not endear him to the local population.⁵⁷ What Steryadis was trying to do in İzmir was to prepare the ground for a Greco-Turkish Empire to be established.

Social life was under the control of the Greek invasion forces. The invading forces command restricted life under martial law and interfered with the natural flow of life with daily orders. It was forbidden to congregate without permission for any reason, and it was necessary to obtain permission from the local invasion commander to go to commute.⁵⁸ Apart from this, İzmir nights were extremely colorful, especially for foreigners, minorities, and Greeks. The cafes, clubs, and casinos on the promenade were in a race to entertain their customers with spectacular lights throughout the night.⁵⁹ In 1921, it was reported that:

“The way of life in the city was based on extremely generous spending. In fact, this generosity can be characterized as wasteful spending. In terms of following fashion, İzmir was a little like Paris and its inhabitants spend large sums of money on clothes and ornaments. Goods for clothing, footwear, and personal care were imported predominantly from Germany, France, England, Italy, and the United States.”⁶⁰

On the other hand, the main places of entertainment for Turks in İzmir were 495 coffee houses employing 2429 people.⁶¹ Street lighting was rarely provided by electricity, partly by gas lamps and partly by luxury lamps, but mostly by oil lamps. We can see from the advertisements in the newspapers of those days that there were craftsmen capable of laying electric and telephone lines. We can say that the lighting of the streets was done with gas lamps and was robust during the period we searched.⁶² The Greeks who retreated to İzmir with the advance of the Turkish Army naturally harmed the economic and daily life of the city. “Due to the unceasing influx of immigrants, there was a shortage of bread in the city on September 5.”⁶³ The retreat of the Greek army later turned into a panic flight. All the local Greeks and Armenians participated in this flight. Unfortunately, these elements left

⁵⁷ Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, p. 68.

⁵⁸ Arıkan, *İşgal Dönemi İzmir Basını*, p. 82.

⁵⁹ Bilge Umar, *İzmir’de Yunanlıların Son Günleri*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Birinci Basım, Ankara Haziran 1974, p. 235; Haydar Rüştü Öktem, *Mütareke ve İşgal Anıları*, Hazırlayan: Zeki Arıkan, T. T. K. Yayınları, Ankara, 1991, p. 99.

⁶⁰ Birge and others, *İzmir’deki [Küçük Asya], Bazı Sosyal Koşullar Hakkında Bir Araştırma İzmir 1921*, p. 1-2.

⁶¹ Birge and others, *İzmir’deki [Küçük Asya], Bazı Sosyal Koşullar Hakkında Bir Araştırma İzmir 1921*, p. 69.

⁶² Ahenk, 12 Şubat 1338; 2 Haziran 1938; 14 Şubat 1335; Şark, 25 Şubat 1338.

⁶³ Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, p. 317.

behind many of their commercial and economic assets in an idle state, and unfortunately, there were no human resources to operate them. During this great exodus, some local Greeks looted the assets of the wealthy. Unfortunately, it is a bitter fact known to everyone that the Greeks burned and destroyed everywhere they passed during this escape. The Greeks, who retreated to Izmir by burning almost the entire Aegean, paralyzed the economy of Izmir by setting a fire that burned 2600 acres of land into ashes while evacuating Izmir. Foreign companies doing business in Izmir at that time demanded losses of up to 100.000.000 dollars from insurance companies after the fire.⁶⁴

Conclusion

As a result, the unjust invasion of Izmir by the Greeks caused torture, atrocities, practiced brutality, and the deaths of many people. For more than three years, the Turkish people of İzmir and its sub-region lived in agony. This suffering continued to increase during the forward movement of the Greek army. The invasion and forward movement of the Greek army was supported materially and morally by the local Greek elements and Armenians. This unlawful atrocity, which was also supported by the British, caused the national flame to ignite in the Turkish nation and lasted until the liberation of Izmir. The liberation of Izmir became a great ideal not only for the Turks living in Izmir but also in Ankara and all of Anatolia. Although these practices during the years of invasion had inflicted great wounds on the Turkish people, in the days following September 9, 1922, many Turks from Izmir made efforts to ensure the safety of their Greek neighbors. They helped them to leave the city safely, despite everything that had happened. In the days following the liberation, the Ankara Government did not act with the idea of revenge and no massacres took place in İzmir. Apart from the prosecution of the criminals, as Mustafa Kemal, Commander-in-Chief and President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, stated, “We do not have the idea of revenge and retaliation. We are not here to settle old scores. For us, the past is buried.”⁶⁵ From then on, the goal of Turkey under Atatürk’s leadership was to develop economically, scientifically, and educationally in peace at home and in the world.

⁶⁴ Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, p. 230.

⁶⁵ *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III*, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 5. Baskı, 1997, p. 66.

THE BLOODY CHRISTMAS OF FIUME: WHEN THE POET D'ANNUNZIO FOUGHT AGAINST OTHER ITALIANS (24-30 DECEMBER 1920)

Lt. Col. Dr. Flavio CARBONE (Italy)

Introduction

With the end of the Austria-Hungary Monarchy after World War One, Fiume (Rijeka nowadays in Croatia) became the centre of tensions between the kingdom of Italy and the new kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later kingdom of Yugoslavia).¹ Considering the international stalemate, the allied powers (USA, United Kingdom and France) pushed to establish an independent buffer zone called the *Free State of Fiume*. At local level, a big dispute erupted between the Italian national council and the Slav national committee. With the dispute, the British and French troops landed in Fiume trying to keep the situation under control. Nevertheless, on 12 September 1919, the Italian poet and Army officer Gabriele D'Annunzio exploited the confusing situation in Fiume starting an occupation lasting for 15 months.² The negotiations between the Italian kingdom and D'Annunzio failed after one year of discussions. On the other hand, with the treaty of Rapallo, signed on 12 November 1920 between the two opponents, the Free State of Fiume was established. From one hand the Allied Powers (UK, USA and France) recognised immediately the new State, on the other hand D'Annunzio refused. He was expelled from Fiume after the confrontation between the Italian regular army, based in principle on Royal Carabinieri mobile battalions and Alpini units who demonstrated the loyalty to the king fighting against the Italian rebels under D'Annunzio orders.³

¹ Angelo Visintin, "Piani di guerra italiani contro il regno Shs gennaio 1919 – novembre 1920", in *Italia Contemporanea*, no. 256-257 (2009), 477-509.

² Giacomo Properzj, *Natale di sangue. D'Annunzio a Fiume*, (Milano, Mursia, 2010), 35-42.

³ We should consider the failure of the so-called "Fiumanesimo" a political perspective with the aim to support other nationalities not recognised by the powers of the time, see Marco Cuzzi, "La nostra bandiera è la più alta: la politica esteriore di d'Annunzio e la Lega di Fiume" in *Fiume 1919-2019 Un centenario europeo tra identità, memorie e prospettive di ricerca. Atti del convegno internazionale di studi* (Cinisello Balsamo, Silvana Editoriale, 2020), pre-print <https://air.unimi.it/retrieve/dfa8b9a4-67a5-748b-e053-3a05fe0a3a96/La%20nostra%20bandiera%20C3%A8%20la%20pi%20C3%B9%20alta%20la%20politica%20esteriore%20di%20D%E1%BE%BDAnnunzio%20e%20la%20Lega%20di%20Fiume.pdf>.

The paper presents the general framework and the action led by Royal Carabinieri and Alpini in the so-called “Bloody Christmas” between 24 and 30 December 1920 against the D’Annunzio Legionari.

A general overview

On 18 January 1921, Gabriele D’Annunzio, the self-proclaimed “Vate d’Italia” (the Poet of Italy), left Fiume (*Rijeka* nowadays in Croatia) to reach his manor in Cagnacco, on the lake of Garda, in what he transformed later in the “Vittoriale”, a monument to himself and his life. What happened in Fiume in what D’Annunzio called the “Bloody Christmas” and even before? Did the Carabinieri play any role? They are rhetoric questions of course, and we know the answer. On 30 October 1918, the Italian national council in Fiume asked for the unity to Italy, just few days before the signature of the armistice on 4th November 1918 with the end of the First World War between Italy and Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hungary had been the part of the former empire linked to Fiume before but the majority of the citizens were Italian claiming the idea to join the Italian Kingdom.

During the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920), Italy asked for Fiume as new request behind the secret Treaty of London of 1915. The other winning countries rejected the request. Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Italian Prime Minister, left the conference to come back to Paris once he understood the uselessness of the initiative. The Fiume question (*Riječko pitanje* in serbo-croatian, la Questione di Fiume, in Italian) popped up. Considering the international stalemate, the allied powers (USA, United Kingdom and France) pushed to establish an independent buffer zone called the *Free State of Fiume*. A new government under Francesco Saverio Nitti established on 23 June 1919 decided to continue the discussions upon Fiume but the prime minister kept a flexible position.⁴ So, on 10 September 1919 the so-called “Big Five” (France, Britain, Italy, USA and Japan) signed the treaty of Saint-Germain. Italy gained the regions of Trentino Alto Adige and Istria. On the other hand, the newly established kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Kingdom of Yugoslavia) received most of the Dalmatian area.

Under the treaty, Italy and Yugoslavia agreed to acknowledge “the complete freedom and independence of the State of Fiume and oblige to respect it in perpetuity” (art.4). The Free State of Fiume had been established formally. USA, France and Britain recognized the new state entity.⁵

⁴ Francesco Barbagallo, *Francesco S. Nitti*, (Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1984), 316-321.

⁵ Properzj, *Natale di sangue*, 108-115. The first period of the situation in Fiume has been described by general Breganze in his diary, Danilo L. Massagranda and Francesco E. Benati,

On the other hand, D'Annunzio rejected the agreement called the territorial gains as "Vittoria Mutilata" (mutilated victory) and declared war to Italy after the signature of the treaty.⁶ Only the iron fist used by Caviglia unlocked the situation with the resignation of D'Annunzio of 28 December.

The International contingent

In November 1918, an international force of British, Italian, French and American troops entered the city, so a small army contingent of the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia left. An Inter-Allied Command under the orders of General Francesco Saverio Grazioli took the security of the area, with a strength of about 14.000 men. Grazioli agreed to establish a local all-volunteer battalion of Italians. On the other hand, the relationship among the allied troops was not perfect. After the first period of life together, some problems erupted and fights between French Ammanite soldiers and Italian Sailors and local Fiumani popped up. On 6 July 1919, the most significant clash happened with nine French colonials died and 11 wounded against three Italian wounded. The enquiry revealed the problems between the French and Italian soldiers and local population, the lack of willingness to investigate by the Inter-allied police led by Carabinieri major, Abba, concluding to remove the Italian Navy Commanders and the Carabinieri officer.⁷

Francesco Saverio Nitti, now, prime minister of the Italian Kingdom took immediately action recalling inside the Italian borders the Granatieri di Sardegna division, the most sensitive to the union of Fiume to Italy, planning the downsizing of the Italian forces.⁸ On 9 September, the Italian troops came back to the armistice line just few hours before the signature of the Saint-Germain Treaty mentioned. The Question of Fiume was still on the carpet.

On 12 September D'Annunzio, wearing his Italian Cavalry uniform, left Ronchi (a small town in Friuli) entering in Fiume with some deserted soldiers and officers and other mutinied troops who decide to join him rather than respect their orders and stop on the border.⁹

"Il *Diario Fiumano* del Generale Giovanni Breganze", in *Fiume* 23, 8 (2003), 7-74 and Danilo L. Massagrande and Francesco E. Benati, "Il *Diario Fiumano* del Generale Giovanni Breganze", in *Fiume* 24, 9 (2004), 3-65.

⁶ Camera dei Deputati, *1919 Anno di cambiamenti e di conflitti. Il Parlamento alla prova della democrazia. L'Impresa di Fiume*, (Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 2019).

⁷ Alain Marzona, "Les incidents franco-italiens de Fiume ou l'expression des frustrations italiennes (novembre 1918-juillet 1919)", *Revue historique des armées*, no. 254 (2009) : <http://journals.openedition.org/rha/6383>.

⁸ Properzj, *Natale di sangue*, 35-42.

⁹ Barbagallo, *Francesco S. Nitti*, 338-334. Tullio Reggente, "Io, il Vate, nel Bogo inconsapevole", in *Il Territorio* 11, no. 23 (1988): 57-81.

The International contingent remained in the barracks for few days before leaving the city and the new commanding officer of the contingent, the Italian general Pittaluga asked for Italian reinforcements¹⁰. The Italian Prime Minister Nitti nominated general Pietro Badoglio Special Military Commissioner for the area of Friuli Venezia Giulia asking him to negotiate avoid confrontation with the D'Annunzio Legionari.¹¹ The situation remained hot in the area while new deserters and reserve officers joined D'Annunzio in Fiume. Nitti government ended in May 1920 and the new Prime Minister, the old politician Giovanni Giolitti changed the posture of the Italian government towards D'Annunzio and his pirates.

The role of the Carabinieri unit in Fiume from September 1919 to May 1920

The paper does not touch the social and political problems of D'Annunzio government of the so-called later "Reggenza del Carnaro". The arditi and other soldiers did not maintain the area under the rule of law and many abuses towards local population came from them.¹² After the retreat of the Italian forces, only a small contingent of Carabinieri remained there to guarantee law and order during the first phase of D'Annunzio occupation.¹³

Once the International Police Forces left, Captain Rocco Vadala (two silver medals for military bravery and First World War veteran) assured the police force duties with a Carabinieri force varying from 73 to 130 about

¹⁰ On regard of the composition of the International Police Force and all the main details on the Armed Forces involved in the Fiume file, see Luigi Emilio Longo, *L'Esercito Italiano e la questione fiumana*, (Roma, Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Esercito, 1996), 2 vol., 1 volume, 26-27 (allegato 4).

¹¹ Properzj, *Natale di sangue*, 46-49.

¹² Properzj, *Natale di sangue*, 72-77 and Alessandra Grasso, "L'Arditismo dopo Fiume: Arditi d'Italia e Arditi del Popolo", *Humanities*, no. 5 (2014), DOI: 10.6092/2240-7715/2014.1.38-47. See Sabrina Sguelgia della Marra, "L'Esercito nella crisi dello Stato liberale: politica ed ordine pubblico" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Università degli Studi Roma Tre, 2007), 115-129.

¹³ With a different perspective, see Fabrice Jesné, "Fiume/Rijeka 1919 : question nationale, expérimentations politiques et contrôle social dans un cadre urbain", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 2013, *Villes et changements de souveraineté en Méditerranée / Mythes de la coexistence interreligieuse. Histoire et critique* 86, 85-96. Regarding the Carabinieri, see Leonardo Malatesta, "L'Arma dei Carabinieri e l'impresa di Fiume", *Rassegna dell'Arma dei Carabinieri* 58, no. 4 (2011), 5-56, <https://www.carabinieri.it/media---comunicazione/rassegna-dell-arma/la-rassegna/anno-2011/n-4---ottobre-dicembre/studi/l-arma-dei-carabinieri-e-l-impresa-di-fiume>. With a divulgative approach, see Marco Riscaldati, "D'Annunzio e i Carabinieri", *Notiziario Storico dell'Arma dei Carabinieri*, no. 1 (2019), 4-23; Carmelo Burgio, "I Carabinieri a Fiume", *Notiziario Storico dell'Arma dei Carabinieri*, no. 5 (2019), 4-13; Carmelo Burgio, "Il ruolo dei Carabinieri nella vicenda di Fiume", *Notiziario Storico dell'Arma dei Carabinieri*, no. 6 (2019), 4-13; Carmelo Burgio, L'epilogo di Fiume, *Notiziario Storico dell'Arma dei Carabinieri*, no. 1 (2020), 4-13;

personnel.¹⁴ The real problem for the Carabinieri was to guarantee public order and public security. A lot of Arditi (shock troops) and other soldiers did not respect the elementary rules, violating the criminal code on daily basis. The Carabinieri had a lot of confrontation with the Legionari (legionnaire) breaking the law with the full support of D'Annunzio. The Vate was sceptical on the intentions of the Carabinieri, because their loyalty to the king and to the State. Moral atrocities were quite common during D'Annunzio regime in Fiume and the local population started to complain asking for the respect of the rules by the soldiers.

During this period, General Badoglio tried to mediate with D'Annunzio proposing the so-called *modus vivendi* recognition. Briefly, the Italian government offered the acknowledgement of the desire of D'Annunzio, the Legionari and Fiume citizens for annexation of Fiume to the Kingdom of Italy (8 December 1919). Few days later, the Vate asked for more obligations from Italy to Fiume aspirations. On the other hand, the Italian National Council of Fiume agreed to the proposal of Italy but then D'Annunzio invalidated the decision of the council.

On 6 May 1920, Captain Vadalà and all the Carabinieri with other troops of the Florence Brigade decided to leave Fiume and come back to the Italian borders. The Arditi and other D'Annunzio troops waited for the Carabinieri to the border post of Cantrida. A firefight erupted caused by the Italian deserters who joined D'Annunzio regency. Two Carabinieri and one civilian died from the bombs and the machineguns fire. The Carabinieri and the Brigata Firenze soldiers were able to reach the suburb of Mattuglie where they stationed. The idyllic relationship between D'Annunzio and the Carabinieri ceased. Enough was enough.¹⁵

On 8 September 1920, he proclaimed the Italian Regency of Carnaro. The time passed over.¹⁶ The kingdom of Italy and the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes signed the treaty of Rapallo on 12 November 1920, agreeing to the borders and the rights between the two states and the establishment of the Free State of Fiume.¹⁷ On 1 December, General Caviglia asked D'Annunzio to leave surrounding of Fiume and come back under the

¹⁴ Giacomo Properzj, *Natale di sangue. D'Annunzio a Fiume*, (Milano, Mursia, 2010), p. 93.

¹⁵ Properzj, *Natale di sangue*, 116-117.

¹⁶ Barbagallo, *Francesco S. Nitti*, 355-412.

¹⁷ Against the treaty, Luigi Federzoni, *Il trattato di Rapallo*, (Bologna, Nicola Zanichelli Editore, 1921). Regarding the view of the area in the International law perspective, see Silverio Annibale, *La questione di Fiume nel Diritto Internazionale*, (Unione Italiana – Fiume – Università Popolare – Trieste, Rovigno, 2011).

borders of the new Free State of Fiume.¹⁸ D'Annunzio refused; he did not agree to leave the deserters to the Italian Army. The refusal of D'Annunzio led Caviglia to provide orders to his subordinate General Carlo Ferrario, commanding general of the 45th Infantry Division who had under his command the Italian troops, mainly Alpini and Carabinieri.

The orders were clear: the Italian troops should enter in Fiume with the use of force, if needed.¹⁹

The so-called “Bloody Christmas”

On 24 December 1920, after the proclaim of Venezia Giulia commanding General Enrico Caviglia, the Italian Army, based especially on Alpini troops and Carabinieri, launched an attack to the defensive position around the city of Fiume.²⁰ After a long period of fighting, the counterparts agreed a truce for 25 December because all the troops were catholic.²¹ Subsequently the battle resumed on 26 December with the aim to keep the position from the D'Annunzio Legionari perspective. Caviglia reached his goal once he allowed the battleships Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio to open the fire on the city of Fiume bombing it for three days. On 28 December, D'Annunzio finally resigned and the Regency officially capitulated on 30 December, with the occupation of the city by the Italian forces.

The Carabinieri were present to the borders of Fiume with *three battalions: Rome first, Milan and Naples I* under the orders of Colonel Ulrico Imbrico, an experienced senior officer of the Carabinieri Corps. Together with the Carabinieri, there were deployed the Alpini battalions Edolo, Vestone and Aosta. The Infantry brigades Lombardia, Bologna and Como completed the circle of the Italian troops around Fiume.

The Italian troops received clear orders and Caviglia divided them in three sectors: the first group from Sussak to Grobnico (Lombardia brigade with a mountain artillery group); the Castua sector with the 23 Infantry regiment Como, three Alpini Battalions, 1 Carabinieri battalion and 3 artillery group to guarantee the blockade from Recina river to the seaside. The third sector (Abbazia) was organised on one Carabinieri battalion, 40th Infantry regiment Bologna, 2 heavy artillery groups creating a second line from

¹⁸ A very short overview on Field Marshall Caviglia in “La questione di Fiume nella Storia della Frontiera Orientale. Il ruolo di D'Annunzio e del generale Caviglia” in *Quaderni Savonesi*, no. 18 (2010).

¹⁹ Barbagallo, *Francesco S. Nitti*, 416.

²⁰ Luigi Emilio Longo, “Regio Esercito e Legionari. Tra scontro e connivenza” in “*Fiume legionaria*”- *A ottant'anni dall'impresa dannunziana* (Trieste: Arti Grafiche Riva, 2001), 67-74.

²¹ Properzj, *Natale di sangue*, 132-136.

Mattuglie to the oriental coast of Istria. On reserve: the 24th Infantry regiment Como, 1 Carabinieri battalion and 4 armored car machine guns (autoblindomitragliatrici) squadrons.

The commanding generals thought that the two infantry brigades were not reliable enough to guarantee their behaviour, so he decided to remove the brigades Como and Bologna and the Alpini battalions Dronero, Saluzzo and Fenestrelle together with Piemonte brigade and the Police Royal Guard battalion Roma arrived on the starting positions. On 21 December a first episode on the control post between Ciaulee and Jelenie, most likely an ardito killed the Carabiniere Maurizio Meloni throwing few bombs, and other two Carabinieri remained wounded.

On 24 December, the Italian troops avoided using guns but the arditi fiumani started shooting with machineguns killing some Italian soldiers. On 26th December, the Italian troops moved in Fiume ready to fight house by house with the counterpart who used bombs and machineguns to limit the moving of Italians. The Carabinieri battalions remained ready to enter to guarantee the public order once the situation was cleared.²²

The bombing of the city from the battleship Andrea Doria clarified the position of the Italian kingdom towards D'Annunzio. Finally, he resigned once it was clear that the Italian National Council agreed to the proposal of Cavaglia.

D'Annunzio left few days later and the demobilisation of the arditi fiumani started. The Army units left Fiume and the Carabinieri battalions stationed on the new borders of the Free State of Fiume.

The orders given to the Carabinieri clarified once again their role. As police force with military status, they should be ready to provide support to the Fiume local authorities and to verify that the formers soldiers leaving the city should not bring weapons and ammunitions coming back to Italy. A general amnesty provided free of movement of the former arditi fiumani and it was guaranteed the recognition of the time passed in Fiume valuable as national service.

²² The political violence continued beyond the D'Annunzio experience in Fiume, Giovanni Stelli, "Le elezioni dell'Assemblea costituente dello Stato libero di Fiume: ordine pubblico e lotta politica a Fiume dal 5 gennaio al 5 ottobre 1921", in *Qualestoria*, n. 2 (2020), 113-136.

Conclusions

The role of the Carabinieri in the very complex situation faced in Fiume was relevant. Coming there as police force inside the International Police Force, a small part of the entire contingent remained after the march of Ronchi when D'Annunzio took the power in the city on the Adriatic Sea against the willingness of the international community.

Captain Rocco Vadalà and his men continued to perform the normal tasks as a police force with military status providing “civilian” and military police. With regards of the hundreds of deserters, the Carabinieri looked to them with the spirit of duty. On the other hand, most of them committed many crimes creating a fracture with local population and especially with the Italian National Council who celebrates D'Annunzio and his legionary.

Some months after the Carabinieri under Vadalà orders decided to quit the city because of the political situation with D'Annunzio who refused to offer respect to the Italian king. The last word pushed the Carabinieri to leave Fiume, together with another contingent of Italian soldiers. At the border the fight started by the arditi who wanted to punish the Carabinieri because of their loyalty to the king of Italy and not to the Comandante D'Annunzio.


After few months, at the end of 1920, the Carabinieri came back with a regiment on three battalions in order to guarantee public order and the rule of law around Fiume now established as the Free State of Fiume.

The Carabinieri covered the same tasks they covered some decades later in the Balkans, guaranteeing the freedom of movement of persons and goods, the public order and the rule of law. In this regard, if we look to the period of D'Annunzio in Fiume, we could consider the Carabinieri presence as the only reliable force in the city against the arrogance and violence of the arditi; D'Annunzio declared them as the new *Uscocchi*, as his special pirates of the Adriatic Sea, recalling the real ones of few centuries before.


In this case, The Carabinieri demonstrated the skills and the strength to keep the point and maintain an environment where the Fiumani could see the real presence of the Italian willingness to guarantee freedom.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The Fiume City Plan before the First World War



Appendix 2: The Italian View of the Request Presented to the Allies
 at the end of WWI



“BLUFFING ON A COUPLE OF TWOS?”: ARMORED CARS IN THE JAFFA RIOTS, 1921

Dr. Gil BARNOLLAR (USA)

Palestine was one of Britain’s spoils of the Great War – General Allenby’s Christmas present to the British people in a difficult year, 1917. Taken from the crumbling Ottoman Empire, it remained under British control after the war and the ensuing negotiations among Arabs, Zionists, Britain, and France.¹ Prized for both its symbolic value as the birthplace of Christendom and its strategic position as a safeguard to the Suez Canal, Palestine was given to Britain under the authority of a League of Nations mandate.

But rising Arab nationalism soon ran headlong into the growing power of Zionism. The two communities found themselves contending for power in a state whose very future, as a mandate, was open to question. Though the Balfour Declaration had committed Britain to the fostering of a Jewish ‘National Home’ in Palestine, the exact nature of this new entity was far from decided. While some Arabs were willing to tolerate a country of roughly equal Jewish and Arab numbers and political power, fears of Jewish domination grew as Jewish immigration into Palestine surged in the early interwar years.

After their distinguished service with Allenby’s army, armoured cars were a natural addition to the British garrison in Palestine. Following the 1920 reorganization of the former units of the Machine Gun Corps, the 4th Armoured Car Company was posted to the Mandate, with its headquarters at Jerusalem. Equipped with eight Admiralty pattern Rolls-Royces and thirty-seven Ford light cars armed with Lewis guns, the company was usually compelled by the terrain to stick to the roads in Palestine.² But in Palestine, unlike in the Arab states to the south and east, the population was concentrated in the urban centers. When outbreaks of sectarian violence occurred, they usually took place in the Mandate’s cities, where the majority of the Jewish population lived.

¹ For an account of the diplomacy that led Palestine’s post-war status, see Martin Sicker, *Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831-1922*, (Westport, Connecticut, 1999), pp. 139-66.

² Lieutenant-Colonel C.D.V. Cary-Barnard, ‘The Tank Corps in Egypt and Palestine’, *Tank Corps Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 42, October 1922, p. 161.

Urban Peacekeeping

Riot policing and crowd control were and are missions detested by most soldiers. Lord Ironside undoubtedly spoke for the British Army as a whole when he said that 'for a soldier there is no more distasteful duty than that of aiding the Civil Power'.³ It was work that had to be done though, and done with a difficult mixture of speed and caution. As in all imperial policing tasks, constant stress was laid on the need to respond to revolt or disorder with the utmost speed. A veteran of the 1929 fighting in Palestine wrote, 'Looking back down the roadway of events, the point that stands out most clearly during the early days of the disturbances, is the immediate effect which the arrival of a handful of British troops had upon the excited inhabitants.'⁴

Despite fears of being trapped in narrow streets and overwhelmed by masses of rioters, armoured cars quickly came to be appreciated as extremely potent tools in quelling urban strife. The primary benefit was what was then called the 'moral effect': the armour and machine guns of the cars usually intimidated all but the most determined of civilians. Numerous accounts in newspapers, service journals, and the testimony of armoured car crewmen testify to this. An armoured car officer who faced sectarian violence in India said, 'Well, when they saw an armoured car they stopped. It was very effective. We never actually fired on them as such ... At least my troop didn't ... Things were burning and everything when we arrived. But they shut up like a shot just on the appearance and the thing quietened down.'⁵

Communal violence in Palestine, though intermittent and usually low level, began before the mandate was even firmly established, with the deaths of five Jews and four Arabs in April 1919.⁶ There was little the military could do about the occasional stabbing or shooting; large-scale fighting and rioting were where the Palestine garrison could earn its keep: 'When there was a riot going on we'd just blaze away with machine guns over their heads and it stopped. And we held on to vital posts and points of supply and things like that, and so that the two could not get together and make a little war of it.'⁷ Despite strict injunctions by Army regulations not to do so, at least one interwar Middle East armoured car veteran recalled that 'we would also carry

³ Quoted in Jeffery, 'The British Army and Internal Security 1919-1939', p. 377.

⁴ Captain A.W. Lee, 'Reflections on the Recent Disturbances in Palestine', *Army Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, April 1930, p. 45.

⁵ IWM transcript of interview with Colonel G.J. Kidston-Montgomerie of Southannan, reel 02, pp. 21-22.

⁶ Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, p. 80.

⁷ IWM transcript of interview with MSM Lewis Harold Porter Harper, reel 05, p. 56.

blank ammunition; we let off blank ammunition it didn't hurt anybody and as soon as they heard that they'd run.'⁸

Armoured cars were also important for their other moral effect, on the policemen they were aiding. There was a close link between armoured cars and the infantry in riot control, with the standard procedure being 'that the infantry covered the armoured cars so that the mobs didn't get too close to you. And you covered the infantry so that they didn't get over-run by the mobs themselves, covered them by fire if that was necessary.'⁹ Urban policing and riot control, therefore, reinforced the value of combined-arms operations and reminded mechanized soldiers that their machines were not invulnerable, even on a battlefield where most of the enemy combatants were unarmed.

British doctrine called for breaking up crowds: 'In all dealings with mobs it must be understood that a mob will never become dangerous or purposeful unless it has been formed some time. If a crowd can be kept moving and any small collections broken up, the formation of the crowd will be prevented.'¹⁰ There was, in theory, an orderly progression of steps, each increasingly aggressive. A captain who had served in riots in Shanghai explained how this worked for infantry on the scene: 'Intimidation, by the mere arrival and disciplined action of the platoon, may be sufficient in itself. This can be followed by the use of lachrymatory gas, followed by the use of batons, then the bayonet and lastly by fire, each and all under the *absolute* and *direct* control of the commander.'¹¹

There were those who argued that armoured cars could only be a bloody tool of coercion. Even some armoured car crewmen felt this way. Major General N.W. Duncan of the Royal Tank Corps, despite having spent some time with armoured cars, judged them 'virtually useless for crowd control ... its only offensive possibility is a gun. And if you're going to use guns on that scale then you are going to have something like the Amritsar Massacre all over again.'¹² Duncan termed the use of armoured cars in civil disturbances 'bluffing on a couple of twos'.

⁸ IWM transcript of interview with MSM Lewis Harold Porter Harper, reel 05, p. 55; on the strict ban on the use of blanks, see NA WO 279/468 – Duties in aid of the civil power 1929 and IWM *Military Training Pamphlet No. 11 (India), Notes on Training for Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1941*, p. 11.

⁹ IWM transcript of interview with Major-General K.C. Cooper, reel 03, p. 26.

¹⁰ Captain and Brevet-Major H.P. Radley, 'The Suppression of Riots', *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Volume 58, No. 250, January 1928, p. 33.

¹¹ Radley, 'The Suppression of Riots', p. 30. Indian doctrine, on the other hand, later stressed that fire and the threat of fire were to be relied upon, and that it was 'definitely wrong' to allow troops to come into physical contact with crowds; see IWM *Military Training Pamphlet No. 11 (India), Notes on Training for Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1941*, pp. 8, 10.

¹² IWM transcript of interview with Major General N.W. Duncan, reel 07, p. 84

Captain E.H. Grant wrote in the *Army Quarterly*: 'In times of civil disturbance personality and tact are often more effective than ruthless force, which often leaves unhealed scars behind it: the British private soldier is world famous for his cheery good-fellowship under the most trying conditions; to imagine a tank being tactful is merely humorous.'¹³ The reply, in the same pages, was that tact and humour, 'admirable as they are, are somewhat easier of exercise for a man with a good solid wall of steel between himself and the rioters, than for one standing unprotected in a street, disturbed and exasperated by stones and bottles flying past his head'.¹⁴

The Jaffa Riots of May 1921 came early in the Mandate's history and were a relatively serious threat to communal peace in Palestine. Thanks to the *Tank Corps Journal* there is a more complete account of the Jaffa Riots than of most similar events in Palestine, and, slightly biased though it may be, it shows the value of armoured cars in urban imperial policing.

The Jaffa Riots actually began as a clash between Bolshevik and Labour Party Jews; when the members of the Jewish Labour Party chased their communist co-religionists into mixed Arab and Jewish quarters, the Arabs thought they were under attack and launched themselves at both Jewish factions. The men of the 4th Armoured Car Company's headquarters and No. 1 Section had mostly been relaxing at the time, as 1 May was a Sunday. Some of the men were off in the city (Jerusalem) or the country, but the majority 'repartook of a siesta.'¹⁵ When the call came in from the Commanding Officer in Jerusalem at 3.20 pm, needless to say, the crews of the cars were not in parade ground attire, nor were they in much of a mind for combat. Nonetheless,

In eight and a half minutes from the receipt of the telephone message, three Rolls armoured cars and two Rolls tenders, fully armed and manned with wondrous crews, some men with and some without coats, one man in running shorts, a sergeant with only one puttee, a lance-corporal with his shirt outside where it should have been inside, and so on, pulled up outside the general's house.¹⁶

The telephone message had been garbled, and the officers and men of No. 1 Section had been under the impression that the trouble was in Jerusalem. Told they had to make the forty-mile drive to Jaffa as rapidly as possible, they

¹³ Captain E.H. Grant, 'Looking Ahead', *Army Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 1934, p. 44.

¹⁴ Captain E.W. Sheppard, 'Seeing Ahead', *Army Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, October 1934, p. 110.

¹⁵ 'The Jaffa Riots, May, 1921, as seen from an Armoured Car Officer's Point of View', *Tank Corps Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 51, July 1923, p. 77.

¹⁶ 'The Jaffa Riots, May, 1921', *Tank Corps Journal*, pp. 77-8.

were naturally dismayed. Led by a commanding officer wearing a cricket shirt, shorts, and blue and red soccer stockings, they set off with as much haste as possible. The drive to Jaffa, despite the excellent condition of the road, was anything but easy. The *Tank Corps Journal*'s anonymous correspondent related the journey of one of the tenders:

Except for about two miles, the road is downhill for nearly 15 miles; but interspaced at varying distances are a series of remarkable hairpin and double hairpin turns, guaranteed to give thrills to even the most initiated. It was one of the maddest drives imaginable, all accelerator and brakes and no happy medium, the crew hanging on for grim death, waiting spellbound for the impending crash that should have occurred about 40 times into donkey, camel or Jew's Ford, whichever might be the unfortunate one; however, it did not happen....¹⁷

Once into Jaffa, the quiet Rollsies sneaked into the middle of full-fledged street combat, and, with klaxons blaring and belts and pickaxe handles in the hands of the crewmen, set about dispersing the mob. The impact was immediate: 'It was ever so simple; the crowd just disappeared, like a shovelful of snow on a red-hot stove.'¹⁸ The cars spent the rest of the day roaming the city, dispersing crowds with physical force and the occasional warning burst of machine-gun fire, and arresting miscreants. There is disagreement about whether armoured cars or the infantry of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment were the first into Jaffa,¹⁹ it is clear that just a four-car section of the 4th Armoured Car Company had a dramatic effect in ending the unrest in Jaffa. The rioting flared up again the next day, and civil strife in the area would continue for the next two weeks, but the worst of the storm had been weathered.

The rapidity with which the cars could respond to trouble, amply demonstrated on 1 May, never flagged. Lieutenant Colonel C.D.V. Cary-Barnard, the Commanding Officer for the armoured cars of Egypt and Palestine, praised the vigilance of his crews in Palestine: 'They were always the first to be called upon in an emergency, and the last to be dismissed; and often, for weeks at a time, they "stood by" ready to turn out at five minutes' notice. Indeed, one section in Palestine had a sub-section "standing by" at five minutes' notice for over a year, and were frequently timed by their brigade commander for practice.'²⁰ In this type of action, where an immediate

¹⁷ 'The Jaffa Riots, May, 1921', *Tank Corps Journal*, p. 78.

¹⁸ 'The Jaffa Riots, May, 1921', *Tank Corps Journal*, p. 79.

¹⁹ See 'The Jaffa Riots: Communist Jews Start Trouble', *The Times*, 4 May 1921, p. 9.

²⁰ Cary-Barnard, 'The Tank Corps in Egypt and Palestine', p. 162.

response could often defuse a volatile situation, just 'a handful of troops' – or a pair of armoured cars – 'were more valuable than thousands a day late'.²¹

Palestine's armoured cars, possessed of a speed of response and radius of action far beyond that of any other available arm, had proved themselves uniquely valuable during the Jaffa Riots. The following year, armoured cars were a great aid in pre-empting sectarian violence, when an Easter pilgrimage of armed Arabs to Moses' supposed tomb, a procession that had caused bloodshed in the past, was shepherded by armoured cars and kept out of trouble.²² The Mandate would remain relatively calm for the next three years, before renewed riots and then, in 1929, open rebellion among the Arabs.

²¹ Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, p. 231.

²² 'No. 4 Armoured Car Company', *Tank Corps Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 39, July 1922, pp. 68-9.

THE ITALIAN ROYAL AIR FORCE AND STRATEGIC BOMBING IN THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT YEARS

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The First World War significantly accelerated the development of aviation, marking the birth of the modern concept of air power. Even today, the tasks of air forces conceptually have much in common with the roles and missions carried out during the Great War. What has evolved is technology, but the essence of an air force – that is, not just the capacity to fly but to plan and execute operations for military goals – was conceived during those years and in those skies.

If the Great War had a huge impact on the development of air power, on the other hand, the air forces did not play a decisive strategic role, however important their contribution may have been at the tactical level. Nevertheless, some key concepts were asserted, starting with the idea that air superiority was a crucial element in the conduct of military operations. The first air force to give formal concreteness to the new concepts, gaining the dignity of an independent armed force from the Army and the Navy, was the Royal Air Force in 1918.

Until the outbreak of the Great War, the debate on air power was not crucial to strategic thinking. Still, the war not only encouraged the quantitative and qualitative development of aviation but also provided the empirical basis on which schools of thought could develop. Then, it was strategic bombing against civilian infrastructures and populations that attracted the most public attention. Among the main proponents of air bombing supremacy in military strategy were the Italian Giulio Douhet, the American William ‘Billy’ Mitchell, and the British Hugh Trenchard. For each of them, the carnage produced by the First World War represented not only a deep blow to collective consciousness but also an excessive expenditure of resources, men, and money considering the new potential of the airplane. Specifically, all three concurred in their belief that this was even truer given the new potential unlocked by long-range bombing. Attacking from the sky represented an alternative and cheap solution to the loss of soldiers, especially in the historical period of the 1920s, characterized by a significant and widespread social and economic crisis.

Let’s focus on the Italian side. The first writings by Douhet on air power date back to 1910. However, it was with the famous *The Command of*

the Air (*Il Dominio dell'Aria*), first published in 1921 and then revised in 1927, that Douhet's thought had an important echo in Italy and abroad. Douhet believed that, with the rise of total war, there was no longer any distinction between military and civilians, between fighters and population. Since the war had become a clash between nations in which the belligerents employed all the resources at their disposal, the populations had turned into legitimate military targets. Moreover, as the Great War had shown, the armies were no longer able to come to a rapid conclusion overpowering the enemy on the battlefield. The key to future wars was therefore the airplane and, more precisely, the strategic bomber, which would not only save many lives – of the attacking nation, first of all –, but would also avoid useless waste of resources.

Douhet stressed that large bomber formations provided the means to direct vast attacks on industrial and population centers. Striking the morale of civilians at heart, even through the use of chemical weapons, and inflicting damage on key economic infrastructures would have caused the enemy country's will to fight to collapse. To achieve this goal, the air forces of the enemy had to be destroyed while they were still on the ground, thus obtaining air dominance if possible, not only superiority. Consequently, according to Douhet, governments should devote as many resources as possible to the development of air power, equipping themselves with a substantial fleet of long-range bombers. Hence, in his view, the activities of the Navy and the Army became subsidiary, if not even counterproductive in case they stole resources from aviation. This seemed to open up a new frontier in the conduct of war.

Actually, throughout the 1920s, despite air bombing being a significant part of the strategic debate, none of the great powers deemed it necessary to equip themselves with a large fleet of long-range bombers. A major factor contributing to this choice was technology. The swift progress of aircraft in terms of power and speed quickly made newer models obsolete, leading to a preference for producing only a few prototypes for on-demand manufacturing. This continuous evolution indicated a gradual increase in the vulnerability of heavier and slower aircraft, especially when fully loaded, like the long-range bomber. As technology progressed over the years, bombers increasingly depended on escort fighters for effectiveness.

Indeed, industrial investments primarily focused on engines to increase power, also in relation to the possible benefits that the improvement in speed and load capacity could have on the civilian sector. During the 1920s, the average power of an average fighter more than doubled. This growth had its effects in terms of speed and mainly altitude, while the performance of a bomber remained virtually unchanged. At the end of the day, preferences

leaned towards cheaper and more accessible short-to-medium range fighters and bombers. From a doctrinal perspective, the central role of the strategic bomber was thus undermined, making Douhet's proposed theory of war essentially unfeasible.

In the years after the conclusion of the First World War, air power was extensively employed by European countries like Britain, France, Spain, and Italy to quell insurgencies in their colonies. For example, the British used air bombing in Somaliland, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the French did the same in Syria and Indochina; the Spanish in Morocco; the Italians in Libya. The United States also used air power in counter-insurgency operations in Nicaragua and Mexico. Not different from what would happen between the 1990s and the early 21st century, air strikes in overseas territories were viewed as a swift and efficient solution that merged firepower and mobility in the battle against insurgents. This approach prevented governments from having to deploy large numbers of ground troops, a move that might not have been fully supported by public opinion, especially during periods of economic hardship.

However, the same public opinion had a very different attitude towards the possibility of massive bombings on European soil. During the 1920s, the possibility that enemy bombers could fly over national skies, attacking millions of unarmed civilians and destroying almost defenseless urban centers, contributed to creating apocalyptic scenarios. The development of aviation thus had two sides to the coin. The first was fascination. The airplane, both in its civilian and military form, was the image of the nation's modern and technological development, it was able to improve communications, facilitate overseas interventions and, ultimately, increase the country's prestige. On the other hand, if used in a war between great powers as an offensive strategic weapon, it could lead to the destruction of Western civilization itself.

Not by chance, one of the major concerns that emerged in diplomatic circles debating international disarmament was the threat that air warfare posed to civilian populations. Given what happened between 1914 and 1918, fears quickly solidified that an air bombing campaign was not just a 'simple' act of war. Instead, it could trigger a series of significant humanitarian backlashes due to the vulnerability of civilians. Diplomacy and the international community tried to deal with this danger throughout the 1920s, albeit with no success. Italy had an important role at the time, not only in strategic thinking. After Great Britain, it was the first great power in continental Europe to create an independent air force. The Italian Royal Air Force (in Italian, *Regia Aeronautica*) was born precisely one century ago, in March 1923. Although the pursuit of independence was a defining aspect of

aviation identity, this decision was part of Benito Mussolini's initiatives to bolster the modern image of the Fascist regime and to break away from previous governments. This was in line with the need to solidify domestic support in a situation of widespread political, social, and economic turmoil. The aeronautical myth, with its dynamism, vitality, and modernity, aptly embodied the Fascist rhetoric of necessary national renewal within the logic of order.

Mussolini had initially considered entrusting Douhet a prominent role within the newly born institution. The ties between the two had consolidated in 1921, the year of the first edition of *The Command of the Air*. In the autumn of 1922, when Mussolini came to power, Douhet was notably active in the Fascist newspaper *Il Popolo d'Italia*, where he presented his theories and argued that land and naval forces would be irrelevant in future wars. However, Mussolini eventually decided not to give him an institutional role as he concluded that he represented a figure too divisive and destabilizing in the balance among the military, especially in the eyes of the Navy. Indeed, the introduction of a third military force promoted by fascism challenged the equilibrium. The debate had two main points: the role of the auxiliary air forces that served the army and navy, and how financial resources for the military should be allocated. Of course, this was not an issue in Italy alone, but this is another story.

What is important is that, throughout that decade and beyond, Douhet's work would serve largely as a political benchmark in the discussion surrounding the Italian Air Force's role. While his theories were not fully adopted at a military level, they were instrumental in strengthening the air force's independence and stimulating discussions among the military. This was evident in the debate between Douhet and his colleague, Amedeo Mecozzi. Mecozzi articulated his ideas in the second half of the 1920s. He disputed the absolute effectiveness of strategic bombing, advocating for an assault aircraft capable of hitting even the smallest targets during low-level flights. This approach was more consistent with joint operations, leading many to view Mecozzi as a proponent of the tactical use of aircraft. To be honest, Mecozzi saw the strategic significance of air power, albeit with a less rigid perspective than Douhet.

Indeed Mecozzi, who was largely unfamiliar to his international contemporaries, agreed with Douhet on the necessity of a robust and independent air force for national defense. However, he stressed the need for synergy with the Navy and the Army in a comprehensive vision. This approach proposed that the three armed forces should operate on a cooperative basis to maximize each one's impact. Consequently, while Douhet's perspective was seen as an exclusive component of aeronautical identity,

Mecozzi's ideas suggested a different inclusive approach. And this approach was more favorable to collaborative planning within the newly formed Italian General Staff.

Italo Balbo, a prominent political figure who held from 1926 to 1934 the top positions at the Ministry of the Air – first Undersecretary, and then Minister –, argued that neither of these theories should be completely disregarded as each held its point.

Both Balbo and Mussolini envisioned an air force that was crucial in fostering national prestige. They understood that this image could not be achieved solely through individual endeavors, such as civilian records or sports competitions – think of the famous Schneider Cup. Collective ventures, aimed to highlight organizational superiority and the concept of teamwork, were necessary. Accordingly, the era of Italian 'cruises' was inaugurated in 1928. It began with the first cruise in the western Mediterranean and culminated in 1933 with the famous Transatlantic cruise to the United States. This successful venture led to Balbo's promotion to the rank of Air Marshal.

Balbo's 'seven-year tenure', as important as it was in consolidating the image of the Italian Air Force and shaping its identity, was a period of transition, conditioned – no differently from what was happening in France and Great Britain – by a limited availability of resources and the attempt to build an air doctrine, which was never really completed in Italy. Economically, the Italian industry leaned towards producing for civilian market demands, favoring orders for lighter aircraft. On the other hand, the prototypes for strategic bombers entailed very high costs for large-scale production, which was too burdensome for the government to handle.

Between 1927 and 1931, the Italian Joint Chiefs of Staff began discussing the broad strategy for a possible future war involving Italy, including the circumstances in which the Air Force would operate. Initially, between 1927 and 1929, the planning considered a conflict only on the eastern front against Yugoslavia. From 1929, with the increasing tensions with France and under Mussolini's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff started studying a possible conflict that would be fought simultaneously on two fronts - East and West.

Actually, the Italian peninsula was geographically exposed to possible strategic air raids, both from the enemies in the east – by Yugoslavia – and in the west – by France. As Balbo said in Parliament,

“Place a compass in Aosta or Trieste, in Rome or Syracuse or Brindisi, draw semicircles with a radius of three hundred or four hundred kilometers and you cannot include within this action radius of a

bomber aircraft, any truly significant demographic or industrial center of the nations that surround us. Do the same thing, placing your compass in Nice or Ajaccio, in Ljubljana, in Bizerte or in Kotor, and you will see that almost the entire surface of our territory is exposed to the air offense of an aircraft that can cover 350 kilometers one way and the same distance back.”

In practical terms, if Italy was in a conflict with France, the main target of an air offensive could have been Corsica. But, in their turn, French bombers in Corsica could easily have launched attacks on Rome. Another possible strategy could have been to disrupt French communication lines with the Mediterranean colonies, perhaps by using hydro-bombing. In any case, it is clear that France had a significant advantage due to the greater geographical vulnerability of Italian territory. As for Yugoslavia, although most of its aircraft were French-made, they were neither superior in number nor quality to Italy's fleet. As the Chief of the General Staff, Pietro Badoglio, stated, Yugoslavia was far behind Italy in terms of aircraft production.

Diplomatic discussions aimed at limiting the threat of air bombing culminated in 1932 at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva. There, the complete abolition of such tools in future wars was proposed by a number of delegations. The negotiations also sought to regulate the development of military aviation and supervise civilian aviation that could potentially be weaponized. However, all diplomatic efforts ended up unsuccessful for several reasons, including the inability to find common ground between the revisionist powers and France and Britain. In Balbo's opinion, these proposals posed a significant hindrance to the Italian Air Force as he was striving to elevate its status within the country.

Indeed, in Balbo's view, if air bombing was banned, it would have meant putting Douhet's war theory aside, which largely justified politically the existence of the Italian Air Force as an independent military force, mainly in public eyes. In the longer term, it would also have prevented Italy, as a poor nation, from having a cost-effective tool for deterrence and coercion, particularly considering the high expenses related to naval construction. Given the potential impact of air power at a political and military level, Balbo saw aviation as the most suitable means to increase Italy's strategic capabilities beyond its actual economic resources. In this way, aviation was seen as an instrument to compensate for Italian economic weakness in an increasingly competitive global strategic context.

The negotiations at the World Disarmament Conference collapsed quickly, much to Balbo's relief. This also marked the end of attempts to limit and reduce armaments globally. Balbo even became a central player in

diplomatic talks, thereby bolstering his influence both domestically and internationally. However, this success plus the very popular echoes of the Transatlantic cruise a few months later came at a price. In Mussolini's opinion, Balbo had become too powerful, and, according to the old principle of divide and rule, the Duce sent him to Libya as governor in 1934.

In the following years, the Italian Air Force faced severe challenges due to insufficient leadership, a weak industrial base and its involvement in overseas conflicts, overstretching its capabilities. At the outbreak of the Second World War, it was evident that the *Regia Aeronautica* was badly equipped for a full-scale war. Meanwhile, strategic bombing had become the domain of Great Britain and the United States with the consequences we all know.

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LES CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIQUES, POLITIQUES ET SOCIALES DE LA BATAILLE DE DAKAR 23-25 SEPTEMBRE 1940

Prof. Dr. Mor NDAO (Senegal)

Vers la fin des années 1930, Dakar constituait un enjeu géostratégique de premier ordre dans le dispositif colonial français. En effet, la ville avait ses caractères spéciaux : chef-lieu du gouvernement général, port militaire et marchand, port d'escale d'importance mondiale et premier port de transit de l'AOF, troisième port de commerce français à trafic intense après Marseille et le Havre, dépôt de combustibles, centre de lignes aériennes françaises et internationales à mi-chemin entre l'Amérique et l'Europe, point d'appui de la flotte de guerre, centre de défense terrestre. Tout cela faisait de Dakar un point tant convoité par les différents protagonistes. Aussi, la colonie constituait-elle un enjeu dès l'éclatement des hostilités et plus particulièrement après l'armistice qui divisa la métropole entre Gaullistes et Vichystes. Alors que pour Vichy, la loyauté des colonies s'avérait nécessaire notamment dans le cadre des négociations éventuelles avec les Allemands, pour la France Libre et De Gaulle, le contrôle d'une partie de l'Empire donnerait une souveraineté effective à son régime.

C'est dans ces conditions que De Gaulle se présenta au large de Dakar le 23 Septembre 1940. Ce que Jacques Mordal appelle «la bataille de Dakar» venait de commencer. Les hostilités vont durer deux jours, mais Dakar résista farouchement, persuadant De Gaulle de battre en retraite pour regagner Freetown au soir du 25 Septembre 1940. Les pertes matérielles et humaines furent lourdes : le bilan officiel, rapporté par le journal *Paris Dakar*, dans sa livraison du 26 septembre 1940, s'élevait à 175 morts et 350 blessés, alors que les sources officieuses faisaient cas de centaines de morts.

La bataille de Dakar entraîna des conséquences politiques (restriction des libertés, répressions, exécution des opposants), économiques (rationnement, blocus des Alliés, effort de guerre) et sociales (paupérisation, épidémies).

Le travail est structuré en deux grandes parties. La première analyse d'abord la « bataille de Dakar » (23, 24, 25 septembre 1940), ses enjeux, implications. La deuxième étudie les conséquences économiques, politiques et sociales de la « la bataille de Dakar ».

1. La bataille de Dakar Enjeux et Forces Impliquées dans la Bataille

A l'orée des années 1940, Dakar constituait un enjeu géostratégique de premier ordre dans le dispositif colonial français. En effet, la ville avait ses caractères spéciaux : chef-lieu du gouvernement général, port d'escale d'importance mondiale et premier port de transit de l'AOF, troisième port de commerce français à trafic intense après Marseille et le Havre, dépôt de combustibles, centre de lignes aériennes françaises et internationales à mi-chemin entre l'Amérique et l'Europe, point d'appui de la flotte de guerre, centre de défense terrestre. Tout cela faisait de Dakar un point tant convoité par les différents protagonistes.

La signature de l'armistice (25 Juin) et l'appel de Londres le 18 Juin 1940 du Général de Gaulle allaient diviser les milieux coloniaux entre partisans du Maréchal Pétain, collaborateur de l'occupant allemand et gaullistes adversaires de la capitulation. A Dakar, nombreux étaient les partisans de la Résistance.

Pour De Gaulle, la lutte de libération nationale dépassait le cadre métropolitain pour s'étendre jusqu'aux colonies qu'il fallait empêcher, coûte que coûte, d'être récupérées par Vichy et c'est précisément dans ce cadre que Dakar fut impliquée militairement dans la deuxième guerre.

Ainsi, dès le 7 Juillet 1940, un contre-torpilleur pro gaulliste fut refoulé à Dakar tandis que, le lendemain, le "Richelieu" fut attaqué et immobilisé dans le port de Dakar. Or, en ces moments, l'A.E.F, par la voix de Félix Eboué, rejoignait la résistance alors que Cayla, soupçonné d'être pro gaulliste, fut muté à Madagascar et remplacé par Pierre Boisson qui, bien que versatile et hésitant au début, finit par rejoindre Vichy.

Pour De Gaulle, le ralliement de Dakar à sa cause permettrait à la France Libre d'avoir des moyens matériels et humains pour continuer la lutte, mais aussi une assise territoriale et politique pour un Etat virtuel qui n'existait que sur du papier. Or le ralliement de l'AEF poussa les autorités de l'AOF à prendre des mesures préventives pour protéger ses bases contre toute attaque anglo-gaulliste. C'est dans ces conditions que De Gaulle se présenta au large de Dakar le 23 Septembre 1940 avec une coalition FNFL-anglaise face aux forces pro vichystes basées à Dakar.

Tableau 1 : France (forces alliées à Vichy)

Cuirassés :	Richelieu (ne pouvant appareiller)
Croiseurs:	Georges Leygues Montcalm
Contre-torpilleur :	Fantasque Malin l'Audacieux
Torpilleur:	le Hardi
sous-marin :	Persée Ajax Béveziers
Avisos :	Calais d'Entrecasteaux d'Iberville Commandant Rivière Gazelle la Surprise
Patrouilleur :	Air france I Air france III Air france IV

Forces Anglaises

Cuirassés:	Barham Resolution
Porte- Avion	Ark Royal
Croiseurs	Devonshire Cumberland Australia Delhi Dragon
Destroyers	Inglefield Faulknor Fortune Foresight Greyhound Fury
Patrouilleurs dragueurs de mines	Milford Bridgewater
Transports de troupes et de matériels :	Westernland (transportant le général De Gaulle) Pennland Ettrick Kenya Karanja Sobieski Anadyr Fort-lamy Neveda Casamance Belgravian pétrolier Ocean Coast

Forces Nationales de la France Libre (FNFL)

Avisos :	Savorgnan de Brazza Commandant Duboc Commandant Dominé
Patrouilleurs :	Président Houduce


Au petit matin, des avions britanniques survolèrent Dakar, jetant des tracts de sympathie et souhaitant le ralliement de l'AOF aux côtés des Alliés, de la France Combattante dans quatre heures, auquel cas serait exclu l'usage de la force matérialisée par cette importante flotte anglaise prête à entrer en action. Peu après, une corvette portant le drapeau blanc, conduite par le capitaine Thierry d'Argenlieu, se détacha de l'escadre aux fins de parlementer et, ce faisant, convaincre Boisson à se rallier. A peine arrivée, elle fut mitraillée, blessant le parlementaire qui se retira à la sauvette. Vers treize heures et devant le mutisme du gouverneur général après l'ultimatum, Dakar fut violemment bombardée par la flotte anglo-gaulliste commandée par le vice-amiral John Gunningham. Ce que Jacques Mordal appelle "la bataille de Dakar" venait de commencer. Les hostilités vont durer trois jours, mais Dakar résista farouchement, persuadant De Gaulle de battre en retraite pour regagner Freetown au soir du 25 Septembre 1940



Salves britanniques sur le Richelieu



Des obus de 380 anglais tombent dans le port



Sous marin le Bevéziers rentrant au port après avoir torpillé le Resolution





Charognards sur les ruines



Ruines de l'imprimerie du
gouvernement général, à Gorée

Les pertes matérielles et humaines furent lourdes : le bilan officiel, rapporté par le journal Paris Dakar, dans sa livraison du 26 septembre 1940, s'élevait à 175 morts et 350 blessés, alors que les sources officieuses faisaient cas de centaines de morts.



Exode de la population



Retour de réfugiés à la gare de Rufisque



Sauve qui peut de la population

2. Les conséquences

2,1 Les conséquences économiques La Crise alimentaire

2.1 La Consommation Indigène

Le régime africain se réduit, pour l'essentiel, en nourritures céréalières toujours monotones. En fait, le riz et le mil tiennent une place centrale dans la consommation indigène. Toutefois, avec la pénurie chronique de céréales principales, les autorités eurent recours aux céréales de secours (orge blé concassé,...) auxquelles devaient difficilement s'adapter les indigènes.


A- Les Céréales Principales

1- Le Riz

La ration fut réduite à 4,5 kg par mois en octobre et novembre 1941 (soit 150 g/jour) pour chuter davantage à 3 kg au mois de décembre. La tendance à la baisse va se maintenir en 1942. La ration, de 3 kg au mois de janvier fléchit à 2 kg en février, mars et avril. Le creux de la vague fut atteint à partir de mai 1942 jusqu'en juillet quand la ration fut fixée à 0,5 kg par mois. Un redressement est observé à partir d'août avec 1,5 kg, puis 3 kg de septembre à novembre avant de fléchir le mois suivant avec 2 kg.

L'année 1943 fut marquée par des variations incessantes : 2 kg en janvier, 1,5 kg en février jusqu'en juin, 3 kg en juillet et août. A partir de septembre, la pénurie devint chronique et l'administration dut supprimer les rations, le blé concassé étant substitué au riz à raison de 5 kg par mois. Un léger mieux fut enregistré en 1944 avec le retour aux rations de riz qui restèrent faibles, voire insignifiantes. Le retour effectif à la normale en 1946, maintint les rations entre 0,5 et 0,4 kg par personne et par jour.

Graphique 1 : Consommation Mensuelle de Riz à Dakar 1941-1943 (kg)



L'évolution de la consommation globale laisse apparaître un pic en 1941 avec 9 500 t ; c'est un record qui ne sera plus atteint. La courbe avec un pic en 1941 descend vite avant de s'écraser en 1942 pour atteindre son niveau plancher. En fait, la chute fut vertigineuse en 1942 avec environ le tiers de la consommation de l'année précédente avec 2 258,5 t. Un léger redressement s'opéra l'année suivante avec 3 600 t. La tendance, qui se poursuivra, certainement à cause de la levée du blocus, fut compromise par la croissance de la population. Celle-ci, de 138 154 hts (population civile) en 1942, atteindra 198 114 hts en 1943 du fait du renforcement des effectifs militaires. Les consommations mensuelles connurent des hausses à partir de 1944 (graphique 13). Dans tous les cas, la sous-consommation de riz fut largement compensée par une forte consommation de mil.

2- Le Mil

Le rationnement du mil débuta en 1941. La ration mensuelle, de 1 kg/mois, de janvier à avril 1942, fut portée à 3 kg/mois de septembre à novembre, période durant laquelle fut supprimée la ration de riz. De 1205 t en 1941 avec une moyenne mensuelle de 100,4 t, la consommation de mil passa à 8 600 t l'année suivante, soit une augmentation de 613 %. Après un fléchissement notable en 1943 avec 1599 t, s'amorça une nette remontée l'année suivante suivie d'une autre chute à partir de 1945. La consommation monte vite à partir de 1941 et culmine en 1942 avec une pointe vive ; puis elle descend vite avant de s'écraser en 1943 pour atteindre son niveau d'étiage. Toutefois, dès 1944, les bonnes récoltes au niveau du Sénégal et de la fédération font augmenter sensiblement les consommations comme du reste l'illustre le graphique ci-dessous.


D'une manière générale, le mil constitue une céréale de substitution au riz. Sa consommation devient importante en période de pénurie, ce que traduit l'allure de leurs courbes qui ont des évolutions inverses. En 1941, la forte consommation de riz occasionna une chute sensible de la consommation de mil. L'année d'après la surconsommation de mil fut consécutive à la pénurie de riz devenu introuvable au dernier trimestre de 1942. D'ailleurs, la persistance de la pénurie poussa les autorités responsables à recourir aux céréales de secours.

La consommation de mil

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
pénurie de riz devenu introuvable au dernier trimestre de 1942. D’ailleurs, la persistance de la pénurie poussa les autorités responsables à recourir aux céréales de secours.

Graphique 2: Consommation Mensuelle de Mil à Dakar 1941-1943(kg)




2.2 La Consommation Européenne

Graphique 3 : Consommation Mensuelle de Farine à Dakar 1941-1943 (kg)



Graphique 4 : Quantité de Viande Consommée à Dakar de 1938 à 1944 (kg)



D'une manière générale, deux périodes se dégagent. De 1938 à 1942 s'amorce une augmentation continue de la quantité de viande consommée à Dakar : 26,53 % entre 1938 et 1939, 26,79 % de 1939 à 1940, 26,98 % entre 1940 et 1941, 4,18 % de 1941 à 1942. Ainsi, de 1938 à 1942, la consommation de viande nette a plus que doublé. Par contre, à partir de 1942, la quantité de viande consommée enregistre une baisse en dépit de l'augmentation du nombre d'animaux abattus qui passe entre 1942 et 1943, de 83856 unités à 86301, soit une augmentation en valeur relative de 2,9 %.

Tableau 2 : Mouvements aux Abattoirs de Dakar de 1938 à 1944 (A.N.S. FDDD. Dossier 107)

Années	Nombre d'animaux	Quantité viande nette
1938	39.537	1.901.815 kg
1939	48.259	2.406.554 kg
1940	62.714	3.051.486 kg
1941	82.947	3.874.774 kg
1942	83.856	4.036.738 kg
1943	86.301	3.616.923 kg
1944	68.505	2.828.724 kg

Tableau 3 : Consommation de Sucre à Dakar 1941-1945 (en tonnes)


Années	Cons. Totale	Moy. mensuelle	Cons. maximale	Cons. minimale
1941	1760	146,6	Septembre: 172	
1942	1544	128,6	Août: 263	Avril : 98
1943	2 211	184	Août: 199,7	Février : 132,61
1944	1 512,7	126	Juillet: 198,5	Mai : 77,6
1945	1443	131		Janvier : 100,4 t

La consommation totale, de 1 760 t en 1941, enregistre une baisse de 12,27 % l'année suivante avant que ne s'amorce une nette remontée en 1943 vite remise en cause en 1944 et 1945. En fait, ni le ralliement, ni l'arrivée du sucre américain n'ont pu juguler la pénurie. D'ailleurs, jusqu'à la fin de l'année 1945, des arrêtés locaux vont procéder à la suspension sur tout le territoire de la Circonscription de Dakar et Dépendances, de la fabrication de sirops, bonbons, confiserie et de tout produit nécessitant l'emploi du sucre.

La courbe glisse en pente douce entre 1941 et 1942 avant de culminer l'année suivante du fait du ralliement à la France Libre qui va diminuer la tension au niveau des marchés. A partir de 1943, la courbe s'effondre pour atteindre son niveau plancher en 1944 avant de s'étaler sans ondulations

jusqu'en 1945. Les périodes de consommation maximale enregistrées en septembre 1942, en août 1943, août 1944 et juillet 1945 résultent des rations supplémentaires de 500 g attribuées pendant les mois de ramadan qui se singularisent par une forte demande de sucre.

Graphique 5 : Consommation Mensuelle de Sucre à Dakar 1941-1943 (kg)



Le Lait

Tableau 4 : Consommation de Lait en 1942 -1943

Années	Concentré sucré	Lait évap. non	Lait poudre	Moy. mensuelle	Totaux
1942	109.943	46.726	1452	13.177	158.121
1943	72.511	272.293	3736	29.045	348.540

Source : A.N.S, Fonds Délégation Dakar et Dép : Dossier 107 bis.

Le doublement de la consommation en 1943 résulte de la contribution des forces alliées avec les arrivages de lait américain. D'ailleurs à partir de septembre 1943, une détente s'amorce au niveau du rationnement. Dans ces conditions, les quantités de lait évaporé américain allouées mensuellement aux enfants d'origine ou de souche métropolitaine étaient fixées à 30 boîtes pour les moins de 3 ans, 20 boîtes pour les enfants de 3 à 5 ans et 15 boîtes de 5 à 13 ans. Toutefois, un fléchissement notable est observé en 1943 pour le lait concentré avec une baisse de 34 %.

L'Huile

Tableau 5 : Consommation d'Huile d'Arachide (en t) Dakar

Années	Cons. totale	Moy. mensuelle	Cons. maximale	Cons. minimale
1942	1978	247	Août: 286 t	Mai : 205,5 t
1943	3388	282	Juillet: 311	Novembre: 251
1944	687	307	Mai: 338	Février: 250
1945	34.03	309*	Août: 345	Juin: 278

Source : ANS, FDDD, Dossier 107 bis.

La consommation globale, après une progression de 71,2 % entre 1942 et 1943 se stabilise autour de 3 500 t environ jusqu'à la fin des hostilités. Ce qui est mis en exergue par l'allure de la courbe qui s'étale sur un long plateau à légères ondulations s'étirant jusqu'en 1945.

3. Les Conséquences Politiques

a. Blocus des Alliés et la Répression

Le blocus de la Royal Navy sur l'AOF eurent des répercussions fâcheuses sur l'approvisionnement de la Fédération en produits alimentaires et industriels. L'insécurité des océans du fait de l'état de guerre et le blocus de la Royal Navy sur l'AOF eurent des répercussions fâcheuses sur l'approvisionnement de la Fédération en produits alimentaires et industriels. Pourrait-il en être autrement pour une ville qui, comme Dakar, reste le symbole du gouvernement de Vichy en Afrique noire. Or, depuis la signature de l'armistice, le gouvernement britannique considérait le régime de Vichy et les colonies sous sa tutelle comme des territoires sous le contrôle de l'ennemi allemand. Dans ces conditions, les colonies, compte tenu de l'extrême précarité des transports maritimes aggravée par le blocus, devaient compter sur leurs propres ressources locales et ménager au maximum les stocks existants.

Il faudra attendre l'échec des anglo-gaullistes à Dakar pour se rendre à l'évidence des effets du blocus. Nous en trouvons d'ailleurs la confirmation dans une correspondance du président de la chambre de commerce de Dakar adressée au directeur des Services Economiques et dans laquelle il déplorait la rupture des relations maritimes avec Saïgon.¹ De toute évidence, les importations de riz indochinois vont enregistrer un fléchissement considérable avec 117 377 t en 1937 pour chuter à 36 741 t en 1938 avant de se redresser

¹ ANS, FDDD, Dossier 555 : Ravitaillement.

en 1939 avec 62 103 t.² La situation empira l'année suivante puisque aucune commande ne sera passée avec l'Indochine. Dans les faits, la guerre sous-marine, le blocus, l'élévation du fret désormais payé en dollars conjuguèrent leurs effets pour dissuader plusieurs navires. D'ailleurs, les arraisonnements et les captures vont se multiplier. C'est le cas notamment lorsque le 10 février 1941 le s/s Eridan en direction de Dakar fut capturé par les Anglais avec un chargement de 750 t; le s/s Desirade subira le même sort avec un chargement de 987 t le 20 août de la même année.³

Devant cette nouvelle situation, les autorités coloniales préconisèrent un repli dans la fédération et la relance du cabotage intercontinental afin de ravitailler Dakar à partir du Togo, de la Guinée, du Dahomey et de la Côte d'Ivoire. Dans tous les cas, la rupture de plusieurs sources d'approvisionnement entraîna un amenuisement des stocks et hypothéqua les possibilités de réapprovisionnement extérieur. En 1941, le blocus s'aggrava à telle enseigne que le Bureau Economique ne put s'empêcher de mettre en garde les autorités de la gravité de la situation. Il souligna en effet dans un de ses rapports que les « captures successives engagent à ne guère compter sur un nouvel approvisionnement en riz d'Indochine ou de Madagascar tant que durera la situation internationale actuelle ».⁴

Aux niveaux politique et syndical, tous les acquis démocratiques sont mis entre parenthèse : dissolution des partis politiques, des syndicats, des conseils municipaux, arrestation de juifs et des partisans de Cheikh Hamalla, d'opposants (Alfred Goux, maire de Dakar, le président de la Chambre de Commerce de Dakar, etc.). Ceux qui sont soupçonnés de résistants sont arrêtés et incarcérés, s'ils ne sont pas exécutés. Parmi les résistants fusillés à Dakar, on peut citer : Ngagne Diba, Idohou Albert, Wabi, Derwole Aloysinos

b. Les Conséquences Sociales

Tableau 6: Évolution des Prix à Dakar de 1941 à 1942⁵

Désignation des produits	1er trimestre 1941	3e trimestre 1942	Pourcentage d'augmentation
Pain	4,50 F	5F	11,11 %
Vin	4,35	11,35	160,91 %
Sucre	7,75	11,65	50,32 %
Riz ordinaire	2,80	4,50	60,71 %

² ANS, FDDD, Dossier 8 : Ravitaillement.

³ ANS, 2G 41/37, CDD : Rapport sur l'activité du Bureau Economique 1941.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ ANS, FDDD, Dossier 107.

MU (le kg)	2	3,35	67,5%
Percalle	6	20,70	245%
Sandales	45	157	248,88 %
Chaussures indigènes (fabrication locale)	27,50	125	354,52 %

Si la hausse a été moindre pour le pain, elle a été plus sensible pour le sucre, le riz et le mil avec des pourcentages d'augmentation oscillant entre 50 et 70 %. Le litre de vin a enregistré une hausse vertigineuse de 162 % du fait de l'occupation de la métropole, principal fournisseur. Les augmentations record sont notées au niveau du mètre de percale et des sandales qui ont vu leur prix plus que tripler alors que les chaussures locales ont failli quintupler. Pourtant, les salaires ne suivirent guère la flambée des prix. Les salaires s'écrasent pendant la montée des prix.

Tableau 7 : Coût Normal de la Vie à Dakar (Européens)

Années	Célibataire	Ménage sans	Ménage avec 1	Ménage avec 2 enfants
1938	20 220 F	27 410 F	32 525 F	35 640 F
1944	74 150 F	102 360 F	124 000 F	138 435 F
Augmentation de 1938 à 1944	256%	273,44 %	281%	288,4 %

Tableau 8 : Coût Normal de la Vie à Dakar (indigènes)

Années	Célibataire (A)	Couple (B)	Couple+1* (C)	Couple+2 (D)	SMO (E)
1938	100	100	100	100	100
1939	125	126	127	128	114
1940	165	167	169	171	129
1941	197	202	206	209	143
1942	243	252	257	260	214
1943	306	314	321	326	171
1944	358	360	367	372	254

NB * Couple avec un enfant; SMO : Salaire minimum obligatoire

Tableau 9: Salaire Minimum Obligatoire à Dakar 1938-1943

Années	E/A	E/B	E/C	E/D
1938	100	100	100	100
1939	91	90	90	89
1940	78	77	76	75
1941	73	71	69	68
1942	88	85	83	82
1943	56	54	53	52
1944	71	71	69	68

Sources: 2 G44 /19; I. Thioub, op cit

Le coût de la vie a été établi sur la base de la formule recommandée par le Bureau du Travail, à savoir les denrées, le chauffage, l'éclairage, l'eau, la glace, le logement, les divers (personnel domestique, entretien, soins corporels, distraction, impôts). Entre 1938 et 1944, le coût de la vie augmenté de 274 % chez les Européens contre 264 % chez les indigènes (258,43 % chez les célibataires, 259,75 % pour les ménages sans enfant, 267,39 % pour les ménages avec un enfant et 271,49 % pour le couple de deux enfants soit en moyenne 269 % pour les deux groupes confondus. D'une manière générale, le décrochement du coût de la vie par rapport aux salaires des indigènes dakarois allait entretenir une sous-alimentation et une malnutrition qui concourent à péjorer davantage leurs conditions de vie.

Conclusion

La principale conséquence de l'échec des anglo-gaullistes à Dakar fut le renforcement du blocus et la généralisation des mesures de rationnement tandis que sur le plan politique le régime de Vichy se durcit avec la suppression de toutes les libertés acquises sous le Front Populaire. En fait, alors que le blocus des Anglais s'exerçait sur Dakar (multiplication des arraisonnements et des captures de navires), les réserves constituées par les commerçants s'épuisèrent et les possibilités de réapprovisionnement, résultant des relations autrefois fréquentes avec la métropole, devinrent quasi inexistantes.

Aux niveaux politique et syndical, tous les acquis démocratiques sont mis entre parenthèse : dissolution des partis politiques, des syndicats, des conseils municipaux, arrestation de juifs et des partisans de Cheikh Hamalla, d'opposants (Alfred Goux, maire de Dakar, le président de la Chambre de

Commerce de Dakar, etc.). Ceux qui sont soupçonnés de résistants sont arrêtés et incarcérés, s'ils ne sont pas exécutés. Parmi les résistants fusillés à Dakar, on peut citer : Ngagne Diba, Idohou Albert, Wabi, Derwole Aloysinos, etc. La reprise des activités politiques ne fut effective qu'en 1943 suite au ralliement de l'AOF aux Forces Alliées et l'arrivée massive de militaires américains à Dakar qui améliorèrent la situation alimentaire sans pour autant endiguer la pénurie qui, d'ailleurs, se poursuivra à bien au-delà du second conflit mondial.

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